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Preface
This is Volume 2 of the study ‘Strategies to Support South African Smallholders as a Contribution to 
Government’s Second Economy Strategy.’ It contains the accounts of the 16 case studies that com-
prised the main ‘data’ for the analysis presented in Volume 1. However, beyond their function of 
supporting the analytical exercise presented in Volume 1, as a group these case studies have a life of 
their own as a rich and diverse repository of descriptive and interpretive narratives depicting various 
types of smallholders in diverse circumstances and environments.
Although the case studies respond to a common fieldwork methodology (see Appendix 1 of Volume 
1), and although some guidelines were offered to the authors as to how to structure the write-ups, 
the researchers were given the latitude to deviate from the ‘standardised approach’, and so many 
case studies follow a near-identical structure but a number do not. The work in this volume reveals 
the authors’ different styles, different emphases, and indeed different disciplinary strengths.  The 
‘unit of analysis’ also differs across case studies: some are studies of single individuals, others focus 
on particular schemes or projects, and still others involve a comparative analysis of individuals or 
projects. 
Thought was given to the categorising of case studies in some meaningful way (e.g. by type of en-
terprise) or to sequencing them in some telling fashion (e.g. along a continuum from ‘subsistence’ to 
‘commercial’). However, the complexity of the case studies compelled us to abandon this idea: many, 
if not most, smallholders combine different types of activities, often dynamically, and while one can-
not deny that there is a distinction between ‘subsistence’ and ‘commercial’ modes of production, it 
is very difficult to ‘peg’ actual case studies to a clearly-defined continuumt.
Therefore the case studies are merely grouped by province, with provinces sequenced very roughly 
from southwest to northeast. It should be noted, however, that the larger study makes no attempt 
to achieve ‘national representivity’ (thus, regrettably, there are no case studies from Northern Cape, 
Free State or Mpumalanga), although the case studies do address a wide breadth of agro-ecological 
zones and production systems.
vi
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Introduction
This case study provides a comparative analysis 
of two different initiatives designed to promote 
the smallholder sector in metropolitan Cape 
Town.
The City of Cape Town has developed an urban 
agriculture policy and initiated a joint venture 
between itself, the Provincial Department of 
Agriculture and private sector partners to put 
in place a fresh produce market in the Philippi 
area. The objective of the market is to provide 
the “suction force to enable the establishment 
of more than 2 500 emerging farmers and the 
development of more than 5 000 hectares of 
farmland over a five-year period in the Philippi 
and Cape Flats area” (Provincial Government of 
the Western Cape, 2006).
Abalimi Bezekhaya is an NGO with over 20 years 
of experience in supporting homestead growers 
and group gardens. It has focused on developing 
a comprehensive range of services to promote 
and ‘push’ small farmers to find their place in 
a production continuum encompassing survival-
ist, subsistence, livelihood and commercial scales 
and modes of production. Abalimi supplies small 
farmers with inputs and infrastructure, provides 
technical advice and institutional support, and 
recently introduced a planned production and 
marketing process known as the Harvest of 
Hope.
We examine what is involved in these differ-
ent initiatives which aim to pull or push small 
growers into production and the market place. 
We profile the Philippi fresh produce market ini-
tiative and the services provided by Abalimi. We 
examine the three groups which Abalimi char-
acterise as their most successful. In the process 
we assess what must be put in place to develop 
an enabling environment for a more vibrant 
and sustainable urban agriculture sector which 
enhances household food security and gener-
ates livelihood opportunities at different points 
along the value chain and identify lessons for 
improved policy and practice.
Context
The Western Cape is the second most urbanised 
province in South Africa (89% of the population 
is designated as urban), second only to Gauteng 
(for which the figure is 97%). According to the 
HSRC, it is also the province that experienced 
the fastest rate of annual population growth in 
the country between 1996 and 2001, at 2% per 
annum (Kok, O’Donovan, Bouare, and van Zyl, 
2003). During this period the Western Cape ex-
perienced the highest net in-migration of met-
ropolitan areas in South Africa, which accounted 
for approximately 58% of population growth 
within the City. The rapid growth of the City is 
associated with the urbanisation of poverty.
1 Abalimi Bezekhaya 
and the Philippi Fresh 
Produce Market initiatives: 
contrasting attempts to 
stimulate smallholder 
agriculture in metropolitan 
Cape Town
Rick de Satge, Phuhlisani Solutions
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The 2003 Provincial Growth and Development 
Strategy, iKapa Elihlumayo, highlights the con-
centration of extreme poverty in the province’s 
urban centres. It observes that in the Western 
Cape, unlike many other parts of South Africa, 
the cities are where the poor live while the rural 
areas are home to many of the wealthy.
In the Western Cape 57% of households earn 
less than R3500 per month, and of those more 
than half earn less than R1500. This economic 
profile means that “the majority of the popu-
lation generally cannot afford service charges, 
let alone meeting home ownership obligations” 
(Department of Local Government and Housing, 
2007: 25).
Smallholder agriculture as a poverty 
reduction strategy
In a context characterised by acute urban pov-
erty, the low levels of skill of many of those in 
poverty and high levels of unemployment, dif-
ferent approaches have been taken to try to 
stimulate small-scale agriculture within the City 
on the assumption that it represents a viable 
poverty reduction and livelihood strategy. In-
terventions to grow small-scale agriculture take 
different forms. They range from policy formu-
lation and investment in infrastructure develop-
ment projects through to small-scale support ini-
tiatives providing a complete basket of services 
and facilitated market access.
At one end of the continuum, the City of Cape 
Town has developed an urban agriculture policy 
and invested R35 million in a fresh produce mar-
ket in Philippi in a joint venture with the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and private sector partners. 
However, this investment and infrastructure-led 
approach shows few signs of securing a return 
on investment in the short term, as many of the 
small-scale farmers which the market is sup-
posed to serve have either yet to ‘emerge’ or are 
not yet a viable productive force. Overall, there 
remains a significant gap between the assump-
tions of policy and the complex realities which 
characterise small-scale production initiatives on 
the ground. 
These ‘complex realities’ are highlighted by the 
experience of Abalimi Bezekhaya (“Planters of 
the Home”), a registered Non Profit Organisa-
tion (NPO) founded in 1982 which provides sup-
port services such as supply of low-cost bulk 
compost, seed and seedlings, training and on-
site project extension to groups and individuals 
in townships and informal settlements. Abalimi 
is based at the Business Place in Philippi, Cape 
Town. It runs two non-profit People’s Garden 
Centre’s in Nyanga and Khayelitsha, which an-
nually supply agriculture and horticulture inputs 
to an estimated 2000 to 3000 home-based sur-
vivalist and subsistence gardeners and approxi-
mately 200 community agriculture and greening 
projects on public land.
With the introduction of their Harvest of Hope 
marketing initiative in 2007, Abalimi have begun 
to provide an ‘outgrower’ model through which 
groups and individuals are contracted to grow 
organically grown but uncertified vegetables. 
These are harvested weekly and are sorted and 
packed into vegetable boxes which are delivered 
to collection points where they are picked up by 
suburban consumers who sign up for the service. 
Abalimi provides these groups with comprehen-
sive services and support as well as a significant 
subsidy to enable them to begin to access the 
market.
The methodology
The preparation of this case study has involved 
the following elements:
• A rapid review of the literature on urban ag-
riculture internationally with particular ref-
erence to Africa;
• A review of the documentation informing 
the development of the urban agriculture 
policy of the City of Cape Town;
• A semi-structured interview with Stanley 
Visser, an official in the City of Cape Town’s 
economic development unit who has overall 
responsibility for urban agriculture policy de-
velopment and support;
• Telephonic and e-mail follow-up with stake-
holders involved in the Philippi Fresh Pro-
duce Market.
• Attendance of an introductory Harvest of 
Hope tour involving a visit to the Eden gar-
den in Khayelitsha and a tour of the pack 
house facility and surrounds at the Business 
Place in Philippi;
• An interview with five members of Abalimi’s 
field support team;
• Three separate interviews with members 
of the Fezeka, SCAGA and Eden producer 
groups.
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The contribution of urban 
agriculture to the livelihoods 
of the poor
Researchers have attempted to disaggregate 
the different ways in which poor urban dwellers 
engage in food production. They highlight the 
following dimensions (Ellis and Sumberg, 1998):
• Farming activities on public and private land 
which is often in conflict with planning and 
land use management regulations in cities
• Personal strategies by women to develop in-
dependent livelihood streams
• Contributions to household food security
0 as a substitute for cash food purchases
ο as a means of supplementary income
ο as a commercial rather than a subsistence 
activity
Research also highlights the importance of dis-
tinguishing the different categories of land on 
which this production takes place, including:
• Home plots or gardens; 
• Cultivated or grazed areas that are apart 
from the household on public land;
• Cultivated or grazed areas apart from the 
household on private land;
• Peri-urban cultivation or grazing.
It has been argued that the keeping of livestock 
and growing of crops can make a significant con-
tribution to the livelihoods of the urban poor. 
These have been characterised as “hidden liveli-
hoods,” based on the premise that many natu-
ral resource-based livelihood activities “are not 
recognised, or are overlooked, in assessments of 
urban livelihoods” (Slater and Twyman, 2003). 
It should be noted that in South Africa and par-
ticularly in Cape Town (see below), urban ag-
riculture policy, where it exists, often rests on 
the assumption that recent migrants to the City 
will be those who opt for agricultural livelihood 
opportunities. This runs counter to research evi-
dence from the rest of the continent which indi-
cates that “established urban dwellers are more 
likely to be involved in agricultural activities 
than new arrivals from the countryside” (Sanyal, 
1986, 1987; Freeman, 1991; Sawio, 1994 in Ellis 
and Sumberg 1998). This research concludes that 
the ability “to command land access” is much 
more significant than recent agricultural experi-
ence, and that recent arrivals are at a disadvan-
tage in this respect.
Urban agriculture in Cape Town
The importance of the potential of urban ag-
riculture features in numerous spatial and de-
velopment planning frameworks developed for 
the metropolitan area. The rural management 
framework for the City of Cape Town (SetPlan 
and Practiplan, 2002) emphasises the importance 
of protecting established and emerging farming 
areas in and around the City, and the opening 
up of opportunities for new and emergent farm-
ers. 
The long-term Metropolitan Spatial Develop-
ment Framework (City of Cape Town, 2005) 
highlights the need to consolidate and expand a 
regional system of urban agricultural complexes. 
Currently, the Philippi Horticultural Area (PHA) 
and Joostenberg Vlakte are the only examples 
of such complexes. The spatial framework envis-
ages that:
“A regional system of these, extending 
beyond Cape Town’s current boundaries will 
ensure the ongoing sustainable production of 
food for the City, provide important income-
generating opportunities for new arrivals to 
the City whose only income-generating skills 
are often limited to agricultural activities and 
provide a new way of addressing housing, 
economic and land restitution issues while 
at the same time safeguarding key parts of 
the City’s agricultural resource base”. (City of 
Cape Town, 2005: 5)
As noted above, the conception which envisages 
agriculture as offering opportunities for new ar-
rivals in the City runs counter to research find-
ings which indicate that it is often long estab-
lished urban residents with stronger social and 
political networks who are best placed to make 
use of urban agricultural opportunities. 
In the metropolitan area agricultural land is con-
centrated to the north-east along the Tygerberg 
Hills, to the south-east around the Helderberg 
Mountains and to the south around Constantia 
and Hout Bay. Continued low-density residential 
expansion into these areas is placing pressure on 
remaining good soils and agriculture. The Philip-
pi horticultural area situated to the south of the 
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Map source: http://planet.uwc.ac.za/nisl/Conservation%20Biology/Conservation_CCT/rural_plan_for_ CAPE% 
20Town.pdf
Figure 1.1: Map of different land uses in the Cape Town 
metropolitan area
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City of Cape Town is also under threat from ur-
ban expansion. 
The map on the following page highlights dif-
ferent land uses in Cape Town. 
Agricultural land in Cape Town is also increas-
ingly threatened by a mix of illegal dumping 
and occupation of public and private land to 
establish informal settlements. A number of 
constraints have been identified which currently 
limit the growth and livelihood potential of ur-
ban horticulture and livestock keeping. These 
include (City of Cape Town, 2008):
Conflicts of interest between livestock keepers 
and City officials (livestock keepers benefit from 
grazing their livestock on open land adjacent to 
where they stay in that they do not pay graz-
ing fees and remain in close proximity to local 
markets);
• Lack of data on urban farming activities in 
the area;
• Insufficient agricultural knowledge and 
skills amongst urban farmers;
• Lack of access to and affordability of water;
• Availability of suitable land;
• Very weak linkages to the commercial agri-
cultural sector in terms of supplies, market-
ing and sharing of opportunities;
• Low level of alignment and coordination 
between all main role-players;
• Lack of tools and production inputs.
Production in the City
Stats SA Agricultural Census of 2002 indicates 
the extent of vegetable production within the 
City of Cape Town. However, a reliable profile 
of who is actually growing and marketing this 
produce does not appear to be available. 
The Philippi horticultural area (PHA)
A recent situation analysis for the MDP/Philippi 
Agricultural Project (City of Cape Town, 2008) 
surveyed and assessed urban agricultural activi-
ties in the Philippi area between the R300 and 
Lansdowne Road. The Philippi Horticultural Area 
(PHA) totals 3074 hectares in extent, however 
currently only 60% (1800 hectares) of the po-
tentially productive land in the PHA is used to 
produce vegetables. Growers mainly supply the 
Epping Market and/or grow on contract to chain 
stores. Currently it is estimated that about 2000 
people are (self-) employed in the PHA in vary-
ing capacities. 
It is in this area that the Philippi Fresh Produce 
Market has been constructed (see below) and 
where Abalimi Bezekhaya has its offices in the 
Philippi Business Place – one of eight centres 
supported by Investec to grow small business in 
South Africa and Botswana. In Philippi, Investec 
has partnered with the American Tobacco Com-
pany, Abalimi Bezekhaya, and the Sustainability 
Institute. Investec acquired 11 hectares of vacant 
land around a defunct cement factory and seeks 
to develop the area into a site which will com-
Table 1.1.: Overview of vegetable production in Cape Town, 
2002
Type of vegetable Planted (Ha) Production (tons)
Potatoes 489 12 274
Tomatoes 85 2 949
Cauliflower 194 4 768
Cabbage 465 19 113
Onions 115 2 559
Beetroot 38 522
Carrots 548 17 189
Sweet potatoes 15 121
Green beans 183 1 213
Pumpkins 117 1 942
Other 1 386 34 248
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bine housing and urban agricultural opportuni-
ties. Currently (2008) the plan is to sell or lease 
small plots to local growers for income-gener-
ating cropping initiatives and subsistence food 
gardening programmes.
The urban agriculture policy process
The development of an urban agriculture policy 
for the City of Cape Town has taken over five 
years to be approved – partly a reflection of the 
changing political character of successive munic-
ipal administrations and the ongoing restructur-
ing associated with the adoption of a unicity in 
September 2000.
An additional complication was that the Consti-
tution of South Africa does not list agriculture as 
a function of local government and, “therefore, 
a lot of motivation and lobbying was necessary 
during the consultative process to convince city 
council decision makers that the development 
of urban agriculture should be viewed as part 
and parcel of poverty alleviation and economic 
development, which are the concurrent respon-
sibility of all spheres of government” (Visser, 
2006).
The City of Cape Town hosted the first ‘Urban 
Agricultural Summit’ on 8-9 May 2002 in order 
to initiate the process of formulating an urban 
agricultural policy for the City of Cape Town. 
This included an attempt to determine the 
current status of urban agriculture in the City, 
which was characterised as a “superficial assess-
ment” (Visser, 2006).
The following year, the City hosted the a follow-
up summit, on 18-20 June 2003, at which it in-
troduced the draft urban agriculture policy, dis-
cussed livestock keeping in the City, and sought 
to identify urban agricultural opportunities in 
the City. 
The period between the second summit and the 
final adoption of the policy in March 2007 ap-
pears to have largely been spent securing politi-
cal approval in a fiercely contested council envi-
ronment. The City of Cape Town claims to be the 
first city in South Africa to have developed an 
urban agriculture policy. This has four overarch-
ing goals:
• To enable the poorest of the poor to utilise 
urban agriculture as an element of their sur-
vival strategy (household food security)
• To enable people to create commercially sus-
tainable economic opportunities through 
urban agriculture (jobs and income)
• To enable previously disadvantaged people 
to participate in the Land Redistribution 
for Agricultural Development (LRAD) pro-
gramme in attempts to redress imbalances
• To facilitate human resources development 
(technical, business and social skills train-
ing).
The City of Cape Town distinguishes between 
four different types of operations:
• Home producers – home dwellers using 
their own gardens to grow vegetables and/
or keep animals on a small scale in order to 
supplement the family diet
• Community groups – a group of people who 
produce food collectively for themselves or 
for a community institution, mostly on pub-
lic land
• Micro-farmers – individuals or groups of 
people involved in urban agriculture to 
generate an income on small pieces of unu-
tilised (private or public) land
• Small emerging farmers – individuals or 
groups of people who are or aspire to be 
full-time farmers 
While community groups can count on various 
types of assistance, home producers are support-
ed only with small tools, basic production inputs 
and some extension services; excluded is assist-
ance with acquiring access to land or infrastruc-
ture as the Municipal Finance Management Act 
(MFMA) states that municipal capital may not be 
used to improve private assets (such as private 
land) (Visser, 2006).
The policy sets out to (City of Cape Town, 
2007b): 
• include urban agriculture in land use man-
agement and physical planning
• create linkage with other strategies
• establish urban agricultural consultative fo-
rums
• build strategic partnerships
• release municipal land for urban agricul-
tural purposes
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• provide subsidised water to vulnerable 
groups
• develop a specific strategy for livestock 
keeping in the City
• introduce a support programme for urban 
agriculture
• integrate urban agriculture into commercial 
agricultural industry
• provide assistance for urban agricultural 
practitioners. 
The policy was designed to align different de-
partments within the municipality in order to 
develop a common approach to urban agricul-
ture rather than a joint programme framework 
which simultaneously aligned the City with the 
key provincial and national government depart-
ments responsible for agriculture, land and wa-
ter. In the City’s conception, a “formal policy will 
lay the legal basis for collaboration between all 
municipal departments on the issue of urban 
agriculture and will ensure each department’s 
undisputed commitment; and it will eliminate 
the need to rely on the goodwill or preferences 
of individuals” (Visser, 2006). However the City’s 
urban agriculture coordinator acknowledged 
that “our point of departure was that urban ag-
riculture should be a good thing without doing 
a lot of research on what is the status quo” (per-
sonal communication, S. Visser, 2008). 
Overall information on the nature and extent of 
agricultural activity in the City remains patchy. 
While the co-ordinator has “…pockets of infor-
mation on livestock and …to a certain extent on 
garden groups…, I don’t have a total picture on 
what exactly is going on in the City (ibid).
Implementation challenges
A number of practical and institutional con-
straints limit the effective implementation of 
the policy. In terms of capacity and co-ordina-
tion, the City’s urban agriculture co-ordinator 
stated the following: 
“With the Provincial department of 
Agriculture we are linking up with them on a 
local level but it is difficult. We talk the same 
language but when we hit the ground we 
just float apart again.
“Agriculture, they can give extension 
support – they can talk – but the moment you 
want something more than that, it is a long 
process. You have to start an application for 
something and the decision-making process 
is too long and that is why we drift apart. 
They can talk with you but then when they 
go back it takes forever. Then when you 
stay on their case they disappear on you. I 
can understand they can’t take decisions 
immediately but it is a problem.
“Three years ago DLA approved that the City 
could purchase commonage. It is now three 
years later. I have given them 10 farms to 
consider but it has still not happened. The 
budget is there but it still has not happened. 
I think the process is too cumbersome.
“All these civil servants they have meetings all 
the time and they make people despondent 
because nothing happens. What I am saying 
is that we know what the challenges are and 
we know what the opportunities are. Now 
we need to get our processes right” (ibid).
Until recently, urban agriculture responsibilities 
in the City were scattered between different 
departments within the City and the Provincial 
administration but with very little co-ordination 
between them. At a recent strategic planning 
session it was proposed that the City needed 10 
people to staff a mature unit promoting and 
supporting agriculture in the City of Cape Town. 
Currently the City of Cape Town has just less 
than the equivalent of one full-time post work-
ing to promote and develop urban agriculture. 
However, they recently received approval to ap-
point an urban agriculture assistant and a pro-
fessional officer for urban agriculture. The post 
was advertised in March and people were inter-
viewed in July. However by August 2008 no ap-
pointments had yet been made.
There has been some discussion about the crea-
tion of a Special Purpose Vehicle tasked with 
agricultural promotion and support. One of 
the perceived advantages of such a unit is that 
it would not be bound to comply with the pro-
curement processes of the City. 
A second issue is competing land needs:
“Overall urban agriculture is not regarded as 
a priority by planners or by the majority of 
people settling in the City. While settlement 
planning frequently allocates land for 
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gardens this tends to be restricted to the 
conceptual phase but when you get there 
you find that there are just houses. The 
pressure to find land for settlement tends to 
trump other land uses. In cases where land 
was allocated for gardening this is usually 
taken up by adding additional rooms or 
backyard dwellings” (ibid).
And a third issue is the tension between regu-
lation and informality. The City has identified 
different categories of livestock owners in the 
townships and informal settlement areas. Peo-
ple with larger herds are often local business 
people with diverse livelihood sources who, the 
City argues, can absorb the transport costs asso-
ciated with raising livestock on land outside the 
City. However the City has also identified many 
small-scale livestock owners who cannot afford 
such costs: 
“At the moment it does not cost anybody 
anything to raise livestock in the City. Most 
stockowners don’t buy food or anything so 
now when you come to the commonage you 
have to pay a grazing fee. Or if you go to 
the community kraal which is based on the 
principle of zero grazing you will have to 
buy food so then it becomes less profitable. 
Accordable to the health regulations the 
informal meat trade is not allowed. Likewise 
you are not allowed to sell raw milk in the 
City” (ibid).
The Philippi Fresh Produce 
Market – a ‘suction force’?
Despite a low base of information and inad-
equate support systems in place, the City of 
Cape Town entered into a joint venture with the 
Western Cape Department of Agriculture and 
MBB Consulting Engineers to put in place a new 
R34 million Philippi Fresh Produce Market. The 
‘Philippi Market’ officially opened for business in 
November 2006. 
According to the Department of Agriculture, 
“the market is supposed to create the ‘suction 
force’ for the establishment of more than 2 500 
emerging farmers and the development of more 
than 5 000 hectares of farmland over a five-year 
period in the Philippi and Cape Flats area.” The 
MEC for Agriculture stated that, “We cannot al-
low ‘land to lie fallow’. We need to utilise the 
land and unleash this productive asset to feed 
our families and communities, create employ-
ment and contribute towards economic growth 
and development of local and rural economies. 
We need to involve our young people who are 
jobless to roll up their sleeves and go to the 
fields. We want to say to them agriculture is 
cool!” (Provincial Government of the Western 
Cape, 2006).
The Philippi Market set targets to secure 75% of 
its supply from the emerging farming sector and 
empowered commercial farms by 2012. It antici-
pated that this would “unlock further Govern-
ment funding into the resource poor farming 
sector of the Western Cape at a tempo of more 
than R50 million per annum and help fund satel-
lite depots located next to larger concentrations 
of new farmers from where farm produce will be 
transported to the market for sorting, process-
ing and marketing” (City of Cape Town, 2006).
However, to date the ‘suction force’ represented 
by the Philippi Market has yet to stimulate the 
growth of a mass of emerging farmers. After six 
months of operation only half of the rental units 
were operational and the pack house for emer-
gent farmers was awaiting a lease confirmation. 
The City of Cape Town reported that estab-
lished commercial farmers in Cape Town and the 
Western Cape were the primary suppliers and 
that produce was further sourced from Epping 
Market. The Department of Agriculture was re-
portedly drafting a strategy to develop emerg-
ing farmers. A review of the first six months of 
operation by Price Waterhouse Coopers recom-
mended that a “vigorous marketing campaign” 
be undertaken to attract new customers and 
tenants (City of Cape Town, 2007a).
MBB is currently in the process of developing a 
supply strategy with the Department of Agri-
culture to improve the linkages between small, 
resource-poor farmers and markets, using the 
Philippi Market as driver (personal communica-
tion, Jan-Willem Boonzaier, 2008). This consists 
of a Project Manager situated at the Philippi 
Market, acting as link between the farmers and 
supermarkets and processors. The manager’s 
role is to coordinate the supply from emerging 
farmers to meet the demand from the markets in 
terms of volume, quality and range of produce. 
The manager will have access to value-adding fa-
cilities at the market to pack produce according 
to specs from the supermarkets or processors. 
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According to MBB, other role players in the strat-
egy include an input supply company to pro-
vide seed, compost, fertiliser and planting pro-
grammes for the correct cultivars to the farmers, 
and the extension officers of the Department of 
Agriculture, who should visit the projects regu-
larly to ensure that the planting programmes 
are followed. The farmers will be responsible to 
pre-sort their produce before it is sent to (or col-
lected by) the Market. This strategy was reported 
to “still be in a developmental phase” (ibid).
According to MBB the Market is currently about 
70% occupied, and combines food processors, a 
bakery, fresh produce traders, a fresh produce 
wholesaler, a fresh produce pack house (focus-
ing on procuring produce from small farmers), 
a banana ripening and fresh produce exporter, 
and a dairy outlet. Furthermore, the market is 
in the process of establishing fresh produce pro-
duction on site for supplying the market, as well 
as a vermiculture composting unit to compost 
organic waste generated on-site into compost 
for small farmers.
MBB highlights that the major challenges re-
main transport for small producers and finding a 
way to coordinate supply from small producers, 
since individually the supply is still not consistent 
enough. 
MBB argues that the Market is still a new ven-
ture which is in a building and marketing phase. 
People of the surrounding area rather buy their 
produce from where they bought it for the past 
decade then at the new market; however it is 
anticipated that this will change over time. The 
low number of customers coming to the mar-
ket relates to low volumes kept by the traders, 
which increases the prices which results in fewer 
people buying from the market – in other words, 
a vicious circle. The market has to secure a larger 
volume of customers to buy produce to increase 
the volume that can be kept on hand to improve 
the profitability of the tenants. 
MBB reports that:
“[S]mall farmers that do not want to supply 
the Philippi Market but rather try to market 
their produce elsewhere (like Cape Town/
Epping Market) despite them complaining 
that their produce is not sold at Epping 
(another vicious circle – the farmers probably 
do not want to supply the market because of 
the low number of people buying from the 
market, but more people would buy from 
the market if more produce were available 
at competitive prices)”. (ibid)
The Philippi Market model is based on private 
businesses renting space from the Philippi Mar-
ket Operating Company, and trying to source 
some of their produce from emerging farmers. 
An important factor of the model is thus the 
drivers of these businesses – the nature of agri-
culture (and especially the resource-poor sector) 
requires dynamic businesses willing to pursue 
the goal despite the challenges and the set-backs 
that are more common than with the traditional 
commercial sector. MMB notes that sufficient 
time should also be allowed for these businesses 
to establish themselves; the time required to es-
tablish oneself in agriculture and agribusiness 
(and once again especially for the resource-poor 
sector) should not be underestimated.
Abalimi Bezekhaya and the 
‘Harvest of Hope’ programme
We turn now to the other component of this 
case study, namely Abalimi Bezekhaya and its 
‘Harvest of Hope’ programme.
Brief background on Abalimi
The work undertaken by Abalimi has a long his-
tory which spans the pre- and post-1994 eras:
Pre 1994 – Abalimi started working in 1982 from 
offices in the Catholic Church in Cape Town. It 
opened its first garden centre in Nyanga in the 
same year and developed a second centre in 
Khayelitsha in 1989. However, Abalimi only re-
ally took off in the period post-1994 when access 
to its constituency became easier.
1995 – In 1995 Abalimi employed two additional 
staff and established a field programme. Field-
workers started to visit people to introduce Aba-
limi’s services. Abalimi began to get requests 
from people for training, mainly in home gar-
dens. 
1996 – In 1996 Abalimi supported the formation 
of the Siyazama Community Allotment Garden 
Association (SCAGA) in Macassar, Khayelitsha. 
The garden was developed on 5000 m2 in a cor-
ridor under low-intensity power lines that were 
later decommissioned. Abalimi estimated that 
SCAGA could provide three to four permanent, 
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full-time formal jobs, but opted to promote 
a garden which would create 30 subsistence 
or livelihood augmentation ‘jobs’ on a mix-
ture of individual and communal plots. At the 
same time Abalimi started a programme for the 
greening of schools. The Schools Environment 
and Development Programme (SEED) grew up 
under Abalimi’s auspices before becoming inde-
pendent in 1997. 
1997 – In this year Abalimi employed more staff 
(two agricultural field workers) and expanded its 
institutional footprint from Khayelitsha to cover 
Philippi, Nyanga, Gugulethu and Crossroads. 
2001 – In 2001 Abalimi expanded further, em-
ploying three field staff from amongst the mem-
bership of the groups they served.
2002 – In 2002 Abalimi facilitated the launch of 
the Vukuzenzele Farmers Association (VUFA), 
which brought together people from about 70 
groups of small growers. As Abalimi grew and 
developed it conceptualised a production con-
tinuum to locate and track the growth and de-
velopment of smallholders from what it charac-
terises as survivalist, subsistence, livelihood and 
commercial levels of productive activity (see 
Figure 1.2). Production ranges from individual 
homestead gardens to groups who farm plots 
on vacant municipal land and in the grounds of 
schools and other institutions. Abalimi also has 
a focus on improving nutrition for people who 
are HIV positive (Rob Small, Kaba, and Mahusa-
Mhlana, 2005). Abalimi notes that agriculture 
remains an activity of last resort for those locat-
ed at the survivalist and subsistence end of the 
continuum. At these levels many will abandon 
agriculture in favour of other economic oppor-
tunities should they arise. However, as produc-
tion becomes more consolidated and benefits 
are more tangible, fewer people are likely to 
exit production. 
2007/8 – In 2007 Abalimi launched the Harvest 
of Hope programme. Current Abalimi staffing 
includes eight contract staff and seven perma-
nent staff.
Overview of the Harvest of Hope 
(HOH) programme
A range of support elements have been com-
bined in the Harvest of Hope (HOH) programme:
• Abalimi Bezekhaya provides training to en-
able growers at different scales to produce 
organically grown vegetables.
• Growers learn about the business side of 
farming through AgriPlanner courses run 
Figure 1.2: The sustainable development continuum for 
organic micro-farming projects
    Source: R. Small, 2007
THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONTINUUM FOR ORGANIC MICRO FARMING PROJECTS
Greatest number of people move through 
to other things
Lest number of people move 
through
Survival phase
Eat – Selling and 
saving begin
Subsistence phase
Eat, sell, save
Reinvestment 
begins
Livelihood phase
Eat, sell, save, reinvest
Profit earning 
begins
Commercial phase
Sell, reinvest profit
Job creation 
begins
Social impacts highest at all stages
Greatest number of people benefit and the poverty 
alleviation movement is most effective
Social impacts 
decrease
Poverty alleviation 
impact dissipates
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by the South African Institute for Entrepre-
neurship.
• Vegetables are harvested fresh on order to 
customers who sign up to purchase a box of 
organic vegetables weekly. Vegetables are 
collected and packed at the Organic Pack 
shed established at the Business Place - a 
business service centre in Philippi. 
• Support is provided by the Western Cape 
Department of Agriculture mainly in the 
form of improved infrastructure.
Other support interventions identified include: 
• Horizontal learning (farmer-to-farmer) ex-
change
• Savings schemes 
• Micro-credit to groups with consistent sav-
ings records will be available in the near 
future to projects entering the Livelihood 
and Commercial levels of the Development 
Continuum. 
• Periodic farmers’ markets, tunnel green-
houses, cold-storage rooms and value-add-
ing packing sheds (Small, 2007).
Currently, Abalimi supports 22 active vegetable 
growing groups at different scales. Most recent 
figures (August 2008) indicate that 146 small 
growers from 9 projects produce vegetables 
for the Harvest of Hope programme. However 
the bulk of the vegetables are currently sourced 
through three groups – Fezeka in Gugulethu, 
and SCAGA and Eden in Khayelitsha which are 
the focus of this case study.
Assessment of the natural and 
physical resources
In all three cases the groups started with unim-
proved Cape Flats sands (Figure 1.3). With the 
support of the City of Cape Town and the Pro-
vincial Department of Agriculture, Abilimi has 
placed a major emphasis on soil improvement by 
investing in organic compost, manure and other 
organic fertilisers such as Rapid Raiser. Produc-
tion methods also emphasise the importance 
of mulch and the planting of indigenous wind-
breaks. 
Physical infrastructure
Each garden has had substantial investment in 
physical infrastructure including:
• Perimeter fencing
• Borehole drilling and pump installation
Figure 1.3: Photograph of SCAGA prior to establishment of 
vegetable farming scheme
Picture from http://harvestofhope.co.za/?page_id=32 
 
12
Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.
• Electricity supply through the installation of 
prepaid metres1
• Water tanks
• Irrigation piping and microjets
• Small nursery enclosures constructed from 
creosoted poles and shade-cloth
• Hand tools and wheelbarrows
• Containers for implement storage and 
meeting space.
Production systems
The HOH production system is derived from an 
Excel-based planning and planting template 
that analyses weekly HOH box requirements in-
cluding:
• Land area required by crop type
• Estimated yields per area of different crops 
by weight and quantity
• Production timelines and maturity dates of 
individual crops
• A succession planting plan
• An estimation of retail and wholesale prices 
by weight or volume for different crops.
Abalimi fieldworkers who support individual 
gardens manage the seedling orders, the plant-
ing process and assess availability of different 
vegetables for weekly harvesting on Tuesdays. 
Individuals in the group are responsible for wa-
tering, weeding and general husbandry of the 
HOH growing areas. In the SCAGA group these 
tasks have been individualised with individuals 
responsible for their own plots and receiving the 
value of produce sold from them. Any surplus or 
substandard produce is either sold or consumed 
by the growers. Where HOH runs short of pro-
duce they also buy from individual plots.
Economic aspects
Harvest of Hope is an organic vegetable box 
project which originated from a partnership be-
tween the South African Institute for Entrepre-
neurship, the Ackerman Pick ‘n Pay Foundation 
and Abalimi Bezekhaya. The project has focused 
on the development of an organic pack shed at 
the Philippi Business Place. 
Initially there was a focus on the training of 
growers to comply with organic certification 
standards. However, the focus subsequently 
shifted to ensuring the throughput of sufficient 
volumes of vegetables from the producer groups 
through the pack house and to the market. A 
consultancy, Just Think, was contracted to de-
velop the Harvest of Hope programme concept 
which delivers a weekly box of vegetables to in-
dividual customers who collect their boxes from 
scheduled distribution points at four participat-
ing primary schools in the Cape Town area. As 
part of the planning and implementation pro-
cess Just Think has developed the Excel template 
discussed above, as well as a crop planning hand 
tool. Initial crop targets were established for 110 
boxes per week and eight producer groups were 
contracted to grow for HOH to specified targets 
(Just Think, 2008). 
The overall objective is to elevate HOH into a 
self-sustaining business enterprise. This depends 
on the ability of HOH to be able to produce 
and sell 600 boxes weekly. Income is distributed 
across three cost centres: 
• Payment to growers – 50% the selling price 
of a vegetable box
• Running costs – Abalimi expenses, Just 
Think consultancy fees and marketing costs
• Profit.
The initial allocation of running costs was calcu-
lated at 47% of revenue. As the number of boxes 
increases so will costs, but these costs will fall as 
a percentage of overall revenue. The target is to 
reduce running costs from 47% to 28%, or by 
5% per quarter. From a start-up profit of just 3% 
for the first quarter (R1325/month) it is envisaged 
that the profit margin on 600 boxes will be 22% 
(R48 583/month).
Just Think has proposed that HOH be established 
as a for profit company with shares distributed 
as indicated in the chart below. The business 
model sets out to provide incentives to Aba-
limi staff who become the largest shareholder 
with the most to make from the success of the 
scheme.
Actual performance
For the first three months of HOH the combined 
produce of the three groups amounted to 440 
boxes of vegetables worth R37 410 from which 
they earned a total of R18 705.1  In the case of Fezeka electricity is still provided free
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Period Feb – April 
2008
May – July 
2008
Aug – Oct 
2008
Nov – Jan 
2009
Feb – April 
2009
Boxes per week 120 240 360 480 600
Monthly income
(R85 x #boxes sold x 
4.33 weeks/month
44 166 88 332 132 498 176 664 222 830
Quarterly income 132 498 264 996 397 494 529 992 668 490
Table 1.2: Projected production and income
Figure 1.4: Proposed distribution of ownership shares in HOH
Currently, Abalimi’s target is for every individual 
to earn R600/month from the HOH project. They 
reported that they were “about half way there 
at present.” Based on the projections above it ap-
pears that to date the scheme has not managed 
to leverage the projected volumes required to 
make a profit. When Phuhlisani visited the pack 
house on Tuesday 22nd July there were orders 
for 84 boxes – 70% of the weekly total projected 
for Quarter 1 and 35% of the total projected for 
Quarter 2.2 
Group perceptions of utilisation of 
total productive output
The three groups used ‘proportional piling’ to 
estimate how their total production output was 
disposed of.
SCAGA individual grower sales
In addition to money paid to the SCAGA asso-
ciation, individual growers in the SCAGA project 
were also paid out for produce sold from their 
plots. The table below shows the value of the 
individual sales.
During the same period, input costs for Eden, 
Fezeka, and SCAGA were R3362, R6255, and 
R6421, respectively, as detailed in the following 
tables:
Assessing the extent of the Abalimi 
subsidy
Currently growers pay for seedlings, seed and 
electricity while Abalimi or other parties (in-
cluding the Department of Agriculture, the 
Department of Social Services and the City of 
Cape Town) cover the costs of organic fertiliser, 
manure, transport, fencing and irrigation infra-
structure repairs, transport and marketing costs.
In answer to a question about how the direct 
costs of production were spread between the 
growers, Abalimi, the City of Cape Town and the 
Dept of Agriculture, Abalimi responded as fol-
lows:
2  Given the lapse in time be-
tween the initial fieldwork and 
the finalization of this report, 
the authors took the occasion 
to check back with Abilimi in 
June 2009 as to production 
levels. According to Abilimi, 
current production levels are 
about 120 boxes per week, 
which they attribute to soft 
demand related to the financial 
crisis (personal communication, 
Bridget Impey, June 2009).
21
Growers Abalimi staff Abalimi Just think Project 
manager
Marketer
38
25
8
5
3
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Grower Feb March April Total
Grower 1 0 0 0 0
Grower 2 R 100 0 0 R 100
Grower 3 0 0 R 120 R 120
Grower 4 0 0 R 351 R 351
Grower 5 0 R 145 R 428 R 573
Grower 6 R 171 R 291 R 132 R 594
Grower 7 0 R 233 R 497 R 730
Grower 8 R 56 R 288 R 407 R 751
Grower 9 0 0 R 828 R 828
Grower 10 0 R 315 R 588 R 903
Totals R 327 R 1273 R 3350 R 4950
Table 1.5: Value of individual SCAGA grower sales for February 
through April 2008
Table 1.4: Summary of perceptions of product utilisation
Lost due to 
theft
Lost to disease Consumed Sold independently Sold through 
HOH
Eden3 10% 10% 25% 20% 35%
Fezeka 0% 10% 20% 20% 50%
SCAGA 0% 15% 20% 10% 55%
3 The three men interviewed 
from the Eden Group found 
this exercise difficult. Each man 
reworked the relative propor-
tions substantially. The final 
result appeared to be more of 
a compromise between them 
than a consensus about the 
output split.
Project People HOH 
area
08-Feb 08-Mar 08-Apr Total 
paid
Produce 
value
Boxes
Eden 4 640 R 2 676 R 2 634 R 1 804 R 7 113 R 14 226 167
Fezeka 6 ? R 1 763 R 1 302 R 888 R 3 953 R 7 906 93
SCAGA 10 756 R 1 613 R 503 R 572 R 2 689 R 5 378 63
R 13 755 R 27 510 324
Table 1.3: Sales 1st February – 30th April 2008
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Table 1.6: Eden’s input costs from February through April 2008
Inputs Quantity Costs
Bean seeds 200 g R 20
Beetroot seedlings 600 R 120
Broccoli seedlings 200 R 52
Cabbage seedlings 400 R 80
Cauliflower seetdlings 200 R 65
Kale seedlings 600 R 120
Kohl Rabi seedlings 1000 R 200
Lettuce seedlintgs 1400 R 280
Marigold seeds 1 R 11
Mulch 40 bales R 1500
Onion seedlings 1100 R 245
Parsley 200 R 40
Radish seeds 4 R 44
Rapid raiser 200 kg R 585
Total R 3362
Table 1.7: Fezeka’s input costs from February through April 
2008
Input Quantity Costs in R
Bamboo sticks 180 540
Basil seedlings 200 40 
Bean seedlings 200 50 
Beetroot seedlings 400 80 
Broccoli seedlings 600 156 
Cabbage seedlings 400 80 
Carrot seed 40 pkts 100 
Fix well point 1 450 
Kale seedlings 200 40 
Lettuce seedlings 400 80 
Manure 10 m3 2 227 
Onion seedlings 1200 299 
Parsley seedlings 100 20 
Rapid raiser 360 kg 1 053 
Spinach seedlings 200 40 
Total 6 255 
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Input Quantity Costs in R
Bean seed 500 90 
Beetroot seedlings 800 180 
Brocoli seedlings 400 80 
Carrot seeds 80 pkts 200 
Cauliflower seedlings 200 50 
Fix well point 1 850 
Kale seedlings 100 20 
Kohl rabi seedlings 400 80 
Lettuce seedlings 1400 280 
Manure 11 m3 2 587 
Onion seedlings 800 160 
Parsley seedlings 400 80 
Potato seed 11 kg 143 
Radish seed 5 pkts 63 
Rapid raiser 120 kg 351 
Spinach seedlings 1000 200 
Turnip seed 3 pkts 8 
Total 6 421 
Table 1.8: SCAGA’s input costs from February through April 
2008
Table 1.9: Distribution of direct costs among various role-
players
Direct costs HOH Grower Abalimi City of 
CT/Social 
services
Dept 
Agric
Notes
Seed/seedlings 100% Seedling costs deducted 
before growers paid
Compost/
manure
100% Groups don’t pay
Mulch 100% Groups don’t pay but 
we are realising that 
can’t do this for ever
Pest and fungal 
controls
Use herbs with chilli, 
garlic sunlight liquid
Water/
electricity
People buy on 
prepaid card – 
pay as you go 
or sometimes 
utilise illegal 
connections
School pays for 
this where gar-
den is on DoE 
land. Other land 
we apply for 
prepaid metre
Depends. Groups pushed 
to get borehole
Transport 100% Struggling for transport 
– only one bakkie doing 
everything for the 
project. A significant 
expense, but only once a 
week. Fieldworkers get 
around by taxi
Post harvest 
processing and 
packaging
100%
Marketing 100%
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Overall, Abalimi estimates that the ongoing sub-
sidy per farmer to support them indefinitely at 
the survival/subsistence stage is between R1000-
R3000 per farmer/gardener per annum, depend-
ing on the farmer’s circumstances and context. 
This subsidy covers all costs including training, 
establishment, institutional development sup-
port and ongoing permanent follow-up, taking 
into account regular cheap and/or free key in-
puts.
Abalimi estimates that to enable growers to 
shift from subsistence to a livelihood or semi-
commercial level requires a developmental sub-
sidy of about “R1000/farmer (or farmer group)/
month, including the pack-shed costs, transport, 
agricultural inputs and core fieldwork support 
to contracted farmers”. However, Abalimi ob-
serves that, “…if we include all possible associ-
ated costs (e.g. specialised focus training inter-
ventions to enhance applied skills), then the 
figure could easily go up to about R8000/month/
farmer or farmer group during the transition 
stage from Subsistence to Livelihood (personal 
communication, Rob Small, 2008).
Livelihood significance
Overall it would appear that the Abalimi and 
Harvest of Hope initiative have had positive im-
pacts on the livelihoods of those participating. It 
is also clear that these impacts are also a reflec-
tion of the fairly substantial subsidy required to 
put in place an enabling environment for small-
scale agricultural production. The exact value of 
this subsidy could only be calculated by a more 
in-depth study than was permitted by the time 
allocated to the research team.
Social and institutional dimensions
The Fezeka group currently consists of seven 
members – six women and one man. All of the 
members are of pensionable age. The group 
members have individual plots and combine to 
cultivate plots from which the produce is mar-
keted through the Harvest of Hope scheme run 
by Abalimi Bezekhaya.
The SCAGA garden as a whole started in 1997. 
Abalimi reported that in 2005 the garden hosted 
its fifth group of 30 people. This suggests that 
four groups had come and gone prior to this 
and that all the previous groups had given up. 
This reiterates the notion that agriculture is an 
activity of last resort which provides marginal 
benefits in relation to the input required. The 
group reported that currently their membership 
was eight people – all women, down by more 
than two-thirds from those who were there at 
the outset.
“Many people came to start with high 
expectations of making money. When it 
became clear that they would not be paid 
a cent except from what they got from the 
soil many people left. Others also left in the 
period before the HOH project as the money 
from sales was not enough.” (SCAGA group 
interview, 2008)
Respondents reported that members were en-
couraged to join by local SANCO members who 
advertised opportunities on the project with a 
loud hailer. There is some inconsistency in the 
dates and group sizes from different sources. 
The group reported that they had started in 2003 
and taken over from a previous group which had 
given up, while Abalimi indicated that the cur-
rent group started in 2005. 
Initially, individual plots for home consumption 
were cultivated and communal plots for the lo-
cal market. However, it appears that since the 
introduction of the HOH programme internal 
disputes amongst the group members concern-
ing uneven labour investment in the group plots 
have resulted in individualisation of production. 
Labour investment seems to account to some 
degree for the earning differentiation amongst 
the membership but the relative value of the 
different crops grown and harvested in each 
individual’s plots is a significant other factor in 
earning differentiation. Given that the group is 
billed jointly for seedlings, and that these are of 
different prices, growers of higher value crops 
may be receiving an indirect subsidy as the cost 
of seedlings is not directly reflected in their sales 
figures.
The Eden group consists of seven men some of 
whom were illegally growing vegetables in a 
wetland area adjacent to the N2. They were en-
couraged to move to the SCAGA 2 site in July 
2007. When they arrived much of the garden 
infrastructure, namely water and an electric 
pump, had already been installed, Irrigation in-
frastructure was added in 2008. 
The men gave unemployment and hunger and 
because “we grew up planting at home” as their 
reasons for becoming involved. Men have their 
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own plots but there was a marked difference in 
quality and investment between plots grown 
for home consumption and plots grown for the 
HOH market. The three members interviewed 
expressed a preference for growing for the mar-
ket. Interviewees reported that they depended 
on social grants and sales from the vegetables. 
One informant whose household did not qualify 
for any social grants reported that his sole in-
come depended on sales of vegetables together 
with some informal selling of small items from 
a home spaza run by his wife. Given that this 
group had only recently started the men stated 
that they were not in a position to assess wheth-
er production was a success.
Clearly the projects make important social con-
tributions. Women who have worked together 
for several years in Fezeka reported that:
“We support each other if a member 
gets sick. We also support some people in 
the community who are sick with HIV by 
donating vegetables”
Fezeka reported that they paid themselves 
R1500 each at Christmas time. However, other 
benefits included a daily meal cooked from their 
produce, which they shared in the garden.
The groups with women members have also de-
veloped small savings schemes which members 
contribute to and can borrow from in propor-
tion to their savings investments. The men in the 
Eden group reported that members can request 
to borrow money from the group in the event 
of a death in the family or a similar problem at 
home. However, there was some uncertainty 
about how to manage this process and ensure 
that there was not a run on the group’s resourc-
es which would undermine their ability to con-
tinue. 
While there are both obvious and hidden ben-
efits it is also clear that the projects and asso-
ciated organisation can also contribute to local 
conflict. This was evidenced by the SCAGA group 
members’ decision to work and get paid individ-
ually as a response to perceived ‘free riders’ who 
were set to benefit disproportionately to their 
labour investment. 
Institutional dimensions
Three institutional dimensions are examined:
• The extent to which the groups of growers 
function effectively and are enabled to in-
crease their control over their business
• The extent to which growers are able to 
represent their broader interests through 
forming associations and engaging with the 
City of Cape Town, the Department of Agri-
culture and other institutional actors
• The extent to which the different spheres of 
government, NGOs and private sector part-
ners combine effectively to support small 
growers.
Growers in different projects had also set out to 
establish their own association with the support 
of Abalimi. However management of the associ-
ation was not without its challenges as observed 
by Abalimi manager, Christina Kaba:
“The growers have their own organisation 
which they call Vukuzenzele Urban Farmers 
Association which has a Committee and an 
Executive Committee. I have seen bad things 
happen when people get into management. 
If they see those funds (from donors) they 
think it belongs to them. We get funding 
for seed and seedlings and funding for 
manure. People want to change this and 
say they want a bakkie because our project 
is big. Money even within Vukuzenzele has 
caused problems. The groups are not all on 
the same level. Some are big and others are 
small but to them they say we need to share 
the money equally.”
As noted in the introductory section, there are 
a number of role players attempting to make a 
Abalimi Dept of 
Agriculture
Social services City of Cape Town
Eden 45% 30% 10% 15%
Fezeka 20% 35% 20% 25%
SCAGA 50% 50%
Table 1.10: Perceptions of support
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Services and support Yes / No? Comments
Group formation Yes
Farmer to farmer extension – 
horizontal learning 
Yes We have taken people on trips from Cape Town to Transkei and 
Maritzburg. We organise farmers’ days for the different groups to meet 
each other. We find that those groups supported by government often 
lack information. When we present what we do they always want to 
come to us. But we don’t want them to come to us. We want them to 
get information
Clarifying production options and costs Yes
Provision of production credit Yes
Facilitation of group savings schemes Yes SCAGA started last year and saved R2/member each week. Now SCAGA 
members have increased the amount that they are saving and are 
banking R100/month in its own savings account which is separate from 
the project account
Production of budgets and records Yes In-house and to some extent with groups
Securing access to land Yes Assistance with contracts with government as landowners
Urban agriculture advocacy and 
integration into City of Cape Town IDP
Yes Played an initial role in policy development forums; however this role 
has diminished. 
Fencing and water infrastructure Yes (apply 
to Agric)
We help them apply to Dept of Agriculture and the City of Cape Town if 
we can’t help them ourselves
Garden design and layout Yes
Planting succession planning and 
rotation
Yes
Access to tools and equipment Yes
Soil analysis Yes The Department of Agriculture does this. We have also examined this 
as part of our exploration of organic certification. In those gardens 
which are close to informal settlements we frequently test for soil 
contamination from human waste
Soil preparation Yes A big focus with investment in manure and organic compost to boost 
soil quality
Provision of compost and mulching 
material
Yes
Seedling propagation/supply Yes Some gardens produce their own for certain crops and we also supply. 
HOH buy seedlings every two weeks for each planting. When the 
vegetables are sold the cost of the seedlings is deducted. We have 
considered possibility of a separate enterprise to produce the seedlings 
but don’t have the labourpower to set this up at present. There are 
other projects like the Sustainability Institute who could become 
involved in this.
Pest and disease management Yes Only companion planting and natural remedies used – garlic and chilli, 
handpicking of snails and good soil quality. Also,  plant health to reduce 
likelihood of fungal infections
Quality assurance Yes We do not have a big problem with this. Overall we have good soil 
preparation which ensures good quality.
Organic certification Incomplete/ 
abandoned
We were working on getting organic certification for 10 projects but 
this fell to 3 and then to 1. Part of the problem is that people could not 
see far enough into the future to know what they wanted to plant. 
Organic certification works best in the context of long term planning 
and reasonable certainty about what will be grown. What we think will 
work best for us is to write our own organic standards. We work on 
a trust basis and we inspect every week. We can see when people are 
using chemicals and we do not buy from them. Examples provided were 
of a garden which had sprayed weedkiller and another which was using 
snail bait.
Advice and support for production for 
consumption and exchange
Yes
Table 1.11: Abalimi’s self-assessment of its support services
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contribution to urban agriculture. However, it 
is clear that the working relationships between 
them are far from optimal. 
Participants in the three projects ranked the as-
sistance they received from different role play-
ers quite differently. In some instances however 
it seemed clear that for the project participants, 
institutional roles, functions and boundaries had 
become blurred.
Unfortunately the Department of Agriculture 
was not interviewed about its role. The groups 
perceived the Department of Agriculture as pro-
viding capital for pumps, equipment and some 
inputs but this is where their role appeared to 
end.
Despite Abalimi and the Department of Agri-
culture working from the same building it ap-
peared that working relations and communica-
tion between them was far from optimal.
“I don’t see them starting something. They 
just support what we do and supply what 
people ask them to give them. They are mainly 
providing things – fencing and equipment. 
They support projects but they support them 
financially. They don’t try to make them 
more independent and then when they have 
finished with them Agriculture walks away 
and projects fold. They do not provide on-
site follow up and support. 
“When HOH was starting to try and secure 
organic certification Agriculture provided 
growers with a whole consignment of non 
organic compost which was a problem. They 
asked us, ‘What is organic? Why are you 
trying to grow organic?’ We tried to explain 
about the compost and they said we only get 
compost where it is cheaper.
“They have got extension people but they 
don’t touch the soil. They are not in touch 
and on the ground. They want to see urban 
agriculture but they don’t know what they 
are looking for or how to make things 
happen.” (Christina Kaba – Abalimi manager)
None of the parties interviewed for this case 
study appeared to have a good understanding 
of the urban agriculture policy and the oppor-
tunities it might create. Within Abalimi all ques-
tions about the urban agriculture policy and 
what the City of Cape Town could be doing to 
stimulate urban agriculture were referred to 
Rob Small. Neither the pilot project in the Philip-
pi area or the Philippi Fresh Produce market was 
mentioned in any interview.
Gender, class and human dimensions
The group profiles highlight the predominance 
of older women, although the Eden group con-
sists of men only. Overall the groups appear to 
be catering for people with few economic alter-
natives. From our assessment of the membership 
of the three groups it is clear that in the main 
the formal education of people is very low. This 
is likely to impact on members’ abilities to man-
age the key planning, technical and financial 
components of the project which are critical for 
their short and long-term success. 
Abalimi has attempted to address the skills defi-
cit through the design of an interactive enter-
prise simulation based training process called 
Agriplanner. This is designed to help growers 
“go beyond the practicalities of merely growing 
produce…. [G]rowers learn how to get the most 
productive use out of their land as well as how 
much money their land could produce for them, 
if they use it well”. The programme has been 
designed to engage with key questions such as:
Services and support Yes / No? Comments
Advice and support for production for 
local markets, as well as 
production for Harvest of Hope 
organic market
Yes We are also working on local markets. We are examining the Harare 
market in Khayelitsha. (Interestingly no mention was made of the local 
Philippi Fresh Produce Market)
Group individual record keeping and 
production accounting
Yes On a very simple basis
Conflict resolution Yes There are often leadership conflicts or financial issues. When money is 
on the table there are often big problems to do with spending priorities 
– how much get reinvested and how much people take home. We get 
help from other organisations in the Business place who specialise in 
group support
21
Research
Report
• How much money can we make from our 
land? 
• What can we plant? When can we plant it? 
• How can we keep our land productive for 
the whole year? 
• How much money do we need to get go-
ing? 
• How much money can we make each month 
from our land? 
The programme integrates a variety of planning 
systems, charts and tools that growers use to 
plan what they will grow and what returns they 
are likely to achieve.
We were not able to assess this programme in 
action or obtain any independent evaluations 
of it in the time available. However it was clear 
from our interactions with group members in-
terviewed that numeracy levels were poor which 
was likely to present an obstacle to successful 
participation in the learning programme. 
Overall the relative success of a HOH programme 
in producing sufficient and regular volumes of 
vegetables for the market appears to depend 
on the strong and directive management input 
by Abalimi. All the groups spoke about their de-
pendence on Abalimi to provide the planting 
plan, provide the required seedlings, oversee 
the planting and harvesting processes, and get 
produce to market. 
“There is a production plan where we plant 
very two weeks. We know what we are 
going to plant when. At the moment it is the 
fieldworker who makes the decisions about 
what to plant when and where, as she has 
the information on the current growing 
conditions and plantings on the project she 
supports. The next step is to increase the 
involvement and capacity of growers so that 
they can move up the hierarchy into the 
livelihood and commercial zones”. (Interview 
with Abalimi field staff, 2008)
Clearly the development of local technical and 
managerial skills must become a key focus for 
future development. However this seems only 
likely to succeed if the skills and age profile of 
the groups is to change. This creates a conun-
drum as it is clear from the case study that ac-
cess to land and ability to grow vegetables are 
not sufficient to secure household livelihoods. 
Access to a reliable and expanding market and 
the ability to secure a reasonable share in the 
value chain appears to remain the critical success 
factor.
Environmental aspects
Abalimi’s focus on organic production limits the 
likelihood of negative environmental impacts. In 
the case of the Eden group it can be argued that 
the project has had a beneficial environmental 
impact as it has encouraged people farming in 
a wetland area to relocate to land more suitable 
for agriculture.
It is not clear however what permissions have 
been sought to sink boreholes and the extent to 
which these may impact on ground water. It is 
also not clear to what extent the water quality 
of the groundwater is assessed. In informal set-
tlement areas where there is inadequate sanita-
tion Abalimi does take precautions to test soils 
for contamination.
As Abalimi has noted, they function on rela-
tions of trust with the different grower groups 
with respect to adherence to organic farming 
principles. This trust is not always well founded. 
On two occasions they have found growers us-
ing herbicides or pesticides, but they argue that 
close and ongoing contact with growing groups 
will usually ensure that pesticide use can be de-
tected. This does however raise a potential con-
cern with respect to the lack of certification or 
independent inspection to ensure standards of 
organic practice are met. However, it is clear 
that the transaction costs associated with organ-
ic certification are much too onerous for small 
producers like the Abalimi groups to bear.
The future of the HOH programme
The Just Think business plan envisaged the es-
tablishment of HOH as a for profit company as 
discussed above. However our interview with 
Abalimi fieldworkers indicated concerns that 
the introduction of HOH had resulted in some 
neglect of individual homestead production. 
Fieldworkers stated that they needed to renew 
their focus on household food security and were 
concerned that the HOH model resulted in a net 
outflow of food to specialised middle class mar-
kets.
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Conclusions
The case study highlights different approaches 
to stimulate the development of smallholder ag-
riculture:
• Measures designed to create an enabling 
environment which helps pull emerging 
producers into production and the market 
from above
• Measures to directly engage with, grow and 
support small producers and push them into 
production and the market from below
The effectiveness of ‘pulling’
The City of Cape Town and the Provincial De-
partment of Agriculture have invested millions 
in the construction of the Philippi Fresh Produce 
Market. It seems that while there is a role for in-
frastructure investment in creating an enabling 
environment for small producers, that on its own 
it is not sufficient to bring new smallholders into 
production and the market place, or rather, that 
this process takes time. The construction of the 
Fresh Produce Market does not appear to have 
been preceded by an in-depth study of exist-
ing smallholder agricultural production in Cape 
Town and has proceeded on the basis of assump-
tions about would constitute an effective stimu-
lus to this sector. Without other measures being 
put in place the Fresh Produce Market may end 
up as an expensive white elephant. 
‘Pushing’ – the boundaries
The Fezeka, SCAGA and Eden cases show that 
many urban smallholders operate in a highly 
constrained operating environment which is 
characterised by low levels of human capital, 
inadequate access to land, equipment, finance 
and infrastructure for production, technical and 
institutional development support, market intel-
ligence and enterprise management capability. 
Abalimi Bezekhaya have attempted to put in 
place a comprehensive and subsidised produc-
tion support system which systematically ad-
dresses these constraints. However there remain 
questions about its sustainability and the extent 
to which growers will become locked into re-
lations of dependency on the support agency 
(however benign the latter). While it seems un-
deniable that these support measures are essen-
tial if small growers are to develop and in par-
ticular to access the market in a remunerative 
fashion, the question remains how to extend 
them at scale and in a way which will enable 
long-term sustainability of both the services and 
the enterprises which are established. 
The effectiveness of ‘pushing’ appears to de-
pend on two things:
• The capacity and co-ordination of the agen-
cies responsible for grassroots development 
support, and 
• Clarity as to what role subsidies should play 
in developing an emerging smallholder sec-
tor and the form in which they are targeted.
Support capacity and co-ordination
The case studies indicate the current limitations 
of available support capacity. This seems par-
ticularly acute with respect to government land 
identification and agricultural extension capac-
ity to support small growers in metropolitan 
Cape Town. Interviews highlight the slow pro-
cesses associated with acquiring land that can be 
used for commonage purposes. They also indi-
cate an approach to extension where it seems 
that extensions officers ‘do not touch the soil’ 
and operate more as dispensers of infrastructure 
and equipment.
Although Abalimi and the Provincial Depart-
ment of Agriculture operate out of the same 
building their functions and programmes do 
not appear to be aligned. Likewise the services 
offered by the City of Cape Town and the Pro-
vincial Department of Agriculture seem in some 
respects to overlap.
Reframing subsidies?
Abalimi Bezekhaya and the Provincial Depart-
ment of Agriculture provide support which sub-
stantially reduces the costs of growers who par-
ticipate in the HOH scheme. But there remains a 
lack of clarity about what constitutes legitimate 
subsidy and support for smallholder production.
In the EU, agricultural subsidies have been de-
fined as “a benefit provided to individuals or 
businesses as a result of government policy that 
raises their revenues or reduces their costs and 
thus affects production, consumption, trade, in-
come, and the environment. The benefit gener-
ated by policy may take different forms such as 
an increase in output-price, a reduction in input-
price, a tax rebate, an interest rate concession, 
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or a direct budgetary transfer”  (Mayrand, Di-
onne, Paquin, and Pageot-LeBel, 2003).
According to a recent OECD review of agricul-
tural policy reform in South Africa, policy trans-
fers to South African agricultural producers – as 
measured by the OECD Producer Support Esti-
mate (PSE) – equalled 5% of gross farm receipts 
on average in 2000–03. This is well below the av-
erage level of support for OECD countries which 
stands at 31%, but is similar to levels of support 
provided in Brazil, China and Russia (Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, 2006).
Internationally, subsidies to producers in devel-
oped countries have gone to the large farm-
ers and have also contributed to an agriculture 
which is dependent on high inputs of fertiliser 
and chemicals and mechanised production with 
a high carbon footprint.
It should be noted that the above definitions 
and approaches are narrowly economistic in na-
ture and ignore triple bottom line accounting 
precepts that assess social, environmental and 
economic dimensions and their interrelation-
ships.
There are strong arguments for subsidies which 
encourage and support organic and/or low in-
put agricultural production and which build so-
cial capital. In the WTO context such domestic 
support measures can be associated with the 
so called Green Box which includes support for 
environmental programmes, government re-
search, extension, and infrastructure provision 
together with income safety-net programs (La 
Vina, Fransen, Faeth, and Kurauchi, 2006). Over-
all these need to provide incentives for the de-
velopment of a more sustainable and low input 
agriculture which has environmental benefits.
Rethinking certification
The Abalimi experience suggests that attempt-
ing to secure formal organic certification is too 
onerous for small producers. This requires a new 
approach which either utilises state support or 
an alternative framework with more appropri-
ate standards and assessment measures.
It is clear that the development of an urban ag-
riculture policy is an important first step in the 
stimulation of urban smallholder production. 
However, for the policy to have meaning and to 
be implementable there needs to be investment 
in implementation capacity. This must combine 
and balance measures to simultaneously align 
human and financial resources and that strategi-
cally ‘pull’ and ‘push’ to secure the emergence 
of new smallholder producers engaged in agri-
cultural activities which are socially, ecologically 
and economically sustainable.
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Introduction
This example of land use by beneficiaries of land 
made available through a Settlement and Land 
Acquisition Grant (SLAG) project was selected 
for inclusion into the study because those farm-
ers engaged in potato cultivation do so pre-
dominantly for commercial purposes. Relative to 
the size of the original beneficiary group, only a 
handful of beneficiaries are still actively engaged 
in crop production. Most of these sell their sea-
sonal harvests to local residents in the village and 
to hawkers (street vendors) in the neighbouring 
coastal towns. However, one farmer collaborates 
with his employer and through this relationship 
is able to produce potatoes and vegetable crops 
for the commercial fresh produce market or on 
contract to a local subsidiary of an international 
food processing and packaging company. In es-
sence, while most active farmers are engaged in 
producing for the ‘second economy’, one farm-
er, who rents land that is owned by other SLAG 
beneficiaries, is able to produce for the ‘first 
economy’ by virtue of his relationship with his 
employer. Interestingly, this farmer is not one of 
the original SLAG beneficiaries but is a resident 
on a neighbouring farm.
Methodology
The author has conducted a number of stud-
ies in this village over several years since April 
2000 until the end of August 2008. Between 
April 2000 and January 2006 the author visited 
the village at regular intervals while conducting 
fieldwork on a number of agricultural projects. 
From January 2006 until March 2008 the author 
lived in the village at various times for periods of 
up to six weeks while conducting ethnographic 
fieldwork. The data obtained during the differ-
ent studies has been used to compile the current 
case.
Participatory Rural Appraisal tools (PRA) tools 
were used at various stages and for a number 
of purposes, but particularly during 2000 and 
2001 in order to get historical information about 
the village, the farmers, agricultural projects 
and practices and to generate an awareness of 
what types of crops were produced, consumed 
and sold. Approximately 40 people from the 
village were interviewed or attended some of 
the workshops. Most of those interviewed were 
male (thirty) as agriculture is predominantly a 
male activity in this village. About ten females 
were interviewed during the course of the study, 
only one of whom was engaged in any agricul-
tural activity. Those interviewed were between 
the ages of twenty-five and eighty-five years. 
Except for four men and one woman, most were 
over forty-five years of age at the start of the 
fieldwork in 2000. Attendance of the workshops 
was entirely voluntary and the numbers fluc-
tuated between two and fifteen farmers and 
sometimes their wives. Data from the workshops 
was further explored by means of participant 
observation, and semi-structured and informal 
interviews. Interviewees included some of the 
men and women who attended the workshops 
as well as a number of others who were unable 
to attend the workshops. Interviews and partici-
2 Friemersheim agricultural 
association: commercial 
smallholder potato farmers 
in a Southern Cape land 
reform project
Tim Hart, Centre of Poverty Employment and Growth, 
Human Sciences Research Council
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pant observation sessions were typically carried 
out during the course of the researcher’s interac-
tion with farmers and other village residents. As 
crops can be grown throughout the year, partic-
ipant observation sessions on agricultural prac-
tices were conducted during both growing sea-
sons. Eight potato farmers were surveyed dur-
ing 2006 and were interviewed on a number of 
occasions between June 2006 and August 2008. 
Data collected at workshops and during inter-
views informed the design of the survey ques-
tionnaire. The average age of those surveyed in 
2006 was fifty-one years.
Historical perspective
The village of Friemersheim lies close to the 
south-eastern seaboard of the Western Cape. 
The climate is temperate with a number of 
smallholder farmers and large-scale farmers in 
the area producing potatoes and other vegeta-
ble crops. Dairy farming is also a common activ-
ity amongst neighbouring large-scale farmers. 
The village and the surrounding agricultural 
holdings fall within the winter rainfall area of 
the Western Cape. 
The village dates back to the early 1800s with 
some residents tracing their ancestry back to 
this period. In the middle of the 19th Century 
the Dutch Reformed Church (NGK) established a 
church and mission station. There are currently 
186 households in the village. Approximately 
95% have electricity and 98% have access to 
potable water on their property. Infants and 
school going children were said to make up the 
greatest proportion of residents. Most of the 
adult residents either work seasonally on neigh-
bouring large-scale commercial farms (mainly 
female residents) or as artisans in the surround-
ing towns (mainly male residents). Some female 
residents work as shop assistants or as part-time 
domestic workers in the neighbouring towns 
and villages. A very small minority of the resi-
dents work for local and provincial government 
organs in the village, such as the primary school 
and the municipal offices. About four to five 
home-based (spaza) shops are operating in the 
village and provide a limited range and quan-
tity of essential goods. There is a local general 
dealer that provides other supplies such as gas, 
electricity, groceries and even some seed. Ac-
cording to local residents very few people in the 
village are extremely poor although there are a 
few households that are considered to fall into 
this category. 
The closest town is about 50 kilometres away 
and the neighbouring village is about 20 kilome-
tres away on a gravel road. Once there residents 
can take a taxi to the towns. While there are no 
taxi services to the nearest towns or the neigh-
bouring village there is a bus service between 
the two villages. However, the bus service only 
operates during weekdays, leaving the village at 
6:30 am and returning in the evening at around 
6:30pm. Consequently, travel outside of these 
times makes it necessary for households to have 
a motor vehicle or at least access to one. The 
closest hospital is in the nearest town and high 
school learners need to go to the neighbouring 
village to attend classes. Transportation to medi-
cal and educational facilities is problematic if a 
resident does not have a motor vehicle. As a re-
sult most households have a motor vehicle.
In 1995 one of the village elders, who was a lo-
cal councillor, heard about the new land reform 
process and the SLAG in particular. He discussed 
it with about six of his contemporaries and they 
organised a meeting with the nearest Depart-
ment of Land Affairs. At the meetings it was ex-
plained that in order to get enough money to 
purchase any land in the area they would have 
to form a communal property association (CPA) 
and get more members, as the proposed grant of 
R16 000 per household for the seven households 
would not be sufficient to purchase any local ag-
ricultural land. The group then approached oth-
er residents until a group of thirty members was 
obtained. A CPA was formed and consisted of 30 
households, of which 28 were male-headed and 
two were female-headed. Nine of the household 
heads were pensioners and three were recipi-
ents of disability grants. A further three worked 
in the village and the remainder all worked out-
side the village with some only coming home on 
weekends or on a more irregular basis. Despite 
claims that all these people had a long history of 
experience in agriculture, for most these claims 
were unfounded. Probably less than half the 
CPA members had any experience in agriculture 
and for many it was confined to small vegeta-
ble gardens at their homes. A handful had been 
engaged in limited agricultural production on 
the local commonage. In the 1970s a number of 
residents had been engaged in dairy activities. 
However, most of the beneficiaries were not in-
volved in these agricultural activities. Most agri-
cultural activities in the village up until this time 
had been on a micro-scale.
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In 1996 the Kagiso Trust supported this group in 
implementing a potato production project with 
the purpose of making the CPA some money for 
future agricultural activities. (At this stage the 
CPA had not yet acquired its own land through 
the land redistribution programme. However, 
adjacent to the village was a portion of farmland 
in extent of 115 hectares. While it was admin-
istered by the local town council its ownership 
was in dispute and it is still pending a decision 
from the Land Claims Commission. It was decid-
ed to use about five hectares of this farm for the 
potato project. The Kagiso Trust, local farmers, 
local agrochemical suppliers, and the Western 
Cape Department of Agriculture all supported 
the CPA members and the potato project. In-
terestingly, none of the claimants were part of 
the CPA and none of them were invited to be 
part of this project which was exclusively for CPA 
members. However, there was a lot of internal 
conflict within the CPA as many members could 
not help with the project, either because they 
did not want to or because they were employed 
and not available to help. A lot of friction arose 
and when it was decided to pay those who had 
helped and not the other members, further 
antagonism arose between members and the 
chairperson and those who had actually helped 
out on the project. In the end the CPA made very 
little money and a lot of ill-feelings were created 
amongst the members. 
In September 1999, the CPA formally took pos-
session of its own piece of land through the land 
redistribution programme. However, contrary 
to the original intention, the chairperson of the 
CPA organised with the Department of Land Af-
fairs that the land be subdivided. This was a di-
rect consequence of the conflict that arose when 
the farmers attempted to work together during 
the 1996 potato project. As a result, each house-
hold head was to obtain ownership of approxi-
mately two hectares of the land and this land 
was to be farmed on an individual basis. The 
remaining thirty-nine hectares was held in trust 
by the CPA. The balance of the SLAG money was 
used to purchase a tractor and some implements 
in 1999. These were and still are managed by the 
CPA which formed into a local farmers’ associa-
tion.
The subdivision of the land was effected in early 
2000 and each household was allocated its stand. 
However, formal transfer of the subdivisions 
only came about in September 2007 as there 
were a lot of problems relating to water access. 
Since transfer, three households have sold their 
land to people from outside of the village. These 
were households that had not used their land at 
all since they obtained it in 1999.
When the land and new machinery were ob-
tained in 1999, approximately twelve of the ben-
eficiaries cultivated their land between January 
2000 and January 2003. However, following this 
initial burst of excitement, there have been no 
more than seven farmers actively producing 
crops, and perhaps another four cultivating fod-
der, during any season. A recent visit in 2008 
indicated that only five farmers had actually 
planted any vegetable crops for that year. Over 
the years discussions with the farmers – those 
who had planted crops at some time on this land 
– elicited the information that farming was for 
most a secondary activity. Employment off-farm 
was the main activity and farming was done to 
increase income or to increase household food 
supply. Some farmers did not farm for two or 
three seasons because they were too busy with 
off-farm employment activities. While the more 
energetic farmers considered the acquisition of 
farmland to be a post-retirement benefit, many 
of the non-farmers considered this to be an in-
vestment in land, the value of which they cor-
rectly surmised would increase in the future.
As a result of the subdivision, most farmers farm 
individually. In some instances related land hold-
ers may pool land and share input costs, for ex-
ample siblings. Amongst the active farmers the 
land is predominantly used for vegetable and 
potato production, especially if the farmers 
work in the village or are pensioners or disabil-
ity grant recipients. Others who are engaged in 
farming, but who work outside of the village, 
tend to use their land as grazing for cattle and 
to this end will plant oats and other fodder. The 
actual amount of land under cultivation at any 
one time depends largely on the season, weath-
er patterns, the farmers’ time for agricultural 
activities and his or her access to inputs. Most of 
these individuals are employed or are recipients 
of private or state disability grants.
Natural resources
The village is situated at the foot of the Outeni-
qua Mountains in the Southern Cape and is be-
tween 300 and 325 metres above sea-level. Rain-
fall throughout the year is relatively consistent 
and ranges between 580 and 695 millimetres 
per annum. According to farmers the driest peri-
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ods are during the months of December, January 
and February, and again during June and July. 
The area is considered to have a mild climate 
with temperatures ranging from a low of 8 de-
grees Celsius in mid-winter to 29 degrees Celsius 
in mid-summer. 
Until the 1960s most agricultural production 
among Coloureds was conducted on residential 
plots for household consumption. Initially these 
plots were about 8000 m2 but as the popula-
tion increased in the village the residential plots 
became smaller, curtailing the volume of agri-
cultural produce that could be generated in the 
home gardens and on the commonage. In 1999 
thirty households each got access to approxi-
mately two hectares of land when a neighbour-
ing 99 hectare farm was purchased through the 
state land reform programme. The thirty-nine 
hectares that are held in trust are currently over-
grown and much of the land is unsuitable for 
agriculture as it is mountainside and gullies.
A March 1998 report by the Western Cape De-
partment of Agriculture describes the landscape 
as undulating, with deep ravines in places and 
that 25% of the land has a gradient of 1:4. The 
soils are deep and have good horizontal and ver-
tical drainage. They are acidic, severely leached 
due to the high rainfall and low in phosphorous, 
copper, zinc, potassium and manganese. Parent 
soil material is Tafelberg sandstone and the soils 
on top of that have a residual nature. Red and 
yellow apedale soils occur on the shale layers 
found in the Tafelberg sandstone. Mechanical 
and/or biological protection of the fields is con-
sidered essential. The report pointed out that 
any crop could be grown on this land with the 
exception of tropical and sub-tropical crops, as 
long as the chemical content of the soil is ad-
justed accordingly. Small grains were not recom-
mended due to the heavy reliance on expensive 
mechanised machinery. The climate was consid-
ered unsuitable for deciduous and other fruit. 
Vegetables from the root crop (potatoes and 
carrots), legumes, onions, curcubit and brassica 
families were recommended. Sweet corn was 
also recommended. The veld is largely covered 
in fynbos and grass and the investigators deter-
mined that it has a very low livestock carrying 
capacity. The natural rangeland has a carrying 
capacity of one livestock unit per 15 hectares. 
The outcome of this report was that as a result 
of the limited water supply only five hectares of 
irrigated vegetables could be cultivated during 
any season on the land to be acquired. This rec-
ommendation was not followed by the farmers 
because they wanted to farm individually and 
were not interested in working together.
The farm lies adjacent to the village in a south-
easterly direction. It is almost L-shaped and this 
provides those farming on it with problems of 
access to water for agricultural purposes. Only 
those farming on the westerly side of the farm 
have access to water from the dams fed by the 
local irrigation network. This network supplies 
the village and the large-scale commercial farms 
in the area. Water allocation is based on a quo-
ta system. Sluice gates can only be opened on 
certain days for a few hours in order to fill the 
dams. This farm receives access to the system one 
day per week for 24 hours. Those smallholders 
farming close to this network have no problem 
with access to water as the sluice opens directly 
into two dams. This sluice is only really opened 
regularly during early summer when the area is 
particularly dry. Those farming on the easterly 
side of the farm have virtually no access to ir-
rigation water. Initially they attempted to make 
use of a dam situated on adjacent land but as 
they do not have permanent access to this land, 
they have had very insecure access to irrigation 
water since 2000. Now there is a land claim ap-
plication pending on this land and the water is 
not accessed at all. The distance between the 
dams that came with the farm is so great and 
the terrain so uneven that no attempt has been 
made to channel water to the other side of the 
farm. The Provincial Department of Agriculture 
and the Department of Water Affairs and For-
estry conducted a number of visits over the years 
to determine how best to supply water to the 
stands on the eastern side of the farm. However, 
as of September 2008 this problem has not been 
resolved. All the proposed solutions are deemed 
unworkable as a result of the costs involved.
Since 2003 some beneficiaries and one or two 
non-beneficiaries, leased fallow uncultivated 
land from the inactive SLAG beneficiaries or 
their families. This was done in exchange for 
a small portion of the harvest or in exchange 
for clearing alien Hakea species from the land, 
which had been fallow for about a decade. In 
2006 there were approximately thirteen people 
who were farming on this land, although only 
about seven were engaged in any form of veg-
etable cropping. Those who lease land are farm-
ing on anything between two and six hectares 
but not more than half of this is under cultiva-
29
Research
Report
tion at any one time. This is due to crop rota-
tion requirements and also limited finances to 
purchase inputs. The most sought after land is 
that situated next to the two dams that are fed 
by the local irrigation network.
The agricultural stands are split almost equally 
between the two different sides of the farm and 
some of the farmers have now borrowed land 
from those owning, but not farming, the land 
closest to the irrigation network. This is a short-
term solution and many are concerned about 
the future when the owners either return to 
farming or decide to sell the land. The sale of 
three stands in late 2007 was met with regret by 
some of the more active farmers. The current ar-
rangements allow farmers temporary access to 
more land for agricultural purposes. Changes 
in access will curtail their agricultural activities. 
One farmer reported that he was already notic-
ing the constraints. As he developed his agri-
cultural activities and experience, his ability to 
increase in scale was restricted by lack of access 
to more agricultural land and also to finances.
During the first two years after receiving the 
farm the farmers identified that they had a root-
knot nematode problem. A subsequent survey 
by the ARC indicated that the problem was se-
vere. However, because farmers did not have the 
money to fumigate the soil it was recommended 
that they plant cabbage and work the residues 
into the soil as a form of bio-fumigation. The 
alternative, and one which most farmers opted 
for, was to sow oats on their field for a num-
ber of years in order to reduce the root-knot 
nematode problem. Oats are a bad nematode 
host and their presence tends to drive down the 
population numbers. Farmers used the oats as 
fodder for their cattle and consequently it was 
mainly those who had cattle in the beginning 
who followed this practice. 
Physical resources
Some mechanised agricultural implements were 
purchased by the CPA members using own funds 
and the balance of the SLAG monies, and some 
were provided by the Provincial Department of 
Agriculture. The list in Table 2.1 was first com-
piled in October 2002.
At the initial assessment in 2002 the farmers 
requested building materials in order to build 
proper storage facilities for their implements. 
They were concerned that these would get dam-
aged as a result of the lack of adequate storage. 
A store was eventually built in 2005 with money 
provided by the Department of Agriculture. Ini-
tially the tractor had been stored at the chair-
person’s house and upon his death in late 2003 
it was moved to one of the containers. Currently 
it is stored in the new storeroom. 
A cursory inspection was carried out in 2008 and 
this indicated that most of the equipment was 
still there plus a bushcutter obtained from the 
Department of Agriculture in 2005. The imple-
ments were still usable but many had been dam-
aged and farmers complained about this. Some 
of the second-hand ploughs and potato harvest-
ers could no longer be used as they were dam-
aged and not repaired. Farmers reported that 
they were no longer looked after as well as they 
had been although the tractor was being serv-
iced at the allotted periods.
Basically it is the responsibility of the chairper-
son and the treasurer to look after the imple-
ments and see to the hiring and maintenance of 
the implements. Those currently responsible for 
this were often not available due to work com-
mitments, many of which took them away from 
the village for weeks at a time. Many accusations 
were made during the interviews about abuse of 
the implements, stealing of diesel and failure to 
report damage. 
In order to ensure that the implements could be 
maintained in good order and replaced after a 
number of years, the Department of Agriculture 
recommended in 2000 that an initial fee of R150 
per hour be charged for the use of the tractor 
and implements. This included diesel for the 
tractor. Since acquiring the implements in 2000 
the hourly charge was R50 for CPA members and 
R60 for non-members. In 2002 this fee was still 
the same. At the time the treasurer said that it 
was unlikely that the CPA could make a profit or 
even manage to cover the maintenance and die-
sel costs if the fee remained so low. Opposition 
voices said that the tractor was theirs because 
it was bought using the remainder of the SLAG 
funds and that the government could not dic-
tate to them what they had to pay for its use. It 
was also felt that the rising costs of diesel would 
make the use of the tractor prohibitive if the fee 
was increased at that time. By August 2008 the 
farmers were paying R100 (R110 for non-mem-
bers) an hour to use the tractor and implements. 
They had been doing so for the past two years 
despite the rising costs of diesel. The same com-
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Implement Date 
obtained
Obtained 
from
Storage Condition
5-ton Trailer 2000 DoA On fenced-in farmland, but 
exposed to the elements
Good
Disc plough 2001 DoA On fenced-in farmland, but 
exposed to the elements
Good
Cultivator – seed bed 
preparer
2001 DoA On fenced-in farmland, but 
exposed to the elements
Good
3-bladed mouldboard 
plough
2000 DoA On fenced-in farmland, but 
exposed to the elements
Good
Tractor mounted 
chemical sprayer
2001 DoA In a container Good
Large mech anised 
potato planter
2001 DoA On fenced-in farmland, but 
exposed to the elements
Good 4
Two second-hand 
storage containers
2000 DoA On fenced-in farmland, but 
exposed to the elements
Good
Landini 53 kw 4X2 
tractor
1999 DLA-SLAG Under a shelter at the 
chairman’s house
Good 
Diesel irrigation pump 1999 DLA-SLAG Usually unprotected and next to 
the dam
Good
Irrigation Pipes 1999 Land 
Affairs 
Grant
Usually unprotected on fields or 
on trailer
Good2
One second-hand 
Potato extractor
2001 Purchased 
from local 
farmer 
using own 
funds
On fenced-in farmland, but 
exposed to the elements
Fair with a 
section of the 
mechanism 
broken
One second-hand 
furrow plough - 
cultivator
1999 Purchased 
from local 
farmer 
using own 
funds
On fenced-in farmland, but 
exposed to the elements
Fair
One second-hand 
trailer
1995/6 Obtained 
from 
Minister 
Lampie 
Fick
On fenced-in farmland, but 
exposed to the elements
Fair to good 
and still used 
regularly
One second-hand 
3-bladed mouldboard 
plough
1995/6 Obtained 
from 
Minister 
Lampie 
Fick
On fenced-in farmland, but 
exposed to the elements
Fair, but 
some blades 
damaged 
and need 
replacing
One second-hand disc 
plough
1995/6 Obtained 
from 
Minister 
Lampie 
Fick
On fenced-in farmland, but 
exposed to the elements
Needs 
repairing as 
some discs 
are bent or 
have come off
Table 2.1: Mechanised agricultural implements at 
mechanisation centre in 2002
4  Interviewees are concerned 
about the quality of these 
pipes. When under pressure 
the couplings come apart. The 
couplings are glued to the 
pipes and some interviewees 
considered this to be poor 
workmanship.
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plaints remained with regard to the inability of 
this low fee to enable the CPA to replace the im-
plements when they were no longer serviceable. 
The opposition voices remained the same. There 
is a lot of conflict over these resources and in 
some cases a few of the more active farmers re-
sort to borrowing implements and tractors from 
neighbouring large-scale producers. Some use 
their own tractors on occasion.
Given the sizes and layout of the plots many 
farmers tend to use animal traction along with 
mechanised implements. While the latter is used 
for the heavier and larger work such as pre-
planting soil preparation, the former is used for 
planting and harvesting of potatoes. However, 
as the farmers get used to the implements, or 
borrow suitable implement from neighbours, so 
this practice is declining. One farmer who rents 
farmland from one of the CPA members only 
uses animal traction as he is unwilling to pay the 
cost involved in using mechanisation. A clear ob-
servation over the past several years is that the 
layout of the farms and the size of the imple-
ments often make it difficult for the farmers to 
use the mechanised implements appropriately in 
the confined spaces. This is evident by the bad 
ploughing and crop spraying practices that are 
used. For example, some farmers plough down 
the gradient, rather than across the gradient, so 
that they can manoeuvre the tractor-mounted 
herbicide sprayer more easily. This leads to wa-
ter run-off problems.
During 2006 eight of the farmers reported own-
ing or having access to the mechanised or hand-
held implements for primary agricultural activi-
ties as indicated in Table 2.2.
Farmers had access to most of the mechanised 
implements recommended for commercially-ori-
ented agricultural production and most had ac-
cess to motor vehicles. More than half accessed 
and used animal traction on smaller areas and 
sometimes in between seasons for practical pur-
poses and also to reduce input costs. While non-
members of the local farmers association can hire 
many of the mechanised implements, some do 
not because the land they work is small. Animal 
traction is used, either borrowed or self-owned. 
These people feel that the cost and effort of us-
Implements Self-
Owned
Borrowed Hired   Self-
owned 
and hired
No 
Access
Tractor 7 1
Car 2 1 1 4
Bakkie (pickup truck) 3 1 1 3
Truck 1 1 6
Tractor mounted chemical sprayer 7 1
Tractor drawn plough 7 1
Horse drawn plough 4 1 3
Planter 1 6 1
Cultivator 5 3
Spade 8
Hand held hoe 5 3
Fork 8
Rake 6 2
Pick axe 8
Watering can 2 1 5
Wheelbarrow 5 2 1
Hosepipe 5 3
Sprinkler 2 1 3 2
Drip-irrigation system 8
Handheld pump sprayer for chemicals 4 1 3
Diesel or electric irrigation pump 1 6 1
Table 2.2: Respondents’ access to agricultural implements
32
Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.
ing the available mechanised implements is not 
worth the return. Similarly, if they hired these 
implements as often as they wanted, this would 
put pressure on all the farmers who wished to 
use them, members and non-members alike.
During the 2006 survey only one household out 
of the eight surveyed owned a tractor but along 
with the other seven households it also had ac-
cess to the tractor and implements owned and 
managed by the local CPA. Seven of the house-
holds, as members of this association, had access 
to irrigation equipment, including pipes, sprin-
klers and a pump. The other household reported 
having no access to irrigation equipment, mainly 
because there was no water source nearby. In 
fact only two of the households were farming 
land near the local irrigation network and could 
access the water that came into the two dams 
via this network.
Since obtaining their plots the active farmers 
have fenced in their land and most have re-
moved alien vegetation. Hakea trees are often 
used as fencing poles and droppers. The land 
held in trust is also enclosed but the alien veg-
etation has not been removed. People seldom 
venture on this land for any agricultural related 
purpose.
Production system
Farmers in the area grow a number of crops such 
as potatoes, green beans, beetroot, carrots, cab-
bage, maize, pumpkin and peas. The two main 
commercially produced crops are potatoes and 
pumpkin. Potatoes cover the largest portion of 
the fields at any particular time, so the data re-
ferred to in this case relate mainly to potato pro-
duction. Also, many of the other crops such as 
peas are only found in home gardens tended by 
female residents. The men initially planted car-
rots and beetroot, but the nematode problem 
discouraged them from continuing with this on 
a large scale. It has not, however, prevented the 
most active farmers from planting potatoes.
All the farmers interviewed reported that in this 
area there are two potato seasons in a twelve 
month period. However, one farmer pointed out 
that he only planted potatoes in winter because 
he experienced many problems with regard 
to water access during summer. In summer he 
would plant pumpkins as these were more toler-
ant to drought. As he was involved in contract 
farming he was able to sell his pumpkin harvest 
as he had a ready market for this crop. Seven 
of the respondents had planted and cultivated 
potatoes at some stage between 2003 and 2006. 
Only four had actually done this during the pre-
vious potato season, which was winter 2006. 
Those who had not, reported the following var-
ied responses: 
• one farmer was working with his brother 
and was experimenting with changing to 
cattle farming as crop farming inputs were 
becoming too costly and his employment 
was taking up too much of his time; 
• one farmer was ill for some time and had al-
lowed the land to fallow for the past three 
years but then planted pumpkins in 2005 
and potatoes in the 2006 summer season; 
• one farmer was still concerned with the 
nematode problem and had planted oats in 
an attempt to reduce the nematode popu-
lation; 
• one farmer had not planted at all as it was 
too dry in September 2005 and the access 
to water for irrigation purposes was a prob-
lem; also, this farmer was no longer plant-
ing as his wife had started to receive a pen-
sion and the household now had the ben-
efit of his and her pensions.
Most farmers considered production of potatoes 
for sale as the most important reason for engag-
ing in agriculture. One farmer, a pensioner, pro-
duced for household consumption and did not 
sell his harvest. All the farmers kept potatoes for 
seed and all ate some of their harvest. However, 
for seven of the farmers the primary purpose of 
production was cash income. Potatoes were not 
produced for any other purpose such as animal 
fodder.
Four of the respondents sold directly to local vil-
lagers from their homes or from their fields. Two 
farmers sold to hawkers who came to the village 
to purchase the pockets of potatoes. Only one 
farmer had access to the fresh produce market in 
one of the district towns, and this was a result of 
his farming in conjunction with his employer. The 
latter provided this access to the formal market 
in the form of contract farming and included his 
employee’s produce along with his own when 
travelling to the market. He also did all the price 
negotiating and marketing on behalf of himself 
and the employee. This farmer was not particu-
larly happy with this arrangement as he felt he 
was being under-rewarded by his employer.
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Irrigation of potatoes
Only four of the respondents actually irrigated 
their potatoes. The fact that the others did not 
can be attributed to the water problem on the 
farm, as previously discussed, and the fact that 
irrigation equipment was shared amongst the 
farmers who were members of the local associa-
tion. This last point meant that people often had 
to wait for others to finish irrigating their crops 
before the equipment was available. Of course 
when there was a dry spell everybody wanted 
to irrigate immediately. The four respondents 
who irrigated their potato crops all reported 
using sprayer irrigation, as this was the equip-
ment to which they had access. The sharing of 
irrigation equipment could lead to water stress 
of the crop. However, some sharing is still better 
than total dryland production, which is associ-
ated with higher risk. As has been mentioned, 
one farmer does not plant potatoes at all during 
summer in order to reduce his risk to crop failure 
from seasonal stresses and lack of sufficient ir-
rigation. Alternatively he plants pumpkins and 
has an established market for this crop.
Methods for obtaining seed potatoes
Farmers were asked where they sourced their 
seed from in an effort to identify the cultivars 
that are used and in an effort to determine 
the use of farmer-kept seed practices. The seed 
sources could explain some diseases experienced 
by farmers and the possible health status of the 
plants before they emerged. It would also indi-
cate the reliance of farmers on certain forms of 
seed supply such as self-stored or purchased tu-
bers. Farmers saved potatoes for seed and also 
purchased seed potatoes from a local producer 
and sometimes the local co-op. These activities 
were carried out irrespective of the cultivars and 
farmers predominantly bought what was avail-
able or what other farmers suggested. Farmers 
indicated that they kept seed from the previous 
season’s crop and when it came to planting for 
the next season they would purchase more seed 
depending on the quality and quantity of the 
saved seed and the size of the land they intend-
ed to plant. They did not always plant the same 
size of land every year or every season. With the 
exception of the farmer who was involved in 
contract farming with his employer, some might 
plant a hectare at a time but most planted a 
quarter to a half hectare every season. The rea-
son for this was the limited finances for inputs. 
The effectiveness of the seed planted could not 
be established as too many variables determine 
if these farmers buy seed or not. Generally most 
of the farmers purchased second generation 
tubers (uncertified) from a neighbouring large-
scale farmer because these proved cheaper than 
purchasing from the co-op. Combining the prac-
tice of planting uncertified and certified seed 
raises more questions than it answers. This is es-
pecially in light of the extremely short rotation 
cycle that these farmers use. If the seed is on 
the same fields, season after season, the effec-
tiveness of buying seed becomes questionable, 
especially if uncertified seed are infected with 
soil-borne diseases, as the two are often planted 
together. 
Potato variety preference
Farmers only cultivate BP1, Vanderplank, Astrid 
and Mondial. The order of preference in terms 
of area of land under cultivation is as follows: 
• All the respondents reported producing the 
potato variety BP1. BP1 is a versatile cultivar 
that has multiple uses and generally good 
yields. While one person reported that it 
was mainly grown for food purposes, the 
remaining seven all said that it was grown 
primarily for sales and then for food be-
cause it had a good taste and was readily 
available in the area. One of these seven 
reported that it was a good summer crop. 
Six of the respondents reported that most 
of their potato production area was primary 
planted with BP1. Five of the respondents 
ranked this as their preferred cultivar. 
• Four farmers indicated that they cultivated 
Vanderplank for food and one of these re-
ported that it was a good cultivar for winter 
sales. Only one of these four farmers con-
sidered this variety to be of primary impor-
tance in terms of area under cultivation. 
Two of the respondents ranked it as a high-
ly preferred cultivar. This cultivar tends to 
have a small but dedicated consumer group 
who prefer the taste and the fact that it 
does not go very soft when cooked. It is an 
excellent salad and French fry potato.
• The potato variety Astrid was cultivated by 
four of the farmers. Only one of the farmers 
considered it to be of primary importance 
in terms of area under cultivation and this 
farmer also ranked it as a highly preferred 
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cultivar. Astrid is a yellow coloured potato 
with a very specific taste that is preferred by 
some people. This cultivar is mainly grown 
in the western and southern parts of the 
Western Cape.
• Five of the farmers cultivated Mondial, and 
while all mentioned that they produced 
this variety mainly for sales, one of them 
reported that the fact that it was resistant 
to blight was an important reason for plant-
ing this variety. None of these respondents 
reported that Mondial was of primary im-
portance in terms of area under cultivation. 
Nor was it ranked as number one in terms of 
preference. Mondial is an imported cultivar 
that is slightly drought resistant.
Careful analysis of where farmers obtained their 
seed tubers and what they planted indicates 
that because BP1 was the most common potato 
that their seed supplier had it was consequently 
the most common one which they had access to 
and therefore planted. It was available locally at 
a cheaper price than that supplied at the co-op 
and this was the main reason it was purchased. 
Also, its versatility means that there is a market 
for it in the surrounding area. In essence the ap-
pearance is given that farmers will plant what is 
locally available as long as the yields are gener-
ally good and there is a market for the harvest.
Crop rotation patterns
In order to understand farmers’ crop rotation 
patterns, they were asked to indicate what crop 
they had planted in the two preceding plant-
ing seasons on the land where they had most 
recently planted potatoes. Previous experience 
had shown that most farmers had trouble re-
membering what was planted more than two 
seasons previously as most farmers do not record 
field histories. In an effort to get some idea of 
the rotation it was limited to just two seasons, 
as it tends to identify rotation with solanaceous 
and other unsuitable crops. At least six of the 
farmers have a rotation system that would gen-
erally be regarded as too short. It is suggested 
that the rotation for potatoes is every four years, 
thus limiting the build-up of soil-borne diseases 
that affect potatoes. One farmer indicated that 
his field was fallow for several seasons; howev-
er, the fallow period was due to his illness and 
was probably not normal practice. Poor rota-
tion practices of farmers need to be addressed, 
since this can lead to a build-up of diseases that 
can eventually lead to the loss of these soils for 
potato production. Crop rotation must take the 
farmers’ needs into consideration, as well as the 
specific agro-ecological environment where they 
farm. Making use of brassicas for biofumigation 
to help control nematodes (an important pest 
for them) and not planting host crops are very 
important strategies. Ensuring that no solana-
ceous plants are incorporated into the cycle is 
also very important. A four year crop rotation is 
seen as the best in most cases. Where crop rota-
tion is shorter the use of certified seed becomes 
crucial as the chances for infection of the soil 
with soil-borne diseases is reduced. However, 
this does not mean that a rotation shorter than 
four years is acceptable. These farmers need to 
get help from a knowledgeable potato produc-
tion person who would be able to help them 
establish the best rotation practice for their 
specific circumstances. Combining their fields to 
help establish a longer rotation is probably not 
an option as local farmers prefer to take respon-
sibility for their own land and crops. 
Support from the various state and parastatal 
research and extension services has not been 
forthcoming is this regard. Since farmers ob-
tained the farm in 1999 they planted potatoes. 
However, nobody has ever assisted the farmers 
to develop an appropriate crop rotation system 
based on the crops they selected to plant. This 
could be one factor that led to the rise in root-
knot nematodes after the first three years of 
production.
Potato storage practices
Farmers stored potatoes for three specific pur-
poses: food, seed and for sales. The latter prac-
tice – followed by only two of the farmers – was 
to allow them to introduce potatoes onto the 
market when prices might be more favourable, 
and is also common among local large-scale com-
mercial potato producers. However, this practice 
can be risky as market prices fluctuate and might 
not be favourable, and because storage condi-
tions are not necessarily such as to maintain the 
quality of the potatoes, typically for a period of 
about four months. While seven farmers stored 
potatoes for food purposes, all eight stored po-
tatoes for seed which they would plant in their 
next planting season.
Farmers were asked how they currently stored 
their ‘table potatoes’ (those they intend to 
consume) and seed potatoes. Cold storage was 
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unavailable in this village so none of the farm-
ers could make use of such a facility. The most 
common method for storing potatoes was either 
in bags or in crates in the store. Often individu-
al farmers made use of more than one storage 
means or facility. Use of a facility or storage type 
is dependent on availability of space and bags 
or crates in which to pack the stored potatoes. 
All respondents reported storing table potatoes 
in bags no matter what structure was used. Us-
ing bags for table potatoes helps limit exposure 
to light, thus preventing greening of the tubers. 
This is essential as they cannot sell green pota-
toes and greening breaks the dormancy of the 
tubers, thus causing sprouting. Consumers will 
buy neither green nor sprouting tubers, if they 
are aware that potatoes are in this stage.
A positive point is that the farmers do not store 
their tubers in the soil. This is especially fortu-
nate given their expressed root-knot nematode 
problems. This would increase nematode popu-
lations in the soil. The piling of seed on the floor 
can result in many storage losses due to rodents, 
poor ventilation and the diseases that are as-
sociated with this. Piling of tubers makes good 
management of seed during storage difficult 
to nearly impossible. Storage of seed potatoes 
in bags is not always the best, as the ventilation 
can be compromised if the wrong types of bags 
are used. Ventilation is one of the most impor-
tant aspects of successful storage, as the heat 
generated by respiration needs to be removed 
from the environment in order to prevent water 
from forming around the tubers and thus creat-
ing conditions for diseases. Storing loose tubers 
in crates or in thin layers tends to be the best 
method for storage under non-cold-room condi-
tions. The use of diffused light during the stor-
age of seed greens the tubers, breaks dormancy 
and encourages the formation of thick sprouts 
that do not easily break-off. Storage trials of 
seed at ARC-Roodeplaat and on-farm found this 
method to be effective for up to eight months.
Potato storage problems
Respondents were shown photographs of 23 
pests. They were asked to identify which of the 
pests they experienced as problems with regard 
to potato production, table potato storage and 
seed potato storage. Once the pests were identi-
fied, respondents were asked to rank them in or-
der of significance. The most significant problem 
was given a ranking of 1, the second a 2, and so 
on. With regard to problems encountered dur-
ing the storage of both food and seed potatoes, 
the most commonly identified problem was the 
presence of potato tuber moth larvae damage. 
In this village this damage was not originally at-
tributed to the potato tuber moth but in fact 
to mites. However, when the farmers examined 
the photographs of various pests and the dam-
age they cause, they identified this mite damage 
as being potato tuber moth damage. Although 
nematodes are mentioned as storage problems, 
they are actually a consequence of production 
rather than storage practices. The open method 
of seed storage (in piles, open on floor, in crates) 
can lead to tuber moth infestation at this stage, 
as the tubers are unprotected from tuber moths 
who can lay their eggs on these tubers. How-
ever, it is not always certain where the tuber 
moth problem comes from. Poor management 
practices in the field could result in infestation 
before or during harvesting. These farmers are 
well aware that steps to control nematodes and 
tuber moth should be implemented during pro-
duction. They were both identified during the 
discussions on storage as it was often only after 
periods of storage that the farmers uncovered 
the damage. Some basic production and storage 
training could help these farmers to minimise 
their losses. 
General potato production problems
In response to being asked what problems they 
generally encountered with regard to potato 
production the respondents provided the fol-
lowing information, presented here in terms of 
the frequency of responses:
• Lack of access to water (7 responses)
• Blight (6 responses)
• Nematodes (5 responses)
• Millipedes (3 responses).
In total the respondents reported fourteen prob-
lems, but the above list only refers to those that 
were mentioned by more than one respondent. 
Given the problems with the water supply for a 
large portion of the farm, it is not surprising that 
the lack of access to water ranked the highest. 
This has been a problem since the farm was ob-
tained and nine years later there does not seem 
to be any solution in the immediate to long-
term future. High levels of root knot nematode 
populations in the soil are another problem that 
has been around for a number of years. Some 
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farmers are trying to control the population by 
planting oats; however, there is some evidence 
that this might not be a good strategy for re-
ducing the population if the varieties are not re-
sistant to root knot nematodes. If the oats varie-
ties are resistant to the nematodes, they should 
assist in reducing the root knot nematode pop-
ulation in the soils. The soil population of root 
knot nematodes has been exacerbated by the 
presence of numerous Australian black wattle 
trees on the farm. These are hosts of root knot 
nematodes. Advice on integrated pest manage-
ment (IPM) that incorporates aspects of biofumi-
Input costs per hectare (oftr 
plant 0.25-o.5 ha in a setason)
How often purchased Amount purchased Actual 
Cost
Where purchased
Seed (tubers) Every season 3-4 X 25 kg crates @ 18 X R60 per 
crate
R3780 Neighbouring farm
Fertilisers
Fertiliser 2-3-4 30% Every season 2 X 50 kg per ha @ R486 per 50kg R902 Local depot
KAN/LAN 28% Every season 2 X 50 kg per ha @R400 per 50kg R556 Local depot
Fertiliser 101 44% Every season 2 X 50 kg per ha @R400 per 50kg R758 Local depot
Fertilisers (organic) 
None Insignificant and no cost   R0 None
Herbicide
Granazon Every season R400 per 5 litre but uses 2 litre per 
ha
R160 Local co-op
Pesticide
None     R0 None
Tractor use (R100 per hour 
includes implements, diesel and 
maintenance)
       
Soil preparation
Plough Every season 2 hours @ R100 per hour R200 Farmers association
Disc Every season 2 hours @ R100 per hour R200 Farmers association
Smooth Every season 2 hours @ R100 per hour R200 Farmers association
Plant        
Planter Every season 2 hours @ R100 per hour R200 Farmers association
Weed control        
Spray Every season 2 hours @ R100 per hour R200 Farmers association
Harvest        
Mechanical harvester Every season 2 hours @ R100 per hour for 2 days R400 Farmers association
Labour - only for harvesting and sorting
Female labour Every season 4-6 for 2 days @ R80 per labourer 
per day
R800 Neighbouring farm
Own transport for purchases 
and sales
Every season 100 km @ R2 per km R400 Own car
Rates on land Monthly R2.10 per month for 12 months R25  
Packaging Every season R1.20 per pocket R1200  
Total expenditure     R9982  
Table 2.3: Potato input costs as of August 2008
gation might help these farmers to reduce the 
nematode population, but this will only be ef-
fective if they change their rotation to four years 
(eight planting seasons). Given the small pieces 
of land actually planted this might well be pos-
sible. Blight and millipedes are also considered 
significant problems with regard to potato pro-
duction. However, during the interviews farmers 
said that these could be controlled if the correct 
chemical controls were applied when necessary. 
However, most farmers admitted not using these 
chemical controls due to the expense associated 
with them.
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Scenario 1 400 pockets @ R25 per pocket R10 000
Total Income (400 pockets) R10 000
Scenario 2 1000 pockets @ R25 per pocket R25 000
Total Income (1000 pockets) R25 000
Scenario 3 2000 pockets @ R25 per pocket R50 000
Total Income (2000 pockets) R50 000
Profit = Income - Expenditure  
Scenario 1 (400 pockets) - R18
Scenario 2 (1000 pockets) R15 018
Scenario 3 (2000 pockets) R40 018
Table 2.4: Profit from potatoes based on three different yield 
volumes
Economic aspects
Involvement in agricultural activities was pre-
dominantly for the purpose of supplementing 
household income, even for the two full-time 
farmers, with only the pensioners using it as a 
source of extra household food. Therefore, most 
households in this sample can possibly be con-
strued as being ‘resource-medium’. They had ac-
cess to some resources and tended to farm for 
more commercially-oriented purposes, although 
they consumed some of their produce and in 
many cases did not rely on their agriculture 
production for their main source of income. For 
most of this sample, agriculture was important 
for an extra food supply and also for generating 
an extra income. Generally, land for agricultural 
activities is small in this village. Even those now 
farming on two hectares or more reported ex-
periencing constraints which prevent them from 
scaling up their production.
During winter of 2006 and again in winter of 
2008, farm budgets were compiled with potato 
producers. In 2006 this was done in an attempt 
to determine the amount of money spent on in-
puts and what percentage this was of the house-
hold income. In 2008 a similar activity was car-
ried out but with the sole purpose of obtaining 
a general picture of the input costs associated 
with the production of potatoes amongst the 
commercially-oriented farmers, i.e. those pro-
ducing predominantly for household consump-
tion were excluded. In both instances the input 
costs per hectare and sales of per hectare yield 
was used to get the figures reported here. The 
figures for the expenses are indicated in Table 
2.3 and for income under three different yield 
volumes in Table 2.4. 
Farmers indicated that they do not get a consist-
ent yield every season and that it often depend-
ed on the quality of the tubers, the season (more 
in summer and less in winter) and access to ir-
rigation. They said that in their experience one 
could get anything from 400 to 2000 pockets 
per hectare depending on success of the plant-
ing. They felt that around 1000 pockets was the 
current average although one or two reported 
not getting much more than 400 -600 pockets, 
which meant they barely broke even. Profit is 
indicated below in Table 2.4 for three different 
scenarios.
One farmer indicated in 2008 that his input costs 
had doubled since the discussion in 2006. Oth-
ers were equally concerned. The contract farmer 
indicated that his input costs had also increased 
to almost double. For all the farmers increased 
input costs were a concern as yields did not im-
prove with the increased costs and the recent in-
crease in market prices had not really benefited 
them to any significant extent that they could 
claim an increase in profits as a result. Two of 
the farmers – the more commercially oriented of 
the group – indicated that potato farming was 
not really viable for them and that many of the 
neighbouring commercial farmers had moved 
away from potato production in recent years 
and were now planting other crops. They saw 
this as a clear indication that other crops were 
more viable. They mentioned pumpkin and but-
ternuts as a more viable summer crop because of 
their lower input costs and high yields. Planting 
potatoes without irrigation was also becoming 
a problem as they were realising that the yields 
in winter were less than in summer, but in order 
to maximise summer planting they required ir-
rigation. 
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However, in an interesting turn of events, the 
farmers who have recently become most active 
tend to be those who are situated the furthest 
from the irrigation dams; these are the farmers 
whose plots are closer to the village, and thus 
for whom combining farming and other liveli-
hood activities is most convenient.
Some of the SLAG beneficiaries have cattle on 
their land, although these are mainly those who 
do not plant crops. Discussions were held to de-
termine the viability of cattle rearing and sell-
ing. All the farmers who had at some time kept 
cattle reported that this was not really an enter-
prise. Rather, the cattle performed the function 
of a savings account which could be accessed 
when required. The return was fairly good and 
the input costs were minimal. Those who no 
longer practised this said it was not a viable way 
of saving money because if the cattle died you 
lost all your money. They also said that they did 
not have sufficient land with adequate grazing 
capacity. Most of those who did not keep cat-
tle suggested that it was only the poorer house-
holds who did so. However, observations clearly 
illustrated that this was not the case. People had 
various reasons for keeping cattle and access to 
different resources. These determined the care 
that the cattle were given. The figures given in 
Table 2.5 below are reported for what can be 
considered the general costs incurred to rear a 
calf in the manner practised by most households 
who planted feed and occasionally used commu-
nal land for grazing. Those who only used com-
munal land would spend less money. Animals 
were usually sold off after three years but this 
was by no means a rule. The current expected 
price was between R2700 and R3200 per animal 
after three years. The figures illustrate that if the 
animal has no serious illnesses and the owner 
experiences no uncommon expenses, then cash 
costs are less than half of cash earnings.
Policy aspects
It can be realistically argued that the South Af-
rican Government does not really have any rea 
l policy with regard to addressing the needs of 
smallholder farmers. It can also be strongly ar-
gued that any policies that are aimed at bringing 
about agrarian reform in South Africa are largely 
commercially oriented and focus specifically on 
supporting groups rather than individuals. The 
SLAG aspect of the land reform programme is a 
good example of this group focus and as noted 
above it resulted in the active farmers having to 
co-opt a number of predominantly non-farmers 
into the CPA in order to access land. While the 
successor to SLAG – the Land Redistribution for 
Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme 
– has somewhat reduced the pressure for appli-
cants to form groups, it tends to ignore the poor 
and especially resource-poor farmers. According 
to officials with the Western Cape Provincial De-
partment of Agriculture, the SLAG beneficiaries 
in this village are entitled to submit applications 
under the LRAD support programme. However, 
this has been done by very few as the funding 
is predominantly for infrastructure development 
and not for implements and solutions to indi-
vidual problems, etc. The store was built from 
some of this money. It seems that the water 
constraints cannot be addressed under this sup-
port programme as it is too costly an exercise. 
With the arrival of an Agricultural Development 
Officer in the village, some of the beneficiaries 
have accessed funds from the Comprehensive 
Agricultural Support Programme (CASP). How-
ever, they have had to do this in groups and 
these are all new projects and do not necessarily 
build on existing activities. Only one land reform 
beneficiary really has anything to do with this 
Agricultural Development Officer. Others argue 
that this official has nothing to offer except pig-
geries and household gardens. None of the cur-
rent problems are being addressed such as the 
water problem and the high price of inputs.
Social and institutional 
aspects
Besides organising the occasional training 
course, suggesting and financing the occasional 
project and providing some advice, local state 
agricultural extension does not interfere with 
farmers’ activities. The establishment of the 
mechanisation centre has been useful to farm-
ers. Farmers in the village, more specifically the 
land reform beneficiaries, have access to one 
tractor and associated implements. However, 
non-beneficiaries generally do not make use of 
this facility unless they are farming large tracts 
of land. Probably because numbers are small 
and some farmers have their own mechanised 
implements, they did not emphasise access to 
mechanisation as a constraint. Also evident from 
the time spent in the village is that there is a 
lot of conflict around the care and payment for 
the use of the implements at the centre. One 
concern was that many people were abusing 
the implements and accurate records were not 
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being kept. Consequently, this compounded by 
the low hourly tariff would prevent the future 
replacement of the tractor. The mechanisation 
centre is seen as useful and a necessity in order 
to access mechanised implements, but some feel 
that it has brought its own set of problems. Simi-
larly, the CPA very seldom meets and this means 
that problems or uncomfortable issues are never 
resolved. 
Farmers cultivating on the land reform farm 
tended to exchange information and also to 
share inputs when appropriate. Exchange of 
information was common between peers. Of-
ten during discussions over the years farmers 
reported to the researcher that they conducted 
certain agricultural practices. However, it was 
later uncovered through participant observation 
that they in fact did not carry out these prac-
tices because they were expensive. The rationale 
for telling these ‘white lies’ appears to be that 
these farmers were aware from other farmers 
that these were ‘good commercial practices,’ 
and did not want to be seen wanting. It also 
became evident over the years that farmer-to-
farmer exchange is most often between peers 
and family members and not between different 
age groups, making it difficult for the young to 
learn from older residents.
Peers noticed that they did not always trust one 
or two of their number and as a result would not 
collaborate with a particular person or persons 
when it came to farming together. One must re-
call that the first group farming activity in the 
village was seen as a disaster by most of those 
involved. Also, it seems that local and often 
long-term disagreements prevent people from 
working together.
Local farmers and particularly the beneficiar-
ies have always cooperated well with outside 
Input How often 
purchased
Amount 
purchased
Cost per 
unit
Where 
purchased
Cost of 1 
livestock 
unit for 
three 
years if 
purchased
Calves 0 0 R200 - R320 Neighbouring 
farmer
R300
Breeding services 1 per year 1 service R50 - 100 Local bull 
owner
R75
Feed (planting of 
oats)
2 per year 8 50 kg bags 
per year
R86 per bag Co-op R229
Growth accelerator 
feed
1 bag per calf and 
mother for first year
1 bag 50 kg R120 Co-op R120
Block of vitamins 1 block per year 1 block for 
all the cows
R85 Co-op R85
Actoban 1 per year 250 ml R90 Co-op R270
Tick fever, 
Redwater - 
Teramycin
1 per year 250 ml R80 - R110 Co-op R300
Shelter Once only R500 R500 Hardware 0
Fencing Once only R1 500 1 ha - 2 ha Co-op 0
Maintenance When necessary R100 R100 Co-op 0
Total R1379
Table 2.5: Cattle rearing costs and return for a single 
livestock unit over three years
40
Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.
agencies such as the Department of Agricul-
ture, Department of Land Affairs, Agricultural 
Research Council and various non-government 
organisations. This cooperation was historically 
extended to local large-scale farmers, on whose 
farms some residents worked and elder residents 
enjoyed good relationships. Relationships with 
many of these organisations has enabled them 
to obtain many of the resources they require for 
farming, such as land, inputs, implements and 
some technical knowledge. Those beneficiar-
ies, especially the active farmers, who see these 
relationships as being valuable, are hesitant to 
criticise and go to great lengths to keep up good 
relations. It is felt by maintaining these relation-
ships more resources may be obtained in the fu-
ture.
Six farmers purchase their seeds, plant mate-
rial and agrochemicals from the co-operative 
in the nearest town. However, many of these 
also purchase potato tubers from a local com-
mercial grower in the area, seemingly because 
the price is significantly less. These tubers are 
second generation and are not certified, hence 
their significantly lower price. Most of the ferti-
lisers are bought at the local depot because this 
is closer than the co-operative and also because 
a local farmer has agreed to pay their value-
added-tax, making their cost significantly lower. 
The co-operative only seems to be a source of 
agrochemicals in the form of weedkiller. Other 
inputs are only purchased from the co-operative 
when they are not available locally. Generally, 
most of the active farmers have a good relation-
ship with local large-scale farmers. Often imple-
ments are lent and advice is given. On a few oc-
casions large-scale farmers have also given old 
implements and tractors to local farmers. There 
appears to be a good supportive relationship 
here but again it is largely between the older 
and active farmers and their large-scale peers. 
One farmer who had no access to a motor vehi-
cle purchased his seeds and plant material from 
the local general dealer in the village or he ob-
tained these from other farmers in the village. 
He also obtained his agrochemicals in this fash-
ion but indicated that he did not use very much. 
The contract farmer obtained all his seeds, plant 
material and agrochemicals from his employer 
of 22 years on credit. He repaid these debts from 
the sales of his harvest, which as mentioned 
above was marketed by his employer. The other 
seven respondents had accessed neither formal 
markets nor credit facilities. However, in respect 
of markets, this is mainly because they preferred 
to get paid at the point of sale (whereas with 
formal markets there is often a considerable 
delay), produced at too modest a scale to jus-
tify marketing at great distances, and generally 
were unable or unwilling to cooperate with one 
another in order to market collectively. How-
ever, with regard to credit, one permanently 
employed farmer had previously made use of a 
Land Bank loan to purchase a second-hand trac-
tor, but was disappointed at the interest rates 
charged at the time of his loan in 2001. In 2008 
he was still repaying this loan after eight years 
because of the increasing interest rates.
The human dimension
Historically farming is a male activity in this vil-
lage and very few women are actively engaged 
in any form of agriculture. In 2002 a daughter 
of a beneficiary inherited her father’s land when 
he died. She planted a wide variety of vegeta-
bles on the land but water constraints eventually 
made her stop this activity. Her husband now 
uses the land to graze cattle. She is busy with a 
chicken layer project and manages this with an-
other villager. 
The arrival of the Agricultural Development Of-
ficer in the village in 2005 saw five women get 
involved in household gardening using rainwa-
ter harvesting technologies supplied by the De-
partment of Agriculture.
At present all the potato and other vegetable 
production on the farmland is done by male 
beneficiaries.
Farmers have received ad hoc training from vari-
ous sources over the years starting in about 1996, 
soon after they had established the CPA, as part 
of the requirements to apply for the SLAG. The 
Department of Agriculture has provided training 
to some of the farmers, both beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries. This has included pig farming, 
vegetable production, layer production, some 
advice on cattle husbandry and also training on 
crop spraying and irrigation scheduling. Two 
beneficiaries were trained in tractor mainte-
nance and driving. However, it is the opinion of 
the author that the farmers need more training 
in some of these skills along with more regular 
support and advice. Currently they get no advice 
from the extension services and only one of the 
active beneficiaries and farmers was aware of 
the presence of the Agricultural Development 
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Officer. Discussions with this person indicated 
that she was aware of many of the social con-
straints experienced by the farmers but was not 
aware of technical constraints due to virtually no 
interaction with most of the active farmers.
The Agricultural Research Council had conduct-
ed a few courses on general soil preparation and 
crop management in 2000 and 2001, but this was 
largely focused on fynbos cultivation which only 
one farmer experimented with. They also pro-
vided a series of business development courses 
in 2003 and 2004 that were well attended. How-
ever, these unfortunately clashed with benefi-
ciaries’ other commitments and many were un-
able to attend. 
During the 2006 survey two of the respondents 
reported that they had no access to agricultural 
training and a third reported the use of his ex-
perience of 22 years as a farmworker on a com-
mercial farm in the area. Five of the respondents 
received agricultural training and advice from 
the local office of the Provincial Department of 
Agriculture when this was available. This includ-
ed attendance of some of the courses indicated 
previously. One reported getting his advice 
exclusively from other farmers. During discus-
sions it became clear that all those in the sam-
ple shared experiences and practical advice with 
one another at some stage. They also used one 
another as sources to obtain inputs or at least to 
get an idea of what the purchase price of inputs 
should be. There is a potential within this group 
for sharing information and experience, but it is 
limited to peers. However, farmers do not want 
to farm communally and prefer being in charge 
of their production activities. 
Household livelihoods
During the 2006 survey the following profile of 
livelihoods was obtained and in 2008 a review of 
this status illustrated that it was unchanged over 
the past two years. Two of the respondents were 
full-time farmers and both received disability 
pensions (one private and one from the state). 
However, they both engaged in other off-farm 
income generating activities when the situation 
arose. Five of the farmers considered themselves 
to be part-time farmers with full-time employ-
ment, either in the village or in the surround-
ing area. However, their actual involvement in 
agriculture depended largely on the time they 
had available and their desire to experiment 
with new sources of livelihoods. One person was 
a pensioner whose agricultural activities had de-
clined in recent years due to old age, ill-health 
and the fact that his wife was now receiving a 
pension. In essence, all respondent households 
had some other form of income besides that de-
rived from agricultural activities. This status ap-
plies generally to all the SLAG beneficiaries as 
most were employed or received social grants 
at the time they applied for and eventually ob-
tained the farm. While sometimes considered 
an important source of income for rural house-
holds, none of the respondent households re-
ceived any form of remittances from members 
residing outside the household. In any event 
they all indicated that agriculture was not the 
primary livelihood of the household.
State social grants do not constitute an impor-
tant contribution to most of the households, 
except for one household that was dependant 
on two state pensions as the sole form of cash in-
come. Only three of the other seven households 
received at least one social security grant. The 
mean annual income derived from formal em-
ployment for the remaining seven households 
was R31 714 with a minimum of R5 400 and maxi-
mum of R63 600 per annum. The sample mean 
for annual income derived from formal employ-
ment for the eight households was R27 750 and 
the median R23 100. Only two households had 
members engaged in part-time employment and 
their average annual income from this source 
was R10 200. 
Annual income generated from the production 
and sale of crops was estimated between R1500 
and R20 000. Only seven households were cur-
rently engaged in this activity. While one house-
hold was realising a value of R100 per annum 
from household consumption of their agricul-
tural produce, six were realising between R1000 
and R2000 per annum. One household had not 
produced any food crops during the 12 month 
2005/2006 period under review. This situation 
remained approximately the same when further 
enquiries were made in 2008.
None of the respondent households had gener-
ated any income from animal production as no 
animals had been sold during the period. Six 
households reported not consuming any animals 
during the period. For those two households that 
had consumed livestock, one reported realising 
a value of R100 per annum and the other a value 
of R2000. It appears that very few households 
consume livestock and seem to only sell livestock 
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in specific instances. Sometimes, a particular 
animal would be purchased four or five months 
before it was intended for slaughter, e.g. for a 
feast or special occasion such as Christmas. This 
was especially the case if it could be obtained at 
a good price. When clarity was sought on these 
points it was indicated that livestock, in partic-
ular cattle, are an investment and are used by 
households as a form of savings. They are sold 
when the household needs money for some-
thing specific. Even where households were try-
ing to build up their numbers of livestock, these 
were not to be sold on a regular basis but when 
the household needed some extra income. 
The total annual household income was calcu-
lated by including the above sources, except for 
the in-kind values as these proved uncertain due 
to possible under-reporting. In this village the 
value of R100 in a year from one household does 
not seem correct. The total annual income for 
the households ranged from R19 680 to R83 600 
with a mean of R46 318. None of the households 
had a total annual income from agriculture 
that exceeded total annual income from other 
sources. This suggests that agricultural activities 
were predominantly for the purpose of supple-
menting household income. However, for one of 
the respondents the income derived from agri-
culture slightly exceeded personal income from 
other sources. For another it was only slightly 
less than income from other sources. Table 2.6 
indicates the percentage of household income 
spent on agricultural inputs and the percent-
age contribution of agriculture to household 
income. Given the fact that income is often 
under-reported and expenses are over-reported, 
these figures should be treated with caution. At 
best they indicate a pattern rather and a fixed 
income or expenditure.
From Table 2.6 we can see that six of the house-
holds were getting a better percentage return 
on household income when investments in ag-
riculture were made. But for some this return 
was not that great when compared with other 
households. Interestingly enough, household 8 
was following conventional practices and the 
return on income in terms of input costs was 
not remarkable when compared to some of the 
other households. Household 1 can be explained 
away by the fact that the respondent was no 
longer actively involved in household food crop 
production because of his age and health and 
it is likely that he was unable to recall accurate 
figures. It is also probable that he could not cal-
culate the correct return on his investment, as 
the figures he cited for return on investment 
were very low (R100/annum). The performance 
of household 5 is understood by the fact that the 
farmer had sown oats to improve the soil health 
and that he had only planted a small portion of 
food crops. 
Local significance of 
agriculture
During 2006 farmers were asked a number of 
questions with regard to their agricultural prac-
tices for household food security, as a source of 
income, production patterns, input expenditure 
trends and general agricultural trends over the 
previous five years. The purpose was to get some 
idea of the changes in agriculture as a significant 
Respondent HH Annual HH input 
expenditure
% income spent on 
agricultural inputs
% contribution of 
agriculture to HH 
income
1 420 2.0 1.0
2 1100 2.8 35.9
3 1295 3.5 0.0
4 1380 1.8 11.7
5 1720 4.5 6.7
6 2485 6.7 45.8
7 5430 6.5 26.3
8 19700 46.9 50.0
Table 2.6: Percentage of household income spent on 
agricultural inputs and the percentage contribution of 
agriculture to household income
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source of food or income and also to see what 
changes had taken place with regard to input 
expenditure, which is often considered to be an 
important constraint to agricultural participa-
tion.
One farmer reported that agriculture had be-
come less important as a source of food during 
the past five years because his wife started re-
ceiving her state pension during this period and 
his health was declining due to his age. Also, he 
was not a beneficiary of the land reform pro-
gramme and only had access to approximately 
a 0.5 hectare piece of land which was exclusively 
rain-fed. The other seven reported that agricul-
ture had become more important. Six reported 
that increased access to land had allowed them 
to produce fresher and cheaper food for their 
households. One reported that improved access 
to land enabled increased production for both 
household consumption and sales. Two of the 
respondents noted that agriculture had become 
less important for them as a source of income. 
One pointed out that it was never a source of in-
come as produce was used exclusively for house-
hold consumption. The second said that his oth-
er enterprise (non-agricultural) required fewer 
inputs and was a better source of income if one 
considered the input expenditure required for 
the two different income generating activities. 
He farmed with his brother who was in the same 
line of off-farm work. Later discussions indicated 
that the brother felt the same way. The other re-
spondents gave the following individual replies:
• One accessed land from land reform ben-
eficiaries who did not farm, so he was now 
able to produce more and sell more of the 
surplus;
• Few village residents plant crops and those 
that do have only small pieces of land, 
therefore there is a good local market;
• One farmer felt that access to more land 
meant it was now cheaper to plant for 
household consumption and for sales;
• Agriculture and subsequent sales helps im-
prove the household’s standard of living;
• Agriculture increases household income 
and pays for cost of school-going child’s 
education;
• Agriculture both reduces household income 
expenditure on food and brings in an extra 
income.
With regard to household expenditure on inputs 
during the previous five years, one respond-
ent noted that less was being spent at present 
because he now farmed much less than he did 
previously. The remaining seven currently spent 
more on agricultural inputs. One reported that 
the increase in expenditure was a result of the 
increasing costs of inputs, although he was not 
always buying more as the size of his land un-
der production varied seasonally. Three farmers 
noted that the high price of inputs was the sole 
reason for spending more on inputs. The other 
three also cited the high costs of inputs but not-
ed that they were farming more land than they 
had been five years previously. Generally, input 
costs had increased but the impact of this dif-
fered from individual to individual according to 
their different farming activities.
Identity
Land reform beneficiaries in the village who 
were still actively producing crops in 2008, and 
those other farmers who were now farming on 
the land that belonged to other beneficiaries, 
felt strongly that for a farmer to be successful 
one had to have farming ‘in the blood’. A per-
son needs to know how to work with the soils, 
the crops, water and the environment and needs 
the knowledge and experience to do this. It was 
strongly felt that to be a farmer one must have 
a love for farming, otherwise one cannot truly 
be a farmer. The person must also be willing to 
experiment with new ideas and have sufficient 
money to farm. All the farmers raised the prob-
lem of the rising costs of inputs and that often 
the rising food prices were not enough to set-
off these costs, so profits remained low. None 
of them felt that they could make a living ex-
clusively from farming and relied on pensions, 
disability grants, and permanent and occasional 
off-farm employment. The two farmers with dis-
ability grants were adamant that they also need-
ed to do occasional off-farm work in order to 
survive and were both fortunate that their wives 
worked. 
The contract farmer makes a living from on-
farm employment as a farm worker and also 
through farming the land he has borrowed from 
two SLAG beneficiaries, so in some sense he 
derives an income exclusively from agriculture, 
but not from ‘own agriculture’. He is far from 
happy with the arrangement with his employer 
who dictates what crops should be planted and 
how much is required. If the farmer wants to 
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plant more that is fine but the employer does 
not guarantee that he will market the extra pro-
duce. There is also discord regarding the money 
put on credit and that received after the crops 
are harvested and sold. Consequently, this does 
not seem to be a happy relationship, although 
it has been going on for almost four years and 
the farm worker is not willing to stop. Also, the 
relationship increases this small-scale farmers’ 
household income significantly and it also raises 
his prestige amongst the SLAG beneficiaries who 
farm similar crops, who respect his ability to pro-
vide information on inputs, pest, diseases and 
prices. But at the same time they are jealous that 
he is able to enjoy the support and cooperation 
from his employer, despite any problems that 
he may have with this relationship. He is able to 
farm up to two hectares of crops during a season 
with this support. None of the beneficiaries are 
able to do this.
Environment
The farming operations are so small that their 
effect on the environment at present seems 
insignificant. Very little land is actually under 
cultivation during any one year on the recently 
acquired farm. Apart from the contract farmer, 
those who are farming seldom use any pesti-
cides. Their use of herbicides is of much less 
cause for concern than that of their large-scale 
neighbours. The trust land has never been used 
for agricultural purposes since it was obtained in 
1999. It was used for grazing by a few livestock 
owners in the beginning but this practice has 
stopped due to its unsuitability: cattle died from 
tick fever and some broke free into neighbour-
ing farmland. In any event, livestock numbers in 
the village are relatively small. Those owned by 
the SLAG beneficiaries and a few other residents 
are grazed in enclosed camps and fodder is 
planted for them. A few local residents make use 
of a neighbouring large tract of enclosed land 
to graze their cattle. However, the beneficiaries 
do not use this land as the ownership thereof 
is under dispute and a claim has been submit-
ted by a group of village residents to the Land 
Claims Commission. In general the beneficiaries 
make use of conventional agricultural practices 
which are neither organic nor environmentally 
friendly. However, their use of agrochemicals is 
very limited. One concern in this regard is the 
observation that none of them wears any pro-
tective clothing when spraying. 
The future
Generally, the various farmers consulted over 
the years are far from optimistic about the fu-
ture of agriculture. Some were concerned about 
the recent sales of land by three of the SLAG 
beneficiaries to outsiders whom they did not 
know. They believed that this meant that the 
farm land was being taken out of circulation and 
that if they ever needed to expand in the future 
this land would become less and less if the trend 
to sell off the land continued. Some of the land 
that was on the market was that next to the 
main irrigation dam and this might complicate 
their access to this water. The lack of a solution 
to their water problem and the continual rising 
cost of agricultural inputs were regularly re-
ported as concerns. One farmer has emphasised 
over the years that while his father was able to 
support and educate a family of eleven mem-
bers as a sharecropper; this would be impossible 
to do nowadays. Another farmer reported that 
agriculture appeared to become more techno-
logically advanced with each year. He cited the 
example of the increased diversification of ag-
ricultural activities among many neighbouring 
farmers, including into tunnel farming. He said 
that obtaining the latest technology required in-
creased capital expenditure and also more land. 
He summed up these changes by noting that the 
small-scale farmer would not be able to do this 
as both the finances and the land were extreme-
ly limited. The water problem was the biggest 
constraint for farming and he said that even if 
agriculture was not becoming so technologically 
advanced, the beneficiaries would always have a 
problem because of the water constraints.
A number of farmers in the village and land re-
form beneficiaries were interviewed to deter-
mine how their production trends and those in 
the village had changed since 1999. Most ben-
eficiaries who had been consistently active since 
1999 noted that they had been very involved in 
preparing their land and in producing vegeta-
bles in the first three years. However, these ac-
tivities had declined for various reasons. Some 
beneficiaries noted that they were produc-
ing more crops since 1999 as a result of access 
to more land and the fact that over the ensu-
ing years they had developed more experience 
in farming. One farmer attributed this to ac-
cessing more land but indicated that access to 
a tractor and associated implements were also 
major contributing factors. The farmer who was 
engaged in contract farming pointed out that 
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due to some beneficiaries not making use of the 
land he was able to borrow land in the village. 
In 2008 he was farming two hectares of land 
(and would be / had been? for three years) and 
had access to at least another two to three hec-
tares. In 2004 he had not farmed in the village. 
As a result of this relationship and that with his 
employer, contract farming was increasing his 
household income by almost 100%.
Responses during discussions on whether agri-
cultural activities were generally increasing or 
decreasing in the village were mixed. Some felt 
that it was decreasing and gave the following 
reasons:
• Married couples were getting grants for 
their children these days so households had 
more disposable income. Consequently, 
fewer households were planting crops in 
their home gardens. 
• It was also reported that the youth (includ-
ing those in their thirties) are increasingly 
uninterested in farming and while many 
farmers recalled helping their fathers or 
their uncles when they were young they 
noted that this trend had stopped. Howev-
er, some youth are interested in agriculture 
but have no access to land.
• High input costs have put farming out of the 
reach of many households so people with 
small pieces of land farmed less or stopped 
altogether. Money is now spent on bought 
food rather than on the production thereof.
• Only a few of the households and the land 
reform beneficiaries are actually engaged in 
agricultural activities. Some are no longer 
involved due to ill-health or old age. There-
fore, they are no longer able to farm as ef-
ficiently as they had done previously.
One person felt that people were farming more 
because some now had access to large pieces of 
land. He was considering output and area un-
der cultivation rather than the number of lo-
cal people engaged in farming. Other residents 
mentioned that the agricultural activities in the 
village as a whole had largely remained un-
changed and gave the following reasons: 
• There was no significant change in agricul-
tural activities in terms of the number of 
people involved or the extent of land under 
cultivation. People had simply shifted from 
the commonages to the newly acquired 
farm. However, this argument appears un-
sound as the commonage has not been used 
for many years and houses now take up a 
large part of it.
• Receipt of land from the state land reform 
programme meant that some people now 
farm on bigger pieces of land and thus pro-
duce more, placing greater emphasis on 
commercial production. This does not mean 
that the numbers of people engaged in ag-
riculture have increased. Often these have 
decreased but people are now able to farm 
larger areas of land.
• Generally households tended to plant less 
because land was scarce in the village. Only 
a few households and farmers planted at 
present. This was a trend that had started 
in the 1960s with the rising population and 
the scaling down of land (commonages) al-
located for agricultural activities.
The author’s perception, based on several years 
of work in the village, is that agricultural activi-
ties have decreased at household level and also 
on the land received from the state. However, 
those few beneficiaries still planting crops on 
the land received from the state seemed to be 
doing so more intensively and indicated that 
their incomes were improving as a result of their 
increased farming experience and access to this 
land, despite occasional seasonal mishaps such 
as dry spells or flooding. In terms of numbers of 
people actively involved in agriculture in the vil-
lage, the current impression is that this has de-
clined. However, it is also clear that none of the 
active beneficiaries farm all their land at any one 
time. There are a number of reasons for this and 
the most commonly mentioned one is the cost of 
inputs and the water constraints which prevent 
them from planting more than about half a hec-
tare to a particular crop. Often only one hectare 
of any crop is planted in a particular season. On 
the other hand the contract farmer who is sup-
ported by his employer never plants less than 
two hectares of crops during a season. His area 
of land under cultivation is decided each season 
by his employer. 
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Introduction and history 
Prince Albert is a village located in the south 
eastern part of the Great Karoo in the Western 
Cape. It is situated at the foot of the Swartberg 
Mountains and this location provides a strange 
situation where there are significant water re-
sources for agriculture close to the mountain, 
from water that flows to the area from the other 
side of the range, but it decreases rapidly within 
a few kilometres from the town. The rainfall in 
the area is between 150-200 mm per year and 
thus it is a semi-arid area. 
Small-scale farmers have been farming in and 
around Prince Albert for many years but this 
farming has been on existing portions of munici-
pal land (which is not large in size) and on other 
land obtained through ad hoc negotiations with 
current land owners. This meant that their enter-
prises were severely constrained and many live-
stock farmers have had to sell their stock when 
such conditions have become too restrictive. 
In the late 1990s, the farmers gathered into 
three farmers’ groups based on particular activi-
ties – pig farmers, vegetable farmers and small 
stock farmers (primarily sheep and goat) – and 
also to lobby jointly for more land as the Prince 
Albert Small-scale Farmers Association. The tar-
get of their request was the municipality and the 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). After differ-
ent options were explored it was decided that 
the Municipal Commonage route would be fol-
lowed.5 In association with the Department of 
Agriculture (DoA) and the DLA, the Treintjies-
rivier farm was identified and acquired. The 
land was to be held by the Municipality and to 
be farmed by the local emerging farmers in the 
Association. 
Commonage policy
Most of the towns in the Western Cape and 
Northern Cape have acquired land over the last 
150 years which became designated as munici-
pal commonage. Such land was granted to the 
municipalities by churches, by individuals and by 
the national state (or Crown) and was granted 
for the specific use of the residents of the town.6 
Such municipal commonage land, because it is 
acquired as a result of a grant (as opposed to 
being bought by the municipality) becomes land 
of a special type with specific constraints on the 
sale and other adjustments to it. Moreover, the 
cost to the user of that land should only be to 
ensure the maintenance of the land and other 
assets – it should not be used for the generation 
of additional income by the owner, i.e. the mu-
nicipality (Anderson and Pienaar, 2003).
Under Apartheid, commonage land increasing-
ly became reserved for white people only, and 
over the years, increasingly became more pri-
vatised – most often being subject to a contrac-
tual arrangement with an individual commercial 
farmer, with market-related rentals attached. 
This was contrary to the law related to the use 
of commonage. 
With the introduction of the White Paper on 
Land Policy introduced by the Department of 
Land Affairs in 1997 (Department of Land Affairs, 
1997), the Department brought back the concept 
of municipal commonage for the use of the com-
munity. It introduced a municipal commonage 
policy with an associated grant to municipalities 
in order to acquire such land and ensure that the 
infrastructure and resources were in sufficient 
good order for the use of people in the town. 
A number of requirements were included with 
3 Prince Albert Commonage: 
diverse individual and group 
enterprises on municipal 
commonage land
David Mayson, Phuhlisani Solutions
5  The Municipal Commonage 
programme is one DLA’s ‘redis-
tribution products’, alongside 
SLAG, LRAD, etc. 
6  This was the era before 
South Africa had ‘wall-to-wall’ 
municipalities, rather the ‘mu-
nicipality’ generally referred to 
the jurisdiction of a town. 
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Figure 3.1: Location of Prince Albert
Source: Municipal Demarcation Board
The documentary sources include the following: 
• Government reports and policies including 
the White Paper; the Commonage Policy; 
the Grants and Services documents of the 
Department of Land Affairs; the Compre-
hensive Agricultural Support Policy (Depart-
ment of Agriculture); and others.
• Specific plans and reports on the common-
age project and the Treintjiesrivier farm, in-
cluding the initial land reform business plan 
for the acquisition of the land; applications 
for the CASP and Land Care Funding; the 
Constitution of the Commonage Commit-
tee; agricultural plans for the Truitjiesrivier 
as a whole as well as for specific portions.
• Contracts between the specific farmers and 
the Mohair South Africa, Klein Karoo Seed 
Marketing (Pty) Ltd, National Development 
Agency and the Municipality.
• Legal documents of the Farmers Association 
and the Onion Producers. 
Semi-structured interviews were undertaken 
with the following people:
• Emerging farmers
this grant: 1) that a notarial deed be placed on 
the property to ensure that it was used for the 
purpose for which it was bought and to place a 
constraint on the sale of the land (the Premier 
of the province must authorise such a sale); 2) 
that a commonage committee be established to 
manage the land (Department of Land Affairs, 
2005); and so forth. 
The Commonage Policy expressly aims to pro-
vide access to land for two primary purposes: for 
food security purposes, and as an initial stepping 
stone for those emerging farmers who want ac-
cess to land from which to expand further. Im-
portantly, commonage land only provides lease-
hold rights – the land remains the property of 
the municipality. 
Methodology 
The methodology used for project-specific in-
formation and analysis was essentially primary 
research in the form of documentation collec-
tion and analysis; semi-structured interviews and 
observation. In addition, documentation regard-
ing the related policy, industry specific informa-
tion, and other more general information was 
obtained and analysed. 
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• Officials from the Department of Land Af-
fairs and the Department of Agriculture.
• Officials from Mohair South Africa and from 
Klein Karoo Seed Marketing.
• Municipal councillors and officials.
A number of visits were undertaken to the farm 
and it was during these visits that most of the 
interviews with farmers took place. At the same 
time, the condition of the animals, the infrastruc-
ture and the natural vegetation was observed as 
were the relationships between the different 
parties in their working operations. 
Natural and physical resources 
and farm layout
The farm Treintjiesrivier (portion 1 of the farm 
Damascus no.153 in the Prince Albert area) was 
purchased in 2005. The farm is situated 6 kilo-
metres west of Prince Albert and has a harsher 
climatic aspect than properties situated on the 
east, where river systems are stronger. It is locat-
ed on the edge of the mountain range and thus 
includes mountain land as well as ‘karoo plains’.
The size of the farm is 5580 hectares and in-
cludes the following resources, according to the 
valuation report submitted to the DLA at the 
time of purchase:
As the table above highlights, the previous 
owner used the land for both arable and graz-
ing purposes and farmed with onion seed and 
lucerne and, in addition, raised ostrich chicks on 
contract to ostrich farmers in the Oudtshoorn 
area. 
The Department of Agriculture undertook a 
soil potential assessment of the area where the 
previous owner cultivated. The assessment was 
divided into 6 profile areas. The dominant soil 
form is Oakleaf 2120 and Oakleaf 2220, both of 
which the Department indicates provide medi-
um to high potential for vegetable production. 
One area on this section of the farm has West-
leigh 2000 soil and this is indicated as poor soil 
for vegetable production. 
There are 12 hectares of land that are currently 
being used for cultivation purposes, and this 
land is fenced with stock-proof fencing. How-
ever, a major problem is the fact that kudu roam 
freely on the farm and are able to scale the 
normal cattle-proof fencing and thus decimate 
the crops. The erection of Kudu-proof fencing 
is included in a current application for funds 
from the Comprehensive Agricultural Support 
Programme (CASP) of the Department of Agri-
culture.
The key resource in this area for both arable and 
grazing farming activities is water. The farm has 
eight dams in total – two earth dams with water 
supplied through capture of mountain water, 
and six cement dams supplied by as many bore-
holes. The water is led to the dams and drinking 
troughs in each camp through the use of wind-
mills and gravity feed. In addition, there are 
overflow dams which capture additional water 
during the winter rainfall season.
All the grazing land on the farm is natural graz-
ing and includes pioneers karoobossieveld and 
grass types such as ‘Boesmansgras’. The carrying 
capacity is estimated at 42 hectares per large 
stock unit. The total number of small stock pos-
sible on the farm therefore is in the order of 
800 small-stock units. The farm is divided into 10 
grazing camps. 
Type of asset Extent (ha) Valuators estimated 
value (R)
Irrigated land (lucerne) 7.0 280 000
Irrigated land (cash crops) 1.5 52 500
Dry with potential to irrigate 11.5 57 500
Grazing 5 560.3 3 058 000
Total land value 3 448 000
Accommodation 867 000
Other buildings 336 480
Dams 362 000
Total value 5 013 980
Table 3.1: Summary of agricultural assets
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Figure 3.2: One of the two earth dams built by the previous 
owner 
Figure 3.3: Diagram of the location of the various camps, 
dams and windmills
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According to the valuation report, when the 
farm was acquired the 10 grazing camps and the 
farm boundary were all fenced with stock fenc-
ing, none of which is jackal-proof. 
The farm also has the following additional in-
frastructure:
• A house of 235 m2
• A storeroom of 175 m2
• A steel shed of 162 m2
• A chicken house of 60 m2
• Three farm workers’ houses of a total of 
210 m2.
Farm layout
The Department of Agriculture has supported 
the project from the beginning and developed a 
farm plan based on separating the grazing area 
into three sections (with the ten grazing camps 
divided between the three) and dividing the 
arable area into different sections as indicated 
below.
The farmers
The project was initiated in 2004/05 to accom-
modate the immediate needs of 26 farmers, of 
whom 5 were women and 21 were men. Ten of 
the men were youth (35 and younger) and 18 
were farm workers. Since the initial application 
however, the numbers of farmers in the group 
increased substantially to 87, with an active 
group of 35 active members.7 
It was reported above that there were three 
groups of farmers initially – those undertaking 
vegetable production, pig farmers and small-
stock farmers. At the time that the project was 
initiated, the pig farmers had formed them-
selves into a formal group for the sale of the 
pigs, called Zwartberg Varke. They had sixty five 
pigs at the time. 
Also, at that time (2004/05), the livestock farm-
ers had in the order of 64 sheep and goats, as 
well as eight calves, thus they went beyond 
‘small stock’ farming. The vegetable farmers 
were farming on a small piece of land but had 
undergone a variety of training courses, and 
had worked with the DoA in order to develop 
a proposal to “move from subsistence farming 
towards the semi-commercial farming sector.”8 
It was with this development in mind that the 
group was seeking access to additional land. 
In 2008, at the time of this research, the number 
of actual farmers on the land was the following 
(note that some of the farmers are involved in 
more than one activity):
• 15 onion seed farmers
• 15 stock farmers farming with sheep and 
boergoats
• 3 stock farmers farming with Angora goats
• 3 farmers farming independently with veg-
etables; and 
• 15 farmers (or workers) farming as part of 
the NDA project.
Onion seed farmers
In 2006, the Municipality started a project where 
it organised the planting of 2 hectares of onions 
as a community project in which certain people 
were employed. However, once the land was 
planted, the Municipality changed the approach 
and provided the opportunity for a group of 
people to harvest and sell the seed. Fifteen 
people, focused around a particular family (the 
Hinkmans), came together into the ‘Group of 
15’. A section of this group then formed them-
selves into a close corporation, given that a CC 
has a limit of 10 members, but the group now 
want to form a cooperative which will allow the 
larger group to join. 
The group members include older people and 
youth; most of the youth are the children of the 
main Hinkman family. The older people are all 
ex-farm workers who have experience of fruit 
farming, vegetable and vegetable seed farm-
ing, ostrich chick rearing, and extensive livestock 
farming. The key person in the group has been 
part of the farmers’ association since 1996, and 
held stock on municipal land until he was forced 
to sell it by the Municipality. 
These farmers have entered into a contractual 
agreement with the Klein Karoo Seed Marketing 
company whereby they will be provided with a 
range of resources to produce onion seed of a 
particular quality, and market this through the 
company. Once the sale of the seed has taken 
place, the expenses will be recouped and the re-
maining amount (profit) will then be paid over 
to the farmers. This contract arrangement has 
8  Fundraising proposal for the 
Prince Albert vegetable farmers 
association.
7 According to the Chairperson 
of the Association.
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Figure 3.4: Diagram showing the use of the extensive grazing 
area
Figure 3.5: Department of Agriculture’s plan showing the 
existing arable land and the dams with their proposed 
land uses
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entered its second year, the first year in which 
the group has been responsible for production 
from planting through to harvest. In the previ-
ous season the farmers took over the production 
process after the planting had already happened 
as part of a municipality project.  
Angora goat farmers
The Angora goat farmers’ enterprise began as 
a result of an interest by Mohair South Africa 
(MSA) to start a training project with emerg-
ing farmers, modelled on a similar arrangement 
supported by MSA in the Eastern Cape. In this 
arrangement, Mohair South Africa provided a 
herd of 174 Angora ewes with 7 rams to a group 
of four emerging farmers who are being trained 
and mentored over a three year period. During 
this period, the clip from the animals and all the 
progeny are acquired by the emerging farm-
ers. At the end of the period, the farmers are 
required to give back a similar quality herd to 
MSA, who will then give that to the next group 
of emerging farmers. The goats were given in 
April 2008 so it is still a new arrangement. 
The opportunity of going into the arrangement 
was advertised in the broader emerging farmers 
association and interested people were asked to 
apply. Only four members applied and they then 
formed the group. All of them are ex-farm work-
ers, one of whom has extensive experience with 
Angora goats. In the early period, however, one 
of the members withdrew from the group, indi-
cating that he was no longer interested. Three 
men therefore remain. 
Sheep and goat farmers
The sheep and goat farmers mostly include 
farmers who, prior to the acquisition of the com-
monage land, held stock in the residential area. 
These animals roamed freely during the day and 
then were kept in the backyards of the owners 
at night. 
The current group of farmers are all members 
of the Farmers Association. There are currently a 
total of 15 stock owners who have sheep or goats 
on the farm. The stock holdings range from 2 to 
64 animals per owner. Only one of these farmers 
is a full-time farmer; this person happens to also 
be the key onion seed farmer. All the rest of the 
farmers engage in stock farming as an addition 
to the other sources of income, e.g. from small 
enterprise (taverns), wage employment, etc. 
Vegetables farmers
The vegetable farmers include two types – there 
are farmers who have access to individual plots 
of land and there is a group that is drawn to-
gether into a group production process in a 
project funded by the National Development 
Agency (NDA). 
Of the three farmers who have their own portion 
of land, two work together and one separately. 
The NDA-supported project appears to have 35 
people working formally in/for it. It has an em-
ployed project manager, and the other people 
are employed on the basis of a daily wage of 
R35. The funding, and thus the beginning of the 
project, was delayed as a result of the fact that 
the contract with the Municipality for the use of 
the land took time to finalise. It therefore only 
began in June 2008, more than a year after the 
intended start. 
Production systems and 
economics
Each of the different enterprises undertakes 
farming in a different way and has different eco-
nomic arrangements. 
Onion farmers
The onion farmers are organised into a produc-
tion co-operative. The production systems were 
developed through consultation between the 
mentor (De Wit), who was appointed by the Klein 
Karoo Seed liaison person, and Mr Hinkman, the 
most experienced of the emerging farmers, who 
maintains strict control of the process. 
The farmers do not own any major equipment 
– specifically a tractor, plough and rake which 
Hinkman indicated are the most important items 
for onion farming. They have developed a men-
toring arrangement with the previous owner of 
the farm (De Wit) as a result of the intervention 
by a councillor. De Wit continues to have an in-
terest in the success of the farm and so provides 
various resources to the onion seed producers. 
He initially offered a service to plough and oth-
erwise prepare the land for the farmers. But 
when he arrived to plough the land, a number 
of the other farmers, including the leadership of 
the Farmers Association, refused to allow him to 
plough, as it had not been agreed that the onion 
farmers should have access to the land where he 
was going to plough. The onion farmers then 
negotiated that they should borrow the tractor 
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for a period and do the work themselves, once 
they had clarified which land would be avail-
able to them. De Wit then agreed to this and 
the farmers now only provide the diesel for the 
tractor and have constant access to it. 
The onion plants are provided by Klein Karoo 
on an annual basis. In the most recent season, 
starting in April, the plant material was in fact 
surplus material provided by the Klein Karoo, 
which meant that the farmers did not have to 
pay for it. 
The production process is as follows:
Preparation of seedlings
Onion seed is planted in March/April of year 1 in-
well-prepared soil which should not have a high 
clay content. It is planted at a density of about 
4 grams per square metre. It is important that 
weeds, diseases and pests are managed and this 
is done with the intervention and under guid-
ance of the production advisors of Klein Karoo 
Seed. This advisor also guides the irrigation and 
feeding of the plants. 
Bulb production 
The seedlings are transplanted after about 12 to 
14 weeks (from June to August) and sowed in a 
density of about 600 000 plants per hectare. The 
bulbs that develop are then dug up during De-
cember and are taken to the drying sheds which 
were built by the previous owner of the farm. 
Once dried, the bulbs are stored in a well-venti-
lated space for 3 to 4 months. 
Planting of bulbs
The bulbs are planted again during April (year 
2) and are planted in a density of about 100 000 
bulbs per hectare, depending on the variety. 
Weeds, diseases and pests are strictly controlled 
by prescribed chemicals and a detailed spraying 
programme is worked out in conjunction with 
the advisors from Klein Karoo Seed. Regular vis-
its are made by the company advisors and the 
locally based mentor is also close at hand dur-
ing this period to address any problems as they 
arise. 
Pollination 
The flowering period is between 32 and 40 days 
and begins in the third week of October. This is a 
sensitive period and it is important for the proc-
ess to be done correctly. The Klein Karoo Seed 
advisors are on hand and recommend a density 
of 8-10 beehives per hectare – for the Prince Al-
bert farmers this means that that have had to 
acquire about 30 hives for their three hectares.
Harvesting 
The harvesting of the seed takes place when 
25% of the seed heads have turned black and 
this is about three weeks after the pollination 
process and is generally in the last two weeks of 
December.
Figure 3.7: The shed for drying onion seed with extractor fans
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Drying, threshing and winnowing of 
seed 
Drying of the seed on the farm takes place in 
the drying sheds where air is forced through 
the seed heads with the help of fans. Once the 
seed is sufficiently dry, the seed is drawn out of 
the heads with a machine and then further win-
nowed. Once this is done, and the seed is clean, 
it is delivered to the Klein Karoo Seed offices for 
further working and packaging and sale. The 
farmers were complimented in the last season 
for the cleanliness of the seed they produced.
Economics of onion production
The costs per hectare incurred in the course of 
producing onion seeds are as follows:
The estimated income from production depends 
on the type of onions produced but the follow-
ing is a guide assuming an exchange rate of 
R7.74= $1:
Given that the farmers had not had a full season 
where they had been involved in the full produc-
tion process, it is unclear yet how the farmers 
will fare. The farmers do not appear to have a 
clear understanding of all the financial aspects 
of their production but have been informed that 
they produced a profit of R30 000 in the previ-
ous season. By agreement, the Klein Karoo Seed 
company is keeping this for the various produc-
tion costs for the current season. 
Angora goat farmers
The Angora goat farmers are in a training con-
tract relationship with Mohair South Africa9. For 
Mohair South Africa, the longer term aim of 
the training programme with the Prince Albert 
farmers is to increase the throughput of mohair, 
while at the same time contributing to the de-
velopment of black farmers in South Africa. For 
the emerging farmers, the aim is to maximise 
production in order to obtain as much return on 
their animals.
Item Cost (Rand)
Fuel 600
Fertiliser 5 900
Pest control 533
Bulbs 10 000
Bulb planting costs 2 200
Pollination 2 400
Weed control 842
Pest control 3 718
Insurance 0
Harvesting costs 3 190
Drying 700
Irrigation and electricity 4 840
Machinery 129
Cleaning costs 3 000
Total 39 052
Table 3.2: Per hectare costs related to the production of the 
onion seed
Onion type Production per 
ha (kg)
Expected income 
per ha (R)
Profit (range) Break even – (kg/
ha)
OP 1000 69 660 25 000 - 30 000 400
F1 450 80 109 36 000 - 41 000 220
Table 3.3: Estimated income from onion production
9 Mohair South Africa Ltd was 
established as the representa-
tive organization of the indus-
try, to facilitate functions such 
as research, training, informa-
tion, national and international 
relations, and activities aimed 
at enhancing the entire mohair 
industry. The board of directors 
of Mohair South Africa reflects 
representation by all the major 
directly affected groups, mostly 
in the early stages of produc-
tion, namely growers, labour, 
breeders, processors, buyers 
and brokers. J. M. van der 
Westhuysen, P. D. Wentzel et 
al. (2004).
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The visit to the farm was only four months after 
the farmers had started operating on the farm 
and so the production methods for the farmers 
were still being sorted out and adjusted to their 
specific conditions. 
The farmers have developed a system where one 
person will be responsible for looking after the 
stock for a month at a time, and the person will 
be paid a wage of R1000 which is paid by Mohair 
SA and then recouped from the wool sales. 
All the activities are undertaken by the farmers, 
with additional labour or support brought in 
when needed. During the research visit to the 
farm, it was lambing time, and the farmer that 
is deemed most experienced with Angoras was 
the person that was asked to work during the 
August month (he had recently also been re-
trenched from his formal job and so was avail-
able). Importantly, he had brought another per-
son to the farm on the day of the visit in order to 
help him with the lambing tasks – marking the 
new lambs with the same mark at their mothers.
There are usually two shearings per year, in Jan-
uary and July. The shearing is undertaken by the 
farmers themselves and they had done the first 
shearing in the July. The clip was then taken by 
the representative of Mohair SA and, in a care-
ful assessment of the market, was sold at a time 
when a good price was paid. Such a system of 
the Mohair SA representatives obtaining the 
clip from farmers and selling it is undertaken by 
most commercial farmers as well. 
The project coordinator of the training pro-
gramme (Grobler), while highlighting that “it 
is difficult to estimate with any degree of cer-
tainty” what the income of the project would 
be, provided initial estimates of a twelve month 
budget for the enterprise, based on two shear-
ings and on 2006 Cape Auction prices:
While this estimation is given for the gross in-
come, Grobler stresses that “the students need 
to get an income from the project; the amounts 
involved will depend on the net income, budget 
requirements for the next year, and whether 
they wish to build up reserves for when they 
start out on their own”.10
It is clear that from a financial point of view, the 
Angora goat farmers are being provided with an 
important opportunity to build the basis of their 
stock holdings for future farming.
Boer goat and sheep farmers 
The boer goat and sheep farmers are all individ-
ual farmers and generally farm their stock indi-
vidually. A number of the farmers do, however, 
farm in a more cooperative manner – looking af-
ter each other’s stock, dosing the stock together, 
working out ways to look after the new-borns to-
gether and so forth. There is also some ill-feeling 
or competition between the farmers, with some 
farmers accusing others of being drunkards and 
lazy, and not looking after their animals. 
The animals of the farmers are obtained from 
a variety of sources. Some farmers obtain the 
Figure 3.8: Piet Loff and his helper herding the goats into the 
enclosure for marking
10 Personal communication and 
unpublished document provid-
ed by Grobler for this research.
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animals as gifts from farmers where they have 
previously worked; others buy the animals from 
other emerging farmers, from commercial farm-
ers or other sources. 
At this stage the aim of the sheep and goat 
farmers is to either just keep the stock that they 
have, or to grow their herds or flocks. Not many 
of the offspring are therefore sold – only the 
spare rams are sold. The key spokesman indi-
cated that he had had 18 goats prior to the farm 
being bought, but had been forced to sell them. 
With the current lambing season he had once 
again built his stock up to 18 – but he “dreams 
of animals” and so was intending to expand his 
stock significantly. 
The goat and sheep farmers generally sell their 
stock in the local township, but those that are 
growing their stock numbers have begun dis-
cussions and negotiations with local large-scale 
farmers to understand the marketing arrange-
ments and to see how they can tie into these so 
that they can get better prices for the stock that 
they do sell. In addition, they have begun discus-
sions about changing the breed of the goats in 
order to get a better quality animal and thus a 
better price when they are sold. 
Mass Price/Unit Number Value
Production income
Hair: kid 1.8 kg 122 80 17 568
Hair: young goats 3.5 kg 74 70 18 130
Hair: ewes 4.0 kg 50 100 20 000
Sub-total 55 698
Trade income
Old ewes 40 kg 8 20 6 400
Kapater kids 20 kg Sold as farming 
stock
35 8 750
Ram 60 kg 6 1 360
Sub-total 15 510
Gross income/100 ewes 71 208
Figure 3.9: Piet Loff and his goats
Table 3.4: Estimated income associated with the Angora goat 
enterprise 
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Vegetable farmers
There are two types of vegetable farmers – those 
who farm for themselves and those who are part 
of a project sponsored by the National Develop-
ment Agency. There are four farmers who farm 
individually on portions of land that are put 
aside by the chairperson and endorsed by all. 
The right to the specific portions of land seems 
to have gone on for a number of years with one 
farmer claiming that some of the other farmers 
want his piece of land because it produces very 
good sweet potatoes. 
The individual farmers produce on about half a 
hectare of land each. Mr Christiaan Witbooi, the 
most successful of the vegetable farmers, farms 
with his brother on their allocated plot. They try 
to get the various inputs in the cheapest way 
possible:
• He bought seed (tomato, pumpkin and wa-
ter melon) in the first year that he farmed 
on the land, in 2006; since then however, 
he has successfully produced his own seed.
• He is also a pig farmer, and has got links 
with a beef farmer that used to gather his 
stock in the town before selling them; Wit-
booi has used the manure from these ani-
mals successfully in the last two years. 
• He has purchased insecticides and other 
poisons from the local nurseries and other 
shops in the town at prices higher than he 
would pay if he was a member of the co-op-
erative (which he can not become because 
of the high joining fees).
• His highest cost is transport – to take the 
fresh produce to town to sell. 
While he could not provide the detail of his costs 
during the season, the payment of which is done 
from various sources through the year, Witbooi 
indicated that he had made a “profit”11 of R6000 
in the previous season. Most of the produce is 
sold to residents in the local town of Prince Al-
bert but some is kept for the use of Witbooi and 
his brother. 
Livelihood impacts
The farmers currently on the farm employ a 
range of livelihood strategies other than agri-
culture, the key ones being pensions and other 
state social grants, the running of taverns in 
the local township, wage labour, taxi owner-
ship and so forth. More importantly, however, it 
seems that many of the farmers engage in other 
income-generating activities to be able to invest 
in agriculture. In the onion co-operative, for ex-
ample, some of the members have specifically 
obtained work in other jobs to provide some of 
the finances for the farming whereas the Ango-
ra farmers have adjusted work responsibilities to 
Figure 3.10: Oom Elvis and his prize ewe that gives him twins 
or triplets each season
11 It is assumed that this is 
total income from the sale of 
produce – primarily tomatoes, 
pumpkin and water melons.
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enable some members to take up opportunities 
that became available outside of the farm12. 
Most of the farmers that use land at Treintjies-
rivier appear to use the social relationship de-
veloped there for those specific activities only – 
they do not appear to engage in joint activities 
outside of the farm. The key exception here is 
the relationship between the chairperson and 
the deputy chair of the Association, who farm 
together on the farm, engage in joint family 
support activities when needed in the town, and 
are continually involved in organisational activi-
ties around the Farmers’ Association. 
The farm does not seem to be used for other live-
lihood strategies such as the collection of wood, 
flowers, and other natural resources, nor does 
it seems to be used for other business premises. 
As is normal in municipal commonage situations, 
the use of the other natural resources is assumed 
to be against the contracts that users have, but 
this is not clear as the contracts have not been fi-
nalised as yet. The management of the resources 
will be important and fortunately, as this point, 
it is under control. It is known, however, that the 
onion seed farmers cut down and sold some of 
the trees on the farm in order to get funds to 
buy fertiliser and other production needs in the 
previous season. Importantly, they were not dis-
ciplined or reprimanded for this and so it may 
have a negative effect for the future attempts to 
manage resource use. 
Environmental dimensions
There are two key environmental issues that 
face farmers in the Karoo, in particular the stock 
farmers, namely dealing with predators and 
managing grazing regimes in a context of ongo-
ing drought. The main factor in this is fencing 
so as to manage the movement of stock and to 
keep predators out.
With regard to grazing, the history of land use in 
the area is worth noting: 
“Early white colonial pastoralists adopted the 
migrant herding strategies of the Khoikhoi 
herders. Transhumance practices (migration 
with livestock to more productive areas, as 
and when seasons or rainfall dictated it) 
constitute an appropriate and sustainable 
environmental management strategy in the 
Karoo. Where rainfall is sparse and patchy, 
this arid, ‘event-driven’ eco-system could only 
be used on an opportunistic basis by highly 
mobile human groups taking advantage of 
highly localised conditions.” (Atkinson, 2005, 
2) 
With the shift to freehold tenure, on a surveyed 
piece of land, Atkinson quotes Hoffman to show 
that: 
“Settlement around privately owned water 
sources and rangeland meant that grazing 
orbits shrank dramatically. Livestock was 
herded from rangeland to water source to 
kraal on a daily basis… (and) (t)his kraaling 
system has been blamed for a great deal of 
the degradation of the Karoo rangelands.” 
(ibid, 2)
A report by Phuhlisani goes on to say that:
“(i)t was only with significant intervention 
of the state and the provision of a spread of 
infrastructural support (windmills, fencing 
and so forth) that enabled the introduction 
of rotational grazing methods of farming and 
thus the relative sustainable continuation 
‘of alien land use practices’ on ‘inherently 
incompatible indigenous ecosystems.’” 
(Phuhlisani, 2008, p.79)
This sensitive context needs to therefore be 
treated with care because once damaged, it will 
take a long time to rehabilitate. 
The Prince Albert Commonage has a lack of 
fencing on the farm – it does not have jackal-
proof fencing on the perimeter and internally 
the stock-proof fencing has broken. Besides the 
social difficulties of managing grazing in a com-
munal management arrangement (discussed be-
low), the lack of good fencing means that it is 
almost impossible to manage the grazing in an 
environmentally sustainable manner. The result 
is essentially as described in the Hoffman quote 
above – that overgrazing is evident around a 
few water sources while much of the land is not 
grazed at all. It is therefore fortunate that the 
total number of stock on the farm is well below 
the carrying capacity for the whole farm at the 
moment. The Department of Agriculture is using 
its CASP funding programme to try to address 
this fencing problem over the current two years.
The management of predators is a national 
problem of increasing proportions; as state sup-
port for agriculture decreased over the years, it 
appears that fencing of large extensive grazing 
12  One of the farmers is an 
experienced fencing specialist 
and an opportunity came up 
for him to fence a local farmer’s 
farm. The farmers adjusted 
schedules and responsibilities 
to enable him to do this out-
side work.
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farms has been one of the main areas that has 
suffered.13 The result is that jackal, caracal and 
other small predators essentially have free reign 
on vast areas of the central parts of the country. 
All the farmers on the Prince Albert Common-
age farm have suffered stock losses as a result of 
jackal and caracal attacks – the most severe was 
a loss of 20 sheep from a flock of 40! The Depart-
ment of Agriculture is once again assisting in the 
upgrading of the perimeter fencing through 
their CASP funding, but the problem is then go-
ing to be getting rid of the many predators that 
are already on the inside, who have open access 
to the vulnerable stock. This is an issue which the 
Farmers’ Association will need to address as the 
new fencing goes up.
Social and institution issues
Tenure arrangements
The land is commonage land acquired through 
the Department of Land Affairs’ Commonage 
programme. The land is therefore owned by 
the Municipality, from which the farmers are 
required to lease it. Formally the Municipality is 
supposed to manage access to the land through 
a system of contracts and via land allocation. 
In practice, however, the Farmers’ Association 
leadership have played that role in the absence 
of such management by the Municipality, which 
appears to be distracted by a state of perpetual 
political transition and turmoil. 
Contractual issues
According to the Commonage programme of the 
DLA, when a municipality receives land through 
the programme, it is required to establish a com-
monage committee to provide overarching man-
agement of the land, as well as entering into 
lease agreements with the users of the land. 
At Prince Albert the users of the land have no 
contract with the Municipality despite having 
requested such a contract for a number of years. 
For the users, contract will provide them with a 
formal document enabling access to government 
and non-government grant funding and other 
support. Given the intense political infighting 
that has been prevalent in the Municipality, as 
well as the lack of capacity to develop such a 
contract, it has been an ongoing issue.
A local NGO, the Southern Cape Land Commit-
tee (SCLC), has been assisting the Farmers’ As-
sociation and the Municipality in developing the 
contract but it appears that there has been an 
inability to find solutions to what appear to be 
different approaches. The SCLC has developed a 
draft contract which would be signed between 
the Municipality and the Farmers’ Association, 
rather than between the Municipality and the 
specific users. The Municipality has objections to 
such a formulation, preferring to sign a contract 
with specific individual users. However, given 
the political tension in the Municipality, this ap-
proach has not been formally communicated to 
the SCLC and to the Farmers’ Association, and no 
progress has therefore been achieved in finalis-
ing the contract. 
The current situation therefore is that the only 
farmers who have any formal contract are the 
Angora goat farmers, which is a jointly signed 
agreement between the ‘trainees’, the Munici-
pality and the SA Mohair Association. The other 
farmers, including the NDA project participants 
who received a total of R817 000, are all farming 
without signed contracts. 
Importance of the Farmers’ 
Association – inhibiting open access 
The lack of involvement by the Municipality, and 
therefore the absence of any external manage-
ment intervention, is not uncommon in munici-
pal commonage situations around the country. 
Anderson and Pienaar’s study has highlighted 
this clearly (Anderson and Pienaar, 2003). In the 
Prince Albert situation, however, the tenure ar-
rangements have not disintegrated into open 
access. While there are complaints about the 
leadership of the Farmers’ Association from the 
membership, it is apparent that the association 
has stepped into the void and maintained some 
control over the process of acquiring and using 
land. The following process is required if a per-
son wants to use land on the farm:
• They must take a copy of the Association’s 
constitution and their identity document to 
the police station to be stamped.
• They must get a stamped certificate from 
the police to say that the livestock that they 
might want to bring onto the farm are not 
stolen. 
• They must take the Constitution and the 
certificate to the Municipality to be regis-
tered.
13 Farmers in the Central and 
Hantam Karoo, as well as in the 
northern areas around Kim-
berley reported these develop-
ments in separate interviews.
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• The Association leadership will then identify 
the area where they can farm on the land. 
While this system is new, and there are tensions, 
it is apparent that there is control over the en-
trance and exit of land users. While on the farm, 
the researcher witnessed the approach by a new 
entrant who requested, and was granted, a spe-
cific site in order to farm with livestock, separate 
to the other farmers already on the farm. 
The Farmers’ Association has a management 
structure which, besides the formal portfolios, 
includes a ‘coordinator’ in each of the various 
divisions through whom other people work – in 
the goat and sheep farmers, the Angora goat 
farmers, the vegetable farmers and the onion 
farmers. While this is quite a loose arrangement, 
these coordinators act to ensure there is some 
order maintained in particular sections. 
The role of the ‘Champion’ 
The chairperson of the Farmers’ Association plays 
an extremely important role in the whole com-
monage initiative. He has been part of the group 
for a number of years although only joined the 
group in the latter period as the moves towards 
acquiring the land were at an advanced stage. 
While he grew up on the farms, as a child of 
farm worker parents, he moved to town at an 
early age, where he completed his matric. Impor-
tantly, he joined the South African army perma-
nent force and the commandos and in the proc-
ess – according to him and others in the town 
– developed a number of organising and man-
agement skills. While there are a number of peo-
ple amongst the farmers’ group that complain 
about him and feel that he favours one group 
above another (the onion farmers, for example, 
felt that he favoured the vegetable producers), 
it is apparent that he is successful in balancing 
the interests of the different groups. There are a 
number of key roles that he plays:
• If there are any disputes, he is called upon 
by the participants to mediate or arbitrate.
• He has developed a number of links to vari-
ous service providers and grant makers and 
is able to combine the different needs of 
the different farmers’ groups and develop 
training programmes and seek funding 
opportunities and market linkages for the 
different groups of farmers and other mem-
bers of the Association. Importantly, he is 
assisted by the SCLC in this regard.
• He develops unity amongst the farmers and 
acts as their spokesperson. Any individual 
or company trying to consult with the As-
sociation or its members is required to go 
through the Chairperson. The Chairperson 
indicated that some people have had a 
problem with this approach, fearing that 
he is a gate keeper. However, it was evident 
that where formal procedures were not 
followed, misunderstandings by outsiders 
created expectations and assumptions by 
farmer members which could not be met 
in the context. The onion producers, for ex-
ample, wanted to expand their production, 
and the previous owner of the farm (their 
mentor) encouraged them to do so and ar-
rived to plough additional land one day. 
The land that they were to plough however 
had been allocated to other farmers even 
though they had not yet worked the land. 
The result was an unhappy group of onion 
farmers (antagonistic to the chairperson) 
and a disgruntled previous owner who felt 
that his offers of support were not appreci-
ated and that “the farm was in chaos”. 
• He provides a ‘service’ to the members to ex-
plain the complicated issues involved in the 
development of the farm and their farming, 
particularly the legal aspects, in terms that 
they understand. 
• He takes the initiative in formalising issues 
in an attempt to ensure security of tenure 
of the farmers on the land; other arrange-
ments are also formalised through other 
mechanisms. In particular, with the help of 
SCLC, they have developed legal entities 
where these are necessary. 
• He plays the crucial role of mobiliser or ‘dy-
namiser’, particularly in getting the farmers 
to work together in a cooperative manner.
In the context where there is a significant lack 
of support from the state, the role performed by 
the chairperson has been absolutely critical for 
the success of the farmers in their various enter-
prises, and for the initiative as a whole. A project 
‘champion’, ‘dynamisor’ or development facilita-
tor appears to be crucial for the success of land 
and agrarian reform initiatives. 
Commonage Committee
The DLA’s Commonage Policy also requires the 
formation of a Commonage Committee and in 
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the Prince Albert situation a Committee was es-
tablished for Prince Albert municipal area as a 
whole – not just for the Treintjiesrivier farm. The 
Committee includes the following role players:
• Prince Albert Municipality
• Prince Albert emerging farmers and tourism 
entrepreneurs
• Klaarstroom emerging farmers
• Prins Albert Weg emerging farmers
• Leeu-Gamka emerging farmers 
• Vyebossie Women’s Association 
• Southern Cape Land Committee
• Department of Agriculture (Laingsburg)
• Department of Land Affairs (Beaufort 
West).
Its primary task, according to the Constitution, is 
to provide a “platform for all role-players to fa-
cilitate cooperation and communication for the 
sustainable use of commonage land in the Prince 
Albert Municipal area” (Prince Albert Municipal 
Commonage Committee, 2008). The Committee 
has the following secondary roles, amongst oth-
ers:
• To develop contracts to hold people respon-
sible for the sustainable use of the land and 
to ensure that these contracts are reason-
able and affordable;
• To establish commonage committees for 
each farming enterprise or group and to 
stipulate roles and responsibilities of the 
committees;
• To support users in their land rights to en-
sure security of land rights
• To identify resources for funding and tech-
nical training for livelihood projects 
• To identify markets for products, and
• To identify and obtain additional land, 
where necessary. 
While these aims are important and relevant 
for the success of the various initiatives on the 
land, the fact that the Committee falls under the 
Municipality has meant that its role has been 
limited. It does however provide a crucial point 
around which the various important role-players 
can meet and engage on the issues facing the 
farmers. In reality, therefore, the Committee ap-
pears to provide the institutional backup for the 
Chairperson and the role he plays. If the Chair-
person was not there, playing the role he does, 
it is unlikely that the Committee would have any 
role. 
Extension support
The different farmers have differing levels of 
extension support, depending on who they are 
linked to. The goat and sheep farmers appear 
to have no extension support from any source 
and the vegetable farmers are similarly not sup-
ported. The onion farmers and the Angora goat 
farmers, on the other hand, are supported in 
two ways – there is a local farmer who acts as 
the mentor and then each farming group also 
has an external specialist (or ‘project manager’) 
that visits the farm regularly to monitor devel-
opments and offer advice. 
It appears that the Department of Agriculture, 
while they have a local “community develop-
ment worker”, do not provide any ongoing 
extension advice to the farmers. The nature of 
their support appears to be:
• As a funder of the infrastructure develop-
ments (through their CASP funding); 
• As a training facility, providing general ag-
ricultural courses at their offices in Oudt-
shoorn; and,
• Providing full farm planning services 
(through their implementing agency – 
CASIDRA). 
Departmental support to individual farmers in 
their enterprises is therefore essentially non-
existent. Moreover, if farmers do not have a 
relationship with a local farmer, or through a 
marketing company, they have had to develop 
this on their own.
Mohair Trust
The Angora goat project is specifically designed 
as a mentored programme of farmer develop-
ment initiated and guided by the industry. 
The aim of the project is to train emerging An-
gora goat farmers who, after an approximate 
three years hands-on training period, can gradu-
ate from the project and have the necessary 
skills to become active, self-sufficient commer-
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cial producers of mohair. It is envisaged that 
every project should be able to rotate a group of 
students every three years. 
The training includes breeding, kidding, the 
shearing process and classing of mohair, animal 
health, grazing management, financial manage-
ment, budgeting, as well as management of in-
frastructure. Where necessary, experts in their 
specific fields will be involved to assist with the 
training (personal communication, G. Grobler, 
2008).
In the Prince Albert arrangement, there is a 
project coordinator who is based in Jansensville 
in the Eastern Cape. He provides the quality 
controls on the hair that is produced, the main-
tenance of the infrastructure and the overarch-
ing management issues. He also manages the 
sale of the hair and animals in order to get the 
best price. Locally, a commercial farmer, who is 
also a very successful mohair farmer and on the 
board of the Mohair Growers Association, pro-
vides more immediate mentoring on farming 
practices.
At the time of this research, the programme had 
just begun and so it is unclear how successful 
this mentoring programme would be with this 
group of farmers; however, a similar approach 
is in process with another group of farmers in 
the Eastern Cape, and reportedly has been very 
successful thus far. 
Karoo Seed
The onion seed farmers are in a more formal 
contractual arrangement, and while the compa-
ny makes allowances for the fact that these are 
new farmers, through providing access to cheap 
plant material, for example, the relationship is 
much more of a commercial contract farming ar-
rangement. The ‘mentoring’ from the company, 
while important, is therefore much more that of 
a monitoring role where the company wants to 
be assured of quality produce in the end, espe-
cially given that the company is extending credit 
through the season. 
The onion farmers therefore approached the 
agricultural representative on the Municipal 
Council to assist them in identifying a suitable 
mentor for their operation. The councillor ap-
proached the previous owner of the farm, who 
was also a vegetable seed producer, and he 
agreed to provide such a service to the farmers. 
This relationship appears to be based on a per-
sonal commitment by the farmer to supporting 
emerging farmers (and a link to the farm – that 
he was forced to sell due to a family tragedy). 
It has been extremely advantageous to the seed 
farmers, as it has included access to a tractor and 
other equipment, continuous and immediate 
advice through the season, and encouragement 
in the process of farming. 
The future
The future opportunities for the farmers involved 
in farming at the different levels of the farm 
are dependent on a number of aspects: access 
to land to expand their initiatives, the extent to 
which they are able to develop the expertise and 
capital to expand, the extent to which they want 
to remain at a small-scale level, and so forth.
Taking these issues into account, the following 
issues impact on the different groups of farmers, 
affecting their future prospects:
• For stock farmers, the Area Based Plan 
provides for access to increasing numbers 
of hectares acquired under the DLA’s Pro-
active Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) pro-
gramme – these are conceptualised in terms 
of PLAS 1 farms (where farmers will be able 
to grow their stock numbers to 90 small-
stock units) and PLAS 2 farms (where they 
will be able to grow their stock numbers to 
300 small-stock units). Currently, land acqui-
sition in the district is proceeding according 
to plan according to the DLA but the ad-
ditional support and management systems 
proposed in the ABP are not being imple-
mented due to confusion between the DLA 
and the Department of Agriculture on the 
implementation of the Land and Agrarian 
Reform Project (due to be coordinated by 
Agriculture). Land will be available, but it 
appears that the necessary controls, which 
operate on the commonage farm through 
the farmers’ association, will not be present 
on the new farm acquired. 
• The problem facing the goat and sheep 
producers is that they have little support in 
terms of access to capital and expertise. The 
expansion of production, as is the intention 
of those that were interviewed, is therefore 
likely to be slow even with the acquisition 
of additional land. 
• Angora goat farmers are being well set up 
to become independent producers (with 
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support in all areas) and, with access to 
additional land after the three year initial 
training programme (through the PLAS pro-
gramme), it is likely that they will be suc-
cessful producers in the future.
• Arable land is limited in the area, with water 
the primary constraint particularly further 
away from the mountain. There are no spe-
cific proposals to acquire arable land under 
the ABP, but there are allocations to joint 
ventures which are primarily on arable land 
in this district. The onion seed producers 
have the opportunity to become independ-
ent farmers but access to land is going to be 
their greatest constraint – and is already a 
constraint. The group has a number of skills 
and experience beyond onion seed and op-
tions to diversify are also possible – ostrich 
chicks, vegetable and other seed production 
have all been highlighted as options by the 
farmers and, given that they are all pro-
duced in a contract farming arrangement, it 
is certainly possible that such developments 
could happen – if the primary constraint of 
access to land is addressed. 
• The lack of formal contracts has been a con-
straint for all the farmers as it has inhibited 
their sense of security of tenure and of the 
investment in the land that they have ob-
tained access to, and they have been unable 
to use the contract as a means to secure a 
loan of whatever size. If there is increasing 
involvement of municipality in manage-
ment of the farm and in the finalisation 
of the contracts then it is likely to provide 
the possibility for more structured develop-
ments by all farmers in the future. This is 
unlikely at present, however, as the current 
political battles are too strained between 
the ANC and the DA. 
• The ABP proposed realistic institutional ar-
rangements in the district (building on al-
ready existing institutions) – in terms of 
supporting the organisation of farmers, 
the provision of technical support and so 
forth. If these structures are implemented, 
then greater, coordinated support to all 
the farmers can be expected. This may then 
provide the much needed support at a gen-
eral level, but also at a specific level with, in 
particular, the goat and sheep farmers. As 
discussed above, however, this is dependent 
on LARP being clarified in the province and 
then in the district, and sufficient resources 
being applied to its implementation. 
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Introduction
Chata Irrigation Scheme is an example of small-
holder irrigation scheme where landowners 
have grouped their plots together to farm to-
gether commercially. The case is particularly in-
teresting from the perspective that the scheme is 
partly managed by its support non-governmen-
tal organisation (NGO). In this case the NGO has 
largely taken over the essential aspects of the 
management of the business, including financial 
and production management. This relationship 
is however structured in a typical NGO/com-
munity partnership manner, whereby the part-
nership is not defined by a paper contract, but 
rather by relationships, and where consultation 
and joint-decision making takes place on a rea-
sonably extensive scale. In other words there is 
perceived mutual ownership of the outcome of 
the partnership work. 
The scheme is located in the village of Chata on 
the slopes of the Amathola Mountain Range, 
some 230 kilometres from East London, and 17 
kilometres beyond the town of Keiskammahoek. 
Chata is within the Amahlati Local Municipality. 
The scheme is 22.75 hectares in size, made up 
of 20 individual plots. The plot owners became 
members of the scheme. Although 22 farmers 
were initially trained for participation, currently 
only 15 work and benefit from the scheme. 
Historical evolution of the 
scheme
The context of revitalisation
The revitalisation of the scheme is one outcome 
of the settlement of the restitution claim origi-
nating from the betterment planning that oc-
curred in the 1960s. The settlement was finally 
awarded in 2000. As part of the settlement, 50% 
of the award went to individual households, 
while 50% was allocated to community devel-
opment. The development process has been ad-
ministered by the Amatole District Municipality 
since mid-2001. Between 2001 and 2003, the com-
munity and various stakeholders participated in 
an integrated planning process which outlined 
how the community was to be re-developed and 
how the award money was to be allocated. 
The success of the restitution case (particularly 
as a betterment case) rested on the partnership 
between the community and the Border Rural 
Committee (BRC), an NGO based in the Eastern 
Cape. This partnership around land rights laid 
the foundation for the ongoing relationship in 
relation to the planning and implementation of 
the community development initiative.
The Chata Integrated Development Plan sets out 
different focus areas for development, namely: 
infrastructure, forestry, agriculture and other 
LED initiatives (including tourism). Infrastructure 
developments flowing out of this plan have in-
cluded roads (including tarring of certain steep 
access roads), a community hall which contains 
a resource centre and a crèche, as well as school 
classrooms. The forestry investment included 
rehabilitation of the wattle plantation and the 
planting of a pine plantation.
The main focus of the agricultural sphere has 
been the irrigation scheme. The scheme was 
based on individual family-owned plots which 
had been developed in the past with a flood ir-
rigation system.
The socio-economic profiling of the villages that 
took place in 2000 identified 422 households liv-
ing in Chata encompassing some 2300 individu-
als. Most of these families depended on remit-
4 Chata Irrigation Scheme:  
individuals pooling their 
land and farming as a group 
Larry Field, Umhlaba Consulting Group
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tances from family members working outside of 
the area, and government grants, while only an 
estimated 8% of household income was derived 
from agriculture. Of the people living in the vil-
lage only 58 had formal employment, and 13 of 
those were employed in the agriculture and for-
estry sector.
1999–2002: pre-scheme establishment
A small number of the land owners worked their 
land individually. BRC provided basic agricul-
tural support to the land owners who wanted 
to cultivate their land. The results and outputs 
were disappointing, leading to BRC putting their 
support on hold until the scheme could be revi-
talised. This was the period in which the focus of 
work for BRC was on facilitating the settlement 
of the land restitution case.
2003–2004: initiation with group 
management
The first years of the group scheme were a diffi-
cult period for the initiative. The scheme was ini-
tiated in 2003 with a focus on infrastructure re-
habilitation, training, and group establishment. 
The first harvest by the group occurred in 2004. 
The infrastructure rehabilitation included fenc-
ing, levelling for irrigation, cleaning irrigation 
furrows, dam repairs, and soil preparation. Ap-
proximately 30 people gained short-term em-
ployment on this work. As part of the overall 
community development, the road that leads 
past the scheme was upgraded and is now a 
good quality gravel road.
The most important aspect of the initiation was 
that the scheme was established as a group 
scheme with the plot-holders as members. The 
group became the Masiphathisane Farmers As-
sociation, a constitution was developed, and 
members were provided with institutional train-
ing. The arrangement was that the members 
would be assisted by BRC, who would provide 
inputs, administer the finances, and ensure that 
advice and direction were provided. For the pur-
pose of technical support, a farm manager from 
East London was contracted to provide plan-
ning, instruction and in-field production advice. 
Members were to receive any income earned 
from the crops, based on the amount of work 
they had put in, as tracked through the ‘labour 
register’.
The first planting was only about 1 hectare in 
size and consisted of maize and cabbage, and 
the crop was not very successful. The maize was 
lost due to the lateness of planting and was 
therefore affected by the weather. This problem 
was partially due to the difficulty in securing 
the timely services of a tractor for ploughing. 
The cabbages were successfully harvested and 
sold, although size and quality was poor. The 
members estimated that their earnings were be-
tween R320 and R1000 per member for the year. 
Participation in the scheme rapidly dropped to 
about 13 from the original 22. 
In the members’ own evaluation of this period 
problems were identified as: a lack of vision 
among themselves, not receiving any income 
(wages) to motivate work, and members being 
‘lazy’. 
2005–2006: evaluation and transition
By 2005 those involved in the project began to 
look for a new direction to save the initiative. 
The key problem areas were identified as be-
ing the lack of real motivation from the par-
ticipants and inadequate management on the 
project. The first issue was linked to the lack of 
consistent and adequate levels of financial re-
turns. Members perceived the situation to be 
one of ‘volunteerism’ on the project, and people 
clearly did not ‘buy into’ the concept of earnings 
through profit. In this context, it became under-
standable why external, contracted manage-
ment/mentorship would prove inadequate. The 
contracted farm manager expected members to 
take responsibility without being managed on a 
daily basis, and react to farming needs on their 
own initiative as well. For their part, BRC felt the 
contracted manager was unable to overcome lo-
cal problems and motivate the project members 
sufficiently.
It was therefore agreed that the project would 
be ‘taken over’ by the CPA. Formally, that meant 
that the project members would be employed as 
workers, and that the CPA would take owner-
ship of the project. In terms of what the project 
members wanted, the CPA resolved to use its 
funds already ring-fenced for agricultural devel-
opment to pay monthly wages. This was initially 
agreed for a one year period and later extend-
ed. In terms of management, agreement was 
reached with BRC that it would expand its role 
on behalf of the CPA and take over as full-time 
project managers.
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2006-2007: expansion and new 
beginnings
The following year and a half saw a substantial 
financial injection into the scheme as well as an 
increased level of management support aimed 
at improving the scheme’s productivity.
Funds were secured from Tina Sinakho and the 
National Development Agency during this pe-
riod. Funds went to upgrading the scheme’s as-
sets. The old shed on the scheme was renovated 
so as to accommodate an office, equipment 
storage, produce storage and a large garage for 
farm vehicles. A one-ton truck was acquired for 
marketing purposes.
In terms of management arrangements, the con-
tract with the East London based consultant was 
not renewed, in favour of appointing a manag-
er from among the beneficiaries. This manager 
works under the direction of the designated BRC 
project officer. The members received regular 
wage payments leading to greater commitment 
to the scheme.
Production levels were also increased significant-
ly during this period. In 2006, about 15 hectares 
were planted with a wider variety of vegetable 
crops. Maize was dropped off the planting list. 
In 2007, approximately 300 fruit trees (mainly 
apples and pecan nuts) were planted. However, 
the scheme continued to be plagued by poor 
crops. The 2005/2006 summer season crop was 
affected by heavy rains which caused water log-
ging in the fields. 
During this period the scheme began to attract 
attention as a success story, seeing a variety of 
visitors, including the MEC for Agriculture, and 
delegations of foreign funders.
2008: striving for profitability
The 2008 period appears to be one in which 
the focus has begun to shift to increasing pro-
ductivity and effectiveness, in search of scheme 
profitability. Existing crops were been success-
fully produced and marketed both locally and in 
the East London area. Crop diversification and 
experimentation continued. New crops such as 
wheat and tomatoes were planted for the first 
time. The failed fruit orchard was replaced with 
a new planting of 500 apple trees, this time with 
better advisory support. 
New equipment was purchased with NDA funds, 
including a tractor, a ridger, a disc, a ripper and a 
trailer. Two Rotivators (weeding machines) were 
also bought and replaced use of hand hoes. 
However, concerns about the long-term viability 
of the scheme are evident. BRC and the scheme 
have begun to lobby the Amathole District Mu-
nicipality to support the installation of a drip 
irrigation system to replace the flood system. 
This is expected to improve crop productivity 
substantially.
Institutionally, a management committee was 
set up, including the project members, BRC, and 
the CPA, with the intention of improving local 
participation in decision making and manage-
ment processes.
Natural resources
The scheme is located in the upper reaches of 
the Amatola Mountain range. Altitudes in the 
area range from 800 metres to 1800 metres at 
the mountain top. 
Climatic conditions recorded in the Keiskamma-
hoek area are as follows:
However, being higher in the mountains, condi-
tions in Chata may be more extreme than pre-
sented in this table. Greater detail of the climatic 
conditions can be found in the Chata IDP (2003).
The main water source for the area is the Chata 
River and the many small mountain streams 
which feed it. The river is dammed about a kilo-
metre below the scheme (the Chata dam).The 
quality of water is reported to be extremely 
pure. Water is used downstream for domestic 
needs. The vegetation above the scheme is rich 
in natural Afromontane forest, as well as large 
areas of pine and wattle plantation. The lands 
immediately surrounding the scheme comprise 
grasslands of the Dohne Sourveld variety.
A soils analysis was carried out by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture in 2001. Approximately 51 
hectares have been irrigated in the past. Soils 
identified were Oakleaf, Cloverly, Shortlands 
and Vaalriver. The depth of the soils varies con-
siderably and this and the different soil types in-
dicate the need to carefully match crops to areas 
within the scheme.
A generalised vegetable crop suitability frame-
work, based on the assessment of climatic condi-
tions and the soils, was identified as follows:
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• Crucifers (cabbage, broccoli, spinach, etc.) 
are suitable climatically and for Cloverly, 
Shortlands and Vaalriver soils, with the best 
growing period being October to April.
• Bean varieties are suitable for any of the 
soils as long as the drainage is good, and is 
most optimal from November to March.
• Cucurbit (squashes, cucumbers, etc.) are 
suitable in well drained soils between No-
vember and March.
• Potatoes are suitable on well drained soils, 
with optimal growing periods being De-
cember to February.
Physical infrastructure and 
resources
The scheme is 22.75 hectares in extent. The lands 
are divided into five sections. Sections 1 to 4 are 
fenced and farmed. Section 5, the southernmost 
section next to the school, is not fenced or uti-
lised at the moment.
The irrigation system is a gravity-fed system via 
cement furrows with two water draw-off weirs 
on the Chata River. There is also a storage dam 
that is fed from a furrow from the river. Section 
1 is fed directly from the river. The dam feeds 
Sections 2 and 3, and can also feed Section 4. 
Section 4 is primarily fed from the lower weir, 
except in times of very low river flow. Section 1’s 
irrigation channel requires maintenance (leak-
ages/unmaintained), but the other channels are 
in reasonably good condition.
The in-field irrigation is a flood system. However, 
many of the flood channels are not adequately 
levelled, and coupled with poor drainage soils in 
some sections, achieving appropriate irrigation 
for all crops is difficult. This problem has resulted 
in parts of Section 2 and 3 being left unutilised.
The installation of a drip irrigation system is pro-
posed to overcome the problems of the flood 
system. A cost estimate of R700 000 has been 
obtained for the installation of the system for 
the whole scheme. It is hoped that the Amathole 
District Municipality will fund this development, 
even if installation takes place in phases.
The project has a relatively new storage and ad-
ministrative centre, which includes office space, 
equipment storage facilities, and a large storage/
shed area for vehicles and crop storage (but still 
waiting for doors to be put on the shed area).
The scheme has its own tractor, plough, discs, 
ripper, a one-ton delivery vehicle, two weeding 
machines, sprayers, hoes, spades, buckets and 
other small equipment. All equipment is in good 
to excellent condition, with much of it being 
less than two years old. The tractor, however, is 
formally registered in the name of the CPA and 
also utilised on the forestry project. Equipment 
is maintained, and during the assessment one of 
the weeding machines had been taken in to the 
supplier for repairs.
The fencing around the sections is in good condi-
tion and is goat-proofed. The gravel access road 
to Chata is in excellent condition. The scheme is 
located along this road.
The production system
Crop selection 
The scheme has focussed on vegetables for its 
income. In the longer term, income is to be re-
alised through fruit and nut orchards. Future 
planting will include fodder crops. 
In the 2007/2008 summer season approximately 
14 hectares were planted. Current land utilisa-
tion is as follows: 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
Mean min temp 
(Celsius)
16 16 14 12 8 5 5 6 8 11 13 15
Mean max temp 
(Celsius)
30 29 20 18 14 11 10 13 16 18 25 27
Mean precip. 
(mm)
88 95 111 62 48 29 30 38 64 87 91 83
Table 4.1: Minimum and maximum temperatures and 
precipitation
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• Section 1: mainly pecan nut trees (of which 
90% are dead) 
• Section 2: replanted with 500 apple trees
• Section 3: planted with vegetables and 
wheat
• Section 4: planted with vegetables and 
wheat.
For the 2008/09 summer season the following 
vegetable crops have been planted: cabbage, 
spinach, beetroot, broccoli, green pepper, but-
ternut, potatoes, tomatoes and two hectares of 
wheat. Approximately 10 hectares of vegetables 
have been planted so far.
In 2007 the scheme expanded into fruit and nuts, 
in a bid to become more profitable. These were 
mainly pecan nuts and apples, but also included 
peaches, plums and pears. Some 300 apple trees 
were planted. However, the scheme members 
and farm manager had had no prior experi-
ence of deciduous trees and training was only 
received after the trees were all planted. It is be-
lieved that due to incorrect watering (linked to 
the positions in which the trees were planted) 
and incorrect fertilisation the trees all died.
Similar problems were experienced with the pe-
can nut trees with the majority of the trees dy-
ing. It is believed that the cause of the problem 
is related to the poor drainage from the flood 
irrigation channels, and possibly also frost prob-
lems.
The scheme has recently replanted 500 apples 
trees and is hoping for better results. Besides the 
Figure 4.1: Photos of Chata Irrigation Scheme
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one-day training on apples, they get ad hoc vis-
its and telephonic advice from the specialist who 
supplied the saplings.
Production planning
The BRC utilises a simple production plan guide 
which sets out crop cycles, seed and planting re-
quirements, and establishes types and quantities 
of fertiliser, pesticides and herbicides needed. 
The plan also requires crop rotation in the fields. 
The costs and anticipated income associated 
with this are set out on a spreadsheet.
Purchases of inputs are done through Umthiza 
in Keiskammahoek, although sometimes pur-
chases are made in King William’s Town. Orders 
always go through BRC, although needs can be 
identified to the farm manager, if the planned 
inputs prove to be insufficient or there are un-
expected needs. BRC pays the accounts directly 
to the suppliers.
Staff structure
The scheme operates with 16 landowners em-
ployed on the scheme. Besides land owners 
there are three full time labourers employed 
and two drivers. The non-landowner employees 
started in August 2008. The labour component is 
structured as follows:
Of the five non-labourer posts, four are held by 
males and one assistant supervisor is female. 
Management responsibilities
While responsibilities can broken down to 
where responsibilities primarily lie, the overall 
approach is a consultative one which emphasis-
es reaching consensus. BRC’s management role 
on the scheme has developed out of its formal 
appointment as implementation agent for the 
restitution development by Amathole District 
Municipality, which administers the restitution 
funds. BRC takes primary responsibility for:
• Annual planning (strategy and production 
goals)
• Financial planning
• Administration
• Production planning (quarterly)
• Marketing.
The farm manager takes primary responsibility 
for:
• Implementation of production plans
• Monthly and weekly task planning meet-
ings with members
• Oversight of labour management and in-
structions to supervisors
• On-site management
• Ordering of inputs as and when required
• Representing the scheme.
Supervisors take responsibility for: 
• Organisation of their teams in the field 
• Keep of timesheets
• Advising farm manager of needs and prob-
lems
• Standing in for the manager when he is 
away.
This division of responsibilities is reflected in the 
approach to the farming of the apples. The deci-
sion to plant apple trees would be motivated by 
BRC to the scheme members as part of the an-
Position Wage (per month) Employer
Farm manager R3 000  BRC
Supervisor R1 300  CPA
Assistant supervisors (2) R1 100  CPA
Labourers R900  CPA
Drivers (2) R1 300  BRC
Records clerk R900  CPA
Table 4.2: Employment structure at Chata
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nual planning. Once this was agreed, BRC would 
source the funding and put the contracts and 
arrangements into effect. Consultation would 
occur with the farm manager as to which lands 
to allocate, and arrangements around the im-
plementation of the planting, training, etc. The 
farm manager in turn would discuss this with 
the members, and a team would be selected to 
work on the planting and looking after the ap-
ples. The details of what needs to happen when 
would be agreed with BRC, and the farm man-
ager would ensure its implementation through 
the weekly meetings and in-field guidance.
Administration and financial 
management
The scheme employed a records clerk in 2007. 
The clerk is a scheme member from a family 
which owns a plot in the scheme. 
Every Friday BRC collects records of sales and 
stock utilised, as well as cash from sales, and re-
turns the records on the following week.
The project does not employ any security for 
their office or fields, and have not had any need 
for security.
The scheme does not have a separate bank ac-
count. All credit and financial arrangements are 
made via BRC. Income from sales are not used to 
offset expenditure (as input costs are from grant 
finance), and this income is paid over to the CPA 
twice yearly to utilise at its discretion. As the 
scheme members receive salaries they have no 
claim to this income.
Marketing arrangements
Crops are sold through the following avenues:
• Direct purchases from the office
• Selling via the scheme’s truck in nearby vil-
lages and towns (in Keiskammahoek they 
discount by R2 per bag for purchases of over 
10 bags)
• Selling according to arrangements/orders 
in King William’s Town and East London 
(BRC arranges for the orders and the price, 
phones through the orders to the office, 
and money is collected by BRC into the ac-
count directly).
It is estimated that roughly half the crops are 
sold in the Keiskammahoek area, and half in 
the King William’s Town / East London area. But 
this depends on production levels. For the mass 
production planned for 2007, 80% of the crops 
would have been sold to commercial outlets. 
During 2007 some retailers were collecting di-
rectly from the scheme. Prices vary from crop to 
crop but staple crops like cabbage achieve better 
profitability locally.
Local sales take place regularly, but sales are 
always better at month end (after payday) and 
after pension payouts. For August 2008 average 
daily sales from the office were between R100 
and R120 rand. 
Clients in the Buffalo City area include:
• East London: Pick ‘n Pay, Fruit & Veg City, 
Pro Veg, Spar (2 branches), OK Bazaars, 
Sanans
• King William’s Town: Fruit & Veg City, 
Popular Market.
Marketing with the retail outlets is undertak-
en by the project officer and an administrator 
in the BRC offices. The marketing approach is 
fairly basic, in that retail prices are established, 
and then offers are made to the various outlets. 
Prices are highly negotiable depending on what 
the retailers are willing to pay. There are no for-
mal contracts in place. The main weakness in the 
marketing is that no ongoing arrangements can 
be established in respect to retailers’ needs be-
Crop Price local Price Buffalo City
Butternut R12 R20
Onion R15 R20
Cabbage R2 R3.50
Table 4.3: Some examples of prices recently achieved
Source: figures provided by the farm manager.
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cause of the lack of stability in production quan-
tity and quality. BRC must first assess what is at 
hand before attempting to market. 
The scheme members do their own packaging. 
In terms of the new wheat crop, the scheme will 
have to find a miller before attempting to sell 
and arrangements are not yet in place. In the 
longer term the intention is to mill locally and 
produce bread for local sales.
There is no formal marketing strategy that has 
been evaluated for the apples, but there is an 
intention to process the apples in Chata and pro-
duce jams for selling.
Overview of external support to the 
scheme
Border Rural Committee support
As the project initiator and manager BRC is in-
tensively involved in supporting the project. This 
support includes:
• Production management
• Marketing
• Finance and administration (including con-
tract administration)
• Liaison and administration related to resti-
tution funds and various donor funding
• Public relations 
• Strategic planning and capacity building.
In 2006 the value of BRC support (direct costs) 
were budgeted at R278 500, which included:
•  Wages of the farm manager and the driver 
on the project
• BRC staff wages
• Finance and administration costs
• Farming input subsidies. 
In 2007 this budget had undergone a major re-
evaluation and was increased nearly threefold 
to R828 000, and in 2008 this again increased 
substantially to R1.2 million, with major increases 
in all categories of expenditure. 
The budgets have been funded from the Nation-
al Development Agency (NDA) to an amount of 
R940 000, by Tina Sinakho to an amount of R1.58 
million, and various other smaller grants. 
It must be noted that this is the first major ag-
ricultural management job undertaken by BRC. 
BRC lacks an experienced irrigation crop special-
ist and has had no prior experience in market-
ing. BRC is learning ‘on-the-job’, and while the 
fresh approach of the NGO in managing the pro-
ject has paid dividends in overcoming the initial 
crises, many serious production and marketing 
problems could have been overcome with ade-
quate technical knowledge within the BRC team 
or if BRC had more effectively brought in spe-
cialist inputs.
Other technical support for production
The private company Earth Innovations was con-
tracted to provide farm management services 
for the period up to June 2006. This was the pe-
riod in which the project experienced its worst 
performance, although the causes underlying 
these problems are varied and cannot be allo-
cated without further investigation. The scheme 
members still recall this relationship in a posi-
tive manner. This farm manager and BRC parted 
ways partially due to different visions as how to 
take the scheme forward.
Currently technical support is provided for the 
growing of the new apple trees. As part of the 
supply contract, the supplier (from nearby Hogs-
Budget Item Budget 2006 Budget 2007 Budget 2008
Administration costs R21 000 R49 500 R95 000
Motor vehicle expenses R10 000 R22 000 R37 500
Programme costs R22 000 R74 000 R140 000
Project resources R70 000 R420 000 R577 890
Salaries R65 000 R110 000 R407 600
Table 4.4: Key budget items for BRC
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back) assessed the lands for suitability and now 
provides advisory services. However these ser-
vices are low intensity. 
Support from the Department of 
Agriculture
In the early years of the project BRC made it a 
specific objective to get the Department in-
volved in the project. However, the response of 
the extension services from Keiskammahoek has 
always been limited. It was noted that extension 
officers periodically visited the scheme, but have 
done little more than collect information on the 
scheme. The extension service’s slow response to 
requests for assistance in identifying diseases, 
etc., was highlighted as an example of the lack 
of support from the Department.
The Department has donated a tractor to the 
community of Chata (not the irrigation project), 
but this is currently parked at the community 
hall and evidently remains unused.
Economic aspects
Production figures for 2007 and 2008 were made 
available although figures provided were not 
for the full year. The information is presented 
on an annual basis, due to the major difference 
in production levels between the two years. In 
2007 production was planned at maximum farm 
utilisation with the intention of achieving finan-
cial profitability. However, there were massive 
losses due to heavy crop damage from rains. BRC 
staff acknowledge that these losses were largely 
caused by a lack of farming experience on their 
part. The impact of such losses caused trauma 
within the organisation and resulted in a scaling 
back of production levels in 2008. While this is 
understandable considering the losses sustained 
in 2007, production levels in 2008 will, for the 
year at least, require heavy subsidisation of the 
scheme.
Production in 2007
Following the take-over of the farm manage-
ment, BRC attempted production at maximum 
possible levels in 2007. The intention was to 
achieve overall profitability. Figures provided 
from May 2007 set out the following plans:
Production costs and returns were anticipated as 
follows (8 month period):
In terms of actual production the following 
planting and harvesting returns were achieved 
(9 month period):
This level of production should have gener-
ated at least R250 000. However, quality of the 
crop was reportedly to be mostly poor. Particu-
lar problems were also experienced in getting 
certain crops like spinach to the market fresh 
enough, resulting in further losses. In all a to-
tal income of only R110 000 was achieved dur-
ing 2007, resulting in losses of over R200 000, 
excluding management/support costs or taking 
account of capital investments.
Production in 2008
Following the problems of 2007, planting has 
been scaled down to about two thirds of 2007 
levels (at a rough estimate) in terms of vegeta-
bles. However, with the planting of the new ap-
ple trees the scheme is still planting intensively.
Crop Numbers to be planted
(8 month period)
Actual Planted
(9 month period)
Cabbage 180 000 137 000
Broccoli 20 000 19 600
Cauliflower 20 000 25 000
Spinach 20 000 17 000
Beetroot 13 000 16 000
Lettuce 8 000 10 500
Potatoes 160 kilograms of seed
Onions 0 10 000
Peas, green beans, carrot, pumpkin, 
butternut, sweet potatoes
Various smaller amounts 
Table 4.5: Production plans
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Item Amount
Cost of seed inputs 61 688
Other input costs 138 000
Wages 135 000
Total production costs 334 688
Total income expected (anticipated 70% production returns) 354 820
Crop Actual Planting (Jan-
Aug 2008)
Harvest Potential (Jan-
Aug @100%)
Actual Harvest 
(recorded)
Cabbage 55 000 25 000 6131
Broccoli 2 000 1 000 23
Spinach 6 000 6 000 371
Beetroot 16 000 16 000 1596
Onion 27 000 0 0
Potatoes 35 bags seed 1225 bags 7
Item (up to August 2008) Amount
Cost of seed inputs 31 234
Other input costs 81 865
Wages 164 809
Total production costs 277 908
Total income achieved 42 450
Table 4.7: Actual returns
Table 4.6: Anticipated production costs and returns
Table 4.9: Total costs and income
Table 4.8: Recent plantings and harvest potential
Crop Actual planted Actual harvested Percentage harvested
Cabbage 137 000 51 000 37%
Broccoli 19 600 9 600 49%
Cauliflower 25 000 12 050 48%
Spinach 17 000 12 000 70%
Beetroot 16 000 9 750 60%
Lettuce 10 500 4 875 46%
Onions 10 000 7 500 75%
Note: figures have been rounded off.
Table 4.10: Annual wage bill
Year Details Amount Monthly Average
2006 End year only R26 000
2007 Full Year R223 000 R19 400
2008 January to August R165 000 R20 600
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Note that these figures do not reflect input sup-
plies in stock or unsold crops. It also does not 
separate out the fertilisers and soil preparation 
costs for the planting of the apple trees. 
The supplier costs for the apple trees was 
R20 000.
Wage costs
Wages on the project are paid both from the 
Restitution Fund allocation (the labourers, su-
pervisors and records clerk) and through BRC 
utilising their grant finances (the farm manager, 
the tractor driver and the vehicle driver). 
The annual wage bill, since the adoption of the 
wage framework on the project, is as follows:
At full land utilisation, this equates to a require-
ment of R11 200 in income per hectare per an-
num just to cover the wage bill. 
General observations
The lack of profitability from the vegetable op-
erations is a major problem for the scheme. The 
failure to break even is mainly based on poor 
production levels and high fixed salary over-
heads.
Scheme members are clearly aware that the 
project is running at a loss. They indicated that 
this had been made clear from the AGM meet-
ing. Members still expressed hope that a profit 
would be generated. However, profitability is 
not a day-to-day concern for the membership 
and the ongoing losses do not appear to cloud 
members’ positive outlook on the project. 
For BRC, profitability is clearly a much greater 
daily concern, and the staff hold a real worry 
about the future of the project unless losses can 
be turned around. Nevertheless, there appears 
to be a sense of uncertainty on how to turn the 
financial situation around. BRC is hoping that 
the additional activities of the fruit orchard and 
fodder production will assist with improving in-
come levels. 
Institutional framework
Land ownership
As part of the former Ciskei the scheme is estab-
lished on communal tenure land. The ‘land own-
ers’ who are part of the scheme are in fact from 
families with Permission to Occupy (PTO) certifi-
cates; in most cases the PTO is in the name of a 
deceased grandfather. The individual members 
involved therefore do not necessarily have sole 
land ownership rights, but rather exercise their 
involvement and claim their benefits as a mem-
ber of a family with historical rights to the land. 
Project ownership 
In 2006 the rights to the scheme were techni-
cally transferred to the Communal Property As-
sociation (CPA). However, in practice the CPA 
does not see its role in managing the scheme, 
but merely in providing a legal framework for 
the scheme’s business operations. The CPA’s role 
is described in terms of “providing vision and 
overall guidance”. This role also includes resolv-
ing internal problems.
The project is currently not separately registered 
as a legal entity. Its bank account, credit arrange-
ments with suppliers, and other legal commit-
ments, are all conducted in the name of the BRC. 
The intention is however to set up a separate le-
gal entity. This was provided for in the 2007 BRC 
Annual Plan, but is it is not regarded as a priority 
at this stage. 
Institutional structure
While daily and weekly decision making is made 
by BRC in liaison with the farm manager, month-
ly decision making and longer term strategic 
planning is done in a representative committee 
called the Company Committee. This committee 
comprises BRC representatives, CPA representa-
tives, the farm manager, two workers, and the 
record keeper (as secretary). Both BRC and the 
farm manager present reports to this commit-
tee. 
The outcome of reports and issues from this 
meeting are fed to the CPA Managing Board, 
who in turn are responsible for keeping the 
general community informed of issues. The CPA 
appears to limit its role, leaving actual manage-
ment to its management agent (BRC) and the 
scheme members. 
There is a multi-stakeholder steering commit-
tee, involving government departments and 
municipal representatives, which deals with the 
developments in Chata in general, including the 
irrigation scheme.
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Profile of scheme participants
The farm manager: Mr Mongameli Rode
The farm manager has a visible passion for 
farming and is the ‘champion’ or ‘driver’ of the 
scheme. Thirty-eight year old Mr Rode is a plot 
owner and has been farming since 1997. He had 
been the farm manager for 18 months as of the 
undertaking of the research for this case study. 
His previous farming experience has been in 
maize and vegetable production on his family 
plot. He has not had any special training but in-
dicated that besides practical experience he also 
learns through reading.
Mr Rode perceives himself to be a farmer for life, 
proudly declaring that he was born in Chata and 
will never leave. His farther was a farmer, and 
he is very clear that he would like his children to 
learn farming as well. 
Profile of other scheme members
Age levels of the scheme members range be-
tween 35 years and 65 years. Education levels 
range between grade 2 and grade 12, with the 
mean being grade 6. Members however ex-
pressed the opinion that formal education is 
relatively unimportant for successful farming 
in comparison to local knowledge and practical 
skills.
Seven of the scheme members are the sole bread-
winners for their families. Three families receive 
government grants, one member has a second 
business (spaza shop and steel works) and the 
other families have another member earning 
wages as well.
A variety of reasons is given for individual par-
ticipation in the scheme ranging from house-
hold food security and household survival, to 
the satisfaction of deriving value out of the land. 
Scheme members tended to express the opinion 
that it is unlikely that their children will ever get 
involved in farming as their children see better 
futures elsewhere. 
Perspectives of performance
Scheme members are currently very positive 
about the scheme, largely because of stable 
wages and a marked improvement in their liveli-
hoods, as well as providing them with a sense of 
achievement and purpose. The members indicat-
ed that even if the BRC support was withdrawn 
they would attempt to continue with the farm-
ing (although this commitment is clearly tinged 
with knowledge of the past failure to farm on 
their own), albeit possibly with less commercial 
aspirations. 
The project also generates a sense of community 
commitment. The project is seen not only to be 
good for those directly involved but also for the 
village. “There are no families starving in Chata 
anymore”. The scheme provides a source of 
cheap food. For example non-commercial qual-
ity cabbages are sold for 50c and scraps are given 
away. Further examples of community benefits 
cited by the members included: fruit and nut 
trees encourage birdlife which will benefit the 
tourism venture in the village; the planned fod-
der production will benefit the livestock project; 
and the planned process operation (milling/
bread; jams from fruit) will also provide the com-
munity with cheaper food.
Conclusions
The Chata Irrigation Scheme is perhaps a story 
of potential. Whether the future will show a lost 
potential or a sustainable enterprise will largely 
be dictated by how current problems are ad-
dressed. 
On the positive side certain key foundation con-
ditions for the success of the scheme are in place. 
These include:
• A clear institutional framework within 
which the group functions, which sets out 
roles, responsibilities and how benefits are 
allocated.
• A clear contractual relationship between 
scheme members, BRC and the CPA.
• Ownership rests in a body divorced from 
the daily management, so it can intervene 
in internal disputes which so often lead to 
group paralysis.
• A clear and accepted management frame-
work with a farm manager and a supervisor 
directing work in the fields.
• An established support environment.
• A highly committed NGO supporting the 
scheme which has also brought in support 
from funders and technical specialists. And 
although the limited technical support is ar-
guably one of the key weaknesses on the 
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project, the mechanism within which to 
bring in such support is in place.
• The scheme initiative is taking place within 
a context of overall community develop-
ment. This results in livelihood improve-
ments from a number of sources, meaning 
greater demand for produce from the com-
munity, and greater household food secu-
rity for participants in the scheme.
• The project driver appears to be in place in 
the person of the farm manager; a group 
project requires the dynamism of at least 
one person with commitment, passion, abil-
ity to learn, and an entrepreneurial vision.
• Although he has limited experience of crop 
varieties and of running the farm as a busi-
ness, the farm manager demonstrates the 
required characteristics.
• Beneficiaries are able to recognise benefits 
and receive direct benefits 
• The outlook of the membership is very posi-
tive in terms of the impact of the scheme 
and they value the income received from 
their work on the project, a marked im-
provement from when the scheme was ini-
tially revitalised.
• The means of production is sufficiently in 
place for efficient production.
• The scheme has been rehabilitated and has 
received key resources needed for produc-
tion and for marketing. 
In terms of weaknesses, the following aspects 
raise concern about the sustainability of the pro-
ject:
• The scheme is hugely subsidised without 
any clear perspective on how long this sub-
sidy will be (or needs to be) in place or what 
aspects are appropriate for subsidisation.
• The management lacks critical technical 
skills and/or experience and this is resulting 
in significant production failures.
• The scheme’s overheads (e.g. its fixed wage 
bill) place the potential future profitability 
of the scheme under constant pressure.
• The solution to current problems is fre-
quently identified to lie in further capital 
investment (drip irrigation, etc.) which de-
flects a focus from other core problems.
• The framework for building the business 
skills and business management within the 
project is not in place or adequately visual-
ised by role-players.
• While the effect of paying wages has been 
positive on the scheme members’ motiva-
tion, it has also removed the rationale for 
building a profitable (i.e. sustainable) busi-
ness from the members.
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Introduction
In the new municipal demarcations, Zanyokwe 
Irrigation Scheme (ZIS) falls under the Amahlati 
Local Municipality of the Amatole District. The 
climate of the area where the scheme is located 
can be described as semi-arid with a mean an-
nual rainfall of about 590 mm per annum (Van 
Averbeke et al., 1998). The ZIS is divided into 
six sections, namely, Kammafurrow, Burns Hill, 
Zingcuka, Zanyokwe, Ngqumeya and Lenye. 
These are villages that make up the scheme. The 
Lenye section is divided into three sub-sections, 
namely Lenye West, North and South. Figure 5.1 
shows the fields of Lenye South. Mr Booi, the 
subject of this case study, is one of the farmers 
in that section.
Historical perspective
Mr Booi is 56 years old, married and has four 
children. For five years he worked as a mine 
worker at Carletonville. According to Mr Booi, 
most farmers at ZIS started working as mine 
workers. However, while most of them were af-
fected by retrenchments that began in the early 
1990s, Mr Booi did not leave the mines due to 
retrenchments. He decided to leave his job in 
1981 as he was earning very little. Back at home 
he made a living by selling chickens until 1984, 
after which he was employed as a farm worker 
at the scheme. 
The ZIS was established in 1984, initially with 
48 members (Van Averbeke et al., 1998). At 
the time, the Ciskei government had a strong 
relationship with Israel. The two governments 
signed a five-year agreement whereby skilled 
Israelis would run the scheme. The main objec-
tive of this agreement was to build the capac-
ity of the local farmers in the areas of farming 
and farm management. The local farmers would 
then take over and run the scheme at the end of 
the contract period. During the contract period, 
the farmers – of whom Mr Booi was one – were 
engaged as workers under the guidance of the 
Israeli managers. 
During this era, all agricultural inputs were sub-
sidised by government, and all machinery and 
equipment were provided by government. Sup-
port services such as marketing and extension 
were government priorities. Most marketing 
functions (grading, packing, selling and buy-
ing) took place at field level. The scheme was 
endowed with a lot of infrastructure, including 
marketing facilities. A store was built on the 
site where buyers could come and buy products. 
Facilities like potato washers and maize driers 
were on the site. The Ciskei government em-
ployed a large number of extension officers of 
whom three served various sections of the ZIS on 
a full-time basis (Bembridge, 1999). 
In 1989, the contract with Israel expired, and the 
scheme was handed over to the 48 members un-
der the management of Ulimocor, a parastatal. 
The scheme entered a phase in which farmers 
began to struggle to make a profit. According to 
Mr Booi, the main problems that affected farm-
ers during this time were poor management, 
5 Mr Booi and the 
Zanyokwe Irrigation 
Scheme, Keiskammahoek: 
a successful smallholder 
relative to his peers
Nomakhaya Monde, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, University of Fort Hare
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poor record keeping, and reduction in exten-
sion services. In addition, government withdrew 
many services (input and tractor subsidies) and 
sold most of the scheme’s equipment and im-
plements. With very little government support, 
farmers struggled to pay the labourers and as 
a result, many labourers stopped working for 
farmers.
In 1996, Ulimocor was disbanded and farmers 
were advised to form a trust whose main re-
sponsibility was to manage the scheme’s affairs 
and look after its infrastructure and equipment. 
The scheme was supposed to be managed by a 
Board of Trustees, but it would appear that the 
trust deed was not registered with the relevant 
authority, and as a result, the proposed trust did 
not have the authority to run the scheme (Van 
Averbeke et al., 1998). So, the period between 
1996 and 2001 was the worst time at ZIS as there 
was neither production nor management at the 
scheme. The scheme’s infrastructure began to 
disintegrate, partly through vandalism. 
In 2002, the farmers received a grant of R1 mil-
lion from government in an effort to revitalise 
the scheme. Farmers were advised to elect a 
management committee to run the scheme. A 
committee of 12 members was elected. They also 
received loans from Uvimba Bank in King Wil-
liam’s Town. However, farmers struggled to pay 
back the loans. In 2005, the trust was changed to 
a Producers Assembly (PA) committee (Monde et 
al., 2005).
Currently, the ZIS farmers have a co-opera-
tive, which was registered in 2007 (Monde et 
al., 2008). They also received a further sum of 
R3 million from government to improve the 
scheme’s infrastructure. In addition, ZIS’s farm-
ers are members of the Eastern Cape govern-
ment’s Massive Food Programme, which aims 
at increasing the production of maize by small-
scale farmers. In the Massive Food Programme, 
farmers benefit from subsidised inputs (seed, 
fertilisers and herbicides), while government 
arranges for their maize to be marketed. The 
fence around the scheme has been repaired, the 
scheme’s offices refurbished, and most irrigation 
equipment replaced. The main problems at ZIS 
are markets and extension services. According to 
Mr Booi, the extension services have gone from 
bad to worse.
Natural and physical 
resources
The area under irrigation in Zanyokwe is uncer-
tain but the land area is estimated to be 635 hec-
tares. Altogether there are 66 individual small 
farms ranging from 1 to 20 hectares. Mr Booi 
has access to 6.3 hectares of land. Of this land, 
5.3 hectares is the land allocated to him, and he 
leases an additional one hectare from another 
Figure 5.1: Zanyokwe Irrigation Scheme
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farmer on the scheme. The average land holding 
at the scheme is 3 hectares. 
The soils at the scheme are rated from moder-
ately to highly suitable for irrigation, however 
a significant percentage are classified as having 
a moderate potential (Monde et al., 2005). The 
main limitations are: poor depth, heavy texture 
and a high percentage of fine sand and silt. Cul-
tivation difficulties and slow permeability occur 
on some of the heavier soils. This shows that ir-
rigation should be carefully managed to avoid 
soil-related problems on the scheme and the 
need for appropriate training. 
ZIS receives its water via an 80 centimetre pipe-
line from the Sandile Dam. The pipeline tapers 
down to a smaller diameter towards the end of 
the scheme. The Kamma Furrow section, which is 
at the very far end of the scheme, has a separate 
pump unit to pump water from the Keiskamma 
River into their reservoir or directly into the dis-
tribution system.
Because the dam also supplies domestic water, 
the pipeline is operated and maintained by the 
Amatola Water Board on behalf of the Depart-
ment of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). 
There is very little contact between the scheme 
and the Water Board. The assured yield from the 
dam is 12.7 million cubic metres and its capacity 
is 30.7 million cubic metres. Depending on the 
dam level the pressure or head at the wall var-
ies between 10 and 50 metres. The outlet of the 
dam is fitted with state-of-the-art water control 
and measuring equipment that is in good work-
ing order.
There are nine main off take points along the 
pipeline to distribute water to the scheme (see 
Figure 5.2). The water supply to the scheme is 
designed with a duty of about 0.9 litres/second 
per hectare. This is considered to be adequate 
at this level of scheme utilisation. If all of the 
scheme were to come into production, the water 
would still be adequate if well managed. Each 
off-take was originally fitted with a flow metre, 
pressure gauges and filters, but at all the points 
visited during the fieldwork, these devices were 
no longer functioning and many pipes leaked 
(Monde et al., 2005).
ZIS makes use of sprinkler irrigation system. The 
sprinklers are mounted on quick coupling pipes 
and the water is delivered from a hydrant for 
each block. The hydrants receive water from a 
network of subsurface pipes, which are connect-
ed to the off-takes from the Sandile pipeline, or 
from the booster pump station or from a night 
storage dam. Until recently, the irrigation infra-
structure at ZIS was in very bad condition. The 
Figure 5.2: Example of block off take showing flow metre, 
pressure gauge, filters, non-return valve and electrical 
supply for booster pumps
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Figure 5.3: A stack of new pipes in Booi’s homestead
Figure 5.4: A facility used to dry maize (maize drier) at 
Zanyokwe Irrigation Scheme
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pipes were damaged and leaking, there were no 
hydrant pipes, and the valves did not work prop-
erly. But the infrastructure upgrade that took 
place in early 2008 has substantially improved 
the situation (see Figure 5.3).
Most of the lands on the irrigation scheme are 
irrigated by gravity from the pipeline, but wa-
ter at Lenye North has to be pumped to a reser-
voir, from which irrigation is by gravity. About 
15 farmers depend on this pump. Until recently, 
the electrical power to the pump was discon-
nected and apparently this had been the case 
for 10 years because of money owing to Eskom. 
The reservoir into which water is pumped leaks. 
Mr Booi has access to the scheme’s other physi-
cal infrastructure as well. However, most of this 
infrastructure is either not working or is in very 
bad state. For instance, the various storage fa-
cilities on the scheme are generally unusable, so 
farmers either use their own storage facilities 
or, more typically, none at all. Also, the scheme 
used to have maize driers (see Figure 5.4) and a 
potato grader (see Figure 5.5), but these are no 
longer in working condition. 
However, the one aspect of non-irrigation infra-
structure that has been recently restored is the 
scheme’s offices; the building has been repaired 
and furniture and office equipment acquired 
(see Figure 5.6). This was largely through addi-
tional funding which the farmers managed to 
secure from the National Development Agency 
and the Small Enterprises Development Agency, 
which was also used to purchased some farm 
machinery to improve tillage and cultivation ser-
vices, and to install drip irrigation on about 20 
hectares of the scheme area.
Production systems
Main farming enterprises
Mr Booi is involved in the production of three 
main crops, namely, cabbages, butternuts and 
maize. Apart from these crops, he also grows 
vegetables such as spinach, carrot and onions 
on relatively small plots. In summer, the largest 
share of the land is allocated to cabbage (2.5 
hectares), followed by butternut (2 hectares), 
and then maize (1.5 hectares); the other three 
vegetables are each planted on about one tenth 
of a hectare. In winter, he again plants cabbage 
(though less than in summer), as well as various 
vegetables. The method of cultivation is by trac-
tor traction. Farmers at ZIS have access to three 
Figure 5.5: An old potato grader
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tractors that are hired by farmers for tillage pur-
poses. For cabbage and maize, Mr Booi buys all 
production inputs at cost while those of butter-
nuts are subsidised by government. 
Maize and butternut farmers at ZIS are members 
of the Massive Food Programme (MFP) of the 
Eastern Cape Department of Agriculture. Gov-
ernment purchases and delivers all inputs to the 
production site. When maize is sold, farmers pay 
a certain percentage of the production costs. 
The MFP is a five-year programme. During the 
first year, farmers did not pay for inputs, while 
in the second year they paid 25% of production 
costs, and every year the proportion increases 
until farmers incur the full costs of producing 
maize. Although Mr Booi is a member of the 
MFP, he no longer produces maize under MFP. In 
2007, he decided to pull out and produce for an-
other market. Therefore, he buys maize inputs 
himself from Umthiza Co-op in Alice, about 40 
kilometres from Zanyokwe. With regard to cab-
bage and butternut, Mr Booi obtains the pro-
duction inputs (seed, fertilisers and chemicals) 
either from King William’s Town or East London, 
and hires transport to fetch them. 
Labour inputs
Mr Booi has one permanent farmworker, but 
also calls upon ‘semi-paid’ family labour. The 
farmworker is paid a salary of R45/day (about 
R900 per month), which is a lot higher than 
the average of R30/day that other farm work-
ers earn at ZIS. Mr Booi’s wife is also actively 
involved in farming and his two children, who 
are scholars, also participate in some farming 
activities such as weeding and harvesting. Mr 
Booi keeps his children motivated by paying 
them for the tasks they undertake on the farm. 
Apparently, the school children in the area 
have a tendency of working for other farmers 
when they do not receive payment in their own 
households. Another source of labour is ‘labour 
exchange’, which is mainly used during harvest-
ing. The only crop that demands a lot of labour 
at harvesting is maize. While some farmers re-
sort to temporary labour which is paid in cash 
during the harvesting (especially for maize and 
beans), Mr Booi turns to his relatives and pays 
them in kind through ‘food parcels’. Those who 
resort to hired labour complain about the un-
trustworthiness of the exchange labour, how-
ever, Mr Booi does not encounter this. Instead, 
people are willing to help him. He thinks that 
they feel obliged as he usually gives them farm 
produce even when they did nothing for him. 
He usually donates food when they have social 
functions or simply when they do not have food. 
Mr Booi therefore cultivates these relationships 
as a means of guaranteeing a relatively cheap 
source labour. 
Figure 5.6: Renovated ZIS offices
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Marketing and transaction costs
During the past three years efforts have been 
made to improve access to markets by small-scale 
farmers in this scheme. Before these efforts the 
marketing ‘system’ consisted mainly of farmers 
seeking to hawk their produce at informal mar-
kets, so in parallel with the revitalisation pro-
gramme, government has sought to make sure 
that these farmers have access to formal markets 
as well. As a result the farmers have been linked 
to supermarkets such as Pick ‘n Pay in Port Eliza-
beth, the Umtata market, Provege in East Lon-
don, Fruit and Veg City? in King William’s Town, 
as well as the University of Fort Hare’s Agripark 
processing unit. The main problems however 
with these markets are high transport costs and 
delays in payment. Farmers either hire transport 
to take produce to the market or the buyers pick 
up the produce from the production site using 
own transport. Either way, farmers have to pay 
for the transport. Most farmers complain that 
they do not make money as almost all profit 
goes to transport costs. 
Farmers not only lose money on transport, but 
on poor quality and packaging as well. Mr Booi 
makes an effort to improve quality and make 
sure that he performs extra marketing functions 
such as grading and packaging. In addition, his 
marketing strategy is different from that of the 
other farmers at the scheme, as he does not rely 
only on the buyers or markets arranged for him, 
but rather searches for his own buyers and make 
an effort to comply with their demands. The 
production of maize at ZIS is supported by the 
Eastern Cape Department of Agriculture under 
the Massive Food Programme (MFP). The market 
for this product is Umthiza, which was also or-
ganised by the Department. Umthiza buys a 40 
kilogram bag of grain at R40. This means that 
farmers get R1000 for a ton of maize. When Mr 
Booi noticed the poor price the MFP maize was 
fetching, he began to search for an alternative 
market. In 2006, he found one in Seymour in the 
Fort Beaufort area. He then pulled out of MFP 
and began to produce maize for this buyer. Mr 
Booi and his buyer (who is a dairy farmer), have 
an informal contract. The buyer wants both 
white and yellow maize, and when the produce 
is ready he collects it from the production site. 
The agreed price for yellow maize is R40 for a 
bag of cobs, which is about twice the price of 
R40 for a bag of grain as earned under the MFP. 
Mr Booi sells his white maize at R100 per 40 kilo-
gram bag of grains. The difference is again huge 
as the kilogram fetches twice as much (R2.5/kg) 
compared to only R1/kg in the MFP. Mr Booi is 
happy with this arrangement and is even think-
ing of expanding the maize area by renting-in 
more land. At the time of this investigation he 
already contacted the land owner and the condi-
tions of the lease were being finalised. 
Mr Booi’s main markets for his cabbage are 
hawkers and the Umtata market, which is about 
300 kilometres away. According to Mr Booi, the 
advantage of selling to hawkers is that he does 
not have to pay for transport; they make use of 
their own transport and if the cabbage is sold at 
R3/head, as a producer that is exactly what he 
gets. In other markets such as the Umtata mar-
ket, it is that price less transport costs. Together 
with other farmers, Mr Booi hires a truck to take 
the produce to this market. The cost of transport 
for one trip is R2000. In order to make money, 
the truck load must be at least 2000 bags of cab-
bages, i.e. so that transport costs account for R1 
per bag. If the load is less than that, the effective 
cost per bag increases. According to Mr Booi, it 
is quite an effort to achieve this target. He says 
some farmers are not committed to produc-
tion, and therefore they rarely reach the target 
of 2000 bags, and as a result, the cost is always 
more than R1/bag.     
Economic aspects
The financial analysis of agricultural enterprises 
is demonstrated in Tables 5.1 (farming expenses), 
5.2 (gross farming income) and 5.3 (net farming 
profits).
The net farming profit figures of all enterprises 
are positive, showing that Mr Booi is making a 
profit in all these enterprises. However, these 
figures are still very low for Mr Booi to make 
huge investments on the farm. Maize has the 
lowest net farming profit (R2 715/1.5 ha) of all 
the crops. But in terms of maize yield, Mr Booi 
receives about 164 bags (50 kg) of maize, which 
translate to 8.2 tons from land of 1.5 hectares. 
This means that he is producing about 5.5 tons 
per hectare, which is an acceptable yield under 
irrigation. The main problem is high production 
costs, especially the costs for permanent labour. 
By the standards of the commercial farming sec-
tor, the wage paid by Mr Booi is average, but his 
wage bill is exceedingly high relative to the small 
number of hectares he is farming. Taking the 
second cabbage crop into account but excluding 
income from the vegetables that he plants on a 
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Table 5.2: Gross farming income of different enterprises
Cabbage Maize Butternut (10 kg bag)
Yield 
(head)
Price/ 
unit 
(R)
Income 
(R)
Yield (50 
kg bag)
Price/ 
unit (R)
Income 
(R)
Yield 
(10 kg 
bag)
Price/ 
unit 
(R)
Income 
(R)
Produce 
sold
9 000 2 18 000 70 white 100 7 000 900 15 13 500
83 
yellow
40 3 320
Produce 
consumed
50 2 100 3 100 300 6 15 90
Produce 
donated
120 2 240 5 40 200 14 15 210
Produce fed 
to animals
0 - 0 3 40 120 - - -
Total 9170 18 340 164 10 940 920 13 800
Table 5.3: Net farming profits of different enterprises
Cabbages (R) Maize (R) Butternuts (R)
Gross income 18 340 10 940 13 800
Farming expenses 11 031 8 225 7 256
Net farming profit 7 309 2 715 6 544
Input Cabbage (2.5 ha)
Amount           Cost 
Butternut (2 ha) 
Amount          Cost
Maize (1.5 ha) 
Amount         Cost
Seed/seedlings 10 000             1 800
seedlings     
60 kg              250 40 kg             1 200
Fertiliser 6 50 kg bags     1 156 8 50 kg bags    1 476 8 50 kg bags   1 476
Pesticide 5 litres             200 10 litres           429 6 kg                30
Ploughing 2.5 ha               1 250 2 ha                 1 000 1.5 ha              750
Discing 2.5 ha               875 2 ha                 700 1.5 ha              525
Marker 2.5 ha               750 2 ha                 600 1.5 ha              450
Casual labour 30 days            900 30 days            900 20 days           600
Permanent labour*                        3 375                         2 700                       2 025
Transport – inputs                        150                          50                       200
Transport – outputs                        575                         120                         -
Total                        11 031                         8 225                       7 256
Table 5.1: Farming expenses of cabbage, butternut and maize
* Permanent labour costs about R10 800 per year, which as been roughly apportioned to the different enterprises. 
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small-scale, Mr Booi’s annual total net income is 
approximately R22 415, which takes into account 
the imputed value of own consumption. 
Livelihood significance
Although farming contributes more than 70% 
of his household income, Mr Booi’s household is 
one of the few who have other means of surviv-
ing as well. One reason is that, like Mr Booi, most 
of the other farmers are in their 40s and 50s, thus 
contradicting the stereotype that black farmers 
are invariably pensioners, but also implying of 
course that they are not eligible for old age pen-
sions. Mr Booi, however, has access to a monthly 
disability grant of about R870 for chronic disease 
(diabetes), and moreover has the good fortune 
to have two grown-up children who are work-
ing elsewhere and who send home about R300 
per month. Apart from crop production, Mr Booi 
is also involved in animal production. He keeps 
cattle and chickens, which are sometimes sold 
for income. The money earned from the sale of 
animals is sometimes used to purchase agricul-
tural inputs or pay for children’s education. 
Access to natural capital is a general problem at 
ZIS. The majority of original farmers have discon-
tinued farming due to factors such as old age, 
ill health or lack of interest. Most current farm-
ers either rent or borrow the land they cultivate. 
Most of those who are renting are in fact share-
cropping it, i.e. the owner is rewarded not with 
an up-front cash payment, but with a share (e.g. 
50%) of the crop or the proceeds from the sale 
of the crop. Whether sharecrop or loan arrange-
ments exist, these are short-term and thus gen-
erally unstable. A typical pattern is that when 
a cropper does well, the owner decides not to 
renew the arrangement for the following plant-
ing season but rather try to resume farming for 
their own account, or at least threaten to do 
so. The common perception of sharecroppers is 
that owners are ‘jealous’ of them whenever they 
show signs of succeeding. 
However, Mr Booi’s situation appears to be bet-
ter than that of most farmers at ZIS, because 
he owns most of the land he is using. He only 
rents about a fifth of the land he uses, and this 
by means of an upfront cash payment, which 
owners find highly preferable to sharecrop-
ping arrangements. In other words, it is mostly 
his land, and in that respect he has more secure 
land rights than most farmers who are cultivat-
ing land that belongs to others. 
The problem of land tenure affects all farmers 
at ZIS. According to Mr Booi, it not only prevents 
them from accessing loans from formal financial 
institutions, but discourages farmers from re-
maining in farming. While in 2004 there were 
60 farmers at the scheme (Monde et al., 2005), 
in 2007 there were only 47 farmers. Land tenure 
was mentioned as one of the reasons for discon-
tinuing farming. 
Mr Booi’s strategy to deal with limited access 
to physical capital is to sell all his produce from 
the production site. Other farmers have adopt-
ed this strategy as well. However, most of them 
experience problems such as product spoilage 
due to lack of market. Mr Booi hardly experi-
ences this problem because, to the extent that 
he is able, he first finds buyers or markets for his 
products. In other words, despite not having his 
own transport does he does not passively wait 
to see if buyers arrive at his doorstep or not, but 
organises for his produce to be purchased. His 
labour strategy, too, is different. He has at least 
one permanent worker; other farmers believe 
they cannot afford permanent labour. Having 
permanent labour gives Mr Booi a sense of se-
curity and peace of mind, knowing that every-
thing is taken care of when he cannot be at his 
field. Most farmers make use of family labour 
but do not pay for it. Mr Booi also makes use of 
family labour, but pays for it, and to some ex-
tent pre-pays for it. Donations of farm produce 
to relatives and friends provide him with access 
to willing workers, which is most needed to ac-
complish farming activities such as weeding and 
harvesting. 
The most important livelihood outcomes for 
Mr Booi’s household are cash and food. Hunger 
is not a problem at all in this household. They 
can afford three meals a day. The adequacy of 
diet in terms of quality is however another issue 
that is beyond the investigation of this study. 
But the main source of vegetables is own pro-
duction even though most other food items are 
purchased. 
Social and institutional 
dimensions
The land tenure in ZIS is complicated and varied, 
with close relation to the history of the villages 
that make up the scheme. A bigger share of the 
scheme is located around Lenye and Burnshill vil-
lages. Mr Booi is a resident of Lenye village. Le-
nye is located on what used to be white-owned 
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farms. When the whites left the area, the land 
was taken by the state and registered under the 
trust tenure system. Land under trust tenure 
consists of formerly white-owned land situated 
in proclaimed native areas. The land was even-
tually made available to people through the 
Native Trust and Land Acts. Hence the land oc-
cupied in Lenye North and South is referred to 
as the State or Trust Land and the farmers from 
Lenye therefore do not have title deeds for the 
land they have access to. 
Mr Booi is also one of the few who have rela-
tively secured rights over land. When the scheme 
was established, the fields allocated to individu-
als were combined, and the owners of these 
fields were made members of the scheme. But 
the labour force of the scheme included both 
land owners and landless. When the farm-
ers took over, landless people were also inter-
ested in farming. There was not enough arable 
land and so some surrounding range land was 
brought into the scheme for cultivation. This 
land had been commonage land, in that, his-
torically, it did not have individual owners. Mr 
Booi received his share of scheme land from this 
range land. Some of the original share-croppers 
have put in applications to reclaim the land and 
have documentation of proof of ownership. 
Those ZIS farmers presently using this land live 
in fear, not knowing when original land owners 
might want their land back. 
The support for the scheme comes from vari-
ous sources. The Department of Agriculture 
supplies farmers who are members of the MFP 
with inputs at subsidised prices. Through this 
programme, farmers also received free imple-
ments and a tractor. Although Mr Booi is no 
longer producing maize under the MFP, he is 
still involved in butternut production under the 
scheme, and thus is still a member. Therefore, he 
benefits from the input subsidy. The farmers at 
ZIS also benefit from the MAFISA and CASP pro-
grammes in the form of loans and infrastructure 
grants, respectively. 
Furthermore, Mr Booi has access to the exten-
sion services of the Department of Agriculture. 
However, the quality of service has gone from 
bad to worse, supposedly because of the intro-
duction of the ‘ward system’, whereby the al-
ready limited number of extension officers has 
to serve an even larger area. This results in fewer 
and less regular visits. Fortunately, however, ZIS 
has a full-time manager who provides farmers 
with advice.
Mr Booi is a member of the Best Management 
Practices (BMP) project, run by the University of 
Fort Hare. Researchers sometimes conduct tri-
als in farmers’ fields, and farmers have to give 
up land for these trials. Not many farmers are 
keen to do so, but Mr Booi always cooperates. 
Unlike many other farmers, he is open to new 
ideas and is always willing to learn new things. 
So, he benefits from the technical advice given 
by researchers. 
The Department of Agriculture together with 
the University of Fort Hare have provided mar-
ket support to ZIS. This support takes different 
forms, including a specific effort to link farmers 
with Pick ‘n Pay, providing training courses and 
arranging visits to formal markets in order to ex-
pose farmers to how formal markets work. 
Gender, class and human 
dimensions
Although there are women farmers at ZIS, the 
majority are men. The wives of the male farmers, 
however, do participate in the scheme, but usu-
ally on a temporary basis, e.g. during weeding or 
harvesting times. As it is the case with communal 
areas, ownership of land at ZIS is in the hands of 
men. The few women farmers are either widows 
or tenants. Although not intentional, men farm-
ers benefit more, and this is reinforced by a man-
agement structure composed mainly of men.
In terms of class, Mr Booi classifies himself as 
an emerging farmer coming from a historically 
disadvantaged background. In terms of school-
ing, he passed standard five. However, when the 
ZIS scheme was established in 1984, he received 
training in agronomic practices at Fort Cox Col-
lege (a nearby agricultural college) for a peri-
od of six weeks. Following this course, he was 
trained to do book keeping at the Border Tech-
nikon (now Walter Sisulu University). However, 
he claims that most of his agricultural knowl-
edge was obtained from the Israelis who man-
aged the scheme in its early days.
Perceptions of performance
According to the economic analysis of his main 
enterprises, Mr Booi is makinga modest profit 
and not enough for him to purchase capital. His 
dream is to have transport of his own, as well as 
a tractor because the three scheme tractors in-
adequate (only two are in good condition as the 
third one often breaks down). There are often 
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delays in planting as farmers have to wait for the 
tractors to become available.  
Policy environment
Small-scale farmers in irrigation schemes in the 
Eastern Cape have benefited from a number of 
policies aimed at the improving this sector in the 
1980s. However, most of these initiatives were 
short-lived due to financial or political reasons. 
During the homeland era, new irrigation schemes 
were established with funding from South Afri-
can Government. Irrigation development during 
the independent homeland era was character-
ised by modernisation, functional diversification 
and centralisation of scheme management (Van 
Averbeke and Mohammed, 2006). Overhead ir-
rigation systems were used instead of surface ir-
rigation in most schemes including ZIS. Also, the 
irrigators enjoyed benefits of subsidised inputs 
(including tractor services) and institutional sup-
port services (extension services) during this era. 
However, these were withdrawn for financial 
reasons.
With political changes in the 1990s, attention 
was focussed on irrigation management trans-
fer. The closing down of parastatal organisations 
such as Ulimocor left a vacuum and an effort was 
made to transfer the management to farmers. 
Conclusion  
There are a number of factors that makes the 
case of Mr Booi interesting: 
• he has secure property rights unlike most 
of the other ZIS farmers. Most farmers have 
access to land that belongs to others, which 
they access either through renting or bor-
rowing. 
• he has arranged access to additional land 
on his own, and is not waiting for govern-
ment and its Land Reform Programme. 
While most farmers at the scheme obtain 
more land by borrowing or sharecropping, 
Mr Booi rents the land and pays cash. With 
this kind of arrangement, he has not had 
problems, because land owners appear to 
prefer to rent their land for cash instead 
of a share of the produce, the amount of 
which is uncertain. 
• his marketing strategy is interesting and 
makes him one of the successful farmers. He 
seeks out buyers and adheres to their speci-
fications. He knows his limitations (e.g. lack 
of storage facilities) and decides to go for 
contract farming in which he does not have 
to store the produce. 
• he is a hard worker and always willing to try 
new things.
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Introduction
Rabula is a small rural traditional authority ad-
ministrative area within the Magisterial District 
of Keiskammahoek, now part of Ward 11 of the 
Amathlati Local Municipaly. Rabula is no more 
than 40 kilometres from King Williams Town, 
easily accessed from the main tar road linking 
Keiskammahoek and King Williams Town. To 
the north of Rabula is the town of Keiskamma-
hoek, to the west the well known irrigation area 
of Zanyokwe, to the east the wooded mountain 
slopes and forests of the Pirie area, and to the 
south the outskirts of Dimbaza.
Rabula currently comprises a number of com-
munal tenure villages, commonage lands, and 
privately owned freehold farms (see Figure 6.1). 
The freehold farms are particularly interesting 
for study for a number of reasons: 
• Firstly, these farmers come from a genera-
tion of family farmers. They have had oc-
cupation and ownership of their land for 
generations. In the two case studies one has 
had occupation of the current land parcel 
for nearly 30 years (but had occupation of 
a nearby farm long before), while the other 
family has had occupation and ownership 
since 1908. 
• Secondly, these examples reflect on black 
smallholder farmers who have historically 
acquired their land through their own fi-
nancial means. This is a very different con-
text to households moving onto land post 
1994 as part the government’s subsidised 
land redistribution programme.
• Thirdly, these smallholders are interspersed 
with communal (Trust) villages and shared 
commonage lands. As such they represent 
a context which may emerge as the norm if 
the Communal Land Rights Act is applied to 
communal areas in the future. 
• Finally, it can be argued that these farm-
ers are small independent smallholders, as 
perhaps one perceives the vision of agrarian 
transformation goals of the current (emerg-
ing) policy of government. These farmers 
own small farms with multiple land uses, 
and in independent landholdings; i.e. they 
are not part of a state-initiated and organ-
ised scheme.
This case study attempts to explain the social, 
political and economic context within which the 
freehold farmers have functioned and then ex-
plore the circumstances of two freehold farmers 
in Rabula, namely Mr Tswengiwe and Mr Njem-
la. While these two farmers cannot be said to be 
representative of all farmers, their circumstances 
do reflect the realities of established freeholder 
farmers in the area. The farmers were selected 
due to their involvement in the Rabula Farm-
ers Association, and their continued attempts 
to make a livelihood out of farming. The one 
farmer, Mr Tsengiwe, is mainly a livestock farm-
er, but with cropping activities as well. He lives 
predominantly from his farming activities. The 
second, Mr Njemla, has more substantial off-
farm income, and his approach is far more based 
on a mix of many different types of activities on 
the farm. 
Larry Field, Umhlaba Consulting Group
6 Rabula freehold farmers: 
two established middle-
class farming households 
with contrasting farming/ 
livelihood strategies
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Unfortunately, none of the farmers were willing 
to go into detail in relation to their profitability, 
and the research parameters did not allow the 
time to develop a more detailed picture of the 
economic aspects of the case studies. However, 
the case studies will show that the challenges 
that the farmers face are multi-faceted, from 
economic, technical, and social perspectives. 
These challenges are located not only in current 
economic realities but also in the strong histori-
cal legacy of how Rabula was shaped from colo-
nial times, through apartheid, and finally how 
current government policy is impacting on small-
holders today. 
The historical context of land 
ownership and land rights in 
Rabula
Rabula was established by the British colonial 
authorities on land vacated during the Frontier 
War of 1850-1853. Lots were demarcated and 
became available for purchase from 1865. Both 
blacks and whites were allowed to acquire land 
in terms of British colonial laws. Land was origi-
nally sold as freehold, but later sold as quitrent. 
Records indicate that by the end of the nine-
teenth century 186 lots had been established 
in Rabula of which the majority had been pur-
chased by blacks (De Wet, 1995). At this stage 
Rabula was characterised by individual land par-
cels owned through freehold or quitrent, while 
the land owners also had user rights to common-
age land. 
Land settlement initially existed almost exclu-
sively on the farms, consisting of the land own-
ers and their ‘farm workers’, who were usually in 
a labour tenancy relationship. Over the years la-
bour tenants began to settle on the commonage 
to gain more freedom from the land owners. 
Children of land owners, unable to secure their 
own land, are also recorded as having moved 
onto the commonage. These people were effec-
tively ‘squatters’ and were known as such by the 
landowners.
In 1936 Rabula became a ‘released area’ in terms 
of the Native Trust and Lands Act (18 of 1936). 
Whites were no longer allowed to buy land in 
the area and the South African Native Trust 
(SANT) began a process of buying up white 
farms. The government began a process of re-
settling the landless people residing on the com-
monage on the Trust farms, giving them house-
hold plots and arable lands. Initially the empha-
sis of this betterment process was on establish-
ing viable farmers on the Trust lands, but later 
the emphasis appears to have shifted to settle-
ment needs. However the betterment process 
Figure 6.1: Map of Rabula villages showing farm boundaries
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never completely removed all ‘squatters’ from 
the commonage. Research carried out by De 
Wet (1995) identified the following breakdown 
of households by tenure:
Thus Rabula today is characterised by people 
with different land rights histories, which forms 
the basis for deeply rooted social tensions that 
are still evident today. In the early years the land 
owners treated the landless as a subordinate 
class of people. Landowner families tended to 
be bigger, wealthier, and dominate important 
social events and positions (De Wet, 1995). The 
betterment process however seems to have cre-
ated opportunities for those in labour tenancy 
relationships with the provision of land rights for 
landless families. De Wet notes that landowners 
appear to make greater use of own family for 
labour in the post-Betterment period (1970s on-
wards). For this and a number of other reasons, 
Betterment in Rabula appears to have had a less 
negative impact than in many other areas of its 
application. 
During the homeland period, landowners em-
braced the opportunities provided by the new 
homeland bureaucracy. These opportunities in-
cluded both an extensive agricultural support 
programme initiated by the Sebe Government, 
and employment opportunities in the bureauc-
racy for those with education. However, in the 
post-1994 breakdown of the land administra-
tion system in the communal areas, tensions 
between land owners and the landless / village 
residents was re-focused on the commonage, 
with land owners’ claims of exclusivity of rights 
being largely ignored. Land owners also found 
themselves increasingly marginalised in terms of 
status and influence within the community. The 
new government’s land reform programme, and 
other social and development benefits, have all 
been focused on the historically landless and re-
settled village groups. Black freehold land own-
ers have been largely ignored both in policy doc-
uments and in local application of agricultural 
development support. 
De Wet’s research turned up the following farm-
ing information in Rabula as at 1990:
• Only one third of landowners used their 
entire property. Cultivation levels, as an av-
erage per hectare, appeared to be higher 
in the Trust areas than on the landowner 
farms. This situation possibly reflects a lack 
of capital, support, and availability of la-
bour for landowners to make appropriate 
use of their greater land assets.
• However, landowners tended to invest 
more in livestock, which has greater status 
and requires less intensive management 
and labour inputs. Landowners had, on 
average, 7.85 cattle, 10.39 sheep and 11.04 
goats per household. In comparison, non-
landowners had, on average, 0.16 cattle, 0 
sheep and 5.0 goats per household. 
The natural resource base
The Rabula area consists of the Rabula River val-
ley and three smaller valleys encircled by steep 
hills, bordered by the foothills of the Amathole 
mountain range. The hills that border the Rab-
ula area are covered in thick indigenous bush 
(Afromontane forest), while the lower slopes 
are covered in thicket and grasslands with sweet 
thorn. The eastern mountain and hill slopes are 
particularly thick in indigenous forest as well as 
cultivated plantations (Kingwill, 2008).
The altitude within the small Rabula area ranges 
between 500 metres and 800 metres above sea 
level, although heights of up to 1400 metres are 
reached just to the east of Rabula villages.
The climatic conditions recorded in the Keiskam-
mahoek area are shown in Table 6.2.
The main water source for the area is the Rabula 
River and the smaller tributaries of the Gxulura 
and the Gqubushe. 
Tenure type Number (percentage)
Freehold/quitrent Approximately 500 (60%)
Trust areas 59 (7%)
New residential areas (on Trust land) 237 (28%)
Informal settlement on commonage Approximately 40 (5%)
Table: 6.1: Summary of tenure types
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Profile A: Mr Tsengiwe
Profile of the farmer
Mr Mtobi Tsengiwe grew up on the farm and 
remembers working on the land as a school boy. 
As an adult he obtained employment in the De-
partment of Agriculture as an extension officer 
in the Ciskei area. He eventually specialised in es-
tablishing agricultural co-operatives for the Cis-
kei Department of Agriculture, having received 
training in England for such activities. However, 
even while he worked as an extension officer, he 
continued to run the farm. Mr Tsengiwe is now 
over 70 years old, having gone on pension in 
1996. He indicated he expects his son, who cur-
rently works as an official in the Provincial Gov-
ernment in Bisho, to take over the farm upon 
his death. 
Mr Tsengiwe’s history as a farmer is in many 
senses not unusual for South Africa, but is cer-
tainly not common for a black farmer in present-
day South Africa. Mr Tsengiwe is also ‘not unu-
sual’ as a commercial farmer in South Africa in 
terms of personality, being strong willed and 
outspoken on a range of problems and issues 
facing farmers.
Despite his age Tsengiwe remains an active indi-
vidual and an active farmer.
Farm details and land use
The Tsengiwe family owns five portions of land 
in Rabula. One portion (farm 1439) is owned by 
Isaac Tsengiwe, Mtobi’s brother. Mtobi Tsengi-
we owns one portion in his own right (farm 
1410, comprising 16 hectares), and three portions 
(of farms 1440, 1441 and 1438, totalling 104 hec-
tares) are owned in equal shares by Mtobi and 
his three sisters. Most of this land has been in 
his family’s name since 1908. In 1932 his farther 
purchased additional portions. The portion of 
land owned by Tsengiwe’s brother is unoccupied 
as this brother and his household have left the 
farm.
The major part of the farm is in the Lower Rabu-
la area, past the villages of Lower Rabula in the 
valley below the Ntsusa Forest. The gravel access 
road is in reasonable condition, and eventu-
ally links Rabula with Zanyokwe. In addition, Mr 
Tsengiwe has access to the commonage land for 
his livestock. However, the exact extent of the 
available commonage, and the utilisation of the 
commonage by livestock owners, could not be 
obtained within the scope of this study.
The separate portion of land (farm 1410) is only 
16 hectares in extent, and is located near the 
main tar road below the Trust village. How-
ever, this portion is not farmed at present. Mr 
Tsengiwe indicated that problems of squatters 
and theft prevent him from utilising this land. 
The utilised portions of his farm consist of graz-
ing lands and arable lands. The main farm en-
terprise today is livestock, with the farming of 
cattle, sheep and goats. Although Mr Tsengiwe 
is unsure of the size of his arable lands, the size 
was estimated to be about 20 hectares. This land 
is farmed as dryland. About 3 to 4 hectares used 
to be farmed under sprinkler irrigation until the 
pump was stolen. The dry land is mainly used for 
fodder for the livestock, with some commercial 
and home-consumption vegetable production 
taking place.
Additionally, the farm has a small orchard with 
orange and pecan nut trees. Mr Tsengiwe also 
keeps chickens and pigs around the homestead. 
These are for home consumption, although he 
will occasionally sell if approached by a member 
of the community.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
Mean min temp 
(Celsius)
16 16 14 12 8 5 5 6 8 11 13 15
Mean max temp 
(Celsius)
30 29 20 18 14 11 10 13 16 18 25 27
Mean precip. 
(mm)
88 95 111 62 48 29 30 38 64 87 91 83
Table 6.2: Minimum and maximum temperatures and 
precipitation
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Infrastructure and equipment
The infrastructure on the farm can be summa-
rised as follows:
• The main Tswengiwe homestead, includ-
ing garages and numerous water tanks. The 
homestead is in good condition. 
• The homestead of Mr Tsengiwe’s brother, 
which is more traditional in nature (wattle 
and daub / rondaval construction) and is in 
average condition.
• The homesteads, arable lands and farm 
boundaries are all fenced. The fencing is 
generally old but mostly still functional, al-
though requires frequent repairs.
• A number of stock dams, fed by surface wa-
ter run-off from the rains.
The following equipment list was provided:
• 2 old tractors (1 working, 1 in need of re-
pair).
• 3 disc ploughs
• 1 planter
• 1 disc harrow
• 1 harrow
• 1 cultivator (7 tooth)
• 1 bakkie.
The equipment is old but, except for the 1 trac-
tor, in working condition. 
Mr Tsengiwe had a pump for irrigating about 4 
hectares, but this was stolen in 1993. He has not 
replaced the pump, most likely due to his focus 
on investing in livestock farming for his income.
The production system
Livestock
Until a few years ago, Mr Tsengiwe’s herd in-
cluded 120 goats and 80 sheep. However, he lost 
all of his sheep and the vast majority of his goats 
to tick-related disease and is now attempting to 
rebuild his herd. He has 30 goats and recently 
purchased a ram for R2000 from a commercial 
auction in Bedford. He currently also has 35 head 
of cattle. 
Cropping 
Crops planted in the past 12 months include 
wheat (1 hectare), maize, oats, and a range of 
vegetables (potatoes, cabbage, pumpkin, onion, 
spinach, beans and peas). The maize and oats 
are used for stock feed. The vegetables are used 
for a mix of commercial and home consumption. 
As of September 2008, Mr Tsengiwe had only 4 
rows of vegetables planted in one field, along 
with the wheat. He indicated he is waiting for 
the rains, which usually come in October, before 
planting any further. 
Field preparation is done by tractor, which is 
an important asset and needed in the commu-
nity. However, Mr Tsengiwe does not hire out 
his tractor, although he may occasionally do a 
neighbour a favour in ploughing their lands if 
the family is experiencing particular hardships. 
He used to be a member of the tractor associa-
tion in Rabula, but the association is no longer 
active.
Mr Tsengiwe has cut back on crop production. 
This is likely due to a number of factors, includ-
ing old age and Mr Tsengiwe’s limited market-
ing strategies (see below). Another factor, which 
Mr Tsengiwe himself identifies, relate to labour 
problems and the situation of the freehold 
farmers within the Rabula area. Mr Tsengiwe 
is clearly reluctant to be reliant on labour from 
the Rabula area and expresses his unhappiness 
with the lack of willingness of people from the 
villages to work in agriculture. He indicated his 
purchase of a planter for the wheat was a result 
of his desire to be able to plant without labour. 
With his age he is obviously able to do less than 
previously, hence it is understandable that pro-
duction on labour-intensive activities has been 
reduced. For regular work Mr Tsengiwe has the 
assistance of members of his extended family. 
When he does use labour from the community 
he uses traditional methods of compensation, 
i.e. by providing food and beer for workers, 
along with a little monetary compensation. He 
usually ‘employs’ about 15 people during harvest 
periods.
Mr Tsengiwe indicated that although small, crop 
theft does occur. Bigger problems in terms of 
‘theft’ occur with troops of monkeys raiding his 
fields. 
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Wheat 
Along with other farmers he received assistance 
from the Department of Agriculture through the 
Massive Food Campaign in 2006, receiving seed 
and fertiliser. However, he indicated that this 
support was not a result of active government 
initiative, but only after the Rabula Farmers As-
sociation had approached the Department and 
shown the Department that they were already 
planting wheat on their farms. No assistance was 
granted beyond the 2006 supplies. 
Assistance from the Department of 
Agriculture
Besides the transitory assistance with the wheat 
farming, Mr Tswengiwe has received no assist-
ance and has limited contact with extension 
officers. His perspective on the Department’s 
extension services since the integration of the 
Ciskei Department of Agriculture into a single 
Department under Bisho is that the officers have 
become ‘desk clerks’ who don’t know how to 
farm.
The Rabula Farmers Association (representing 
freehold farmers) has asked for fencing for ar-
able lands, fencing for the commonage (which 
is disputed in terms of rights), a tractor for the 
farmers in the area, and machinery for threshing 
and milling of wheat. They have also asked for 
improved control over the commonage to pre-
vent the informal expansion of housing onto the 
commonage. To date this support has not been 
forthcoming. 
Marketing
Livestock 
Oxen are sold to traders who visit the area. 
Most sales though are to local households for 
ceremonial needs. A large livestock unit is sold 
for between R3500 and R4500 per animal. Mr Ts-
wengiwe is not selling any goats at present, but 
when his herd was at its optimum size (given at 
120) he was selling up to 60 goats per annum.
He does not currently participate in the stock 
sale days that take place at Keiskammahoek. 
There used to be stock sale facilities in Rabula 
during the homeland days, but this has long 
since stopped and the facilities have been van-
dalised.
Vegetables 
Mr Tsengiwe previously sold vegetables in Stut-
terheim and King Williams Town, but presently 
appears to be less interested in, or able to cope 
with, regional marketing than in the past. His 
current approach to marketing involves driving 
his loaded bakkie to town to sell to retailers, but 
without prior arrangements or negotiations. His 
experience has understandably been increas-
ingly unsatisfactory in terms of prices offered. 
On a recent trip to King Williams Town in Febru-
ary 2008, he returned home with his full bakkie 
load of pumpkins, refusing to sell at the prices 
offered. 
He also used to sell to hawkers in Keiskamma-
hoek. However, he became dissatisfied with 
these arrangements as hawkers kept trying to 
negotiate credit with him. Mr Tsengiwe refuses 
to sell any produce on credit, even within Rabu-
la, citing past experience of such arrangements 
resulting in financial losses as people default on 
their debts.
The following Marketing information per crop 
type is shown in Table 6.3.
Profile B: Mr Njemla
Historical background
Mr Makuza Njemla owns a 14 hectare farm in 
upper Rabula near the village of Magcumeni. 
Table 6.3: Overview of marketing information per crop
Crop type Price information
Pumpkins Offered R2 per pumpkin by small retailers in February 2008. Declined to sell and is 
mostly utilising the crop for home consumption.
Potatoes Good demand, a 10 kg pocket is sold for between R10 and R15 locally.
Maize Sold in 50 kg bags or smaller tins. He however has not sold for a while as he utilises the 
maize as stock feed. He estimates a price of R120 per bag would be attainable.
The wheat is sold to the mill in Fort Jackson (East London).
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The family took ownership of the farm in 1980 
as part of a land swop organised by the Ciskei 
government. The Njemlas had land (farm 1431) 
that was wanted for forestry development, and 
the current farm was vacant, having been tak-
en over from the previous white land owner in 
1966. The Njemla family was therefore persuad-
ed to move as part of a land swop. Although the 
farm is legally owned by Mr Njemla, the land is 
considered a family asset, and both his brother 
and his sister have homesteads on the farm. 
The white family that previously owned the farm 
was the Cookes. During their period of owner-
ship, the Cookes farmed oranges using an irri-
gation system they established based on access 
to an off-farm river which fed a holding dam 
above the land. This dam is still evident today. 
The Cookes also ran a small farm shop servicing 
the neighbouring village, which was established 
from 1938 onwards as Hamans 6, in terms of the 
Betterment processes.
The Cookes left in 1966 after being bought out 
by the SANT in terms of the 1936 Native Trust 
and Land Act. When the Cookes left, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture removed all the citrus trees 
and the land was left vacant from 1966 until 
1980, during which it was used as commonage, 
presumably for the new Trust village. During this 
period the property was extensively vandalised 
and the buildings, irrigation and other infra-
structure destroyed. 
The only assistance given to the Njemla’s in re-
establishing the farm was from the Department 
of Agriculture, which bulldozed the thorn trees 
out of the arable lands so the lands could be 
planted once more.
Profile of the farmer
Mr Njemla is a part-time farmer. His primary oc-
cupation was as a teacher, following which he 
became a school principal. During this period he 
ran the farm with the help of a foreman. How-
ever, when Mr Njemla retired at the age of 65, 
he carried on farming without a foreman.
Mr Njemla is now 73 years old. As he has gotten 
older, he has cut back on his farming, and esti-
mates that he currently spends no more than 20 
hours per week on farming. He indicated that he 
would be willing to lease out the arable lands if 
there was a serious offer. When he dies, the fam-
ily would select a new family member to run the 
farm. However, the farm will never be sold as it 
is the family’s home.
The Njemla family could be considered middle 
class. Both Mr Njemla and his wife were em-
ployed by the state and now they receive gov-
ernment pensions. His brother and sister also 
receive pensions. He has four daughters, two of 
whom are earning salaries (one is employed in 
government), and the other two are engaged in 
ad hoc or temporary employment activities. 
Farm details and land uses
Mr Njemla is best understood as a smallholder 
engaging in mixed income generating practices, 
all of which contribute to the total household in-
come. These household income sources include: 
• Employment / pension
• Crop production (vegetables and wheat)
• Tractor services (ploughing and cartage)
• Milling (grinding maize for other farmers/
villagers).
• Chickens (selling eggs and meat)
• Ad hoc cattle sales.
The 14 hectare farm has about 6 hectares of ar-
able land. The lands are farmed as dryland. The 
only stream on the farm is insufficient to support 
irrigation, and the previous (off-farm) irrigation 
network could not be re-established due to a 
number of factors, including costs, tensions with 
the villagers around water use, and possible van-
dalism or theft.
Besides the cropping, Mr Njemla keeps a small 
number of cattle for his family use. The cattle 
are not for commercial purposes, although an 
animal may occasionally be sold to a local family 
for ceremonial needs. Besides the small amount 
of grazing lands on the farm, he has access to 
the commonage lands for grazing. 
Infrastructure and equipment
The farm has three homestead areas for the two 
brothers and sister. The homesteads are large 
and in good condition, reflecting significant in-
vestment. Even for the residential uses, water 
remains a problem. Besides the many rain tanks, 
Mr Njemla has a water tank on a trailer which he 
fills from the river.
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Besides the residential buildings, there is a zinc 
and pole construction garage facility in poor 
condition, and there is a self-built chicken house 
and pig sty.
Mr Njemla has significant ploughing equipment. 
This includes four tractors, all purchased second-
hand. Three of the tractors are still in use. The 
fourth tractor no longer works, but was already 
in poor condition when purchased. The three 
functioning tractors are all Massy Fergusons, in-
cluding two 240s (one 1992 and one 2000 mod-
el), and a 2004 290.
The MF 290 was purchased for an amount of 
R69 000. Mr Njemla paid R15 000 in cash from 
his savings, and took a Land Bank loan for the 
remaining amount of R54 000. This loan was re-
paid within the three-year loan period. 
Besides the tractors the following equipment is 
available:
• 3 ploughs (all in good condition)
• 1 disc harrow (in poor condition)
• 1 disc plough (not in working condition)
• 1 trailer 
• 1 hammer mill (old but in working condi-
tion).
The production system and 
marketing
Tractor services
Although not an income derived directly from 
farming his family’s own land, the tractor servic-
es are perhaps the most lucrative income gener-
ating activity for Mr Njemla. His services appear 
to be in high demand, and he is apparently the 
only service provider residing in Rabula. 
Ploughing is charged at R450 per hectare, which 
appears to be an accepted rate for the area. Mr 
Njemla only ploughs in the Rabula area, and re-
fuses to service needs beyond this. For carting of 
wood he charges R200 a trailer load, irrespective 
of the actual distances travelled within Rabula.
Mr Njemla either drives the tractors himself or 
uses the services of a driver when necessary. The 
tractors are serviced by a part-time mechanic 
from Keiskammahoek.14 
Vegetable production
Vegetables planted include: maize, potatoes, to-
matoes, beans, pumpkins, cabbage, spinach and 
peas. At least half of what is planted is utilised 
for home consumption, although this depends 
on amounts planted and harvested. The maize 
is also used as feed for the chickens and pigs, 
although a portion is usually sold.
Since going on pension, Mr Njemla no longer 
uses the services of a foreman for his crops. At 
the beginning of a season he has no specific 
plans as to what to plant. He will first gauge the 
rains and then decide on what to plant and the 
appropriate quantities. All supplies are obtained 
from Umthiza in Keiskammahoek.
Those vegetables that are sold are sold off-farm 
to local villagers. This is mainly because the 
quantities being sold are fairly small.
Prices achieved in the recent past are shown in 
Table 6.4.
Livestock
Mr Njemla currently has a herd of 20 cattle. A 
herder is employed to look after the cattle. In-
terestingly, the herder is from Lesotho and not 
a local person. The herder is given accommoda-
tion, food and a very small wage.
No small stock are kept due to problems with 
predators living in the forest, such as lynx and 
wild pigs. 
 14 According to Mr Njemla, 
this man’s situation reflects the 
collapse of the services from 
the Department of Agriculture. 
This mechanic is employed by 
the Department of Agriculture. 
Within the Ciskei homeland 
period he was employed as a 
mechanic, but as no such posts 
were allocated to Keiskamma-
hoek, he is now employed as 
a watchman and does vehicle 
repairs in his spare time.
Crop Price information
Potatoes R20 per pocket
Tomatoes R4 to R6 per dish (depending on the size of the dish)
Cabbages R7 to R8 per head
Spinach R3 to R5 per bunch
Table 6.4: Prices (2008) received per crop
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Poultry 
Mr Njemla buys batches of 50 chicks at the age 
of 4 days, from a nearby white farmer. He grows 
the chickens until 3 to 4 months old, at which 
stage he sells the cocks for meat and keeps the 
hens for egg production. Once the hens become 
too old for good egg production he sells these 
for meat as well. 
Eggs are consumed by the family, and whatever 
is surplus is sold locally.
Milling
Mr Njemla uses the hammer mill to grind maize 
and wheat for home consumption and as an ad-
ditional way to earn income. He charges R20 for 
grinding a 50 kilogram bag of maize. The level 
of demand for this service is dependent on how 
good the maize crop is in the area. As the mill is 
powered by a tractor, there are diesel costs as-
sociated with the milling operation.
Conclusions
The two case studies reveal interesting differ-
ences as well as similarities. In terms of differ-
ences, the farms are considerably different in 
size, offering very different economic opportu-
nities. The smaller farm (14 hectares) is such that 
the Njemla’s middle class lifestyle is crucially de-
pendent on agri-services (such as the tractor and 
milling services) and non-farm income, while 
the larger farm (100 hectares) is such that the 
Tsengiwes are far more focused on traditional 
land-based farming activities. The other noticea-
ble difference relates to the farmers themselves: 
where Mr Njemla appears to have integrated his 
economic activities with the needs of the local 
community, Mr Tsengiwe has largely made his 
activities independent of the wider community. 
This situation may be partially personality based, 
and partially related to the different enterprise 
orientations of their farms.
In terms of similarities both case studies reflect-
ed the following situations:
• Both farmers have reasonable non-farm 
based income sources (employment and 
then retirement pensions).
• There is evidence that household residence 
for the wider family remains an important 
component in the utilisation of the farm 
(i.e. the land is not just a market com-
modity). This family-based understanding 
of ownership of the land is also the basis 
for succession of one farmer to the next 
(though whether succession of farming ac-
tually takes place remains to be seen and is 
somewhat doubtful). 
• Both farmers have made considerable per-
sonal financial investment into their farm-
ing operations without any government 
assistance (e.g. tractors, fencing, breeding 
stock, etc.).
• Interestingly, neither farmer was prepared 
to invest in irrigation, preferring to focus 
on other enterprise opportunities. This may 
be the result of the cost of irrigation in-
vestment, but also appears to be related to 
other factors which could bring the farmers 
into difficult social negotiations, especially 
over water and labour. This meant that, al-
though dryland cropping was practiced, it 
was regarded as too risky to constitute the 
primary enterprise.
• Indeed, both case studies indicated prob-
lems with labour. While Mr Tsengiwe indi-
cated this directly, there is indirect evidence 
to the same effect from Mr Njemla’s case, 
for example the employment of a foreigner 
and lack of any real other employment on 
the farm. Clearly the social context of small-
holders (including and perhaps especially 
‘freeholders’) located within a context of 
communal land / resources, is important.
• Both farmers indicated that they receive no 
state assistance, either in the form of grants 
or extension support. It is also noteworthy 
that the nature of assistance that farmers 
are seeking is different to that of the group-
based projects. The individual farmers are 
firstly seeking support in developing their 
enabling environment (roads, fencing of 
the commonage and along the roads, man-
agement of the commonage); and secondly 
assistance in equipment / support that can 
be pooled for their operations (shared mill-
ing and tractor equipment under the aus-
pices of the Farmers Association). 
• In the same vein, the support that was 
briefly received in the form of subsidised 
seeds and fertilisers for the wheat farming, 
appeared to be welcome, but was not pri-
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mary on the list of needs considered. This 
is probably because the farmers recognise 
that without the milling infrastructure the 
planting has more limited financial oppor-
tunities. Furthermore, the farmers engage 
in a diverse range of cropping types, and 
any ‘massive’ food mono-crop focus runs 
counter to their diversification strategies. 
In conclusion, it is also important to note that 
both farmers are over 70 years old. However, 
with adaptations to their farming practices they 
are both still active and able to generate an in-
come out of their farms.
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7 Phakamani Mawethu 
Development Trust, 
Stutterheim: an emerging 
commercial farming project
Patrick Masika, Agricultural and Rural Development 
Research Institute (ARDRI), University of Fort Hare
Figure 7.1: Panoramic view of the project farm
This case study presents a profile of a project 
that is locally considered to be very successful. 
Considering the project members’ background 
of having worked on white-owned farms, they 
had the urge to own a farm to generate an in-
come and also provide employment to others.
Historical perspective
1998-2000
In 1998 the owner of the farm Renan, Mr Rod 
Buchler, was shot and killed. This was during a 
time when there was a wave of farm murders in 
the region. After his funeral, his family decided 
to sell the farm because of their sense of insecu-
rity. They gave the first option to buy the farm 
to their four farm workers. The workers mobi-
Introduction
The Phakamani Mawethu Development Trust 
project (Figure 7.1) is situated in Bolo, an area 
bordering Mgwali village in Amahlathi Local 
Municipality. The nearest town is Stutterheim, 
which is about 28 kilometres away along a dirt 
road that follows the perimeter fence of the 
Dohne Agricultural Technology Transfer Insti-
tute. The members of the project come from 
Mgwali Village, which was established in 1873. 
At the turn of the century, its population greatly 
increased due to the eviction of farm workers 
from surrounding white-owned farms. Mgwali 
was declared a ‘black spot’ in the 1960s and the 
community was faced with relocation to Frank-
fort in the former Ciskei, which they resisted 
(Border Rural Committee, 1998). 
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lised others from the village of Mgwali, based 
on work ethic and trustworthiness. Eventually, 
they formed a group of 21 people in order form 
a large enough applicant group to raise the nec-
essary funds. At the time, they were each eligi-
ble for a Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant of 
R16 000, meaning the group would be able to 
command a total of R336 000. The farm was ini-
tially priced at R600 000, but through negotia-
tions, it was reduced to R400 000. In the end, the 
group was awarded a total grant by the Depart-
ment of Land Affairs of R328 500 and secured a 
loan of R71 500. Transfer of the land took place 
in February 2000.
2000
In the process of buying the farm, a constitution 
and a business plan were crafted by an attorney 
in Stutterheim. The same attorney processed the 
transfer and registration of the farm on behalf 
of the previous owner. The project members 
were advised to form a trust, which was ulti-
mately registered in the year 2000. In order to 
get commitment from the 21 people who had 
expressed interest to be part of the project, each 
member was required to contribute a once-off 
joining fee of R250, a cow and a monthly fee of 
R50 per person. This was done in order to raise 
funds to start operating the farm. However, be-
cause of these requirements, ultimately only 13 
members were able to contribute as required 
and thus were the active members. Recently, 
one of the members passed-on, leaving 12 active 
members. On selling the farm the previous own-
er bought 2000 day old chicks, together with the 
necessary drinkers, feeders, heater (gas and elec-
tric) and abattoir equipment (stunner, plucker, 
bleeder) to kick-start the farming enterprise of 
the ‘new farmers’. The new owners had to buy 
feed from their own funds. As it was the first 
time they kept broiler chickens on their own, 
they lost more than a tenth of them.
2002
This was a period when job creation was pro-
moted by Cosatu, and a few years after the 
launch of the Job Creation Trust, administered 
by the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
and funded by money donated by workers. The 
management team of Phakamani Mawethu De-
velopment Trust approached the DBSA to secure 
a loan. When the project was assessed it quali-
fied for R1.5 million as a soft loan and R300 000 
as a grant, so they applied for R1.8 million. 
2003
DBSA approved the amount of R1.8 million 
which was used to buy a second-hand tractor 
and various implements, as well as cattle, goats, 
10 000 broiler chicks, feed, abattoir equipment, 
and office equipment. Everything went well in 
that year; the group even employed 15 interns 
from the community to assist in the abattoir and 
in weeding the fields.
2004
The group formally launched the project where 
an ox was slaughtered (equivalent to R4500) 
and 10 sheep that cost R500 each. Among those 
who attended were delegates from COSATU and 
Land Affairs. The project used part of the money 
they got from DBSA to organise the launch with 
the understanding that the funds would be re-
funded. Unfortunately, the money was never 
refunded. 
2005
This is the year when there was an outbreak of 
Newcastle disease among chicken farms across 
the Eastern Cape. The project also was badly 
affected, with the loss of 2000 chickens in one 
house and 5000 overall; this resulted in a loss of 
close to R30 000. The poor condition of the poul-
try houses contributed to the occurrence and 
spread of the disease. Wild birds, which are car-
riers of this disease, have access to the feed and 
water because the poultry houses are not bird-
proof. The project was granted a loan of R100 
000 from Uvimba Bank. The project was able 
to re-stock with day-old chicks, 2000 every fort-
night. The same year, Eskom gave the project a 
grant of R300 000, which was used in the build-
ing of additional poultry shelters. Unfortunately, 
the contractor who built the shelters did not do 
a good job because the floor started chipping a 
few weeks after completion. In addition the sails 
that were provided were of a poor quality such 
that they are already torn. The project did not 
have a say in the selection of the contractor, but 
depended on who the funder had decided on. 
2006
This was the year when there was a shortage of 
chickens in the country due to the country-wide 
Newcastle disease in 2005. As a result the parent 
stock used in the production of day-old chicks 
was destroyed. So farmers could only buy 200 
chicks at a time. The project continued stocking 
about 500 in order to supply their customers.
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their spouses as memebers rather than introduc-
ing totally new individuals to the project. 
Natural and physical 
resources
The farm comprises a total of 515 hectares, of 
which 30 hectares are arable with approximately 
10 hectares of irrigable land. Soil tests were con-
ducted by the extension officers from the Stut-
terheim office to determine suitable crops to be 
grown on the farm. Rain comes in mid-Septem-
ber and farmers grow vegetables, potatoes and 
maize. 
There are a total of five chicken houses, but 
as already mentioned, two suffered from poor 
workmanship and are in unsatisfactory condi-
tion. The farmers converted one of the sheds 
that was previously used as a shearing shed into 
a poultry shelter, which stocks 2000 birds. The 
other two buildings are rondavels, each with ca-
pacity to house 1000 chickens. Another building 
that is located close to the entrance of the farm 
has a capacity to house 3000 chickens. Several of 
the houses on the farm will have to be moved to 
ensure that the farm conforms to the require-
ments of good abattoir practice, where there is 
a clean area and a dirty area.
Each of the houses is fitted with feeders, drink-
ers and all are wired with electricity which is 
used for lighting and heat for the chicks. 
The farm has a relatively new fence which was 
provided by the Department of Agriculture in 
2006. The project also has a 3-ton Toyota truck 
that was funded by Shell in 2005. The project has 
stock dams used to water the animals. Water to 
irrigate the crops is from a borehole that uses an 
electric pump.
Production systems
The project is involved in both livestock and crop 
production.
The group is involved in the production of three 
breeds of beef cattle, namely Beefmaster, Brah-
man, and Nguni. Their aim is to produce wean-
ers which tend to fetch relatively high prices at 
the auctions compared to older animals. At the 
time of conducting the fieldwork, there were 
120 cows and 3 bulls. Cattle are dipped weekly in 
summer and fortnightly in winter. 
The project also raises goats, especially the Bo-
ergoat breed. Goats are dipped only when they 
2007
This is when the project had a problem with the 
abattoir. It was inspected by inspectors from East 
London who found that it was not up to stand-
ard. For example, there was no ceiling and there 
were holes in the cement floor.
2008
The group secured support for getting a new 
and improved abattoir with a bigger capacity 
and ability to slaughter both chickens and other 
animals. It is funded by the National Department 
of Agriculture for an amount of R500 000. The 
chicken shelters will also be improved.
Management 
Before starting the project, the group selected 
office bearers based on previous experiences. 
The positions were Chairperson, Deputy, Secre-
tary, Vice Secretary and Treasurer. The manage-
ment team was sent for training and also the 
person who was tasked to run the animal pro-
duction was sent for technical training at Fort 
Cox College of Agriculture. Further training was 
offered through the Department of Labour on 
vegetable, poultry, and pig production and fenc-
ing.
A great concern is the lack of youth involvement 
in the project. When the project has work, the 
project employs casual workers who are mostly 
youth. A problem is that they reportedly want 
payment on a daily basis and do not want to 
work long hours. However, each of the members 
has to include one of their children in their wills 
to ensure the continuity of the project. 
At the time of registration there were 21 mem-
bers, but as a result of the reduction of mem-
bers, they would like to change from a Trust 
to another entity because it is a requirement 
of their registration that they be 21 in number. 
Their fear is that if they were to bring in new 
members in order to reach the stipulated num-
ber, they might in the process bring in people 
who could turn out to be disruptive to the pro-
ject. Since the original members contributed a 
cow as one of the criteria of joining, this crite-
rion has remained in place for new membership. 
It id felt that f a person is willing to contribute 
the cow it is an indication of their seriousness 
about the project.
Another approach they have decided on is that 
the married members of the project can include 
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have lice, mites or when there is a high incidence 
of limping. At the time of conducting the field-
work there were 80 goats. 
Kraal manure from both the goat flock and the 
cattle herd is used as fertiliser, either on its own 
(especially for fields planted to a single crop) 
or in conjunction with chemical fertiliser. This 
lowers costs for fertiliser, but at the same time 
project members report a reduction in yields.
 The project also keeps pigs. In 2003 they bought 
four sows and one boar; in 2004 they sold about 
24 piglets at R150 each. In 2006, there was wide-
spread swine fever, which resulted in many com-
munities losing their pigs, and as a consequence 
government introduced a process of 100% ter-
mination of pigs in some areas. Although the 
project farm did not experience the disease, 
they had decided to reduce numbers; at the 
time of conducting fieldwork, there were only 
two sows and the one boar. This reduction was 
partly a precaution and partly in response to the 
project’s unrelated cash flow problems (i.e. due 
to the closing of the chicken abattoir), as pigs 
are expensive to feed.
 The project produces broiler chickens which they 
raise from day-old chicks. They use a deep litter 
system using wood shavings as bedding. With 
good feeding and management it takes approxi-
mately 6 weeks for a broiler chick to reach mar-
ket weight. At the end of a production cycle the 
litter, which is by then mixed with the chicken 
droppings, is used as fertiliser, but also report-
edly fed to the ruminants. The droppings are a 
source of non-protein nitrogen which is utilised 
by ruminant animals in their digestion. At the 
time of conducting the filed work, the broiler 
enterprise had been suspended because of the 
closure of the chicken abattoir, though why the 
group did not figure out a way of marketing its 
broilers to someone else’s abattoir is unclear. In 
full operation the project used to stock close on 
2000 chickens per week.
In 2005 the Department of Agriculture provided 
fertiliser to the project; however the farmers had 
to buy their own seeds. In addition the Depart-
ment also provided the farmers with veterinary 
products for their chickens.
In the beginning, before they had cattle, two 
private farmers leased some of the project land 
at R20/month per cow. In fact the project’s first 
bakkie was obtained through an exchange ar-
rangement whereby one of the neighbouring 
white farmers paid in-kind for cattle grazing 
with a bakkie.
At present, each of the project members keeps 
their own animals on the farm, but separately 
from the project animals. Pressure on grazing 
resources is contained by practising rotational 
resting. 
Challenges
Theft is starting to be a problem, which is attrib-
uted to unemployment in the area exacerbated 
by hard economic times. At the time of conduct-
ing this case study, thieves had broken into the 
chicken houses three times. And because of the 
fear of theft, the project does not keep sheep, 
because they are easily stolen. 
The project bought a second-hand tractor, which 
has been giving the group problems (Figure 7.2). 
As a result it is used for light duties only.
Economic aspects
The project uses a range of marketing strategies. 
They sell locally directly to Spaza shops, but in 
other instances they transport their broilers to 
the former Transkei, Alice, Middledrift, Whittle-
sea, East London, to a poultry packing company, 
and even to KFC fast food outlet in Stutterheim. 
Their chicken marketing strategy has evolved 
greatly since they began; in fact, they sold their 
first batch of chickens in 2000 to the brother of 
the late former owner of the farm, largely ow-
ing to the fact that they did not know what to 
do with them. They also sold some of their broil-
ers in the village of Mgwali. 
During the time when they produced chickens, 
they would earn a profit of about R800 per 
month. But as mentioned above, when they were 
stopped from slaughtering chickens in the abat-
toir, they stopped keeping chickens. High chick-
en mortalities also eroded the project’s funds. 
The project is now dependent on the goats and 
cattle, which they sell in order to service their 
loans. As a result of cash flow problems, they 
scaled down on the use of electricity to pump 
water and thus cannot irrigate the crops.
Cattle are sold at auctions when they are 18 
months old, which results in higher prices com-
pared to mature cattle. Cattle are only sold when 
the project has to pay loan instalments. This is a 
temporary measure to ensure they do not fall 
behind with the repayment of their debts. Goats 
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Figure 7.2: The project’s tractor
are mainly sold on the farm, especially during 
June and December which is when traditional 
ceremonies take place.
Sows are kept to produce piglets, which are sold 
off at R150 each. Ultimately the mature sows 
are slaughtered and the meat sold amongst the 
project members and the remainder sold to the 
community of Mgwali.
Over the years the project has managed to es-
tablish and produce profitably from various en-
terprises, as detailed in Tables 7.1 through 7.5. 
Of interest to note is the major contribution the 
broiler enterprise had made to the income of 
the project. This enterprise was possible because 
of easy access to finance, but now that the broil-
er enterprise is temporarily grounded, the mem-
bers do not receive any wages and discipline is 
required and practised to pay outstanding loans.
The production cycle for broiler chickens is 6 
weeks, following which the houses have to be 
cleaned, disinfected and left standing for a week 
or so. Overall it takes two months to restock in 
the same house. Considering that the project 
stocked 2000 day-old chicks on a weekly basis, 
using 4 houses, they would stock 8000 chickens 
in a period of 4 weeks. There would be 4 other 
cycles of this nature, giving a total of 32 000 
chickens produced in a year. Assuming an indus-
try acceptable mortality level of 5% (1600 chick-
ens), and the number of chickens donated to 
each member at the end of each cycle (total of 
192), the number sold would be 30 208 chickens. 
As previously indicated, during the period when 
the project kept chickens, the members received 
a monthly wage of R800. Assuming that it was 
over the whole 12 months, this would come to a 
total of R115 200.
Farming expenses for broilers include wages for 
12 members for a year R115 200. Farming expenses 
for livestock were not accessible, but they should 
be minimal and include dipping and treatment 
costs. Although the gross income from livestock 
seems to be on the lower side, it should be re-
membered that the project sells livestock only 
to pay the instalments on bank loans. The gross 
income does not include the produce that the 
project members receive in-kind.
Participation in other sections of 
agricultural commodity chains
The project engages in various activities of value 
addition, mainly slaughtering and packaging of 
various livestock products, and milling of maize 
into maize meal for household use. Plans are 
underway to plant peach trees facilitated by a 
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Input How often purchased Amount 
purchased
Cost (Rand) Where purchased
Day-old-chicks Used to stock every 2 
weeks
32 000 64 000 IQP East London
Feed
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
At the beginning of a 
cycle
(50 Kg bags)
192 
640 
448 
28 416
80 640
47 040
Epol, Berlin
Umthiza at times
Vet products
Terramycin pwdr
Newcastle Divac
Gumboro vac
At beginning of cycle
Beginning of cycle
Beginning of cycle
500 g x 128
32 vials
32 vials
19 200
1 280
1 216
Umthiza
Umthiza
Umthiza
Electricity
(lighting, heating, 
pumping water)
Monthly 64 000 Eskom 
Stutterheim
Bedding 5 bales (each 
about 50 Kg 
bag x 6
Free Rance timber
Total 305 792 
Table 7.2: Purchased inputs – broiler related (2008)
Input How often 
purchased
Amount purchased Cost 
(Rand)
Where purchased
Seeds/ seedlings  
      Cabbage
      Spinach 
      Potatoes
      Maize
June
June
End August
End August
50 000 seedlings
5000 seedlings
10 Kg x 70 pockets
25 Kg x 4 seed
6 500
550
11 200
3 000
Umthiza Stutterheim
Umthiza Stutterheim
Umthiza Stutterheim
Umthiza Stutterheim
Fertiliser, chemical
      2:2:3 or 3:4:3
      LAN
July – August 50 Kg x 20 bags
50 Kg x 15 bags
3 700
1 500
Farmarama, East London
Fertiliser, organic Own kraal 3 cubic metres/ 50 ha Free
Herbicide Seasonally 2 480
Pesticide
Folicur 250 EW
Seasonally Donation Donation Department of 
Agriculture
Diesel Daily if 
ploughing
R600 x 24 days 14 400 Stutterheim 
Diesel Every 3 days 
carting
R300 x 10 days 3 000
Maintenance When 
necessary
Done by members Free Project members
Milling Whenever 
necessary
30 litres of fuel at 
R10/ litre
300 Stutterheim
Electricity to irrigate 
crops
Monthly 1 500 Eskom
Total 41 080
Table 7.1: Purchased inputs – crop-related (2008)
109
Research
Report
Table 7.3: Revenue from crops (2008)
Type of crop Quantities Price (Rand) Revenue (Rand)
Potatoes 10 Kg x 750 bags 20 15 000
Cabbages 40 500 heads 2 90 000
Spinach 10 000 bunches 2 20 000
Maize 250 x 50 Kg bags 100 25 000
Total 150 000
Adult 
females
Revenue 
(Rand)
Adult 
males
Revenue 
(Rand)
Non-adults Revenue 
(Rand)
Cattle current 93 4 33
Sold within past 12 
months
1 bull 6 000 8 units 20 000
Slaughtered for 
funeral
1 ox
Goats – current 60 1 5 (kidding 
time)
Sold 12 months 
ago
7 4 900 6 4 200
Slaughtered 1 ( R600)
Pigs – current 2 1 -
Pigs as of 12 
months ago
4 1 16 2 400
Poultry sold 12 
months ago
30 208 @ 
R25
755 200
Slaughtered 1 per 
member 
at end of 
production 
cycle
Total 760 100 10 200 22 400
Crops (R) Livestock (R) Broilers (R)
Gross income 150 000 37 500 755 200
Farming expenses 41 080 - 420 992
Net farming profit 108 920 37 500 334 208
Table 7.4: Changes in stock and revenue generated (2008)
Table 7.5: Net farming profits of different enterprises (2008)
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stakeholder from Paarl who is funding the seed-
lings. The project members are to be trained in 
the processing of fruit into various products like 
jam.
Livelihood significance
It is apparent that the Phakamani Mawethu De-
velopment Trust project has had a positive im-
pact on the livelihoods of the members. Mem-
bers derive both income and food. In addition, 
members are provided with alternative grazing 
for their animals. Seasonal workers also derive a 
source of income from the project. The project 
provides a sense of belonging for the members, 
especially important since most of the members 
of pensioners. 
Social and institutional 
dimensions
The Phakamani Mawethu Development Trust has 
a good relationship with Mgwali Village which 
borders the farm where this project is located. 
All the project members are from that village 
and the project also provides seasonal jobs for 
some people from the village. In addition, the 
project farm provides grazing for the members’ 
livestock, especially in times of droughts.
Since the project’s initiation, several institutions 
have provided support in the form of funds, 
training, infrastructure development, and in-
puts. Table 7.6 shows the type of support and 
the respective institutions responsible for each 
input. 
Gender, class and human 
dimensions
The management of the project is by men. The 
membership profile indicates the predominance 
of older people and especially men. The mem-
bers have identified their age to be a big chal-
lenge in the sustainability and thus the future 
of the project. The strategy they have adopted 
is for each member of the project to enrol two 
younger people from their families to partici-
pate in the project. 
Out of the 12 members, there are only three 
women. These women tend to be responsible 
for carrying out relatively light tasks. They are 
responsible for the cleaning of the compound 
and removing grains from the cobs.
Generally the education level of the members is 
very low, (many of the people in Mgwali were 
previously farm workers who were retrenched). 
The exception is two people in the management 
of the project who have tertiary education quali-
fications. Despite the low level of formal educa-
tion, members have the technical skills necessary 
for the enterprise or activity they are responsible 
for. Relevant skills were acquired through train-
ing offered to the group, but also from their 
previous places of work on farms. 
Perceptions of performance 
Analysis shows that the profits of this project 
are good, especially from the broiler enterprise. 
Focus was mainly on the broiler enterprise, and 
when production was halted all the other enter-
prises were affected negatively. Irrigation of the 
vegetables was not possible due to the decision 
to rationalise in order to reduce the electricity 
bill. 
The project has established a good quality herd 
of cattle and flock of goats that match commer-
cial livestock herds and flocks. The adoption of 
standard production practices, like disease pre-
vention in the form of vaccination scheduling, 
strict tick and worm control measures, and the 
selling yearlings brings in higher practices.
Type of support Institution(s)
Funding (loans 
and grants)
Department of Land Affairs, Land Bank, Development Bank of Southern Africa, 
Uvimba Bank, Eskom, National Lotteries, National Department of Agriculture
Infrastructure National Department of Agriculture
Training Fort Cox College of Agriculture and Forestry, AgriSeta
Vehicle (3 ton) Shell
Inputs EC Department of Agriculture
Table 7.6: Institutions and types of support offered to 
the farm
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The project has been able to pay its loans as re-
quired. This is due to good management based 
on experience of running projects of this nature 
and a cohesive and supportive membership. 
Despite these achievements, the fact that the 
members go for long periods without any in-
come may eventually lead to loss of morale. This 
is also why youth are not interested who, ac-
cording to members, want to receive immediate 
payment for work.
Some machinery, notably the tractor, will need 
to be replaced, although it is still used for light 
tasks like carting.
Success is a subjective concept. From an out-
sider’s view, one notes that despite the several 
grants and support from various stakeholders, 
there is a shortage of cash flow. This could be 
explained mainly by failure of the broiler pro-
ject. Despite setbacks and challenges, the com-
mitment of all project members has helped to 
keep this project together. In addition, technical 
ability to run the enterprise with minimal out-
side intervention is admirable. 
The ability to establish a market, to dispose of 
all produce is one of the fundamentals of suc-
cess and one the project has complied with well. 
The ability to fulfil the project’s financial com-
mitments to the repayment of loans is another 
indicator of success.
Environmental aspects
The Phakamani Mawethu Development Trust 
has incorporated an environmental protection 
component in their operation. One such practice 
is the use of organic manure from their cattle, 
goats and broiler enterprises, which results in 
the reduction of synthetic fertiliser use in crop 
production. Organic manure also increases the 
water retention abilities of soil that results in the 
reduction of water loss to the atmosphere. Ulti-
mately less water will be required for irrigation.
The project uses a lot of herbicides in the effort 
to control weeds. These may impact negatively 
on to the soil and the water. 
The future
Funding from the National Department of Ag-
riculture will see the erection of a modern ab-
attoir and the poultry houses will be rebuilt or 
upgraded to a standard acceptable to industry. 
Following this, one expects that the project will 
resume its broiler production enterprise which 
is its main money earner. Longer-term sustain-
ability of the project will depend on getting the 
youth involved. To its credit, the group is tak-
Figure 7.3: Some members of the project
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ing active steps to try to involve the youth now, 
showing an unusual degree of forward-thinking. 
Conclusion 
Many Land Reform Programme projects, espe-
cially redistribution projects, have failed. This 
particular project was selected for a case study 
to provide some understanding of the challeng-
es it had to overcome to succeed. Of importance 
are the following observations:
• Members are all elderly; no youth partici-
pates on a membership basis although sea-
sonal labour involving youth is used. 
• The size of the operation is relatively big, 
but this is managed through the allocation 
of individual responsibility for certain op-
erations or enterprises on the farm.
• Despite the members going without wages 
or income for long periods, they still carry 
on. This is due to a sense of ownership and 
a strong work ethic. They have shown com-
mitment and dedication.
• All members are constantly active in the 
various operations on the farm, which elimi-
nates free riders and absentee members – a 
factor that has contributed to the failure of 
many projects.
• The success of the project thus far is also 
partly attributed to the management, 
which is consultative in style. As a result the 
membership gives them all the support and 
decisions are owned by all. This is also re-
flected in the financial discipline exhibited, 
so that the project is able to pay its loans 
as planned, despite financial hardships at 
times.
• The fact that many members have techni-
cal knowledge and skill has ensured better 
performance than in many other similar 
projects.
• The project has been able to solicit resourc-
es from various stakeholders and to main-
tain a good relationship with the various 
organisations.
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Introduction
The Marang Women in Agriculture and Devel-
opment project is a women-driven initiative 
with a long history of financial independence 
and demonstrated job creation capacity. It is 
located in Phokeng, which is about 15 kilome-
tres from Rustenburg, North West Province. It 
is involved in vegetable production, bee farm-
ing and training. The farm has committed and 
hardworking beneficiaries who have won recog-
nition and various awards from different institu-
tions. The members of the project depend solely 
on the incomes from the project for their liveli-
hoods. There are also some spin-off benefits to 
the immediate community in the form of afford-
able, quality vegetables and honey. The project 
blends well with a number of technologies in 
support of its enterprises. Some of the elements 
of success that can be drawn from this case study 
are that: 
• The individual members of the project 
are strongly motivated and committed to 
achieve a sustainable living from their hold-
ings. Each member shows clear satisfaction 
with her achievement.
• The project demonstrates effective partner-
ships and cooperation between community, 
government and NGOs.
• The project facilitates development through 
providing appropriate training, and linkag-
es with institutions which can provide tech-
nical guidance.
However, in some respects the project bears the 
traits of a ‘magnet project’, i.e. one which at-
tracts a disproportionate share of external sup-
port. Together with the unusually high educa-
tional attainment of the project’s leaders, there 
are doubts as to the project’s replicability.
Historical evolution
In 1997, in the face of escalating crime, unem-
ployment and poverty, twelve unemployed 
women came up with an idea of establishing an 
agricultural project. Due to lack of financial and 
technical support, the number of participants 
quickly dropped to four during the initial con-
ceptualisation phase. The four remaining mem-
bers eventually came up with an idea of provid-
ing training and development in agriculture for 
the disadvantaged communities. This women’s 
group is called Marang Women in Agricul-
ture and Development (“Marang” means “Sun 
Rays”). Initially, the group utilised the members’ 
own small backyard plots for small-scale veg-
etable production. In 2000, however, the Royal 
Bafokeng Administration, in partnership with 
the Department of Agriculture, allocated a two-
hectare plot to the project. In the same year, the 
National Development Agency (NDA) assisted 
the Marang group to access training in commer-
cial bee farming. 
Marang was registered as a Non-Profit Organisa-
tion (NPO) in 2001. When members realised that 
the production of vegetables and honey was 
rapidly growing, the women founded the Mar-
8 Marang Women 
in Agriculture and 
Development: a profitable 
multi-enterprise group 
project in North West
Mike Antwi and Simeon Materechera, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, North-West University
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wa Honey Queens Close Corporation in 2003, 
which specialises in honey production and by-
products. Also in 2003, Marang requested more 
land from the Royal Bafokeng Administration, 
and were allocated an additional four hectares. 
In 2007, Marang registered a co-operative.
The organisation has been functioning well and 
has had consistently good results because it 
is headed by a strong, skilled team who share 
the same vision. The organisation’s activities are 
monitored and evaluated at specified times to 
ensure sustainability. The organisation gener-
ates income through various activities and serv-
ices including:
• Training services.
• Honey and by-products – income generated 
from sales.
• Pollination service – commercial farmers 
rent hives populated with bees to pollinate 
their crops.
• Bee removals – problematic bees are re-
moved from homes and buildings at a fee.
• Vegetables – income generated from sales.
• Networking – negotiating with sponsors, 
donors and institutions for funds.
Although Marang is involved in a variety of en-
terprises, they see their core business for the 
future in vegetable and honey production, be-
cause training is an irregular activity. Produce 
activities have grown from backyard plots to 
two hectares to the current five hectares. They 
intend to de-bush the remaining two hectares 
for further expansion of vegetable production. 
Marang has won various awards from different 
organisations and institutions in various catego-
ries since 2001 as shown in Table 8.1.            
The major challenges facing the organisation 
have been:
• Financial – limited funds that do not fully 
cover the operational costs.
• Infrastructure – especially farm equipment 
that needs to be upgraded.
• Water – the project has no borehole and 
depends on municipal water. This source 
sometimes gives problems to the extent 
that the project can stay for more than a 
week without water.
Natural and physical 
resources
The main type of soil on the project site is a red 
brown sandy loam classified as Hutton. The par-
ticle size distribution of the soil is given in Table 
8.2 while its chemical properties are presented 
in Table 8.3. The textures of the soils are within 
what is considered optimum for irrigation. Al-
though no field measurements of infiltration 
rate were undertaken during the survey, meas-
urements carried out in similar soils elsewhere 
suggest that both soils would have sustained in-
filtration rates in the range 60-100 mm per hour, 
implying that it is suitable for irrigation. 
Year Name of awarding organisation Name of award
2001 National African Farmers Union                         Farmer of the Year
2002 Department of Agriculture   Certificate of Achievement
2002 Department of Economics and Tourism Achiever Award Woman in Business 
(‘Overall Winner’)
2002 Impumelelo Innovation Award Trust Silver Innovative Award
2003 Department of Agriculture Runner-up Female Farmer
2004 Eskom Development Foundation Sustainable Development Award
2005 Mail & Guardian SMMES Award (‘Overall Winner’)
2006 Sowetan/Old Mutual/SABC District Community Builder
2006 Eskom Development Foundation Bronze Award Best Exhibitor
2007 Shoprite Checkers/SABC Runner-up Woman of the year 
Table 8.1: Awards and achievement certificates won by 
Marang since its inception
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The phosphorus content of the soil at the site is 
quite high compared to soils found in many parts 
of the province. Phosphorus (P) is an important 
nutrient, the absence of which limits crop pro-
duction in many soils. The general requirement 
is likely to be of the order of 80 to 120 kg/ha 
P for most crops. Use of adequate amounts of 
manure will help to build up the soil P levels in 
the long term. 
In terms of the calcium and magnesium contents 
and pH values, the soil at the site does not re-
quire liming either for nutritional or pH amel-
ioration purposes. In the longer term, however, 
with prolonged irrigation, applications of dolo-
mitic lime might become necessary to ensure op-
timal plant growth. Thus, the changes in the pH 
and concentration of bases in the soils need to 
be monitored continuously. It may be concluded 
that the soil of the site has an excellent potential 
for irrigated crop production. This is mostly be-
cause in addition to being located on relatively 
flat terrain, the soil has a deep, well-drained 
profile. It has an effective soil depth of over 90 
cm and the topsoil is porous. The soil is thus suit-
able for crop farming and is good for most types 
of vegetables, orchards, use as a nursery and in-
digenous plants. 
According to hydrological investigations previ-
ously undertaken in the area, the hydro geologi-
cal potential is classified as moderate to good. 
The quality is also considered to be suitable for 
irrigation. However, although there are four 
boreholes, they are not well endowed with wa-
ter and dry up during the summer. Since project 
implementation requires substantial water, 
the participants carry water in buckets on their 
heads from far away. However, in late 2003 the 
Department of Agriculture provided the project 
with a R3100 grant to tap municipal water from 
the Bafokeng Tribal Authority to the training 
site. This has alleviated the problem and reduced 
the drudgery and water is now being drawn 
very close to the project. Recently, the project 
was granted permission by the Royal Bafokeng 
Administration to use local Magalies water for 
their activities. The connections were sponsored 
by Impala Platinum Mine.
Figure 8.1 shows the monthly distribution of 
rainfall for Phokeng, which is the closest sta-
tion to the location of the project. The area falls 
within the dry winter and wet summer region, 
since 86% of the annual rainfall comes during 
the summer months of October to March. The 
rainfall is quite unreliable in both quantity and 
Soil Depth (cm) 0 -15 15 -30
Horizon Name Top Sub
Particle size distribution (%)
    Sand (>0.002 mm)
    Silt (0.053-0.002 mm)
    Clay (<0.002 mm)
20
70
10
23
67
10
Texture SL LS
Soil depth (cm) 0 -15 15 - 30
Horizon name Top Sub
Exchangeable cations (ppm)
    K
    Na 
40
10
34
75
Available P (mg/kg) 216 67
Organic carbon (%) 0.8 0.74
Ph (water) 1:2.5 6.06 6.05
EC (ms/cm) 18.2 17.5
Table 8.2: Particle size distribution analysis and texture of the 
soil at the project site
Table 8.3 Chemical properties of the soils at the project site
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distribution. Because of frequent prolonged dry-
ness however dryland crop production is both 
risky and unreliable. Irrigation will thus have to 
be utilised for vegetable production. The area 
has hot summers with mean monthly maximum 
temperatures for December to February rang-
ing between 29° and 30° C. During this time, ex-
treme temperatures of 39° C may be recorded. 
These extremely high temperatures may cause 
heat stress in crops resulting in damage, espe-
cially for fruit and orchard crops. Winter tem-
peratures, on the other hand, are cool to cold, 
with monthly means of 7° to 9° C. The area en-
joys high levels of radiation and light is probably 
the least limiting factor of all the climatic vari-
ables influencing the agricultural potential of 
the area.
The risk of frost incidence in the area is consid-
ered to be relatively low, although ground frost 
can be expected for some 5 to 10 days each win-
ter. However, the temperature regime in the 
area, which determines the frost-free period, 
does not pose major constraints that would re-
strict agricultural activity, as most crops are cul-
tivated during the summer months. The project 
area is relatively flat and has a slope of less than 
1:120. This slope is generally ideal for crop pro-
duction and amenable to irrigated agriculture. 
The vegetation in the project area lies in a sa-
vannah biome called Kalahari Plains Thorn Bush-
veld (or commonly as ‘Kalahari Thornveld’). The 
vegetation is characterised by a fairly well de-
veloped tree stratum with Camel Thorn (Acacia 
erioloba) and Boscia albitrunca as the dominant 
trees, along with scattered individuals of Acacia 
luederitzi and Terminalia serecea, which is con-
spicuous. 
An array of infrastructure and equipment used 
at the farm include:
• Tractors
• Garden tools
• Hydroponics structures
• Honey processing machines
• Cold room
• Beehive boxes. 
An inventory of moveable and immovable assets 
at the farm as at September 2008 is presented 
in Table 8.4. Most of the assets were acquired 
through grants from government and mining 
companies around Rustenburg. However, a few 
of the assets such as a farm tractor and accesso-
ries were acquired with own funding.
Production systems
The enterprises undertaken by this project are: 
Vegetable production – This involves the produc-
tion of a variety of vegetables under irrigation in 
tunnels and under net structures. The vegetables 
produced on the project include tomatoes, car-
rots, spinach, beetroot, green pepper and chil-
lies. In some of the tunnels, the seedlings are 
planted in polythene bags while in other tunnels 
they are planted on seed beds. The production 
follows a well designed rotation that incorpo-
rates both summer and winter crops. The veg-
etables in the tunnels are irrigated by drip while 
those under the nets are irrigated by a furrow ir-
rigation system. The members also fill used tyres 
Figure 8.1: Monthly distribution of rainfall at Phokeng
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with soil and plant vegetables in them. Some-
times, sprinkler irrigation is utilised in the lat-
ter. Both fertiliser and organic manure are used 
during production. Disease and pest control are 
maintained by spraying with appropriate chemi-
cals. Weeding is mostly done by hand on the 
project. The vegetables are harvested and sold, 
mostly without any value-adding. 
Honey production and by-products – This in-
volves the rearing of bees in wooden beehives. 
The beehives are placed in the uncultivated 
areas of the project site and on some nearby 
commercial farms. The honey is harvested us-
ing conventional technology that Marang has 
mastered over the years. The honey is processed 
using both motorised and manual centrifuges 
as shown below. The processed honey is then 
bottled for market. The main by-product is wax, 
which is made into candles which are sold local-
ly. The beehive boxes are made by the women 
themselves and also sold to other interested 
smallholder farmers in the province.
Training and development – Marang provides 
training to farmers and the community in vari-
ous disciplines such as agriculture, HIV and AIDS, 
basic computing, project management and 
book-keeping. This training is conducted at the 
project site, but generally only when a tender 
is won, hence it does not represent a reliable 
source of income.  
Establishment of nursery – This is in the process 
of being established. The idea is to produce veg-
etables and tree seedlings that can be sold to the 
community. 
Table 8.5 gives a summary of the enterprises, 
goals, activities and implementation of these 
activities.
All the production and marketing activities on 
the farm are done by the project members and 
by hired workers. There are also no gender-spe-
cific roles in the production and marketing of 
the various enterprises.
About 88% of the products from the farm are sold, 
3% are consumed directly by the beneficiaries, 7% 
given away to ‘social responsibility’ projects and 
2% is lost through damages. The technologies 
which are employed in the production of the 
various enterprises are mostly manual with 
limited modern technology. There is some value 
adding that is done to the honey and some of 
the vegetables (i.e. cleaning and packaging, but 
only for some of the produce). The products are 
marketed locally in the informal settlements 
Item Year of 
purchase
Present 
value
Condition How 
it was 
acquired
Predicted 
lifespan
How asset 
maintained?
Who operates 
the asset?
Stallion 
bakkie
2002 R15 000 Old but 
functional
NDA 
grant
3 years Serviced 
when 
needed
Supervisor
Volkswagen 
Citi Golf
2003 R45 000 Old but 
functional
NDA 
grant
5 years Serviced 
when 
needed
Supervisor
Hydroponic 
structure
2004 R30 000 Good Impala 
grant
5 years Self- 
maintenance
Farm workers
Rotovator 
hand 
propeller 
tractor
2005 R35 000 Good NDA 
grant
10 years Maintenance 
monthly
Farm workers
Mac 
Ferguson 
tractor
2006 R30 000 Average Own 
funds
5 years Maintenance 
monthly
Farm workers
Honey 
processing 
machines
2006 R20 000 Good NDA 
grant
10 years Maintenance 
when 
needed
Farm workers
Net 
Structures
2007 R180 
000
Good CASP 
grant 
(Dept. of 
Agric)
10 years Self-
maintained
Farmworkers
Table 8.4: Inventory of movable and immovable farm assets 
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Figure 8.1: Honey extraction machines
Enterprises Goals Activities Implementation
Vegetable 
production
To promote fresh 
and healthy 
products
Different vegetables 
are planted, marketed 
and supplied to local 
communities and formal 
markets
Communities including 
people living with HIV/AIDS 
encouraged to eat fresh and 
healthy food. 
Vegetables donated to needy, 
hospices, foster and old age 
homes.
Honey production 
and by-products
To promote 
natural and 
health products
Advertising, promotions, 
exhibitions and sales
Communities are encouraged 
to use natural medication 
from the hive e.g. pure honey, 
propolis, pollen, etc.
Training and 
development
To empower 
communities
Training in farming skills; 
creation of awareness of 
opportunities in farming 
sector.
Trained people are 
encouraged to start their 
own enterprises.
Trained in trainees’ language 
preference.
Hands-on and on-site training
Levels of literacy are 
considered and training is 
done in an environment that 
is conducive to visible results.
Establishment of a 
nursery
Promote 
healthy, clean 
and attractive 
environment
Liaise, communicate and 
network with Dept. of 
Water and Forestry 
Promote nursery projects in 
the communities
Table 8.5: Enterprises, goals, activities and their 
implementation
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and to the major food retail outlets. The farm 
has a special market arrangement with DWF, 
which is a subsidiary company to Tshwane Fresh 
Produce Market. Also, the farm has marketing 
agreements with other companies like Smith’s 
Dairy and local Spars for the supply of honey. 
The major production and marketing challenges 
facing the farm were listed as lack of:
• Sufficient operational funds
• Improvement of corporate image budget
• Improved infrastructure
• Modern technologies
• Additional cold room facilities for storage.
A list of inputs used on the farm and their sourc-
es of supply are presented in Table 8.6, while 
Table 8.7 indicates how Marang has dealt with 
farming stresses and shocks experienced in the 
past.
Economic and livelihoods 
aspects
Analysis of the economic aspects of the pro-
ject’s operations focuses on purchased inputs 
(Table 8.8), regular labour (Table 8.9), casual 
labour (Table 8.10), capital inputs (Table 8.11), 
other general expenses (Table 8.12), and cash 
income over 12 months (Table 8.13). Loan repay-
ments and rentals were stated as R15 000 per 
year. Gross cash income from farming and train-
ing was given as R587 950, and in-kind income 
as R57 650. Input costs excluding maintenance 
were given as R35 711. Expenses on regular la-
bour and maintenance were stated as R493 200 
and R4 500, respectively. 
In order to determine what share of the labour 
costs should be regarded as farming expenses as 
opposed to training-related expenses, we con-
sidered the ratio of income derived from farm-
ing on the one hand (meaning vegetables and 
honey) versus training on the other. The total 
incomes from farming and training are R315 600 
and R272 350, respectively, thus the income ra-
tio of farming to training is 0.54 to 0.46. Based 
on this income ratio, farming expenses come 
to R296 142, and so net farm profit is R19 458. 
While this amount is very modest, it should be 
borne in mind that it already takes into account 
remuneration to project members via their sala-
ries/wages. And yet, it is also worth comparing 
this figure to the net profit from training, which 
is R45 478, i.e. over twice as much as that from 
farming. The fact that training was more remu-
nerative than farming, however, is regarded by 
the project leaders as neither here nor there, 
in the sense that the training income is erratic 
and unpredictable. Moreover, if one takes into 
account the in-kind consumption ‘income’ from 
Stress/shock Remedy 
Drought Irrigation
High fuel prices Tried to reduce operational costs
High fertiliser prices Tried to use self-made organic fertilisers 
High temperatures The use of net structures and irrigation 
Excessive rainfall Drainage channels around the field
Drop in marketing prices Secure more markets
HIV/AIDS epidemic Trained staff in HIV/AIDS programmes
Water scarcity New connection to Magalies water; large storage tanks 
Table 8.6: Inputs used on the farm and their sources of 
supply
Table 8.7: Dealing with stresses and shocks in the past
Input Source of supply
Seedlings Bought from profit at Dan Man Boerdery and Multi-plant
Fertilisers Bought from DICLA
Organic fertilisers Self-made (compost from crop residues)
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Input How often 
purchased
Amount 
purchased 
Cost Where purchased
Seedlings Once a quarter 66 000 R11 165 Dan Man Boerdery 
(Haartebeesfontein)
Fertilisers – chemical Once a quarter 20 bags R6 498 DICLA (Krugersdorp)
Fertilisers – organic As needed N/A n/a Self-made (compost)
Pesticide Once a quarter 10 x 20 litre 
containers
R 3 220 DICLA (Krugersdorp)
Diesel Monthly 450 litres R5 828 Shell Garage 
(Phokeng)
Maintenance Once a year or as 
needed
R4 500 Rietvlei Trok & 
Trekkers (Rietvlei)
Net structures, self-
made
2 big & 1 small R15 000 n/a
Net structures, 
purchased
2 big R180 000 Obaro (Rustenburg)
Table 8.8: Operational expenses, crop-related (2008)
Input Number of 
women
Number of men Average 
payment each 
per month
Total payment 
per month
Directors 3 0 R7 500 R22 500
Managers 0 2 R4 500 R9 000
Farm workers 0 6 R1 200 R7 200
General workers 1 1 R1 200 R2 400
Total 4 9 R41 100
Total cost for 12 months R493 200
Input Number of 
women
Number of men Average days 
each over year
Pay per day
Paid facilitators 10 7 As per available 
contract
As per 
agreement
Seasonal workers 6 4 20 R45
Table 8.10: Labour – casual/seasonal/irregular (2008)
Table 8.9: Labour – regular (2008)
non-marketed agricultural products, then the 
total net profit from agriculture value of agri-
culture would be R77 108.15
The project creates employment for a total of 
42 people (both men and women) as shown in 
Table 8.14. The income from these jobs was con-
sidered as the major contributor to the house-
hold food security and livelihoods of the project 
members.  
Social and institutional 
dimensions
The project has over the years benefited from 
the support of many institutions in the form 
of resources (e.g. land), information, training, 
marketing, conflict resolution and funding. The 
institutions that have been involved with the 
project are listed in Table 8.15. These instances 
of support have helped Marang to sustain its ac-
15 Two caveats regarding this 
figure: first, it does not take 
depreciation of assets into 
account, and thus in that re-
spect is an over-statement; and 
second, it is arbitrary to have 
used the case income ratios 
from farming and training to 
have allocated the wage bill, 
when one might just as well 
have used the fuller (cash plus 
imputed own-consumption) 
income in deriving the ratio.
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Item Year acquired Year made Cost / value at 
time of purchase
How acquired
Stallion bakkie 2002 1989 R7 000 Govt. Tender 
purchased with 
grant
Volwagen Citi Golf 2003 1993 R45 950 NDA Funds
Hydroponic structure 2004 2001  Unknown Impala Funds
Rotovator hand 
propeller tractor & 
implements
2005 2003 R58 000 NDA Funds
Mac Ferguson tractor 2006 1998 R44 000 NDA Funds
Honey processing 
machines
2006 Unknown R30 000 NDA Funds
Net structures 2007 Unknown R191 000 CASP Fund
Table 8.13: Cash income over past 12 months (2008)
Table 8.12: Other general expenses 
Table 8.11: Capital inputs (2008)
Table 8.14: Employment created by Marang
Item Details
Rent and interest on debt Payments to Bafokeng Authority for office and 
equipment rentals and interest payments on loan 
(R15 000 pa) 
Bank transactions cost Bank charges as per funds granted
Time taken to complete marketing 
arrangement
Ongoing
Taxes Payment to SARS for taxes (not available)
Item Details
Vegetable sales R129 600
Honey sales R186 000
Sub-total farm income (vegetables & honey) R315 600
Training
    Soul City 
    Cargill
    Synercon
Sub-total
R235 000
R26 950
R10 400
R272 350
Total R587 950
Nature of employment Men Women Total
Permanent employment 9 6 15
Seasonal labour 11 16 27
Total 20 22 42
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tivities and its benefits to the beneficiaries. The 
social benefits of Marang to the surrounding 
communities include the supply of free vegeta-
bles to the old age homes and orphanages, and 
the use of the farm as learning centre for schools 
in the province. 
Gender, class and human 
dimensions
Marang was initiated by women and continues 
to be managed by women. The ratio of direct 
beneficiaries of the project is 5 women to 8 men. 
However, the three directors of the project are 
all women. Table 8.16 shows the demographics 
of the beneficiaries of the project. Out of the 13 
direct beneficiaries of Marang, only three are 
below thirty-five years of age. The majority of 
the beneficiaries are over forty years of age. The 
three women directors of the project are the 
only ones who have been with the project since 
it began in 1997; the rest joined the project after 
2001. Six of the beneficiaries have tertiary and 
college education. Most of the coordinating and 
managerial/directorship positions in the project 
are held by women while the direct field activi-
ties are done by the men. 
Perceptions of performance 
The project is sustainable in its activities because 
it has been in operation without fail for the past 
11 years. This farm is considered to be successful 
because of the following:
• Commitment – the group consists of mem-
bers who are very committed to the farm 
operations.  
• Networking – the farm has established and 
sustained good networks that have pro-
vided them with appropriate information, 
technology and resources required for op-
timal operation.
• Infrastructure – over the years of its opera-
tion, the farm has acquired a good techno-
logical infrastructural base required for ef-
fective operation. 
• Skills – skills development initiatives have 
been undertaken by the members which 
have enabled them especially with manage-
ment and technical skills. 
• Leadership – it has a leadership which shares 
the vision of the farm. 
Policy environment 
Marang currently relies on municipal water for 
its farming activities. However, in some areas of 
the province, there are policies that do not allow 
the use of municipal water for farming purpos-
es. There may come a point when this becomes a 
problem for Marang as well.
Marang also needs more land in order to expand 
its operations. The beneficiaries indicated that it 
is difficult to acquire more land from the tribal 
authorities in the area. There is a need for poli-
cies that facilitate easy access and acquisition of 
land by smallholder farmers.
Environmental aspects
In executing their cropping and bee farming 
activities, Marang considers the protection of 
the environment. Among the environmentally 
sound practices on the Marang projects are: the 
use organic manure to supply crops with nutri-
ents; the use of hand weeding in order to reduce 
the amount of chemicals applied; the use of wa-
Table 8.15: Institutions and types of support offered to the 
farm
Type of support Institution(s)
Resources NDA, CASP, Impala Mines, Eskom Foundation, Bafokeng Tribal Authority
Information Local Municipality and District Municipality
Networking Various stakeholders
Funding NDA, National Lotteries
Training AgriSeta, Soul City & IDT
Marketing National Marketing Council
Conflict resolution Department of Labour CCMA
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ter filtration to reduce the amount of salt in the 
water before irrigation helps to prevent soil sa-
linisation; recycling and paper-making projects; 
the use of environmentally friendly techniques 
of honey harvesting from beehives. 
The future
The future expectation for this farm is to grow 
its agricultural production activities to a com-
mercial level and to add value to the products. 
The group also wants to raise the level of their 
training centre to that of a Further Education-
al Training (FET) accredited unit, allowing it to 
share and transfer information to other interest-
ed people. According to the group, these aspira-
tions can be achieved by having flexible policies 
that allow access to financial and other relevant 
resources.
The group sees their children having a future in 
this project, particular as the leadership of the 
project are in their 50s. The group leaders are 
hoping that the visible benefits they derive from 
the project will inspire their children to replace 
them when they retire. 
Name of 
participant
Age Year joined 
project
Gender Position in 
project
Place of 
residence
Educational 
Level
Responsibility in project
Tshidi Mataboge 55 1997 F Managing 
Director
Phokeng Tertiary Spearheads all projects
Boipelo Kubyana 50 1997 F Training 
Director
Tlhabane Tertiary Coordinates training
Mato Mputle 53 1997 F Production 
Director
Luka High School Coordinates production
Beauty Raseleka 25 2005 F Office Admin Phokeng College Administrate office 
activities
Kelebogile Nakedi 23 2007 F Secretary Phokeng College Typing and filing
Bicorly Segwape 43 2003 M Training 
Manager
Bethanie College Overseer training activities
Thami Mathunda 32 2007 M Production 
Manager
Wonder-kop Tertiary Overseer production 
activities
Shimi Mokgatle 38 2004 M Supervisor Phokeng High School Supervises Production 
activities
Happy Mabeko 39 2003 M Farm worker Phokeng Primary Operates farm activities
Pogiso Phiri 55 2001 M Farm worker Phokeng Primary Operates farm activities
Doctor Mogapi 35 2002 M Farm worker Holfontein Primary Operates farm activities
Hendrick Modikela 52 2006 M Farm worker Rietvlei Primary Operates farm activities
Letima Molokwane 2007 M Farm worker Pella Primary Operates farm activities
Table 8.16: Demographics of project members
Conclusion
The main reasons why the project was selected 
for a case study include:
• Although the project was not designed to 
involve only women, it was interesting to 
observe that five years after its initiation, 
only women were left. Technically, the 
commitment of the women and dedication 
of the local extension workers has ensured 
successful application of technology on the 
project. 
• The size and organisation of the project was 
stable. Compared to other similar commu-
nity projects, the size of this project is small 
in terms of number of participants. Moreo-
ver, the clear management hierarchy in the 
project appears to prevent discontent from 
either arising or erupting to a point that it 
becomes disruptive.
• The design of the project capitalises on an 
effective blend of modern technology and 
local knowledge. This ensures improved 
productivity and sustainability. 
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• The location of this small-scale commu-
nity agricultural poverty alleviation project 
within the surroundings of Rustenburg, 
a rapidly growing city that provides many 
other competing non-agricultural employ-
ment opportunities, especially in the mining 
and tourism sectors is conducive to growth 
and development.
Some of the elements of success that can be 
drawn from this case study are briefly summa-
rised as follows:
• The individual members of the project 
are strongly motivated and committed to 
achieve a sustainable living.
• The project members have successfully 
taken modern technology and advice from 
external agents, then blended these with 
their own indigenous knowledge systems 
and skills
• The project demonstrates effective partner-
ships and cooperation between beneficiar-
ies, government, NGOs and private institu-
tions.
• The project facilitates development through 
providing appropriate training, linkages 
with institutions which can provide techni-
cal guidance and financial support
• National and provincial policies and institu-
tions that create an enabling environment 
for the projects are required.
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Introduction
The Wadela Trust project is involved in the pro-
duction of vegetables and broilers. Most of the 
beneficiaries are from a peri-urban squatter area 
near the town of Potchefstroom. The location of 
the project is about 30 kilometres from Potchef-
stroom within the mining areas of Carletonville. 
The project activities are conducted on a previ-
ously commercial farm which was owned by a 
white farmer and which therefore has most of 
the infrastructure needed for farming. The mem-
bers of the project depend solely on the incomes 
from the project for their livelihoods. One of 
the elements of success that can be drawn from 
this case study is that the major infrastructure 
required for sustainable production is in place. 
The individual members of the project are also 
strongly motivated and committed to achieve a 
sustainable living from their holdings. 
Historical evolution
This project was an initiative of the then Wad-
ela Transitional Local Council (TLC). (‘Wadela’ 
stands for Western Deep Levels and Elandsrand.) 
In 1998, the Wadela TLC tasked a consultant to 
conduct research in the area on the issues of un-
employment and HIV/AIDS, with a view to rec-
ommending possible interventions. According 
to the research, many of the Wadela inhabitants 
stated that they were interested in agriculture. 
This led the Council to purchase a 36-hectare 
farm that was on the market. The Councillors 
were tasked to bring people from within their 
wards to be registered and to offer their services 
on the farm and receive some remuneration for 
their work. The project started in 1999 with 136 
people from Wadela Township.
Initially, about five hectares of the land were 
planted under tomatoes and green beans, in-
cluding some tomato production in a tunnel. 
Production was also begun in the two broiler 
houses, each of which has a capacity for accom-
modating 800 birds. The project quickly encoun-
tered problems due to the fact that the farm’s 
production could not generate enough income 
to pay wages to the workers. The project did 
not identify a reliable market; rather products 
were sold to poor residents within the township. 
These problems led to the removal of the first 
project manager.
The project was revived in 2000 using funds 
from the Department of Provincial and Local 
Government. A consultant was appointed to run 
the farm, which was to include six broiler houses 
with a capacity of 1500 birds each, to be built 
according to the specifications of a well-known 
company that develops poultry enterprise infra-
structure (DICLA). A drip irrigation system was 
also installed to meet the requirements of the 
vegetable production. The chicken production 
in the six new poultry houses was staggered in 
order to optimise production for maximum prof-
it. The chickens were processed in abattoirs in 
Elandsfontein and sold to Top-Chicks in Pretoria 
on a weekly basis. The project’s income was put 
in the Council’s coffers, to which the beneficiar-
9 Wadela Trust vegetable 
and broiler project: a 
group-based poverty 
reduction project with 
unrealised potential
Mike Antwi and Simeon Materechera, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, North-West University
126
Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.
ies did not have access. The Council subsequently 
informed the beneficiaries that the coffers were 
exhausted. Thereafter, the project become inef-
fective and was vandalised. At around the same 
time the consultant’s contract was terminated. 
The beneficiaries could not produce any more 
and requested to have an audited statement of 
their account. 
Between 2001 and 2004, some of the benefici-
aries moved to stay on the farm with the aim 
of reducing vandalism and theft on the farm. By 
this stage, there were only nine beneficiaries still 
committed to the project. These nine stayed on 
the farm and produced vegetables in order to 
sustain themselves. They later leased the farm to 
a white farmer from Khutsong who paid rent for 
use of the land. The new lessee used the nine 
remaining members as a source of labour, but 
subsequently failed to pay either the rent or 
their wages, which resulted in the termination 
of the lease agreement. In 2004, the MEC for Ag-
riculture sent a task team to look at what was 
needed to refurbish the farm. Following this, the 
Department of Agriculture allocated R1.2 million 
to the project for the construction of three tun-
nels, cables, repair of four boreholes and other 
operating expenses.
Some of the major achievements of the group 
are that the project once supplied President Hy-
permarket with tomatoes, and had a contract 
with a commercial farmer from Randfontein 
who purchased chickens from them on a week-
ly basis. The project managed to sustain itself 
through the profits and beneficiaries realised 
monthly wages of R1200 for all nine benefici-
aries. At the time of the fieldwork for this case 
study, the project had managed to accumulate 
an amount of R100 000 in the project’s bank ac-
count. It is one of the only commercial projects 
around in which women outnumber men. Ma-
jor challenges of the project have been theft by 
neighbouring community members and emerg-
ing broiler producers in the immediate area who 
could compete in the future for the same mar-
ket. In respect of the theft and vandalism prob-
lem, the police have responded by conducting 
regular patrols around and inside the farm. 
Natural and physical 
resources
The farm’s soil is sandy loam which varies from 
Avalon to Hutton with a mid-slope topography. 
The soil is deep and has no limiting layer within 
the effective rooting depth (1.2 metres). The 
borehole water used on the farm is Class 1 Low 
Sodium water. The vegetation of the land is 
mixed Bankenveld of Cymbopogon contortus 
and Themeda Triandra. The climate varies 
from warm summer to cold winters. The good 
quality soils have allowed the continual planting 
of vegetables, which is in demand by hawkers 
from Carletonville and the Greater Wadela 
Community. The physical resources on the 
project include: 
• 3 tunnels (10 x 30 metres) 
• 1 tunnel heater 
• 6 1500-bird broiler houses 
• 2 800-bird broiler houses 
• 4 boreholes (of which only 2 are equipped)
• 1 tractor
• 2 ploughs 
The inventory of the farm assets is presented 
in Table 9.1. Most of the assets were acquired 
through funding from Local Government and 
the provincial Department of Agriculture 
through the Comprehensive Agricultural Sup-
port Programme (CASP).
Production system
The enterprises undertaken on the farm include 
vegetables in tunnels and in the open field 
(spinach, carrots, beetroot and green peppers), 
and broiler production. The group takes 6 weeks 
to raise and sell chickens with an average weight 
of 1.8-2.0 kg and sells to President Hypermarket 
at Fochville and the Carletonville hawkers. 
They take about 60-80 days to raise tomatoes 
in the tunnels, which are then packaged in 
plastic bags and boxes (value adding) and sold 
to President Hypermarket; the surplus is sold in 
the local communities. The technology used in 
the tunnels for vegetable production involves 
the planting of tomato seedlings on sawdust 
and the scheduling of the fertigation machine 
to supply water and fertilisers. The vegetables 
are irrigated with a well designed drip irrigation 
network in which drippers are allocated directly 
to the rooting zone. The humidity inside the 
tunnel is controlled by vents that are located 
around the side and top of the tunnels. Other 
vegetables grown on the farm include spinach, 
carrots, cabbage and beetroot and this is done in 
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rotation. The vegetables are cleaned and packed 
for sale in surrounding areas.
The chickens are produced in deep litter hous-
es with semi-automated waterers and feeders. 
The day-old chicks are bought from Serfontein 
Kuikens in Potchefstroom and DICLA Farm and 
Seed Company at Muldersdrift at a rate of 1500 
chickens per cycle. The feed is high grade Agro 
concentrate that is purchased form Farmer City 
(Silverlake). The bedding for the floor is pur-
chased from Hansie Millers. The production 
uses hygienic practices and follows disease con-
trol procedures in each house. The chickens are 
dressed and wrapped at the farm and sold to 
nearby shops. However, the farm’s facilities do 
not constitute a proper abattoir, and would not 
qualify for an abattoir license. 
The group decided to engage in these enterpris-
es because the infrastructure was available, and 
because they have a brief production cycle and 
the potential for high turnover. The other factor 
considered was the low input costs of vegetable 
production. Another consideration was that the 
farm is only 36 hectares indicating the appropri-
ateness of intensive production systems. Mem-
bers of the group normally consume non-mar-
ketable chickens and surplus vegetables which 
are over-ripe. Excess production (tomatoes) is 
stored temporarily in the farm house and poul-
try in the broiler houses. The production and 
marketing challenges facing the farm are that 
they cannot supply orders for processed chicken 
products to the mining houses and restaurants 
in the area due to the lack of a licensed abattoir. 
Another concern are the steep increases in input 
costs experienced over the past few years, e.g. 
for fuel and feed product. The security on the 
farm is also of much concern in that there have 
been several break-ins. 
Economic and livelihood 
aspects
The analysis of the economic aspects of the 
project focuses on purchased inputs (Tables 
9.2 and 9.3), regular labour (Table 9.4), capital 
inputs (Table 9.5), other general expenses (Table 
9.6) and cash income over a 12 months period 
(Table 9.7). The loan repayments and rentals 
were stated as R43 000 per year. The 15% interest 
on the loan was given as R6450. The gross cash 
farming income was given as R678 000. The 
farming expenses on inputs, regular labour and 
maintenance was stated as R550 510. The net 
farm profit is therefore R121 040.00. The project 
creates employment for a total of nine people, 
of whom three are men and six are women. 
The income from these jobs was considered as 
the major contributor to their household food 
security and livelihoods. The group consumes the 
unmarketable vegetables and chicken produced 
from the farm, and this seemingly constitutes 
their main source of food. Currently, there is 
gross under-utilisation of the resources by the 
beneficiaries. The capacity of the resources on 
the farm is capable of generating over R2 million 
annually. Presently, the group is using only one 
Table 9.1: Investments in farm assets over time (2008)
n/a=not applicable
Item Year of 
purchase
Present 
value
Condition How it was acquired Predicted 
lifespan
2 x broiler house (800 capacity) 1998 R25 000 Good Through Local Gov’t 
Funds (DPLG)
20 years
6 x broilers houses (1500 capacity) 2000 R20 000 Good Local Gov’t funds (DPLG) 20 years
1 x tunnel 1998 R11 000 Vandalised Local govt funds 5 years
3 x tunnels 2006 R70 000 Good DACE (CASP) 5 -10 years
1 x tunnel heater 2007 R110 010 Good DACE (CASP) 5-10 years
Borehole testing equipping 2007 R65 029 Good DACE (CASP) 10 years
3 x tunnels 2007 R148 029 Good DACE (CASP) 10 years
Broiler houses refurbishment 2007 R123 179 Good DACE (CASP) 10 years
Electrical equipment for boreholes 2007 R2 856 n/a DACE (CASP) n/a
Water connections 2007 R2 875 n/a DACE (CASP) n/a
Broiler house equipment 2007 R50 196 Good n/a n/a
Hydraulic lift pump 2007 R4 372 Good DACE (CASP) n/a
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Input How often 
purchased
Amount 
purchased
Cost Where purchased
Seed/seedlings Quarterly 950/tunnel R14 500 DICLA Farm and Seed 
Co; Muldersdrift
Fertilisers – chemical Bi-annually 15 items R450 DICLA Farm and Seed 
Co; Muldersdrift
Fertilisers – organic None (get chicken 
manure from farm)
N/A N/A Get it freely from the 
farm
Pesticide Annually 5 litres R390 RJ Besproeing; 
Potchefstroom
Diesel Annual exact quantity 
unknown
R5 000 Excel Service Station; 
Carletonville 
Total R20 340
Table 9.2: Purchased inputs – crop-related (2008)
Input Number of 
women
Number of 
men
Average payment 
each per month
Total payment per 
year
Paid; managers 6 0 R1200 R86 400
Paid; non-managers 0 3 R600 R21 600
Total 6 3 R108 000
Input How often 
purchased
Amount purchased Cost per 
unit
Total cost Where purchased
Day-old 
chicks
Weekly 1500 chicks R4.50 R6750/cycle 
x 4 cycles x 
4 houses=     
R108 000
Serfontein Kuikens - 
Potchefstroom and 
DICLA Farm and Seed 
Co;  Muldersdrift
Feed Monthly 4 kg/2 kg chick x 
1500 chicks = 6000 
kg/50 kg bag
=120 bags x R145/
bag =R17 400 x 4 
cycles 
= R69 600 x 4 
houses
=R278 400
R145/bag R278 400 Farmer City (Silverlake); 
Potchefstroom 
Vet products Monthly 5 items R55 x 6 
months
R330 SENWES and Serfontein 
Kuikens; Potchefstroom
Electricity Monthly 3 KVA R2000 x 6 
months
R12 000 ESKOM; Carletonville
Bedding Quarterly 3 tons R50/ton R600 Hansie Miller; 
Viljoenskroon
Maintenance Monthly 3 x tunnels and 4 
x broiler houses, 
tractor and 
machinery
R3 500 x 6 
months
R21 000 DICLA Farm and Seed 
Co; Muldersdrift
Total R420 330
Table 9.3: Purchased inputs – livestock-related (2008)
Table 9.4: Labour – regular (2008)
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Item Year acquired Year 
made
Cost/value at time of 
purchase
How acquired 
Tractor and 
implements
1999 1992 R60 000 Bought by Merafong City 
Council 
Bakkie 1999 1999 R230 000 Bought by Merafong City 
Council
Table 9.5: Capital inputs – e.g. tractors, vehicles, implements, 
livestock, etc.(2008)
Table 9.6: Other general expenses (2008)
Item Relevant details
Local transport R800
Transport hire R500
Rent R0
Commission paid R0
Storage cost R0
Bank transactions cost R45/month x 12 = R540
Time taken to complete marketing arrangement 3 days
Interest on loan. R43 000 on feed (Farmer City, Potchefstroom): 
15% p.a.
R6450
Total R8290
Item Describe and capture relevant details
Poultry 1450 chickens x R25 = R36 250 x 4 = R145 000 x 4 houses = R580 000
Vegetables (spinach) 500 bundles x R300 = R15 000 x 3 weeks = R45 000 x 2 cycles = R90 000
Poultry manure R800/bag x 100 bags = R8 000
Total income R678 000
Table 9.7: Cash income over past 12 months (2008)
Gross farming income R678 000
Farming expenses – R550 510
Net farming income  = R127 490
Interest on loans –R6 450
Net farming profit = R121 040
Table 9.8: Overall financial performance (2008)
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of its seven tunnels and uses a fraction of its 
broiler capacity.
Social and institutional 
dimensions
The identification of this project followed the 
‘sacred cow approach’ – an announcement 
was made by senior officials to the effect that 
a project would be created, and junior officials 
were compelled to create it regardless of the 
many problems they saw with the idea. This 
division has carried on over time, whereby the 
project enjoys high-profile support, but only 
grudging support from implementation-level 
staff. One dimension of the misgivings of gov-
ernment staff is that the project resources are 
of such great value and represent such great 
economic potential, and yet the beneficiaries 
are primarily ethnic Xhosas (in an overwhelm-
ingly Tswana area), whose ability to cling to the 
project is subtly but strongly resented.     
One peculiar feature of the project is the degree 
to which it remains under the control of civil 
servants; for example, a Department of Agricul-
ture official maintains the books and determines 
what money may be paid out as wages and 
what must be deposited into the project’s bank 
account. While this is not necessarily the norm 
among agricultural projects in North West, it is 
not unique. The need for continued ‘support’ of 
such projects is partly a function of their usual 
group nature: virtually all of the agricultural 
development projects in North West promoted 
by the provincial department of agriculture and 
supported by the National Development Agency, 
are group projects, and the general perception is 
that external management support is required 
to compensate for groups’ internal inadequa-
cies. Why this is the case rather than a distancing 
from group projects is unclear.
Gender, class and human 
dimensions
The demographics of the project beneficiaries 
are shown in Table 9.9. The group consists of six 
women and three men. The age range among 
the beneficiaries was 44 to 62 years. None of the 
beneficiaries had reached matric. The project 
has created nine permanent self-employment 
opportunities for the beneficiaries and six tem-
porary jobs for other people from the Wadela 
Township. Other sources of income to the ben-
eficiaries beside the project were mainly old 
age and child support grants. Task distribution 
among the beneficiaries is not influenced by 
gender. One peculiar characteristic about the 
group, as mentioned above, is that all the wom-
en are Xhosa speakers. One possible interpre-
tation is that when the project shrunk from its 
original number of 136, the few that remained 
behind were the most marginal in the commu-
nity, i.e. ethnic outsiders.
There was no indication of serious conflicts 
among the beneficiaries, although it was in-
dicated that the project had its own internal 
mechanisms of dealing with conflicts when they 
arise.
Perception of performance
Even though the project can be said to be sus-
tainable, its performance at this stage is still no-
where near optimum capacity. The tunnels and 
some of the poultry houses are currently grossly 
under-utilised. A conservative estimate of the 
annual income possible from the existing infra-
structure is R2 million. All the poultry houses and 
the tunnels are fully equipped but are not fully 
utilised. In 2007, when the project managed to 
improve the scale of operation, it made a profit 
of R212 000 out of which R100 000 was saved. In 
order to improve the output, a farm manager 
has to be appointed to take charge of all the 
production activities on the farm. 
Policy environment
The Council bought the land for the Wadela 
Trust around 1999. The farm is leased for free to 
the beneficiaries with the intention to purchase. 
The policy of the provincial Department of Agri-
culture of providing support to smallholder pro-
jects for one year only is impacting negatively on 
this project. The Department provided funding 
for the farm’s operation and some of the infra-
structure on the farm through CASP. Now, oper-
ating capital is needed to fully utilise the assets, 
but the Department cannot provide any further 
financial assistance in terms of its own policies. 
Since the group does not have a title deed to 
the land, acquiring loans through the commer-
cial banks is problematic. 
Environmental perspective
The project has tried to practise environmentally 
friendly approaches to production including the 
use of organic manure from chicken droppings 
in the vegetable production. This avoids the use 
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Table 9.9: Demography of the project beneficiaries
Name of 
participant
Age
(yrs)
Year 
joined 
project
Gender Position in 
project
Edu 
level
Responsibility 
in project
Is HH 
food 
secure?
Income/
month 
from 
project
Other 
sources 
of food 
security
Other 
benefits 
from project
Angel Mxoli 44 1998 Female Treasurer Grade 
10
Makes cash 
related 
transactions, 
Keeps records 
of  receipts 
and expenses 
Yes R1200 Own grant 
(disability) 
+ 2 x child 
support 
grant
Employment, 
income 
generating, 
training site, 
experience 
and 
knowledge
Joyce 
Tshapile
45 1998 Female Blank cell? Grade 8 Rears chicks 
and general 
farm work
Yes R1200  3 x child 
support 
grant 
Employment, 
income 
generation, 
training and 
development 
site and 
knowledge 
Monica 
Siko 
46 1998 Female Chairperson Grade10 Overseer of 
the whole 
farm/project
Yes R1200  2 x child 
support 
grant
Employment 
Florence 
Nkotswana
64 1998 Female General 
secretary
Grade10 Keeps 
records and 
minutes of all 
meetings
Yes R1200 Old age 
grant 
Employment 
Nobantu 
Pato
46 1998 Female Additional 
member
Grade 5 Overall 
project work 
– tunnels and 
broilers
Yes R1200 None Employment 
Deliwe 
Mamkeli
45 1998 Female Additional 
member
Grade 2 Overall project 
work – open 
field crops 
and broilers
Yes R1200 None Employment 
Alfred 
Nkotswana
61 1998 Male Additional 
member
Grade 2 Repairs and 
maintenance 
to broiler 
and tunnel 
equipment
Yes R1200 Old age 
grant
Employment 
Ben 
Mothibedi
62 1998 Male Additional 
member
Grade 1 Tractor driver, 
repairs and 
maintenance 
to all broiler 
and tunnel 
equipment 
Yes R1200 None Employment 
of chemical fertilisers which tend to be detri-
mental to the soil environment. 
The future 
This project has the potential to be successful in 
that it has good infrastructure and committed 
beneficiaries whose livelihood and futures de-
pend on the success of the project. The project 
also enjoys a lot of support from the Merafong 
City Council and the Department of Agriculture. 
The future expectation of the beneficiaries is to 
expand the project by adding more enterprises 
and also to meet market-related demands, espe-
cially to the mining companies in the area. To 
bring about the described changes require an 
injection of extra capital and training of the par-
ticipants in agribusiness. There is also the need 
to appoint a farm manager as an overseer. The 
group would also like to purchase the farm from 
Merafong City Council and transfer it into their 
own names. 
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Conclusion
The Wadela Trust Vegetable and Broiler Project 
is one case of a small-scale agriculture initiative 
that has succeeded due to the persistence and 
commitment of its members despite experienc-
ing many problems. This project is interesting in 
that it has a well developed infrastructure and 
committed beneficiaries who need little moti-
vation and operational finance to succeed. The 
vegetable and poultry enterprises work well to-
gether. The project seemed to be well aware of 
this idea and was willing to increase the number 
of enterprises. The marketing potential for the 
products from this project is readily available 
from the mining companies surrounding the 
project. However, this potential can only be re-
alised if the scale of production is increased to 
the optimum of the available infrastructure. The 
level of technology and infrastructure provided 
to this project and the current status of produc-
tion requires that higher levels of productivity 
could be achieved. This cold be achieved if a 
mentor or manager is engaged. During this time 
the beneficiaries could be appropriately trained 
and guided to enable them to sustain all farm-
ing activities on which they embark.
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Introduction 
Msinga smallholder irrigation farmers are re-
nowned within the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands for 
their production and marketing of green meal-
ies and vegetables. Although productivity varies 
widely among farmers (Mkhabela, 2005), a num-
ber of smallholders have maintained vibrant lev-
els of crop production despite the withdrawal of 
government subsidies after 1994. This contrasts 
with the collapse of many similar irrigation 
schemes in former homelands across the coun-
try following the same move. While smallholder 
irrigators in provinces such as Limpopo and the 
Eastern Cape have since received substantial 
government and private sector assistance in in-
frastructure rehabilitation, revitalisation of crop 
production and integration into the mainstream 
commodity markets, Msinga smallholders have 
received no such assistance, apart from a veg-
etable pack house that was established in 2001 
through donor funding. However, in light of the 
failure of assisted agricultural commercialisa-
tion in many reported cases, such as projects un-
der the Revitalisation of Smallholder Irrigation 
Schemes (RESIS) Programme of Limpopo Prov-
ince Tapela 2009; Denison and Manona, 2007), 
the success of Msinga farmers is not only ironic 
but may shed light into alternative ways of as-
sisting South African smallholder irrigators. This 
case study sought to gain insights into factors 
underlying the success of the Msinga farmers. 
Socio-economic context
The Msinga Irrigation Scheme is located along 
the Tugela River, close to the small town of Tuge-
la Ferry in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands. The area 
falls within Msinga Local Municipality, which is 
one of the four local municipalities that compris-
es Umzinyathi District Municipality. The nearest 
urban centres include Greytown, Pietermaritz-
burg, Weenen, Kranskop, Dundee, Ladysmith 
and Mooi River. Umzinyathi District Municipality 
is one of the rural poverty nodes prioritised by 
South Africa’s Integrated Sustainable Rural De-
velopment Programme (ISRDP). Of the District’s 
four local municipalities, Msinga has the lowest 
levels of basic services (Table 10.1).
The population of Msinga is 171 071, with more 
women (58%) than men (42%) owing to higher 
migrancy rates among men. The municipality is 
largely rural in character, with 69% of the area 
(1725 km²) comprising Traditional Authority land 
held in trust by the Ingonyama Trust and the re-
maining 31% consisting of commercial farmland 
(Msinga Local Municipality, 2008). 
As in many other predominantly rural munici-
palities, the rate of unemployment is relatively 
high. The main sources of livelihood in Msinga 
are remittances from migrant workers, social 
grants (pensions, child support grants and dis-
ability grants), crop and livestock production, 
sales of craftwork, sales of fuel wood and 
thatching grass, as well as informal trading 
(Mkhabela, 2005). Labour tenancy is still found 
on some farms in the district, and some people 
are employed as waged farm workers (ibid). A 
small number of people are formally employed 
in the local service sectors, such as health, educa-
tion and retail, while others are self-employed 
in the informal economy, where they run small 
10 Msinga smallholder irrigation 
farmers: commercially successful 
smallholders using mixed 
technologies
Barbara Tapela, Institute for Poverty, Land and 
Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape 
Rauri Alcock, Church Agricultural Projects
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enterprises such as taxi services, vehicle repairs, 
retail shops and micro-manufacturing industries 
(Msinga Local Municipality, 2008; Mkhabela, 
2005). A significant number of people practise 
small-scale agriculture on an estimated 1967 hec-
tares of land, of which 767 hectares are under 
irrigation. 
There seem to be ongoing shifts in the pattern 
of livelihoods in Msinga. According to Mkhab-
ela (2005), remittances appear to be in decline, 
due to high levels of unemployment in the for-
mal economy. However, they remain an impor-
tant source of income for households, and many 
young men are absent either at work or seeking 
work in urban areas, especially Gauteng. Older 
men generally have a history of migrancy and 
some have invested earnings in large herds of 
livestock (ibid), with the municipality record-
ing 46 000 head of cattle and 45 000 goats 
(Msinga Local Municipality, 2008). The dry area 
with a relatively low average summer rain-
fall of around 600 mm is indeed better suited 
to livestock than crop production (Cousins and 
Mwheli, 2008; Mkhabela, 2005). In contrast with 
the past, fewer households presently grow crops 
in rain-fed arable land on a reasonably large 
scale. The main crops are maize, sorghum (for 
beer making), beans, pumpkins, melons and 
imifino (spinach). Some people grow dagga, a 
lucrative but risky crop given periodic police ef-
forts to destroy dagga fields. However, dryland 
crop production has been in decline as a source 
of livelihood for some years and increasing num-
bers of households do not cultivate all their ar-
able land (Mkhabela, 2005; Cousins and Mwheli, 
2008). Due to the limited formal employment 
opportunities in the area, the decline of remit-
tances and the aridity of climate, irrigated agri-
culture has become more central to livelihoods 
of many people in Msinga, directly and indirectly 
contributing to livelihoods of an estimated two 
thousand five hundred (2500) households. 
Profile of the Msinga 
irrigation scheme
The Msinga Irrigation Scheme has existed for 
over one hundred years and comprises an 
area of 767 hectares, which is divided into five 
‘blocks’. The younger blocks were established 
around 1960. This was soon after the Bantu Pro-
motion of Self-Government Act of 1959, which 
paved the way for the establishment of ‘home-
lands’ and ‘independent states’ in South Africa. 
Each of the blocks has a sub-committee, and 
three members of each sub-committee together 
comprise the umbrella management committee 
for the scheme. Sub-committees are responsible 
for the day-to-day operation and maintenance 
activities, and the umbrella committee coordi-
nates and oversees the overall management of 
the scheme. 
The irrigation scheme falls within the Traditional 
Authority Land Area held in trust by the Ingon-
yama Trust. Plots of land within the scheme are 
allocated by chiefs and chairpersons of irriga-
tion scheme committees. Access to land within 
the scheme is also through inheritance, informal 
leasing and share-cropping. Some of the plots 
have been passed down through inheritance for 
three to four generations.
Between 500 and 1000 smallholder farmers are 
estimated to eke livelihoods from the irriga-
tion scheme. Difficulty in determining the ex-
act number of farmers relates to the constantly 
changing pattern of the use of plots and a co-ex-
istence of single and multiple plot users, sharing 
of plots and unused plots. Plots are called umt-
hathe or ‘beds’ in the local vernacular. The aver-
age plot size is 0.162 hectares or 180 metres x 90 
Local 
Municipality
Area 
(km)
Population Population 
density 
(people/km)
Percent of households having access to…
electricity water sanitation Refuse 
removal
Nquthu 1454 150 000 103 11 – 20% 11 – 20% 11 – 20% 0 – 10%
Endumeni 1612 50 000 31 61 – 70% 71 – 80% 71 – 80% 71 – 80%
Msinga 2500 171 071 68 0 – 10% 0 – 10% 0 – 10% 0 – 10%
Umvoti 2509 90 000 36 31 – 40% 31 – 40% 31 – 40% 21 – 30%
Source: Msinga Local Municipality IDP, 2008-09.
Table 10.1: Descriptive statistics of Msinga and other local 
municipalities within Umzinyathi District Municipality, 2008
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metres (Mkhabela, 2005), with plot sizes ranging 
from 800 m² to 0.2 hectares. Some farmers have 
access to more than one plot while many have 
four plots. This study identified one farmer who 
had access to 12 plots through a combination of 
inheritance, informal leasing and share-cropping 
arrangements. Farmers can lose their access to 
plots of land if they do not use these for a few 
consecutive years. 
Msinga smallholders have had a fairly long his-
tory of involvement with formal institutional 
structures. Involvement with the Ingonyama 
Trust, through traditional leadership, has been 
and remains consistent. Smallholders have also 
interacted with the Zulu homeland government 
Department of Agriculture, which in the 1980s 
implemented irrigation scheme reorganisation, 
infrastructure development and the introduc-
tion of furrow irrigation. After 1994, irrigation 
scheme management passed on to the KwaZulu-
Natal (KZN) provincial Department of Agriculture 
and Environmental Affairs. Msinga smallholders 
began intersecting with this structure at a time 
when government subsidies were abruptly cur-
tailed, partly to dismantle apartheid systems and 
partly in line with international developments in 
Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT). While 
smallholders perceived support by government 
at that time as lacking, the department appears 
to have redeemed itself through its mandate to 
develop small-scale farmers and the launch of 
several farmer assistance programmes, including 
subsidy schemes for seed, seedlings, fertiliser and 
extension services. More recently, through IMT, 
Msinga smallholders have assumed responsibil-
ity for operational and maintenance functions. It 
is within the IMT framework that block commit-
tees and the umbrella committee for smallhold-
ers have been formed. 
Production system 
Msinga smallholders practise furrow irrigation. 
Farmers dig furrows from canals to their plots 
and flood channels in the cropped area. All 
farmers interviewed expressed a concern over 
water losses from leaking canals. A few farm-
ers have connected pipes to the canals in order 
to increase efficiency of water supply to their 
fields. Concerns were also voiced about wa-
ter shortages, which resulted in farmers often 
spending days and nights tending the flow of 
water to guard against crop water stress. Apart 
from the problem of water shortage, farmers 
were concerned about crop losses from livestock 
breaking through the old, dilapidated fence. Al-
though farmers had attempted self-reliance by 
contributing R50 each for fence repairs, the total 
amount of money raised was not sufficient. Con-
sequently, farmers spend additional time in their 
plots guarding against entry by stray livestock. 
Msinga smallholder farmers grow green mealies 
and vegetables, such as tomato, butternut, 
green peppers, sweet potatoes, spinach, mus-
tard greens, beetroot, peas and beans. Farmers 
grow these crops primarily for the market and 
surplus is consumed by households. Each farmer 
works individually in the production process, of-
ten with the assistance of household members or 
hired labour. Increasingly, household members 
are demanding to be paid for their labour. Re-
muneration for hired labour varies, with work-
ers paid R30 per day (the work generally being 
to prepare or weed a plot), a share of the crop 
produced, or a larger amount of money after the 
crop is harvested and sold, where the work has 
involved preparing or weeding multiple plots.16 
In some circumstances, farmers voluntarily pool 
their labour to work on each others’ plots (i.e. 
‘labour exchange’) using hoes, shovels, picks and 
rakes. Ploughing is done mostly using donkey-
drawn ploughs and sometimes by tractor. It 
costs R110 to hire a tractor from the municipality 
and R120 - R190 to hire a donkey-drawn plough 
from local community members. Most farmers, 
however, use the more expensive donkey-drawn 
ploughs because there are too few municipal 
tractors.   
Inputs, such as fertiliser, seeds and seedlings, 
are sourced either from the small local town of 
Tugela Ferry or from the more distant urban cen-
tres, such as Greytown and Pietemaritzburg. The 
provincial Department of Agriculture and Envi-
ronmental Affairs assists farmers with extension 
services and subsidy schemes for seeds, seedlings 
and fertilisers. The Department also provides 
farmers with transport for inputs sourced from 
more distant suppliers. This is part of the De-
partment’s mandate to develop the smallholder 
farming sector in the province. Msinga small-
holder irrigators have also received support in 
the form of technical advice and extension ser-
vices from non-governmental organisations and 
tertiary institutions, such as Church Agricultural 
Projects, the University of KwaZulu-Natal, and 
Zakhele Agricultural College. Such support, how-
ever, is far below that received by smallholders 
in Limpopo and Eastern Cape provinces under 
the RESIS and RESIS-Recharge Programmes. The 
16 Many farmers have four 
plots and when they hire work-
ers will hire them to work all 
four, which is why many farm-
ers report total labour costs 
per season of R120 (i.e. four x 
R30). The payment is typically 
made after selling the produce 
because many farmers are too 
cash constrained to pay at the 
time the work is done. 
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performance of Msinga smallholders following 
the support given has been varied, with some 
farmers achieving impressively high levels of 
productive efficiency while others not improv-
ing their productivity significantly (Mkhabela, 
2005). The present case study was interested in 
gaining insights from the more successful farm-
ers among the smallholders. 
Marketing strategies vary depending on the 
type of crop. For green mealies, buyers travel 
to Msinga from places as far afield as Durban, 
Ladysmith, Dundee, Mooi River, Pietemaritzburg 
and Weenen. In the 2007 season, the more suc-
cessful smallholders earned net profits ranging 
from R2000 to R2500 per bed from selling green 
mealies (Table 10.2). With most farmers culti-
vating two beds of green mealies per season, 
farmers typically earned net profits of R4000 to 
R5000. By contrast, the marketing of vegetables 
requires farmers to go out in search of buyers. 
Crops such as tomato and green peppers are 
packed in crates and transported either by pri-
vate or public means. It costs farmers R7.00 per 
crate and R16 per person to transport farm prod-
ucts from Msinga to markets in Greytown and 
Pietemaritzburg, for example. Since these crops 
are highly perishable and markets not assured, 
farmers invariably express concerns about the 
high levels of risk associated with these crops de-
spite their high value (Table 10.2). A few farmers 
deliberately refrain from producing these crops 
as a measure of risk-avoidance. For other crops, 
such as sweet potatoes and butternut, there is a 
relatively low risk of spoilage. The bulkiness of 
these crops, however, entails high public trans-
port costs, which restricts the range of produce 
since many farmers are compelled to market 
these crops mostly within local markets in and 
around Tugela Ferry. Although market prices for 
sweet potato are relatively low (Table 10.2), the 
low input costs for producing the crop have re-
sulted in most farmers growing sweet potatoes. 
Over-supply of the crop reinforces the low mar-
ket prices.  
Success criteria 
Although the study took cognisance of observa-
tions by Mkhabela (2005) of the relatively high 
levels of mean technical efficiency (84.3%) in 
the Msinga Irrigation Scheme, this study delib-
erately refrained from relying solely on conven-
tional criteria for gauging smallholder farmers’ 
success, namely ‘economic viability’ and ‘techni-
cal efficiency’. An attempt was made to broaden 
criteria for assessing success, both from the point 
of view of farmers and their communities and 
from perspectives of outsiders, such as agricul-
tural extension officers, social researchers and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The 
following criteria were therefore used:
• Income from crop production 
• Technology
• Labour
• Ownership of the production system 
• Individual versus collective action
• Number of plots used in crop production;
• Productive versus non-productive use of 
plots
• Number of crops planted per year
• Nature of involvement in contract farming
• Land ownership versus leasing
• Achievement of specific livelihood objec-
tives
• Attainment of social well-being.
Factors contributing to 
the success of the Msinga 
smallholders
In many ways, factors contributing to the ‘suc-
cess’ of the Msinga smallholders go against con-
Crop Profit (Rands)
Green maize 2000 – 2500 per bed
Tomatoes 5000 – 8000 per bed
Green peppers 6000 – 9000 per bed
Sweet potatoes 1290 per bed
Source: fieldwork, 2008
Table 10.2: Illustrative net income from selected crops 
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ventional thinking in South African government 
and other circles on requisite interventions to 
assist smallholder farmers. The Strategic Plan 
for South African Agriculture (DoA, 2001)  and 
Water Allocation Reform (WAR) Programme res-
onate with NEPAD’s Comprehensive Africa Ag-
ricultural Development Programme (CAADP) in 
their inclusion of the objective to enable small-
holders to become integrated into the main-
stream, globalised and highly competitive com-
modity sectors within agricultural value chains. 
At the launch of the Water Allocation Reform 
(WAR) Strategy on 12 April 2005, the Minister of 
Water Affairs and Forestry stated:
“We will continue to strive to help our 
people along the journey from being 
small subsistence water users to, if they 
so wish, large commercial, productive and 
competitive water users not just in South 
Africa but internationally.” 
Prescriptions for achieving smallholder integra-
tion and commercialisation include rehabilita-
tion and upgrading hydraulic infrastructure and 
shifts from subsistence to commercially-oriented 
farming. The support to smallholders is often ar-
ticulated through government-facilitated joint 
ventures or strategic partnerships between re-
source-poor farmers and private investors, and 
the promotion of capital-intensive production 
of high value crops. Evidence from post-1994 
smallholder farmer assistance programmes such 
as RESIS in Limpopo Province (Tapela 2009; Den-
nison and Manona, 2006; Veldwisch, 2004) and 
RESIS-Recharge in the Eastern Cape (Dennison 
and Manona, 2006) shows that the “revitalisa-
tion” of smallholder irrigated agriculture has 
often compelled smallholders to shift away from 
low-cost production methods, such as furrow 
irrigation and small implements like hoes and 
spades, towards the use of sophisticated irriga-
tion technology, such as micro-filter sprays and 
‘floppy’ systems. By contrast, Msinga smallhold-
ers have not received such assistance, apart from 
a donor-funded vegetable pack house that was 
constructed in 2001 and remains unused. While 
the non-use of the pack house resonates with 
post-1994 smallholder assistance cases such as 
Hereford (Tapela 2005), in many ways the case 
of Msinga smallholders runs contrary to prevail-
ing prescriptions and interventions. 
Low-cost technology
Msinga smallholders have retained the use of 
low-cost farming technology, such as furrow irri-
gation, donkey-drawn ploughs and small imple-
ments like rakes, hoes, spades, picks and shovels. 
As already mentioned, Msinga farmers hire mu-
nicipal tractors at a cost of R110 for ploughing a 
‘bed’, but rely mainly on donkey-drawn ploughs, 
(R120 - R190 per bed) because of the unavailabil-
ity of enough tractors. In the context of rising 
input costs and an absence of massive subsidies, 
reliance on low-cost technology has ensured 
that Msinga smallholders obtain relatively high-
er profit margins than many similar smallholders 
elsewhere. 
Labour intensity
Msinga smallholders use labour-intensive meth-
ods of crop production. This is linked to their 
widespread use of small implements as well 
as the continuing traditional practice by some 
farmers of pooling labour resources to help each 
other with specific tasks. Other farmers have 
moved away from this practice and prefer to hire 
neighbours and household members to work on 
tasks such as planting, cultivation and harvest-
ing. Problems of water shortage and the risk of 
crop losses due to stray livestock, which are cited 
by all respondents, also compel farmers to tend 
irrigation furrows throughout much of the day 
and overnight to ensure that their crops get ade-
quate water and are not eaten by stray animals. 
Despite the disadvantages of long hours spent 
guarding against crop losses, labour intensive 
farming seems to contribute to higher yields and 
quality produce, while providing employment to 
a larger number of local people. This is not to 
argue, however, for the preservation of a status 
quo that obviously disadvantages smallholders. 
Ultimately, there is a need to repair infrastruc-
ture and secure access by smallholders to suffi-
cient water.   
Individual ownership of the 
production system
Individual ownership provides an incentive for 
full-time commitment to farming by Msinga 
smallholders. The farmer is in control of most of 
the decisions and actions relating to crop pro-
duction. Individual ownership of the production 
system also removes problems of free-riding and 
power dynamics that are often observed when 
farmers work in groups.
Shared procurement of inputs
Although crop production is on an individual 
basis, farmers voluntarily cooperate in specific 
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activities. Apart from the pooling of labour re-
sources by some of the farmers, most farmers 
also cooperate in the procurement of inputs, 
thus taking advantage of economies of scale as-
sociated with bulk purchasing. For example, a 
25 kilogram bag of maize seed is shared among 
two to ten smallholders, such that each small-
holder ultimately pays a lower price per unit of 
seed than what they would otherwise pay when 
individually purchasing the same amount in 
smaller quantities.
Cooperation in determination of 
producer prices
The Msinga smallholders also cooperate in de-
termining a common price for green mealies. 
Such cooperation seems borne out of a realisa-
tion that when farmers rather than buyers de-
termine crop prices, there is a greater possibility 
that producer prices will be fair. The strategy (or 
‘closing of ranks’) by Msinga smallholders, how-
ever, only works for prices of green mealies and 
not for vegetables. The reason is that the strat-
egy works because it is employed in conjunction 
with related adaptation and innovation strate-
gies for ensuring that Msinga smallholders suc-
ceed in establishing and maintaining a niche in 
markets for green mealies.  
Adaptation and innovation strategies have in-
cluded a re-orientation from ‘subsistence’ to 
‘commercial’ production. This change seems 
to have emerged voluntarily and organically 
following the reorganisation of the irrigation 
scheme, construction of gravity-fed irrigation ca-
nals and promotion of furrow irrigation by the 
Zulu homeland government in the 1980s. A few 
farmers led the adoption of commercially-orien-
tated farming and awareness of the advantages 
of this type of farming spread to the rest of the 
smallholders through diffusion. Many Msinga 
smallholders made the shift from subsistence to 
commercially-oriented production between the 
mid-1980s and the early 1990s. It is worth noting 
that this shift also coincided with the return of 
many Msinga men from the mines in Kimberley 
and Gauteng during the hostel-based violence 
of the 1980s. These men needed to continue 
earning incomes. Their return to Msinga appears 
to have exerted a strong influence on decisions 
to adopt commercially-orientated farming.
Innovation and adaptation strategies have also 
included a shift by smallholders from producing 
the more common 4.1.4.1 strain of maize seed to 
the Zimbabwean developed SC-701 strain, which 
is in greater demand in green maize markets. A 
cob of the latter strain retails a higher price than 
the more common varieties like 4.1.4.1. While the 
high demand for the crop variety and relatively 
high retail price for SC-701 has allowed Msinga 
farmers to raise producer prices for the crop, this 
strategy has been complemented by the practice 
of early planting to ensure that Msinga farmers’ 
produce gets to the markets long before that 
of other farmers, particularly established large-
scale commercial farmers.
The production and marketing of green mealies 
reflects the capacity of Msinga smallholders to 
adapt and innovate. While the high demand 
for early green mealies has been a strong pull 
factor drawing buyers to the irrigation scheme 
to purchase the produce in situ, a critical factor 
has also been the farmers’ use of cell phones to 
link up with prospective buyers. Those investing 
in and making effective use of cell phones were 
the leading farmers, who recognised the critical 
importance of communication in the setting of 
market prices and in securing buyers for a highly 
perishable crop such as green mealies. The strat-
egy of using cellular networks is particularly 
effective in light of the fact that most Msinga 
smallholders do not farm under formal contracts 
and therefore have no assurance that the crop 
will be bought other than the certainty that the 
produce is in high demand when it enters the 
markets.  
The use and non-use of market 
contracts
Although conventional wisdom is that contracts 
provide the required regulation and coordina-
tion mechanism for transactions between pro-
ducers and buyers, many Msinga farmers view 
formal contracts for green mealies as a source 
of risk in that they restrict farmers’ freedom to 
determine prices or decide to whom to sell their 
produce. Smallholders have therefore tended to 
avoid market contracts, preferring to enter into 
loose arrangements with buyers. Such arrange-
ments are not strictly binding, and if a buyer 
does not turn up at an agreed date, the farmer 
has the freedom to sell his green mealies to an 
alternative buyer. The logic behind the success 
of this strategy seems to hinge precisely on the 
timing of sales of green mealies at peak demand 
in November. Despite the absence of formal 
contracts, which embody the conventional insti-
tutional economics notions of coordination and 
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security, Msinga farmers’ niche and competitive-
ness in markets for green mealies seem resilient 
so far. This is evidenced by the fact that in spite 
of a number of incidents of violent attacks on 
and armed robbery of buyers by local criminals, 
buyers continue to ‘run the gauntlet’ in order 
to gain access to the produce. It is not certain, 
however, whether the smallholders’ success with 
green mealies would be able to withstand un-
expected factors, such as competition by other 
farmers for the same niche market. 
By contrast, contracts for vegetables, such as 
green peppers and tomatoes, are seen as desir-
able. Farmers with contracts to produce these 
vegetables are among the more successful farm-
ers. Presently, however, most vegetable produc-
ers farm without entering into contracts with 
buyers. They frequently experience losses due 
to the uncertainty of markets. Despite these 
losses, many Msinga farmers continue to grow 
tomatoes and green peppers because of envis-
aged profits from these high value crops. Conse-
quently, there is often an over-supply of toma-
toes, resulting in the spoilage of surplus produce 
and lowering of producer prices. In a context 
where most tomato producers use the more ex-
pensive public transport to take their produce to 
markets, the lowering of prices narrows profit 
margins and increases the risk of smallholders’ 
financial losses. A number of smallholders de-
liberately refrain from producing tomatoes in 
particular, in order to avoid risk. For crops such 
as sweet potatoes, with low input costs and low 
perishability, the level of risk is relatively low. Al-
most all farmers therefore grow sweet potatoes 
as some form of security to hedge against pos-
sible losses from the more perishable, more in-
put-intensive and higher value vegetable crops. 
Income from sweet potato, however, is relatively 
low (Table 10.2).
Income from farming
The amount of income earned from farming is 
viewed as an important success factor by small-
holders. Farmers, however, do not compute this 
income using conventional agricultural econom-
ics approaches. For example, they do not calcu-
late the opportunity costs associated with the 
time they spend farming, which is not to say 
they do not recognise the value of their time. 
Their work on the plots, which at times involves 
labouring days and nights, is taken as a neces-
sary component of a successful production sys-
tem. This might be construed by economists as 
an uneconomic practice by smallholders to sub-
sidise their own production system, to the point 
where taking the value of farmers’ time into ac-
count through proxies could be used to demon-
strate that farmers are actually incurring ‘losses’. 
However, since Msinga farmers compute the 
economic performance of their enterprises dif-
ferently, the result is one of profitable incomes. 
What this perhaps indicates is that smallholder 
farmers’ conception ‘economic viability’ does 
not squarely match that of project planners and 
economists. 
Achievement of specific livelihood 
objectives
Success among the Msinga smallholders is also 
measured in terms of achievement of specific 
livelihood objectives. Respondents consistently 
allude to farming having enabled them to build 
houses for their families, buy vehicles, educate 
their children and ensure food security for their 
households. In a context where Msinga Local 
Municipality, which is an ISRDP poverty node, 
has a very high rate of unemployment, low in-
comes and low levels of infrastructure and so-
cial services (Table 10.1), such achievements are 
significant. A number of smallholders who have 
been able to achieve livelihood objectives us-
ing income from farming are elderly, widowed 
women, who have single-handedly provided 
comfortable homes, food security and educa-
tion for their children and grandchildren. With-
out access to productive land in the irrigation 
scheme, these women farmers may have been 
confined to a life of abject poverty. For that rea-
son, contributions of smallholder agriculture to 
the livelihoods of these farmers and their prog-
eny should not be under-estimated. 
Attainment of social well-being
The attainment of a sense of social well-being 
within the community is considered by all re-
spondents to be important. Social well-being in 
this instance is indicated by a sense of self-es-
teem emanating from being gainfully employed 
and from contributing to the livelihoods of oth-
ers in the community. Such esteem enables farm-
ers to command a degree of respect from their 
fellow community members. Social well-being 
derived from farming, however, is not attained 
in isolation, but is strongly linked to farmers’ 
contributions to the maintenance of healthy so-
cial relationships within the community. This is 
often at the smallholders’ own expense. 
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For example, smallholders consciously make ef-
forts to adopt peaceful means of resolving prob-
lems of crop losses due to stray livestock rather 
than engage in conflicts with owners of such 
livestock, who may or may not be fellow irriga-
tors. Smallholders have in the past unanimously 
cooperated in contributing R50 each towards 
mending old fences, although the total amount 
raised was insufficient to resolve the problem. 
As a result smallholders are compelled to spend 
longer hours in the plots guarding against entry 
by stray livestock. 
Another example is that of smallholders adher-
ing to the customary practice of ukuzila, which 
is abstinence from farming for a few days before 
and after the death and burial of a fellow com-
munity member. Contravention of this practice 
entails a high cost in terms of social relationships 
and farmers’ well-being within the community. 
Seen from an outsider’s narrow economic viabil-
ity lens, these two examples might be construed 
as wasteful and inefficient aspects of the Msinga 
smallholder production system. What the outsid-
ers’ lens would fail to account for, however, are 
the less tangible social losses that might result 
from conflicts between livestock and crop farm-
ers or between aggrieved and bereaved mem-
bers of the community and ‘errant’ smallholders 
who break the ukuzila custom. Where there is 
a recognised need to reduce the time spent on 
ukuzila, for example, negotiation might be a 
useful approach to ensuring that the interests of 
both smallholders and the community are rec-
onciled.  
Number of plots used in crop 
production
Among smallholders, an important measure 
of success is the number of plots used in crop 
production. The more ‘successful’ farmers use 
at least four plots. This study identified a small-
holder who produced crops on 12 plots. There 
seems to be a need, however, to guard against 
capture of plots belonging to indigent small-
holders by the more affluent farmers. 
Productive versus non-productive use 
of plots
Closely linked to the number of plots used is the 
productivity of farmers using plots. While many 
of the more successful farmers used several 
plots, those perceived to be the most successful 
are often smallholders who made productive use 
of all the plots. 
Number of crops planted per year
Productive use of plots is related to the number 
of crops planted per year. Farmers who produce 
three to four crops per plot per year are per-
ceived by their peers and external agencies, such 
as extension officers and NGOs, to be among the 
more successful. An example is Mrs MM17, a wid-
owed pensioner, who produces four crops per 
plot per year in each of her four plots (Figure 
10.1).
Land ownership versus leasing
A critical factor with respect to land is security of 
tenure. Those with secure tenure tend to make 
more investments in developing their plots. This 
is regarded as generally true among smallholders 
worldwide, but was also vividly demonstrated in 
the course of our fieldwork with smallholders at 
Msinga. For example, Msinga smallholders are 
able to invest in hydraulic  infrastructure such as 
irrigation pipes and water pumps. Smallholders 
whose tenure is most secure are those who have 
inherited the land through kinship ties. Other 
tenure arrangements, such as informal leas-
ing and sharecropping, do not seem to provide 
smallholders with sufficient levels of security to 
enable long-term investments. All respondents 
allude to constraints due to insecure tenure. 
While smallholders have no problems with re-
quirements by lessors for lessees to either plough 
lessors’ plots or to give them a share of their pro-
duce in lieu of cash rentals for use of land, there 
is a strong sentiment that the short-term of use 
of leased land severely disrupts production and 
perpetuates insecurity among smallholders.
Short-term leasing needs to be understood in 
the context of the need to retain rights to the 
land by those whose extended families hold per-
mission to use it. Such land rights extend several 
generations into history and provide an impor-
tant safety net for members of that family group. 
Such land rights, however, can be lost if the land 
remains unused for an extended time (Cousins 
and Mwheli, 2007). There are deep-seated fears, 
though, about such land being lost if it remains 
for too long in the hands of people outside the 
particular extended family holding rights, hence 
the short duration of informal lease arrange-
ments. Although the short duration of informal 
leasing is a constraint to production, the fact that 
17  Real name withheld to 
protect the privacy of the 
respondent.
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Figure 10.1: Mrs MM’s annual cropping pattern
it allows for unused land to circulate and hence 
become productive is a positive factor. What is 
perhaps required are mechanisms to ensure that 
leasing affords both the land rights holders and 
lessees security of tenure.  
Challenges
Many of the voiced challenges experienced by 
the Msinga smallholders revolve around institu-
tional issues. The less known challenges pertain 
to implications of narrow definitions of commer-
cial and subsistence farming against the back-
drop of water sector reforms.
Institutional organisation, capacity 
and coordination
The role of the block committees is to maintain 
canals and fences, manage the sharing of water 
and collect administration fees from farmers. 
The role of the umbrella committee is primarily 
to coordinate all management functions. The 
transfer of management functions to smallhold-
er institutional structures has not been matched 
with resources to enable these institutions to 
perform their responsibilities. 
Farmers’ committees lack the capacity to resolve 
challenges, such as leaking canals and aged and 
broken fences, which require funding and tech-
nical know-how. Although farmers’ committees 
are tasked with the management of water use, 
they lack the technical capacity to determine 
the percentages of water lost through leakages. 
While committees have made attempts to raise 
funding for repairing fences, such funding has 
fallen short of required amounts. 
A second institutional problem is the poor coor-
dination between farmers and relevant govern-
ment departments. For example, water shortage 
is cited by all respondents as a major constraint 
to crop production. Apart from a lack of infor-
mation on water losses due to canal leakages, 
none of the respondent smallholders, commit-
tee representatives or agricultural extension 
officers knows how much water is allocated to 
Msinga smallholders from the Tugela River. Such 
information should be available from the De-
partment of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). 
The problem of poor coordination is also evident 
in the lack of awareness by respondents of the 
availability of subsidies to repair dilapidated in-
frastructure, such as canals and fences. An exam-
ple of such subsidies is that availed through the 
DWAF 2005 Policy on the Financial Assistance to 
Resource Poor Irrigation Farmers. Another ex-
ample relates to subsidies provided through the 
MAY
Cabbage
JULY – AUGUST
Maize
(green mealies)
DECEMBER
Butternut
Green Pepper
FEBRUARY
Beans
Potoatoes
Sweet Potatoes
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LandCare and WaterCare Programmes of the 
Department of Agriculture under the Conserva-
tion of Agricultural Resources Act (CARA). Im-
proved coordination and communication would 
contribute to a reduction in the amount of time 
spent by farmers guarding against crop losses 
due to water deficit or stray livestock.
Narrow conceptual definitions 
of ‘commercial’ and ‘subsistence’ 
farming
A major challenge for Msinga farmers is the pre-
vailing narrow definitions of ‘commercial’ and 
‘subsistence’ farming in various South African 
circles. Such definitions view these types of farm-
ing as discrete and mutually exclusive. The nar-
row definitions consider commercial farming as 
simply involving market-orientated production 
and subsistence as entailing production strictly 
for own consumption. In practice, however, 
there is an overlap between the two concepts 
and definitions are therefore broader than of-
ten realised. The distinction is that commercial 
farming, on the one hand, is primarily geared 
towards the markets, with the surplus often 
consumed by producer households. Subsistence 
farming, on the other hand, is mainly aimed at 
own consumption, with surplus produce often 
sold in order to generate extra income. In light of 
ongoing reforms in South Africa’s water sector, 
the narrow definitions of subsistence and com-
mercial farming pose significant implications for 
the sustainability of livelihoods of smallholders, 
such as Msinga irrigators. 
In terms of the National Water Act (Act 36) of 
1998, Msinga farmers are currently using Tugela 
River water lawfully, since such use predates 
the promulgation of the National Water Act by 
more than two years. The same Act requires all 
commercial water users to register their use and 
obtain licenses for such use. In the interests of 
administrative efficiency, licensed users are re-
quired to pay the full economic cost of water 
resource management services. Exemptions to 
the licensing requirement apply to water ‘rights’ 
namely, water for basic human needs and the 
ecological reserve. Human rights to water are 
administered under the Water Services Act (Act 
108) of 1997, and refer principally to domestic 
uses for food preparation, hygiene and sanita-
tion purposes. Under the National Water Act, 
exemptions to licensing relate to Schedule One 
water use, which refers to limited abstractions 
for narrowly ‘subsistence’ crop production on 
plots of less than 0.1 hectare, provided such plots 
do not collectively constitute significant levels of 
water use. Schedule One use also refers to stock 
watering and ad hoc uses of water, such as in 
cases of emergency. 
While a concerted effort has been made to 
broaden access to water for basic needs, a large 
number of the poor, particularly the rural poor, 
still do not have adequate access to water. Ac-
cess problems are compounded by the narrow 
focus of water policies on allocations of water 
for basic needs and narrowly-defined commer-
cial and subsistence uses. Provisions of the water 
policy for direct abstractions of water without 
the requirements for registration and licensing 
of use, limit such abstractions to non-commercial 
uses. Effectively, therefore, resource-poor farm-
ers such as the Msinga smallholders, who eke 
out livelihoods in informal economies, are often 
left without means of access to water for liveli-
hood strategies that are neither basic nor nar-
rowly ‘commercial’ or ‘subsistence’, but contrib-
ute nonetheless to local economic well-being. 
It is also inappropriate that the articulation of 
South Africa’s National Water Act should view 
the market orientation of crop production by 
resource-poor black smallholders as not much 
different from the highly industrialised and es-
tablished large-scale white commercial farmers. 
It is essential therefore that measures to support 
smallholders should start by correctly defining, in 
broader terms, the different categories of com-
mercial and subsistence producers, and make ap-
propriate legal provisions to ensure that the live-
lihoods of these farmers are not compromised in 
the interest of neo-liberal notions of economic 
efficiency in water resources management. 
Conclusion
The Msinga case demonstrates a need for great-
er flexibility in the definition of ‘viability’ of 
farming. Any programme of interventions to 
support resource-poor smallholders should be-
gin by shifting away from:
• Narrowly-conceived notions of viability in 
terms of conventional economic approaches 
and agricultural technical efficiency to, for 
example, a suite of measures that includes 
livelihoods;
• Narrow definitions of commercial and sub-
sistence farming to a recognition of the 
existence of a middle ground where both 
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forms of production orientation overlap, 
and in which many smallholders eke out a 
living for themselves, their households and 
their communities. Such recognition should 
be accompanied by relevant practical mech-
anisms that address the interests of small-
holders such as those of Msinga; 
• The commonly practiced one-size-fits-all ap-
proach, which ignores the social differen-
tiation of smallholders and therefore their 
different interests, to an approach that ac-
commodates the variety of socio-economic 
needs and objectives;
• The equally common group approach used 
in projects to support black smallholders, 
which has been dogged by problems of 
free-riding and group power dynamics, to 
an approach that recognises and accommo-
dates the value of individual enterprise in 
black farmers; 
• The prevailing poor institutional coordina-
tion, communication and capacity to a more 
effective governance framework that draws 
on synergies between various sectors to en-
sure meaningful support to smallholders.
What is perhaps most important is that interven-
tions to support smallholders should build upon 
what is already in place, rather than radically in-
troduce completely new farming practices. While 
the intention to enable smallholders to success-
fully compete in national and international com-
modity sectors is perhaps a worthy goal, such an 
ambition needs to be tempered by the sober re-
ality that attaining the goal will necessarily be 
a process that requires interventionists to work 
hand-in-hand with smallholders rather than hur-
riedly push them ‘into the deep end’. This view 
is based on observations that smallholders face 
significant constraints to establishing niches 
within the highly competitive and globalised 
commodity sectors. While contract farming has 
the potential to launch enterprising smallhold-
ers into mainstream commercial production and 
markets, due care should be taken to ensure 
that smallholders are not exposed to inordinate-
ly high levels of risk.   
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Introduction
Smallholder irrigation schemes in 
South Africa
South Africa is a dry country and the productiv-
ity of much of its arable land can be substantial-
ly enhanced when irrigation water is available. 
South Africa has about 1.3 million hectares un-
der irrigation but only about 0.1 million hectares 
(7.7%) is held by smallholders (Backeberg, 2006). 
Du Plessis et al. (2002) categorised smallholder 
irrigators into four groups, namely, 
• farmers on irrigation schemes; 
• independent irrigation farmers; 
• community gardeners; and 
• home-gardeners. 
Backeberg (2006) estimated that there were 
between 200 000 and 250 000 smallholder irri-
gators in South Africa but among them at least 
four out of five were community gardeners or 
home-gardeners, who farmed very small plots of 
the order of 0.1 hectares or smaller, primarily to 
provide food for home consumption. Less than 
one out of five smallholders were operating as 
independent irrigation farmers or as plot hold-
ers on irrigation schemes, cultivating somewhat 
larger plots, of the order of one or more hec-
tares, for subsistence or commercial purposes. 
Not much is known about the population of 
independent irrigation farmers but a consider-
able body of knowledge has been compiled on 
smallholder irrigation schemes. 
Denison and Manona (2007a) define South Af-
rican smallholder irrigation schemes as multi-
farmer irrigation projects larger than 5 hectares 
in size that were either established in the for-
mer homelands or in resource-poor areas by 
black people or agencies assisting their devel-
opment. Using this definition, they counted 317 
smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa in 
2003. Different estimates of the combined com-
mand area covered by these irrigation schemes 
range between 46 000 hectares and 49 500 
hectares (Bembridge, 2000; Backeberg, 2003; 
Denison and Manona, 2007a). On average these 
schemes cover about half (47%) of the total 
smallholder irrigation area in South Africa and 
3.6% of the 1.3 million hectares under irrigation 
(Backeberg, 2006). Denison and Manona (2007a) 
estimate that the land on smallholder irrigation 
schemes was held by about 31 000 plot holders. 
Dividing the total smallholder irrigation scheme 
area by the number of plot holders, the average 
size of irrigated plots on these schemes is about 
1.5 hectare. By comparison, the average size of 
irrigated holdings in the large-scale commercial 
irrigation sector is about 42 hectares. 
Most smallholder irrigation schemes are found 
in the economically under-developed former 
homelands of South Africa, where the incidence 
of poverty is high. In these areas, smallholder ir-
rigation schemes present an opportunity for lo-
cal economic development. For homesteads that 
hold land on these schemes, the irrigation plot 
is an asset that can be used to augment or di-
versify their livelihood (Mohamed, 2006). Small-
holder irrigation schemes can also have positive 
11 Smallholder irrigation schemes in 
South Africa with a focus on Dzindi 
Canal Irrigation Scheme in Limpopo: 
dynamic smallholders amidst 
contested policy priorities
Wim van Averbeke and T. B. Khosa, Department of Crop 
Sciences, Tshwane University of Technology
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economic impacts on people other than plot 
holders. On the plots there may be employment 
opportunities for farm workers, whilst addition-
al livelihood opportunities may arise from back-
ward and forward linkages, such as the provision 
of land preparation services, the trade in fresh 
produce, and processing of farm produce. 
Historical development 
of smallholder irrigation 
schemes
The history of smallholder irrigation scheme 
development in South Africa was influenced by 
policy perspectives and the technology that was 
available at the time. Accordingly, Van Averbeke 
(2008) identified three important smallholder ir-
rigation scheme development eras, namely,
• The smallholder canal scheme era (from 
about 1930 until about 1969)
• The homeland era (from about 1970 until 
1994); and 
• The irrigation management transfer (IMT) 
and revitalisation era (1995 to present).
Table 11.1 provides an indication of the origin of 
existing smallholder irrigation schemes in South 
Africa in relation to these three developmental 
eras. 
Smallholder canal schemes
Most of the schemes that were established dur-
ing the smallholder canal scheme era were con-
structed between 1946 and about 1960. Their 
establishment was aimed at providing African 
families residing in what were then called the 
‘Native or Bantu Areas’ with livelihoods that 
were entirely based on farming. During the 
1950s they were considered to be highly success-
ful development projects. A country-wide survey 
conducted during 1952-53 found that the mean 
farm income derived from plots of 1.5 morgen 
(1.28 ha) and a livestock holding of 5.2 animal 
units was £110 on these types of schemes. On 
average, 55% of farm income was obtained 
in the form of food for own consumption and 
45% from the sale of produce. By contrast, the 
nationwide mean annual income among rural 
families with livelihoods that were completely 
land-based was only £57 (Commission for the So-
cio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas 
within the Union of South Africa, 1955). 
Socially and institutionally, tenure and farming 
on canal schemes differed from traditional ar-
rangements. When the state identified land for 
scheme development it first sought to transfer 
ownership of the land from the tribe to the state 
and then imposed Trust tenure and Betterment 
planning. Farmers held their plots by means of 
Permission to Occupy (PTO). Trust tenure provid-
ed the state with the necessary powers to pre-
scribe land use and to expel and replace farmers 
whose practices did not comply with its prescrip-
tions. In selected cases, the state effectively used 
these powers to enforce the production objec-
tives of the scheme by evicting poorly perform-
ing farming families. A similar authoritarian and 
paternalistic approach by the state prevailed on 
white settler schemes established during the 
great depression and WWII period (Backeberg 
and Groenewald, 1995).
From a design perspective, many smallholder 
canal schemes relied on a concrete weir to di-
Era No of schemes Area (ha) Mean area per 
scheme (ha)
Main irrigation 
technology used
Smallholder canal 
scheme (1930-1969)
74 18 226 246 Gravity-fed surface 
irrigation
Independent 
homeland (1970-1996)
62 12 994 210 Different forms of 
overhead irrigation
IMT and revitalisation 
(1997-present)
64 2 383 37 Pump and sprinklers or 
micro-irrigation
Year of establishment 
uncertain
117 15 897 136 Mostly overhead 
irrigation
Total 317 49 505 156
Source: Van Averbeke, 2008.
Table 11.1: Categorisation of existing smallholder irrigation 
scheme development in South Africa
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vert water from a river, from which a system of 
concrete canals and furrows conveyed it to field 
edge. Plot size typically ranged between 1.5 and 
2 morgen (1.28 to 1.71 ha) (Bembridge, 1997). 
Independent homeland schemes
Smallholder irrigation development during the 
independent homeland era was characterised 
by modernisation, functional diversification and 
centralisation of scheme management. Examples 
of large projects (>500 ha) in the Eastern Cape 
that were characteristic of irrigation develop-
ment during this era were the Keiskammahoek, 
Tyefu and Ncora irrigation schemes (Van Aver-
beke et al., 1998) (see Table 11.1).
On large schemes, economic viability was pur-
sued by means of a strategy of functional diver-
sification. Typically included were a commercial 
function in the form of a central unit which was 
farmed as an estate, a commercial smallholder 
function in the form of medium sized plots (also 
called ‘mini farms’), which were 5 to 12 hectares 
in size, and a subsistence function in the form 
of food plots, ranging from 0.1 to 0.25 hectares 
in size (Van Averbeke et al., 1998). It can be ar-
gued that functional diversification was a way of 
catering for rural livelihood diversity, although 
this concern was not necessarily stated explicitly 
in the plans. In practice, however, functional di-
versity provided rural homesteads with different 
options to benefit from irrigated agriculture, de-
pending on the structure of their existing liveli-
hood. For example, the mini farms were meant 
to cater for homesteads that sought full land-
based livelihoods, whilst the food plots provided 
homesteads that derived their livelihood from 
external sources – such as male-migration or old-
age pensions – with an opportunity to enhance 
these livelihoods by producing food for home 
consumption. The estate component offered 
opportunities to members of rural homesteads 
who were searching for employment and mon-
etary income close to home. Management of 
these large schemes was centralised in the hands 
of specialised parastatals, such as Ulimocor in 
Ciskei, Tracor in Transkei and Agriven in Venda.
Socially and institutionally, the large schemes 
were very complex. Arrangements to use the 
land for irrigation development often involved 
the provision of services to historical land hold-
ers (Van Averbeke et al., 1998). Social unrest and 
conflict during the late nineteen-eighties fur-
ther reduced the sustainability of these schemes. 
When the post-1994 provincial governments de-
cided to dismantle the agricultural parastatals 
in the former homelands, these large schemes 
were particularly affected, because they were 
the most complex and had been centrally man-
aged from inception, resulting in exceptionally 
high levels of dependency among farmers (Van 
Averbeke et al., 1998). Partial or total collapse of 
production followed this decision almost imme-
diately (Bembridge, 2000; Laker, 2004).
In terms of design, the irrigation infrastructure 
on the large schemes established during the in-
dependent homeland era was amongst the most 
modern that was available at that time, but even 
on smaller schemes, pressurised overhead irriga-
tion was used instead of surface irrigation.
The irrigation management transfer 
(IMT) and revitalisation era 
The irrigation management transfer and revi-
talisation era started in earnest around 1997 and 
is still continuing. During this era, the focus of 
smallholder irrigation development has mainly 
been on the transformation of existing schemes, 
but the approach used by the state to achieve 
this has been subject to review and change. As 
a result, this era can be subdivided into several 
phases. 
The first phase, which was transitional, occurred 
during the political transition period between 
1990 and 1996, when several new small irrigation 
schemes were established as part of the Recon-
struction and Development Programme (RDP) in 
support of rural poverty alleviation. Denison and 
Manona (2007a) counted 62 irrigation schemes 
that were established during this era. Combined, 
these new schemes added about 2400 hectares 
to the total smallholder irrigation scheme area 
(Table 11.1), at an average of about 39 hectares 
per scheme. Typically, they use mechanical pump 
and sprinkler technology to extract and apply ir-
rigation water.
The second phase commenced more or less when 
GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) 
superseded the RDP as the overall economic de-
velopment policy of South Africa. Under GEAR, 
the strategy to eradicate poverty shifted from 
funding community-based projects à la RDP, to 
pursuing economic growth through private sec-
tor development. Existing irrigation schemes 
were identified as important resources for eco-
nomic development in the rural areas, but they 
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required revitalisation first. Revitalisation was 
linked to Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT). 
IMT refers to the transfer of the responsibility of 
managing, operating and maintaining irrigation 
schemes from the state to farmers themselves. 
Elsewhere in the world IMT had been imple-
mented as a strategy to improve scheme man-
agement performance, increase the profitability 
of irrigated agriculture and reduce recurrent 
public spending on the operation and mainte-
nance of irrigation schemes (Vermillion, 1997; 
Shah et al., 2002). Adoption of the policy of IMT 
was aligned with GEAR, because it promised to 
improve the lives of poor people by means of a 
process that empowered them to take control of 
their own resources and destiny, typically with a 
commercial economic focus.
Among the different IMT initiatives in the 
country, the Revitalisation of Smallholder Ir-
rigation Schemes (RESIS) of Limpopo Province 
stands out for its comprehensiveness. The RESIS 
programme evolved from the WaterCare pro-
gramme launched in 1998, which aimed to revi-
talise selected smallholder irrigation schemes in 
Limpopo, not only infra-structurally but also in 
terms of leadership, management and produc-
tivity. Using a participatory approach, WaterCare 
involved smallholder communities in planning 
and decision-making, and provided training to 
enable these communities to take full manage-
ment responsibility over their schemes (Denison 
and Manona, 2007a). In 2000, much of Limpopo 
was ravaged by severe storms, which resulted in 
widespread floods and damage to roads, bridg-
es and also to the weirs that provided water to 
many of the smallholder canal schemes. Declared 
a disaster area, Limpopo Province was allocated 
special funding to repair the damage to its infra-
structure, providing impetus to the WaterCare 
programme. 
In 2002, the provincial government of Limpopo 
broadened the scope of its irrigation scheme 
rehabilitation intervention by launching a com-
prehensive revitalisation programme, called 
RESIS (Revitalisation of Smallholder Irrigation 
Schemes). RESIS adopted the participatory ap-
proach of the WaterCare programme, but 
planned to revitalise all smallholder schemes in 
the province (Limpopo Department of Agricul-
ture, 2002). As was the case in the WaterCare 
programme, RESIS combined the reconstruction 
of smallholder irrigation infrastructure with IMT. 
In support of IMT, the programme dedicated 
one-third of the revitalisation budget to capac-
ity building among farmers. RESIS also sought to 
enhance commercialisation of the smallholder 
farming systems on the schemes, in order to im-
prove the livelihood of plot holder homesteads 
(Limpopo Department of Agriculture, 2002). 
However, during the WaterCare programme 
and the first phase of RESIS (1998-2005), the em-
phasis was primarily on the rehabilitation of the 
existing scheme infrastructure and on sustain-
able IMT, and less on commercialisation. Canal 
schemes that were revitalised during this phase 
remained canal schemes.
The third phase of the IMT and revitalisation era 
commenced around 2005, when commercialisa-
tion, water productivity and water use efficiency 
became the principal development objectives of 
smallholder scheme revitalisation. In Limpopo 
Province the Department of Agriculture devel-
oped the view that canal irrigation was associ-
ated with subsistence farming and inefficient 
water use. Consequently, the Department termi-
nated the revitalisation of canal infrastructure 
and only considered applications for revitalisa-
tion of canal schemes if farmers agreed to the 
replacement of their canal systems with modern 
irrigation technology, such as micro-irrigation or 
floppy sprinkler systems. However, the Depart-
ment soon discovered that commercialisation 
was not just a function of irrigation technology, 
and in 2007 it encouraged plot holders of revi-
talised schemes to enter into partnerships with 
experienced commercial farmers to form joint 
ventures. Makuleke Irrigation Scheme became 
the flagship project of the Department’s new 
approach. 
Under RESIS, Makuleke had been revitalised 
when new sprinklers and pumps were installed. 
Supported by CottonSA, farmers agreed to pro-
duce cotton, but low prices marginalised the 
production of cotton and the project collapsed. 
Subsequently, the Department financed the re-
placement of the sprinkler system with centre 
pivots and arranged for a joint venture with a 
commercial farmer. The joint venture was struc-
tured around 43 smallholders supplying a total 
of 138 hectares of irrigation land for the com-
mercial partner to farm. Profits were shared 
at the end of each production cycle (60% for 
the commercial partner and 40% for the plot 
holders). During the first year of production 
(2007/08), smallholders twice received R5000/
hectare as a share in the profit of a potato and 
a maize crop. Considering that each smallholder 
on average contributed 3.2 hectares, they each 
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earned about R32 000 during the first year of 
production. Plot holders received this income 
solely by making available their plots as all costs 
were carried by the commercial partner, who 
also brought in his own labour force. Highly 
satisfied with this outcome, the Department 
announced the application of the joint venture 
approach on 15 other smallholder schemes that 
had been revitalised and equipped with modern 
irrigation technology.
Options for smallholder 
irrigation scheme 
development
Denison and Manona (2007b) point out that suc-
cessful revitalisation of smallholder schemes de-
pends on a clear and unambiguous statement of 
the objectives of revitalisation. They argue that 
one of the weaknesses of smallholder irrigation 
scheme revitalisation in South Africa has been 
that the objectives guiding revitalisation efforts 
were sometimes contradictory, making it impos-
sible for revitalisation to achieve all its stated 
objectives. Moreover, they identified scheme-
specific factors that preordained the objectives 
that could be achieved in any particular case. 
This made them conclude that the direction 
of smallholder irrigation scheme development 
needed to consider the locally specific circum-
stances. They outlined four principal develop-
ment pathways or trajectories that could be con-
sidered, depending on local conditions. These 
are described as follows:
•	 The ‘business farmer’ – commercial produc-
tion on consolidated farms: This develop-
mental pathway involves the establishment 
of farm enterprises held by individuals who 
produce commodities on relatively large 
farms ranging between 5 hectares and 40 
hectares, depending on the commodity 
being produced. Business farmers are ex-
pected to have the required technical and 
managerial capacity and financial resources 
to deal with the risk associated with com-
mercial farming, and to sustain the use of 
moderately to highly sophisticated irriga-
tion technology. Under certain circumstanc-
es, particularly in relation to produce mar-
kets, business farmers could also act as out-
growers producing one commodity only, as 
in the case of the cane growing sector. Revi-
talisation objectives congruent with this tra-
jectory are increased production, economic 
viability, commercialisation, establishment 
of an African peasant or commercial farmer 
class, and Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE). It must be noted that for many small-
holder schemes, selecting this particular de-
velopmental trajectory would require the 
consolidation of existing plots into larger 
units.
•	 The	’smallholder	farmer’	–	diversified	farm-
ing and reduced risk: This development tra-
jectory accommodates livelihood diversity 
among plot holders, with particular refer-
ence to the various roles farming plays in 
their livelihoods. Denison and Manona point 
out that this trajectory is unlikely to be a fi-
nancially feasible proposition on schemes 
where the cost of the overheads and man-
agement of the irrigation are high, and 
suggest that this trajectory is best suited for 
low-cost canal schemes. The only tangible 
revitalisation objective of this trajectory is 
improved efficiency of the canal system re-
sulting in increased delivery of water to the 
plots, but from an economic perspective the 
impact of revitalisation is highly dependent 
on how farmers make use of the improved 
conditions.
• The ‘equity-labourer’ – plot holders in 
large-scale commercial partnerships: This 
development trajectory calls for commer-
cial partner investment to cover the cost of 
overheads and management of irrigation 
and production. Denison and Manona pos-
tulate that this trajectory is probably best 
suited for large and complex schemes that 
are remote, such as the Ncora Irrigation 
Scheme in western Transkei. They point out 
that this trajectory largely transfers control 
over the assets and the mode of production 
to the commercial partner in return for jobs, 
probably at the minimum wage level and 
the opportunity to earn some dividends. As 
such, job creation is the revitalisation ob-
jective congruent with this trajectory, but 
evidence from Makuleke indicates that divi-
dends paid to plot holders can be an impor-
tant objective also.
•	 The ‘food producer’ – irrigated food plots 
and home gardens: This development tra-
jectory aims to provide homesteads with 
the opportunity to enhance their access to 
food through own production on small irri-
gated plots of 0.25 hectares or less. Poverty 
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alleviation and enhanced homestead food 
security are the revitalisation objectives that 
are congruent with this trajectory.
Denison and Manona (2007b) indicate that re-
vitalisation of a particular scheme could involve 
the adoption of more than one development 
trajectory. For example, the business farmer tra-
jectory could be combined with the food pro-
ducer trajectory by subdividing the scheme into 
parts, each with its own specific revitalisation 
objectives. 
Current smallholder 
irrigation scheme 
development in Limpopo 
Province
Of the nine provinces in South Africa, Limpopo 
dominates in terms of smallholder irrigation 
scheme development. Mohamed (2006) re-
ported that in 2004, 57% of the total number 
of smallholder irrigation schemes (154 out of 
287), and 54% of the total area under small-
holder irrigation (24 795 hectares out of 46 000 
hectares), occurred in Limpopo Province (Ta-
ble 11.2). Combined, the Limpopo smallholder 
schemes were farmed by 15 919 plot holders, 
which represented 51% of the national total of 
farmers on smallholder irrigation schemes. The 
average size of smallholder irrigation schemes 
in Limpopo Province was 161 hectares, the aver-
age number of plot holders per scheme was 103, 
and the average land holding per plot holder 
was 1.5 hectares. Other provinces in which small-
holder irrigation schemes are important include 
the Eastern Cape with 21% of the total irrigated 
area and 7 845 (25%) plot holders, and KwaZulu-
Natal with 14% of the total irrigated area and 6 
174 (20%) plot holders (Table 11.2). 
The current policy of the Limpopo Department 
of Agriculture favours the ‘equity labourer’ de-
velopment trajectory and funds for smallholder 
irrigation scheme revitalisation are allocated 
accordingly. The case study presented in this re-
port argues that this policy is too narrow. Rea-
sons supporting this argument include:
• The policy does not take into account that 
circumstances among irrigation schemes 
differ substantially, as pointed out by Deni-
son and Manona (2007b). At some schemes 
the application of the ‘equity labourer’ de-
velopment trajectory is likely to be prob-
lematic because factors such as slope or plot 
size may limit the possibilities for consolida-
tion of the land.
• The application of the ‘equity labourer’ 
development trajectory may not be accept-
able socially because on some schemes plot 
holders have built sustainable agrarian live-
lihoods and they may not be interested in 
becoming share holders or farm workers.
Whereas the ‘equity labourer’ development tra-
jectory may yield impressive financial returns 
for plot holders, these only materialise follow-
ing substantial public investment in new irriga-
tion systems, which have a limited lifespan. The 
question of who will take responsibility for the 
repair and replacement of these systems when 
they start to age or reach the end of their life 
span arises.
Moreover, the application of the ‘equity la-
bourer’ development trajectory at Makuleke 
indicates that this trajectory contributes little to-
wards the establishment of a commercial African 
farmer class. On the contrary, the way in which 
the joint venture operates at that scheme com-
pletely divorces plot holders from production 
decisions and practices. 
The case study presented here analyses farming 
on a smallholder canal irrigation scheme called 
Dzindi. It draws on reports by Mohamed (2006) 
and Van Averbeke (2008), which elaborate dif-
ferent aspects of this scheme, but uses new field-
work to present up-to-date farm enterprise in-
formation. Updating the enterprise information 
provided indications of how farmers have coped 
with changes that have occurred since 2003, 
when Mohamed (2006) collected enterprise 
budget data at the scheme. During the five-year 
period that has elapsed since then, important 
macro-economic developments have occurred, 
such as the rapid increase in the cost of diesel 
and chemical fertilisers. 
The case study provides material that supports 
the revitalisation of selected canal irrigation 
schemes, such as Dzindi, using the ‘smallholder 
farmer’ development trajectory proposed by 
Denison and Manona (2007b). From an irrigation 
technology perspective, this trajectory calls for 
the refurbishment of the canal infrastructure, 
which may be cheaper than replacing the ca-
nal system with another type of irrigation. Fur-
thermore, the study argues that under specific 
circumstances, the development of new canal 
schemes could be considered. The study dem-
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onstrates that enterprises on smallholder canal 
schemes can generate financial returns per unit 
area that match those obtained by plot hold-
ers involved in joint ventures, using Makuleke 
Irrigation Scheme as a benchmark. One of the 
most powerful arguments in favour of canal ir-
rigation is the longevity of the system. At Dzindi 
the canal system is 54 years old and there are 
several other functioning canal schemes that are 
as old if not older. In addition, canal schemes use 
gravity for the conveyance of water, making it 
independent of the cost of energy. Some of the 
weaknesses and limitations of smallholder canal 
schemes are also pointed out.
Methods
Study site
Dzindi (23o 01’S; 30o26’E) is located in Itsani, 
about 6 kilometres southwest of the town of 
Thohoyandou, in the Thulamela Local Munici-
pality, Vhembe District, Limpopo Province (Fig-
ure 11.1). The scheme was established in 1954 and 
has a total command area of 135.6 hectares that 
is subdivided into 106 plots of 1.28 hectares each, 
which are held by 102 plot holders. In terms of 
scheme size, plot size and plot holder popula-
tion Dzindi more or less typical of smallholder 
canal irrigation schemes in Limpopo (Mohamed, 
2006). 
At Dzindi, water is supplied by the diversion of 
the Dzindi River by a concrete weir. The Dzindi 
River is perennial, but its water flow is subject to 
considerable seasonal variation (Van der Stoep 
and Nthai, 2005). At the weir, water enters the 
main concrete canal, which runs over a distance 
of about 14 kilometres and conveys the water to 
the four irrigation blocks (Figure 11.2). The irriga-
tion blocks are divided into plots, which receive 
their water by means of secondary concrete ca-
nals. Most of the land at Dzindi is sloping and for 
this reason, the plots are terraced. Farmers refer 
to these terraces as beds. On average, a plot con-
sists of 15 beds but the number varies consider-
ably from plot to plot. Contour bunds separate 
the beds from each other and the area occupied 
by these bunds occupies about one-quarter of 
the plot. As a result, the effective cropping area 
of a plot is just under 1 hectare. 
Dzindi has one night-storage dam, which sup-
plies Block 1. The amount of water entering the 
scheme is sufficient only to allow each farmer 
one irrigation per week. Each day, two farmers 
per secondary furrow have the right to draw wa-
ter, one during the morning and the other dur-
Figure 11.1: Location of Dzindi Irrigation Scheme
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ing the afternoon. This rule applies during day-
light hours only. During the night anyone who 
needs water may irrigate except farmers in Block 
1, because the night storage dam is replenished 
during the night. According to Van der Stoep 
and Nthai (2005), water conveyance at Dzindi is 
within the acceptable irrigation efficiency limits, 
even when water losses through seepage and 
spillage due to the poor conditions of the water 
conveyance system are taken into account.
For various reasons, such as the lack of money 
to pay for land preparation or the occurrence of 
water shortages, not all the available irrigated 
land at Dzindi is cultivated (Table 11.3). During 
the period August 2005 to March 2007, the pro-
portion of land that was covered with a grow-
ing crop ranged between 22.7% and 65.4%. The 
intensity with which land is cropped varies from 
plot to plot. Summer use is higher than winter 
use because that is the season when many plot 
holders produce grain for their families. Table 
11.3 shows that maize was by far the most impor-
tant crop and featured throughout the year at 
Dzindi, because maize is not only grown for grain 
but also for the harvest of green cobs, which are 
nearly all marketed. Conditions at Dzindi allow 
for the planting of maize throughout the year. 
Winter plantings are aimed at exploiting out-of-
season demand for green maize. In 2002, about 
two-thirds of the grain produced at Dzindi was 
Source: Van der Stoep and Nthai, 2005.
Figure 11.2: Schematic layout of the water distribution 
network at Dzindi 
used for home consumption and the other third 
was sold. Besides maize, farmers also grow ex-
otic vegetables (cabbages, Swiss chard and on-
ions), and African leafy vegetables (Chinese cab-
bage and nightshade) during winter, and pulses 
(mostly groundnuts), tubers (sweet potatoes), 
traditional vegetables (pumpkins and melons) 
and exotic vegetables (tomatoes, green peppers 
and cabbages) during summer.
The 2003 livelihood survey by Mohamed (2006), 
which covered 97 of the 102 plot holder home-
steads at Dzindi, demonstrated high levels 
of livelihood diversity. All of the homesteads 
farmed their plots but only 20 of the 97 home-
steads obtained more than half of their income 
from farming. Using main source of income 
(>50% of total) as the criterion for differentia-
tion, plot holder livelihoods at Dzindi can be cat-
egorised into five main types, namely: 
• Social grant holders-37%
• Employees-22%
• Farmers-21% 
• Petty entrepreneurs-11%
• Diversified-income households-9%.
Mohamed (2006) also reported considerable 
variability in the way homesteads approached 
Weir in Dzindi River 
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Thohoyandou  road 
 
      Block 3 
 
      Block 2 
 
      Block 1 
 
      Block 4 
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farming. Diversity in farming was described us-
ing the farming style concept. Van der Ploeg 
(2003) defined farming style as an integrating 
concept that portrays a particular way of prac-
tising agriculture and called it an expression of 
how farmers combine and order the elements 
that are used in the process of agricultural pro-
duction. 
Analysing 96 farm enterprises at Dzindi, Mo-
hamed (2006) identified three distinctly dif-
ferent farming styles at Dzindi, namely food 
farmers, employers and profit makers. A fourth 
category, designated ‘other’, was created to 
accommodate homesteads whose farming did 
have the defining characteristics of any of the 
three main farming styles. 
The key objective of food farmers was to pro-
duce food for own consumption at low cost and 
low risk, funding production using income de-
rived from other sources, mostly social grants. 
Employers typically left farming to full-time 
farm workers because they were involved in 
other livelihood activities, or because they were 
Land use
Aug-05 Dec-05 Mar-06 Jun-06 Aug-06 Dec-06 Mar-07
Proportion of total irrigated area (%)
Fallow 34.23 33.91 61.26 41.62 36.58 22.90 44.27
Prepared 23.52 8.66 16.06 27.74 32.33 11.73 23.06
Maize 22.70 47.37 13.65 2.12 8.65 58.60 6.98
Indigenous leafy 
veggies 4.27 0.00 3.80 15.13 7.97 0.00 11.66
Chinese cabbage 0.79 0.00 3.75 10.28 3.02 0.00 10.95
Nightshade 3.48 0.00 0.05 4.85 4.95 0.00 0.71
Exotic leafy 
vegetables 6.55 0.16 2.30 8.88 8.92 1.05 5.98
White cabbage 3.74 0.05 2.30 6.52 5.64 1.05 5.71
Swiss chard 2.85 0.11 0.00 2.36 3.28 0.00 0.27
Root and bulb 
crops 2.95 1.28 0.99 2.25 2.13 1.19 3.06
Sweet potatoes 1.53 1.11 0.99 1.75 0.77 0.81 2.98
Onions 1.42 0.00 0.00 0.40 1.22 0.00 0.08
Beetroot 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.24 0.00
Carrots 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00
Vegetable fruits 0.69 0.69 0.07 0.14 0.52 0.40 1.71
Tomatoes 0.69 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.32 0.84
Green peppers 0.00 0.32 0.07 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.05
Chillies 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82
Cucurbits 3.35 3.75 0.25 0.00 0.41 1.40 0.02
Pumpkins 3.35 3.54 0.18 0.00 0.11 0.37 0.02
Butternut 0.00 0.21 0.07 0.00 0.30 1.03 0.00
Pulses (fresh 
and dry) 1.74 4.18 1.62 2.12 2.49 2.73 3.26
Dry and green 
beans 1.32 0.16 0.49 1.81 2.22 0.00 2.31
Bambara 
groundnuts 0.00 0.11 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19
Groundnuts 0.42 3.91 0.89 0.00 0.00 2.73 0.76
Peas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.27 0.00 0.00
Total under 
growing crops 42.25 57.43 22.68 30.64 31.09 65.37 32.67
Table 11.3: Land use at Dzindi
Source: Van Averbeke, 2008.
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too old to farm. Employers adopted a partially 
market-oriented approach to recover at least 
part of the cost of labour, which was the princi-
pal variable cost in this particular farming style. 
Profit makers farmed to earn cash income and 
in pursuit of this objective they adopted a strat-
egy characterised by relatively high levels of risk. 
Production of white cabbages and green maize 
featured prominently in their farm enterprises. 
Profit makers tended to be highly dependent on 
farming for income. They mainly relied on fam-
ily labour but hired casual labour on a daily or 
piece-work basis during peak times. Additional 
information on farming styles at Dzindi were 
presented by Van Averbeke and Mohamed 
(2007). Table 11.4 shows the frequency distribu-
tion of livelihood types and farming styles at 
Dzindi in 2003.
Data collection during 2008
Fieldwork conducted for this case study involved 
interviews with nine plot holders during July 
and August 2008. The main objective was to find 
out to what extent change in circumstances had 
affected farming of the selected homesteads. 
For this purpose, particular attention was paid 
to the enterprise budgets, which were collected 
for the period 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008. Ad-
ditional information that was collected was the 
life history of the plot holder, the current struc-
ture of the livelihood of the plot holder home-
stead, the marketing strategy of the plot holder 
and involvement in collaboration, perceptions 
of success and perspectives on the future.
Sampling of the nine plot holders was purposive 
with a bias for the selection of plot holders who 
were making a living from farming (the ‘farmer’ 
livelihood type) while using a commercial ap-
proach to agriculture (the ‘profit maker’ farm-
ing style). Table 11.4 shows that in 2003, 20 of 96 
plot holder homesteads had a farmer livelihood 
type and 16 out of 96 had a profit maker farm-
ing style. For this reason, generalisations of the 
findings of this case study to scheme level are 
not warranted. 
Table 11.5 indicates the livelihood type and farm-
ing style of the nine plot holder homesteads 
included in the sample using the same criteria 
for categorisation as those used by Mohamed 
(2006).
Case studies
Historical perspective
The focus of this section is on the life history of 
the nine plot holders who were selected for the 
case study. Considering that the Dzindi small-
holder canal irrigation scheme started 54 years 
ago, most plot holders are second- or even third-
generation, but one of the original plot holders 
has been included in the study (Case 5). Table 
11.6 summarises the life histories of the nine plot 
holders featuring in this study. 
The nine life histories illustrate how agrarian 
livelihoods are or were constructed using the 
irrigation plot as the central asset. One of the 
prominent themes is the association of youth 
with off-farm work and urban migration. All 
eight male farmers covered by the study first 
sought to make a living off-farm, often as mi-
grant workers. For various reasons, they chose 
or were forced to return home and decided to 
make a living from farming. They then (re)-ac-
tivated the plot that was left to them by their 
families and set out to develop their farm en-
terprises. In some instances this was achieved 
successfully (Cases 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 9), whilst in 
others the plot holders lacked the resources to 
Livelihood type Farming style
Food farmer Employer Profit maker Other All
Social grant holder 17   9 1 9 36
Employee 11   4 3 3 21
Farmer 4   2 11 3 20
Petty entrepreneur 8   1 0 1 10
Diversified-income household 4   0 1 4   9
All 44 16 16 20 96
Table 11.4: Relationship between livelihood type and farming 
style at Dzindi (2003) 
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Case number Age of farmer Gender of farmer Livelihood type Farming style
1 44 Male Farmer Profit maker
2 56 Male Petty entrepreneur Other
3 41 Male Farmer Profit maker
4 40 Male Farmer Profit maker
5 74 Male Grant holder Other
6 44 Male Diversified income household Other
7 63 Male Diversified income household Food farmer
8 43 Female Farmer Profit maker
9 56 Male Employee (spouse) Profit maker
Table 11.5: Livelihood type and farming style of the nine Dzindi plot holder 
homesteads sampled in 2008
Case Brief life history
1 The eldest son of a Dzindi plot holder, Mr Musecho grew up in a homestead that had an agrarian livelihood. Livelihood 
activities included irrigated cropping, the marketing of produce in town using a donkey cart for transport, and a spaza 
shop. Mr Musecho left school after Grade 5 at the age of 17 and migrated to Gauteng to look for work. He remained a 
migrant worker until 1994. In the meantime he got married and started a family. At the age of 30 he was retrenched 
and returned home to take over the plot of his father, who had passed away. He has based his livelihood on farming 
the plot ever since. His spouse is a security guard, earning R1500 per month, and they also receive two child support 
grants. 
2 Mr Baloyi grew up in a farmer homestead. Livelihood activities included irrigated cropping on the scheme and 
livestock farming. He left school after Grade 2 and travelled to Gauteng to look for work at the age of 17. He remained 
a migrant until 2004, holding a variety of jobs. He combines farming the plot with earning income from painting 
houses. His spouse is not working but they receive one child support grant.
3 Mr Mushidzi grew up in a farmer homestead and applied for work in the army after completing high school, but 
was not successful. He found work as a driver for a supermarket in the region but did not enjoy the work and felt he 
could do better farming the plot left to him by his father. He has since added broiler production to irrigated cropping, 
growing four batches of 100 chickens per year. His spouse is working and earns R2500 per month.
4 Mr Mabulanga dropped out of school in Grade 8. He never left Dzindi. He was given two beds (about 1200 m2) by his 
plot-holding father to start farming on his own and worked as a tractor driver at the scheme for 12 years. He saved 
to buy his own tractor and received an additional 10 beds when his father retired from farming. The use of the rest of 
the plot was given to his four siblings. During winter, he rents in excess of 40 beds from other plot holders. He earns 
income from irrigated cropping and the provision of land preparation services.
5 Mr Tshikhudo grew up in a family that practised irrigated farming near Lwamondo using river diversion. He 
completed Grade 7 and became a shop assistant. His life story is a classical example of the growth and development 
of a smallholding. Through the accumulation of assets in support of an agrarian livelihood, Mr Tshikhudo was able to 
provide for the tertiary education of his children, but his success meant that there is no successor. He is now well past 
70 years old and his enterprise is now in decline. 
6 Mr Mawela grew up at Dzindi and when he was a high school student his father lent him a bed which he cropped 
to pay for school and to earn pocket money. After high school he became a migrant, working for a Johannesburg 
construction company. He saved enough to enrol in a teacher training college in 1992. He qualified in 1995 but failed to 
find work. To assist him his father gave him 12 beds in 1997 but after 10 years he still struggles to lift his enterprise to 
the level where he can earn an adequate income to invest in high-value crops. 
7 Born in 1945, Mr A Nethonzhe is a first-generation plot holder at Dzindi because his father registered a plot in 
his name in 1956. He completed Grade 7 and in 1965 he joined other young men to become a migrant worker in 
Johannesburg, until he returned to Venda in 1975 to earn a living as a driver. In 1983, at the age of 38, he decided to 
farm full-time. As in the case of Mr Tshikudo (Case 5), his enterprise flourished at one stage but now it is in decline.
8 Mrs Mudau is the spouse of a migrant worker but her husband has more or less abandoned her, making her the 
decision-maker. In many ways her situation resembles that of Mr Mawela, being characterised by a lack of financial 
resources to make full use of her plot. 
9 Mr B Nethonzhe grew up in a very large farming family and attended school until Grade 10. He became a migrant 
worker in 1978 working for a construction firm. He returned to Venda in 1978 and started his own construction 
company, building schools and later on houses, but business slowed down and in 2002, when his father transferred his 
plot to him, he became a full-time farmer. He is considered an innovator and he is also a prominent scheme leader.
Table 11.6: Summary of life histories of selected plot holders at Dzindi (2008)
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achieve full development (Cases 2, 6 and 8). In 
this way, the case studies illustrate the lifecycle 
of plot enterprises, characterised by phases of 
development, growth and then finally decline 
in line with the lifecycle of farmers, which is a 
common feature of family farms throughout the 
world. 
Natural and physical resources
From a natural resource perspective, irrigated 
farming centres on land and water. Generally, 
the quality of the irrigated soils at Dzindi is 
good. Approximately three-quarters of the com-
mand area is covered by deep, well-drained soils 
(Hutton form), which are considered suitable for 
irrigation. The rest of the land is of lesser qual-
ity including a small portion of coarse sandy soils 
which, from a plant nutrition perspective, is of 
very low quality. Access to irrigation water at 
Dzindi is limited as a result of the water shar-
ing institutions and the seasonal variation in the 
flow of the Dzindi River. During drought, access 
to irrigation water is severely limiting.
From a physical resource perspective, canal ir-
rigation centres on the conveyance system. To 
function optimally, the canals and concrete 
furrows must be maintained and kept clean at 
all times. Cracks and breaks result in seepage 
and leaks and these reduce the conveyance ef-
ficiency of the system. Sediment, weed, algae 
and other obstructions in the canals and furrows 
reduce water flow. At Dzindi, cleaning of the 
conveyance system and the execution of simple 
repairs are a collective responsibility. When the 
scheme started, the state enforced this collective 
responsibility but since about 1975, state control 
has been withdrawn. During the past 15 years, 
scheme leadership has found it difficult to main-
tain the old patterns of collective action, ulti-
mately resulting in the outsourcing of the clean-
ing works to local contractors. Plot holders have 
to contribute financially towards the services of 
these contractors. 
Production system
Without exception, farmers at Dzindi practise 
short-furrow irrigation. When a bed is prepared, 
it is usually ploughed, then disced and then 
ridged. The bed is then subdivided in smaller 
parcels by filling the longitudinal furrows at 10 
to 20 metre intervals. When a bed is irrigated 
the water flows along the ridge closest to the 
contour bund. As the water flows it is diverted 
into the first parcel and each of the furrows in 
the parcel is filled with water. Then the passage 
into the first parcel is closed off and entry to the 
second parcel is created. This process is contin-
ued until all parcels in the bed have received wa-
ter. Short-furrow irrigation typically has a high 
distribution efficiency, meaning that along the 
length of the plot the amount of water that is 
applied is more or less constant. 
Characteristic of production at Dzindi is that 
plantings occur on a small-scale of the order 
of 0.1 hectare. This allows farmers to do all op-
erations manually, with the exception of land 
preparation. Differences in approach tend to 
reflect risk. Crops such as green maize and cab-
bage carry more risk than traditional vegetables 
and maize grown for grain, primarily because 
the variable costs per unit area are higher and 
quality assurance is critical. Profit makers tend to 
take risks whilst food farmers avoid risk.
Farmers and Dzindi make use of chemical fertilis-
ers and plant protectants. They are also familiar 
with hybrid seed. The presence of a farm supply 
outlet close to the scheme facilitates access to 
these inputs. Use of animal manures is also com-
mon. Cattle manure is purchased from kraals 
in neighbouring villages, whilst poultry litter is 
purchased from broiler units in the area. 
Economic aspects
Table 11.7 provides summary information on the 
2007/08 enterprise budgets for each of the nine 
cases. 
When evaluating the information in Table 11.7 it 
should be kept in mind that at Dzindi it is possi-
ble to grow two or even three crops per year on 
the same piece of land, explaining why in some 
instances the amount of land that was cropped 
exceeded 1 hectare, being the effective area 
available for crop production on the 1.28 hec-
tare plots. Another important fact is that farm 
size differed among the enterprises. Some farm-
ers were renting-in land or had activated parcels 
of unscheduled irrigation land, whilst others did 
not have use of a full plot.
Gross income data in Table 11.7 represent the 
monetary value of the produce. When produce 
was sold, the actual income was recorded. When 
produce was consumed at home, the local Rand 
value of the produce was used to impute the 
monetary value of the produce. 
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Table 11.7 shows that all but one of the sampled 
farmers achieved positive returns from farming. 
Mean gross income was R19 964 and mean total 
variable costs amounted to R9 326, resulting in a 
mean gross margin of R10 368. 
Reporting on the 2002/03 production season, 
Mohamed (2006) reported a mean total gross 
farm income of R4 692 and mean total variable 
costs of R3 429 for all farmers at Dzindi, resulting 
in a mean gross margin of R1 263. Focusing on 
plot holders with a profit maker farming style 
only, which is more in line with the sample of 
plot holders contained in this case study, he re-
ported a mean total gross farm income of R8 
966, mean total variable costs of R3 256 and a 
mean gross margin of R5 710. 
Based on the nine cases presented here, farm-
ers appear to have adapted well to changes in 
selected factors that affect the variable costs of 
production, namely sharp increases in the price 
of diesel and fertilisers.
Livelihood significance
Agriculture plays a very important role in the 
livelihood of most of the nine plot holders that 
feature in this case study, but this does not apply 
to all plot holders at Dzindi. Mohamed (2006) 
pointed out that the way the plot is used de-
pends on the structure of the livelihood of plot 
holder homesteads.
Social and institutional dimensions
Canal maintenance, sharing of water, land ten-
ure and marketing of produce are important 
social and institutional domains at Dzindi. Canal 
maintenance was dealt with above. Sharing of 
water on canal irrigation is an important source 
of conflict because of the front-ender versus tail-
ender effect. Farmers who are located near the 
front-end of the canal tend to get more water 
than those at the tail-end, unless the rules that 
govern access are strictly adhered to. During 
times of water scarcity, which typically occur in 
spring when farmers prepare to plant maize but 
the summer rains have not yet arrived, conflicts 
over water occur most frequently. Since plot 
holders are responsible for scheme manage-
ment, it is the elected scheme leadership that 
has to deal with conflicts of this nature, and in 
the event it often struggles to do so (Van Aver-
beke, 2008).
When Dzindi was established, the land was 
‘detribalised’ and Trust tenure was implemented 
before the scheme was settled. Strict land use in-
structions applied and non-compliance resulted 
in plot holders being expelled. Transfer of the 
plot was controlled by the state but in practice 
plots tended to remain in the family. Plots had to 
be transferred wholly to a single person. When 
researchers from the Tshwane University of 
Technology (TUT) first arrived at Dzindi in 2003, 
renting land to others was not permitted, but as 
a result of encouragement by TUT researchers, 
this practice has taken root. Another practice 
that has gained prominence is the transfer of a 
plot to multiple family members even though 
the plot is registered to a single person. It ap-
pears that this arrangement also existed in the 
past but was hidden from officials.
Farmers at Dzindi market individually. Fresh 
produce hawkers play an important role in the 
chain from producer to consumer, and many 
farmers depend on them to market their crops. 
Hawkers seek to exploit competition among 
farmers for markets to keep the price as low as 
possible. In 2008, farmers in Block 2, who mostly 
deal with hawkers from Muledane, colluded to 
fix the price of commodities as a strategy to deal 
with this practice of hawkers. 
Gender, class and human dimensions
Men dominate at Dzindi, primarily because plots 
are transferred to males. Widows can hold their 
husband’s plot, but when they pass on the plot it 
is usually once more allocated to a male person. 
On the farms themselves, women feature more 
prominently, but at scheme level they have little 
say in decision-making even though they attend 
meetings.
Plot holders at Dzindi are not rich but few if any 
are destitute. Most are able to educate their 
children and maintain a reasonable standard of 
living. All but a few have brick homes. Several 
among them own a vehicle.
The level of education among plot holders is 
probably not much different from that in other 
rural areas. As elsewhere, the trend is for formal 
education levels to rise with successive genera-
tions. Plot holders take their children to the field 
to transfer farming skills but most of them desire 
their children to become professionals through 
tertiary education. Farming is usually seen as a 
fall-back option, as indeed it was for some of the 
nine cases presented above.C
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Perceptions of performance
Perceptions of performance differed among the 
nine cases. The plot holders described in Cases 2 
and 8 were of the opinion that their enterprises 
were performing below potential because they 
lacked financial resources. The plot holders in 
Cases 5 and 7 were of the opinion that their en-
terprises were on the decline because they were 
getting too old to handle the work. The other 
five cases were positive about the performance 
of their enterprises.
Policy environment
The current policy of the Limpopo Depart-
ment of Agriculture, which is responsible for 
smallholder schemes in the Province, is highly 
negative towards canal irrigation. Requests by 
farmers for upgrading of the canals have been 
rejected. Small repairs are being done by the De-
partment of Public Works, but plot holders have 
to purchase the materials. Dzindi has not re-
ceived any financial support for at least the past 
10 years. Even the extension officer, who used to 
be dedicated to Dzindi, now serves a much more 
extensive ward. 
Environmental aspects
The impact of the scheme on the environment is 
mostly through the extraction of water from the 
Dzindi River, which undoubtedly has an impact 
on the base flow and the river ecosystem. Inflow 
of nutrients may be another impact. 
The future
The future of Dzindi is uncertain given the cur-
rent policy towards canal irrigation. Yet, this 
case study shows that canal irrigation presents a 
viable option for successful livelihoods and local 
economic development.
Conclusions
This case study shows that smallholder canal 
schemes such as Dzindi are durable and resil-
ient and such projects contribute significantly 
to the local economy and to the livelihoods of 
plot holders and other people making a living 
in or around such schemes. Homesteads who 
focus on farming for their livelihood continu-
ously adapt their farming to maintain positive 
returns from their enterprises. The evaluation of 
current enterprise budgets against those of five 
years ago shows that this is being achieved suc-
cessfully. The peri-urban location of Dzindi con-
tributes to the ability of smallholders to explore 
and exploit new markets for produce. The ques-
tion arises whether smallholder communities on 
schemes such as Dzindi should not be considered 
as sources of land reform beneficiaries. The case 
studies show that some plot holders are inter-
ested in farming on a larger scale. Elsewhere in 
the world it has been shown that experience in 
running a farm enterprise is a key success factor 
in successful land reform. 
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Introduction
African indigenous people, including many 
South African ethnic groups, have survived for 
millennia by consuming plants collected from 
the wild (Fox and Norwood Young, 1998). Such 
practices are still prevalent in South Africa to-
day. The different parts of the plants that are 
used as foodstuffs include roots, tubers, stems, 
rhizomes, leaves, flowers, fruits, nuts, gums 
and berries. Generally, at least two parts of the 
plant can be eaten, of which the young leaf is 
almost always one. This has resulted in many 
researchers calling these plants African leafy 
vegetables (ALVs) (Laker 2007). However, given 
that more than one part is generally consumed 
and because dishes, the morogo dish, for ex-
ample, often contain more than just the leaves 
of a single plant,18 in this case study we use the 
term ‘African vegetables’. This more inclusive 
term is used by many rural consumers. Morogo 
is the sePedi word that refers to a relish made 
from a number of these leafy and fruit plants 
that are either harvested in the wild or are lo-
cally grown for food consumption. This relish is 
also known as marog, imifino or miroho and is 
regularly consumed in rural areas as an accom-
paniment to maize porridge. The plants which 
make up this relish may be indigenous to rural 
areas or they may be exotic vegetables that have 
been indigenised and incorporated into the lo-
cal diet over a number of generations through 
migration or trade, either prior to or during the 
colonial era (Schippers, 2002). 
According to Jansen van Rensburg et al. (2007) 
the most prominent of these plant species that 
are used as a relish in South Africa are Ama-
ranth (Amaranthus spp.), Spider flower (Cleome 
gynandra L.), Jute or Jew’s Mallow (Chorchorus 
olitorius and C. tridens), Black Jack (Bidens pilosa 
L. and B. bipinnata L.), Nightshade (Solanum ni-
grum complex), various Curcubits and Cowpeas 
(Vigna inguiculata L.). The leaves of all of these 
plants are consumed and in some instances the 
fruit are also consumed (e.g. nightshade, cur-
cubits and cowpeas). Many other plants are 
found in different regions of South Africa and 
are harvested and consumed as food, the preva-
lence of which depends on local availability and 
preference. Some of these plants have not yet 
been identified by researchers. While many of 
the identified plants occur naturally in the wild, 
some are actively cultivated or their presence 
encouraged in homestead food gardens where 
they appear after the first seasonal rains. In 
parts of South Africa, active cultivation of some 
plants needs to be encouraged because they are 
becoming a diminishing resource due to over-
harvesting in the wild (Hunter et al., 2007).
This study of two villages in Limpopo was select-
ed because it illustrates how rural households in 
arid areas practise agriculture for food security 
purposes. While a handful of residents, not more 
than 32, are active members of two extension-
supported communal vegetable garden projects, 
they and most senior female household mem-
bers also grow crops in their home gardens. Dur-
ing different temporal dimensions (when water 
is available or unavailable) and spatial dimen-
sions (at home and at the communal garden pro-
jects), they resort to different agricultural prac-
12 African vegetables and food 
security for poor agrarian 
households in Limpopo Province: 
effective but neglected indigenous 
knowledge under threat
Tim Hart, Centre of Poverty Employment and Growth, 
Human Sciences Research Council
18 Morogo may contain leaves 
of other plants, the fruit of 
the same or other plants such 
as unripe pumpkins, cowpeas, 
tomatoes and groundnuts. 
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tices, either ‘conventional’ (as for wider scale 
commercial production) or ‘traditional’ prac-
tices.19 The case illustrates how people resort to 
local agricultural practices and ‘traditional’ crops 
when the infrastructure in extension-supported 
communal food gardens is stolen or not working 
and that this is the predominant form of pro-
duction at home for food security or household 
consumption. The shift in practices is despite the 
extension officers’ emphasis on conventional 
practices involving high volumes of costly and 
locally scarce inputs and the emphasis on irriga-
tion. It is a result of the need to reduce risks and 
costs when the necessary resources for conven-
tional crop production are unavailable. 
Methodology
Between January 2005 and May 2006 the author 
and four researchers conducted a study of ag-
ricultural practices of African vegetables used 
by resource-poor rural households in a rural vil-
lage situated in the northeast part of Limpopo 
Province. While one of the fieldworkers was 
permanently based in the village, the rest of 
the team lived in or visited the villages for up 
to twenty-one days at a time for certain periods, 
in order to get more involved in village life and 
to conduct the fieldwork. The author made two 
follow-up visits in August 2008 to obtain further 
information. A variety of research methods and 
techniques were used for data collection, com-
plementing one another and allowing for trian-
gulation of data. 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) tools were 
used at various stages of the study, but particu-
larly at the beginning of the study in order to 
obtain background information about the vil-
lage, agricultural projects and practices and to 
generate an awareness of what types of crops 
were produced and consumed. Approximately 
42 people (forty women and two men) from the 
village attended the workshops at various times, 
and all except ten women were involved in the 
two vegetable garden projects introduced by 
government extension services. Thirteen of the 
participants were between the ages of thirty 
and sixty years. The remainder were all over the 
age of sixty. Workshop attendance was entirely 
voluntary. Data from the workshops were fur-
ther explored by means of participant observa-
tion, semi-structured and informal interviews. 
Interviews were conducted with some of the 
women and men who attended the workshops 
as well as a number of others (two women and 
four men) who were unable to attend the work-
shops. Interviews and participant observation 
sessions were typically carried out during the 
course of the researchers’ interaction with resi-
dents. Most of the participant observation ses-
sions on agricultural practices were conducted 
during the planting and growing season be-
tween November 2005 and March 2006. A for-
mal questionnaire survey of 108 randomly select-
ed households was conducted in June 2005, in 
order to get inferential socio-economic statistics 
on the population of the villages and to get an 
idea of the extent of consumption patterns and 
the significance of African vegetables as a food-
stuff at the household level. Data collected at 
workshops and during interviews informed the 
design of the questionnaire. 
The visits in August 2008 involved discussions 
and interviews with several local women, the 
initial extension officer (who has subsequently 
moved to another area), and a local male resi-
dent. The main purpose here was to get updated 
knowledge about the projects, practices and to 
note changes over time.
Historical perspective
Historical overview of the village
Limpopo Province is described by government 
sources as poor. The village which is the focus of 
this case study is situated in an area of Mopane 
District Municipality, in which 71% of the popu-
lation lives in poverty (AGIS, 2008). The village is 
situated in the northern part of the Nkuna Tradi-
tional Authority Area, which formed part of the 
former Gazankulu homeland, about 15 kilome-
tres north of its major town, Nkowankowa. The 
population of the area consists primarily of sePe-
di and Tsonga speakers and the village consists 
of two adjacent but distinct settlements, each 
with its own Nduna (headman). However, they 
are collectively serviced as one unit by the local 
government and extension services. The Greater 
Tzaneen Municipality provides minimal services 
to this and other villages in the surrounding ru-
ral areas. A gravel cul-de-sac links the village to 
the tarred road and the nearby village of Ma-
farana (which houses the local municipal clinic), 
which is about 10 kilometres west of the small 
agricultural town of Letsitele. 
The older of the two settlements comprises the 
village we will call Settlement A. It consists of 
19 By ‘conventional’, we mean 
those practices that tend to 
be promoted by government’s 
extension officers.
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the descendants of local families that have lived 
in the area for generations, before any formali-
sation occurred. Settlement B is made up of the 
descendents of farm workers, who, in 1963, with 
their families were living on the South African 
Government-owned citrus farm near Letsitele 
and were then forcibly removed in terms of 
the Group Areas Act to this area. Despite there 
being no clear boundary between the two set-
tlements, locals give the settlements different 
names. It was only in 1969 that any formalisation 
of the area took place. The Ndunas from each 
settlement and officials from the South Afri-
can Government marked out stands and roads 
in the area. The people who had been living in 
the surrounding hills moved onto the stands, as 
did other people from neighbouring areas who 
were looking for places to stay. In 1986 more 
people moved into the area and were allocated 
stands between Settlement B and the tarred 
road in the west. Over time this portion of land 
was gradually settled.
Census figures obtained from the Greater Tza-
neen Municipality indicate that in 2003 the vil-
lage had 3821 residents in approximately 721 
households. In 2005 researchers estimated the 
number of households in both settlements to be 
approximately eight hundred. During the Au-
gust 2008 visit it was evident that the number 
of households had modestly increased over the 
previous three years, as previously unsettled ar-
eas were now being settled. It is estimated that 
the number of households is probably around 
830 at present (2008). The data that follow are 
based on the survey of 108 households in June 
2005 and on qualitative interviews and work-
shops that were held during 2005/2006 and in 
August 2008. 
Ninety-one percent of the survey respondents 
were directly involved with household food 
production, harvest and preparation. Of the 
survey respondents, 93% were female and 7% 
were male. The mean household size was 4.77 
people per household with 81% of the house-
holds having six or fewer members and 19% be-
tween seven and eleven members. On average 
the households had 2.64 members who were 18 
years or older and would be in the position to 
seek employment. About 55% of the households 
surveyed were de jure female-headed and 24% 
were headed by pensioners. 
The vegetable garden projects
In 1983 a number of women in Settlement A 
formed a care group. This was a group of wom-
en who shared sentiments and information, 
and collaborated and supported one another in 
various situations. In 1984 members of this care 
group started a vegetable garden using land ac-
quired from the Nduna. Each woman brought 
seeds to plant on her demarcated plot. They 
generally grew cowpeas, maize, groundnuts, 
pumpkins and beans, and maintained African 
vegetables already growing on the plots. In 
1985 the Gazankulu Department of Agriculture 
provided the group with a borehole and pump, 
irrigation piping, a reservoir and a fence. Unfor-
tunately, in 1991 the borehole pump was stolen. 
The group continued to plant crops in the field 
but were now once again dependent on rain-
fall for yields. They concentrated on traditional 
crops as they considered these to be drought 
tolerant. No crops were produced during winter 
due to the lack of irrigation. Members reported 
that the harvests were usually insufficient, as 
they had no surplus to sell. Between 2003 and 
early 2006, the extension officer (now with the 
Limpopo Provincial Department of Agriculture 
and Environment) organised various donors to 
provide the project with a new fence, irrigation 
pipes, a water tank and an electric borehole 
pump and some other inputs. The new borehole 
pump, installed in late 2006, was ineffective as it 
did not have the capacity to irrigate a plot big-
ger than about 400 m2. This problem had not 
been resolved by August 2008. The Department 
of Agriculture also initiated a broiler project 
with the members and the chicken houses were 
built by late 2005. However, the ineffectiveness 
of the borehole pump meant that water had to 
be transported in containers from a household 
tap to the chicken houses. As a result of limited 
water only a small number of chickens are pro-
duced. 
After the first democratic elections in 1994, the 
Nkuna traditional authority was given money 
for the development of the villages within its 
area of influence. The Nduna for Settlement B 
decided that their allocation should be used for 
a vegetable garden project so that the people 
could produce more food and sell any surplus. 
He approached the Limpopo Department of 
Agriculture for assistance. The Nduna allocated 
land for the project and used the allocation to 
obtain irrigation piping, taps, a borehole and 
diesel pump, and a reservoir, and the Depart-
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ment provided fencing. The members initially 
each paid a R12 registration fee and R2/month 
to purchase diesel for the pump. In 1995 the lo-
cal extension officer started supporting them 
by providing advice and organising training on 
exotic vegetable management, fertilisation and 
irrigation practices. In 1998 project members 
took part in a local agricultural competition in 
a neighbouring extension ward and won first 
prize for their crops. This created an awareness 
of their products, with people coming from 
neighbouring villages to purchase their produce. 
In late 2004 the extension officer had organised 
with the SPAR supermarket in Tzaneen to pur-
chase their produce. However, in November 
2004 the borehole pump was stolen. As a result 
of the lack of irrigation and unfavourable rains 
in 2004/2005, the project members lost the ma-
jor proportion of their summer exotic vegetable 
crops and were unable to sell any produce to 
the SPAR. In 2005 an anthropologist who had 
lived in the village for a number of years dur-
ing the late 1980s organised another borehole 
pump. However, given the good rains during 
the summer of 2005/2006, the group decided to 
only begin using it in the winter of 2006. There 
were also concerns about its security and given 
that the borehole for the domestic water source 
had not been installed, some residents were de-
manding that this pump be used to supply wa-
ter for all the Settlement B residents. However, 
when the pump was to be connected in late 
2006 it was found that it did not fit properly and 
that extra parts and adaptations were necessary. 
A visit in 2008 indicated that this pump had still 
not been installed and connected, as the group 
did not have the money to pay for the adapta-
tions. While they attempt to save money to pur-
chase the necessary fittings, the pump remains 
stored at the chairperson’s house – where it has 
been for the past two years. The Department of 
Agriculture is not prepared to pay for the neces-
sary adaptations. 
During 2005/2006, 32 people were active in 
these projects. The project at Settlement B had 
12 active members, of whom two were men, and 
the Settlement A project had 20 active female 
members. The chairpersons of each project were 
both women. The extension officer – who spent 
one day per week at each project – moved to 
another area at the end of 2006 and another 
extension officer took over his role. This latter 
person is very ill and contact with the villagers is 
rare and irregular.
The problems related to the borehole pumps at 
both garden projects and consequent lack of ir-
rigation renders these two projects largely inef-
fective in improving the livelihoods of members, 
and decidedly not the other village residents 
who are not reached by the extension services. 
Natural resources
Attempts to obtain natural resource data from 
the local Department of Agriculture office 
proved difficult as they did not have this infor-
mation, despite servicing the village since 1995. 
Most information was obtained from the AGIS 
website and is not specific to the village but 
rather a projection of the surrounding area. The 
settlements are situated on sloping terrain (13-
20% slope according to AGIS, 2008), backed by 
steep hills. Officially, the area is classified as an 
arid zone and has limited potential for agricul-
tural production (ibid.). Annual pan evaporation 
is relatively high at between 2001 and 2200 mma-1 
(ibid). Official figures for average annual rain-
fall in this area estimate it to be around 500 mm 
(ibid.). From mid-April 2005 until the end of April 
2006 daily rainfall readings were monitored and 
recorded by the fieldworker who lived in the 
village. Daily readings were done at 8 am every 
morning and then the instruments were reset. A 
total of 906 mm fell during this 13-month period. 
For four months (July to October 2005) there was 
no rain at all and for a further two months (May 
and June 2005) the rainfall was insignificant at 
around 1 mm. In essence there was no rainfall 
during six months of the year. Most of the rain 
fell between November 2005 and March 2006. 
This totalled 867 mm and was considered much 
higher than normal by local residents, suggest-
ing that official projected figures are closer to 
the reality. Local residents also mentioned that 
the first summer rain was delayed as it usually 
came during September, suggesting that they 
had experienced a heavier rainfall but over a 
much shorter period. During discussions in May 
2006 residents reported that they had obtained 
a better than usual harvest during the 2005/2006 
summer cropping season as a result of the unusu-
ally high rainfall. The rainfall pattern was largely 
due to the El Nino and La Nina weather patterns 
that prevailed during this period. 
Using a Trend Line during the various work-
shops, residents indicated the rainfall pattern 
trend for the previous ten years. The Trend 
Line showed that the villages last received very 
high rainfall during the summer of 2000/2001. 
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Residents reported that the rainfall during that 
season was excessive and recalled flooding and 
the destruction of crops. Since then the rain-
fall has reverted back to low ‘normal’ patterns 
during the summer seasons between 2001and 
2005. According to residents, the high rainfall 
experienced in 2005/2006 was nowhere near the 
amount experienced during 2000/2001, but was 
still significantly more than usual. The pattern il-
lustrated by the Trend Line suggested that high 
rainfall is abnormal with the local perception 
being that the area usually has a low rainfall 
during the summer months. Thus, the rainfall 
figures recorded during 2005 and 2006 seem to 
be unusually high for this village and while it in-
creased crop yields it also caused erosion which 
is likely to negatively affect production in the 
future. Rainfall erosivity is officially considered 
to be high in this area.
Household gardens and fields
Despite the shortage of water and limited period 
of summer rainfall, usually between September 
and April, in the 12 months prior to June 2005 
most households grew a number of food crops 
in their household gardens (90%) or allowed a 
number of naturally occurring African vegeta-
bles to grow in their gardens (5%). The remain-
der did not cultivate any crops during the pre-
vious twelve months for various reasons. These 
included having recently moved to the area, not 
having implements, money or material to erect a 
fence to protect crops from roaming livestock. 
While 94% of the households had access to one 
home garden only, 6% had access to two or 
three gardens. These figures include the plots al-
located at the vegetable garden projects, which 
provided the affiliated households with access 
to additional land on which to grow food crops. 
Home gardens were on average 853 m2 with the 
smallest being 100 m2 and the largest being 4550 
m2. During the 2005 survey the respondents indi-
cated that households intercropped the follow-
ing crops in different ways: African vegetables 
(87%); maize (89%) and legumes (83%). Table 
12.1 reports a detailed list of crops produced. 
Winter crops reported by the extension officer 
included: spinach, cabbage, onions, beetroot, 
carrots, green peppers, tomato and sweet po-
tato. With the exception of sweet potato, these 
winter crops were almost exclusively produced 
at the two vegetable garden projects and only 
when the irrigation systems were working. Dur-
ing the survey, 3% of the households, all with a 
water tap on their property, indicated that they 
produced some exotic vegetables during the 
previous twelve months. About 61% of house-
holds reported growing fruit such as paw-paw 
(papaya), marula (Sclerocarya birrea), avocado, 
litchi and mango.
According to the respondents, 88% of their 
home gardens were managed and maintained 
by adult female household members. Others 
might be managed by men but maintained by 
women. Observations indicated that the activity 
of young and old men was limited to plough-
ing with donkeys, ensuring that crops such as 
maize were planted, and taking care of fruit 
trees. During summer, the women responsible 
for the household garden spent on average 2.6 
hours per day (with the median being 3 hours) 
and an average of 3.65 days per week (with the 
median being 4 days) working in the household 
food garden. However, 30% indicated that they 
spent five days per week working in these gar-
dens. Usually this was from early morning until 
midday, by which time it was too hot to work 
in the gardens and other household chores re-
quired attention. Producing food for the house-
hold is predominantly an activity undertaken by 
women. 
A handful of men and even fewer women ac-
cessed larger fields surrounding the village 
(approximately one hectare in size) which they 
cropped during the summer period, relying on 
seasonal rainfall. Large fields were predomi-
nantly intercropped with maize and groundnuts 
or cowpeas. On occasion curcubits were also in-
tercropped with maize. These producers report-
ed that they cultivated traditional crops on these 
fields in order to generate a little extra income 
for themselves, but that often these crops were 
mainly for consumption by household members. 
One farmer was known for selling small quanti-
ties of his maize and other produce locally.
Physical resources
Water supply
Agriculture in this village is highly dependent 
on seasonal summer rainfall. While the physi-
cal water infrastructure is available, its uses 
and availability need to be clearly understood, 
especially the reasons why it is seldom used for 
agricultural purposes. In 1979 communal taps 
were installed for household purposes. Water 
was pumped from the Letaba River to reservoirs, 
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Tsonga English Latin
African vegetables
Tinhwembe Pumpkin / squash leaves Cuccurbits sp. (often local landrace of C. pepo)
Kwembe Pumpkin / squash fruit Cuccurbits sp. (often local landrace of C. pepo)
Swiluva Pumpkin / squash flowers Cuccurbits sp. (often local landrace of C. pepo)
Tinyawa leaves Cowpea leaves Vigna unguiculate
Tinyawa fruit Cowpeas Vigna unguiculate
Muxiji Blackjack Bidens pilosa L. and B. bipinnata L.
Mihlata Sweet potato tubers Ipomoea batatas
Tshimbu Sweet potato leaves Ipomoea batatas
Guxe Jews/jutes mallow Corchorus tridens
Ntsumbula Cassava / manioc Manihot esculentum
Xiyakayana Wild gherkin Cucumus anguria
Gumbu-gumbu Milk thistle Sonchus oleraceus
Mariwa Tsamma Citrullus lanatus
Nkaka Balsam apple Momordica balsamina
Vilolo Purple flower Talinum sp
Rirhudzu Spiderflower plant / cat’s 
whiskers
Cleome gynandra L.
Thyeke Amaranth Amaranthus grassians / spinosum/ cruentus
Phuphuruka Kale Brassica oleracea L. / Sabellica L.
Sindza mbita Meidebossie Waltheria indica
Nkeketi Wild bindweed Convolvulus farinosus
Marhanga Calabash / bottle gourd Lagenaria siceraria
Mandhanda Okra Abelmoschus esculentus
Mapampunu Boerpampoen Cucurbita maxima
Vurhakarhaka Wild gherkin Cucumus sp
Biriviri Local chilli Capsicum frutescens L.
Makalavatla leaves Bitter melon Citrullus lanatus var lanatus
Makalavatla fruit Bitter melon Citrullus lanatus var lanatus
Timanga Peanut / groundnut Arachis hypogaea
Tindluwa Bambara groundnut Vigna subterranean L.
Grains
Mavele Maize Zea mays
Matimba Soetriet / chewing sorghum Sorghum bicolour
Exotic vegetables
Swikwembyana Butternut Cucurbita moschate
Swikwaribani Gem squash Cucurbita pepo
Matamatisi Tomatoes Lycopersicum lycopersicon
Tinyala Onions Allium cepa
Tikherotsi Carrots Daucus carota
Khavichi Cabbage Brassica oleracea var. capitata
Tiherekisi Peas Pisum sativum
Table 12.1: African vegetables, grains and exotic vegetables 
found in the villages
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which supplied the taps in the village. In 1986 
three boreholes were established in Settlement 
A and fed the communal taps by means of two 
diesel pumps and one electric pump, the latter 
installed in 2003. A single borehole was intro-
duced in Settlement B during 1986, equipped 
with a diesel pump. It was connected to the ex-
isting network of taps. Because this single bore-
hole and pump supplied a settlement equal in 
size to Settlement A, certain parts of Settlement 
B had access to water only on certain days. In 
practice the schedule was not adhered to and 
the supply of household water was erratic. In 
August 2005 the diesel pump was removed and 
there were plans to install an electric pump. Al-
though a new pump house was built in early 
2006 the pump was only installed at the end of 
that year. In the meantime, people relied on the 
taps in Settlement A and the summer seasonal 
streams for household water supply. 
The 2005 survey indicated that one household 
had plumbed in cold water from a self-installed 
borehole on its homestead. Only 11% of the sur-
veyed households had a tap on their stand, ac-
cess to which they shared with their neighbours. 
About three quarters of the respondent house-
holds had to travel more than one hundred me-
tres in order to obtain water for household pur-
poses, an activity mainly carried out by women 
and children. A number of residents in Settle-
ment B reported having to access water from a 
stream during summer for household purposes 
as this was the closest source of water. This il-
lustrates that the municipal provision of water is 
inadequate for domestic use and that water is a 
very scarce resource in the village. 
During workshops respondents noted that the 
water they collected from the taps and the 
streams was used exclusively for domestic ac-
tivities, such as washing, cleaning, drinking and 
cooking. Household garden crops were generally 
not irrigated because the collection of sufficient 
water for irrigation purposes would require too 
much time. Similarly, the use of communal taps 
for the collection of water for irrigation would 
prevent other households from collecting suffi-
cient water for important domestic uses. Particu-
larly in Settlement B, this is a result of the water 
supply being irregular and only being available 
in certain areas on certain days of the week. Con-
sequently, home gardens were rain-fed and gen-
erally crops were only grown during the summer 
rainfall season. Some residents mentioned using 
very small amounts of household water to irri-
gate pumpkin/squash and kale plants when first 
planted if they deemed this necessary.
Despite the water problems experienced by most 
households, rainwater harvesting was not really 
practised. About 92% of all dwellings had slop-
ing corrugated zinc roofs, but none of them had 
gutters. When a heavy downpour occurred some 
people would place bowls and other containers 
underneath the roofs but this was a very inef-
fective means of rainwater harvesting as most 
of the water was not collected. The little water 
harvested in this fashion was typically used for 
domestic purposes.
Agricultural implements owned by 
households
Access to agricultural inputs and resources often 
dictate the type and extent of agricultural activi-
ties that can be undertaken. It was noted previ-
ously that conventional input usage was restrict-
ed by household income. A similar situation ap-
plies to access to agricultural implements. Most 
households owned handheld implements only. 
One household owned a tractor which was some-
times hired by a few households to plough the 
larger fields. This household also had a plough 
and some other implements for the tractor. Only 
6.5% of the households owned donkeys and had 
ploughs that could be drawn by donkeys. During 
2005 donkeys were hired out at between R60 
and R80 per span to plough a household gar-
den. In 2008 this price had increased to R100 per 
household garden. This price could be higher if 
a household had a larger-than-average size gar-
den. Observations suggested that many women 
used handheld implements to prepare the soil 
before planting as they could not afford to hire 
donkeys. Table 12.4 indicates the percentage of 
households that owned handheld implements.
This data suggest that most households are not 
in the position to actively pursue agricultural 
activities requiring modern technologies, imple-
ments and associated inputs. Most households 
do not own more than the implements with 
which to perform basic agricultural activities on 
garden plots. These handheld and animal trac-
tion implements were also used at the vegeta-
ble gardens projects. At the time of the June 
2005 survey, 97% of household gardens and 
plots were fenced as were the community gar-
den projects. During winter most households al-
lowed their livestock and that of others to graze 
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on the previous season’s crop residues. This was 
often considered necessary as very little winter 
cropping was done and livestock needed fodder 
in winter. 
Production system
Naturally occurring and cultivated 
plants
African vegetables start growing at the begin-
ning of the summer rains and some can be har-
vested from two weeks after the first rainfall. 
A list of the identified African vegetables and 
other prominent crops grown in the settlements 
are indicated in Table 12.1. Groundnuts, along 
with pumpkins and cowpeas, are so entrenched 
in the Tsonga and Pedi food culture that they 
are discussed as part of the African vegetable 
group. The June 2005 survey revealed that 95% 
of the respondents had African vegetables in 
their home gardens or fields at some time dur-
ing the preceding twelve months. When it came 
to prioritising a particular African vegetable 
plant, local residents attached highest priority 
to those plants that could provide a household 
with more than one foodstuff during the plant’s 
lifecycle, such as curcubits, which can provide at 
least three products at different times. Second 
highest priority was given to those plants whose 
leaves could be dried and stored for consump-
tion during the winter months. Perceived nutri-
tional value and drought tolerance were given 
some subsequent priority. Taste only became a 
preference after these factors. For example, el-
derly respondents said that the cowpea plant 
provided leaves and fruit (peas), and that both 
were dried making it a very important African 
vegetable. When it came to taste they preferred 
the dried peas to the leaves as these were said 
to be tastier and could be eaten alone or added 
to other dried leaves to increase the flavour and 
nutrition of the dish. However, both were con-
sidered important foodstuffs. The order of pri-
oritisation suggests that food security is a very 
important consideration when it comes to se-
lecting plants and ranking their usefulness.
About 95% of the surveyed households indicat-
ed that African vegetables were important food-
stuffs for their households. Reasons for attribut-
ing importance to African vegetables were: 
• local availability and in plentiful quantities 
(more than similar exotic vegetables) (90%); 
• better productions capacity under local 
conditions without irrigation requirements 
(97%); 
• taste is preferable to that of similar exotic 
vegetables such as cabbage and spinach 
(96%); 
• they are believed to be nutritious (98%); 
• some can easily be dried and stored for con-
sumption during the winter months when 
they are not freshly available (94%). 
It is evident that their local availability over a 
protracted period, perceived nutrition content 
and the ability to produce them within the con-
straints of the local environment are important 
criteria for using African vegetables to ensure 
household food security. Local production al-
lows households to spend limited household 
income on other goods and services which they 
cannot produce locally. 
Agricultural Implements Percent
Spade 82%
Handheld hoe 83%
Fork 57%
Rake 66%
Pick-axe 61%
Watering can 4%
Hosepipe, sprinkler or drip system 14%
Handheld pump sprayer for agrochemicals 7%
Table 12.2: Percentage of households having various handheld 
implements
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Identified naturally occurring food plants in 
home gardens included Thyeke (Amaranthus 
sp.), Guxe (Chorchorus sp.), Xiyakayana (Cu-
cumis anguria), Rirhudzu (Cleome gynandra), 
Nkaka (Momordica sp.), Muxiji (Bidens pilosa), 
Vilolo (Talinum sp.), Gumbu-gumbu (Sonchus 
oleraceus) and Nkeketi (Convolvulus farinosus). 
Another nine plants were mentioned but the re-
search team was unable to identify these. Less 
than 8% of households reported actually plant-
ing any of the plants listed above, but 82% re-
ported encouraging their growth. This was done 
by turning over the soil and working the previ-
ous season’s crop residues into the soil prior to 
the first rain (all households), working manure 
into the soil (only those households owning 
livestock that supplied sufficient manure) and 
in some cases by adding fertiliser mixes (SASOL 
2:3:4 (30%) + Zn 5grms/kg) (about 6% of house-
holds). Only those households that could afford 
synthetic fertiliser applied it in conjunction with 
manure. Poorer households did not use manure 
or fertiliser but merely ploughed the plant resi-
dues from the previous season back into the soil. 
Agricultural practices invoked the use of local 
agricultural knowledge – especially low external 
input principles. Ploughing was usually done by 
hand using a handheld hoe. The crops selected 
and planted tended to be drought tolerant. As 
most households could not afford to purchase 
agrochemicals, fungicides, pesticides and her-
bicides were generally not used. Intercropping 
and companion planting were the order of the 
day. For example, maize was often intercropped 
with cowpeas. The cowpeas protect the soil from 
erosion, and fertilise it with nitrogen and or-
ganic matter. These local practices prevail when 
water is a constraint, both at home and at the 
garden projects.
Once the African vegetable plant has germi-
nated it is not weeded out of the garden un-
less there are too many in one place and they 
threaten the growth of a planted crop. Only a 
few women, mainly the elderly, collect seeds 
of Thyeke (Amaranthus), Guxe (Corchorus), 
Rirhudzu (Cleome gynandra), Muxiji (Bidens pi-
losa), Vilolo (Talinum sp), Nkeketi (Convolvulus 
farinosus), Gumbu-gumbu (Sonchus oleraceus) 
and Xiyakayana (Cucumis anguria). When the 
plants are not growing in areas where they are 
wanted, then the women broadcast the seeds in 
their gardens. All other naturally occurring Af-
rican vegetables are allowed to flower and re-
seed themselves at the end of their growth cy-
cle. However, this practice is gradually resulting 
in the depletion of the seedbed, which is made 
worse by rainfall erosivity.
A high number of households (79%) planted 
other plants that they also categorised as Afri-
can vegetables because these were indigenised 
into the local food culture. Tinwhembe (Curcu-
bits sp.) was the most popular, being cultivated 
by 79% of the households; Tinyawa (Vigna un-
guiculata) was the next most popular (74%), fol-
lowed by Mandhanda (Abelmoschus esculentus) 
(40%), Marhanga (Lagenaria siceraria) (40%), 
Makalavatla (Citrullus lanatus) (31%), Tshimbu 
(Ipomoea batatas) (28%) and Phupuruka (Brassi-
ca oleracea L. / Sabellica L.) (8%). These plants’ 
seeds (or vines in the case of sweet potato) were 
sown or broadcast at the time of ploughing. 
Depending on the household’s resources, ma-
nure and compost might be added. Curcubitis 
sp., Abelmoschus esculentus and Brassica oler-
acea L. / Sabellica L. might be watered during 
the first month by some households. All other 
cultivated and naturally occurring African veg-
etables relied exclusively on rainfall. Except for 
the seeds of okra (Abelmoschus esculentus) and 
kale (Brassica oleracea L. / Sabellica L.) the seeds 
of the other actively cultivated African vegeta-
bles can be purchased at the co-operative in the 
nearby town of Letsitele. Despite this availabil-
ity many women reported preferring to save 
and store seeds as this not only saved money but 
also allowed them select the best seeds for stor-
age and replanting. Consequently, a number of 
the more entrenched cultivated African vegeta-
bles were local landraces. Seeds were typically 
replaced if they were damaged during storage 
or if the yields appeared to be deteriorating 
despite sufficient rainfall. Women reported 
exchanging seeds amongst themselves but ac-
knowledged that if many people were short of 
seed then people usually purchased seed in Let-
sitele. Seed saving and storage is mainly done 
by older women and it is clear that most of the 
younger women have no idea how to collect and 
store seeds. Because of the introduction of new 
crops some women, again mainly the elderly, 
were interested in learning how best to collect 
and store the seeds of these crops. It must also 
be noted that while men might contribute mon-
ey for maize seed they did not do so for African 
vegetable seed.
Consumption patterns
During the survey all of the respondents reported 
eating African vegetables at some stage during 
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the preceding twelve months. Most households 
surveyed generally consumed three main meals 
a day (93%), with 72% typically consuming Afri-
can vegetables at two of these meals. In winter, 
cabbage was often the replacement for African 
vegetables, especially at times when the house-
hold had money. While brown bread was usually 
consumed at the first meal of the day by 95% of 
the households, maize porridge was consumed 
at the other two meals by 89% of the house-
holds. When they could afford to do so house-
holds indicated that they tended to consume 
red meat (79%), chicken (mainly necks, head and 
feet) (82%) and fish (mainly canned fish or fish 
heads) (76%) with their maize porridge. The reg-
ularity of consuming any type of meat depended 
largely on a household’s access to livestock and 
income. Limited food diary recording, facilitated 
by the fieldworkers, indicated that meat (usu-
ally chicken parts) was seldom consumed more 
than twice a week and that vegetables were 
consumed at most midday and evening meals 
although not necessarily twice a day.
The leaves of some of the naturally occurring 
and cultivated African vegetables were often 
dried and stored for later consumption. For 
most households (94%), dried African veg-
etables were the main source of vegetables in 
winter when fresh vegetables were scarce. As a 
result of drying and depending on the volume 
harvested per household, respondents said that 
dried vegetables could be the main source of 
vegetables consumed for up to nine months 
(25%), with 29% indicating that they could be 
consumed for twelve months of the year if they 
had harvested and dried sufficient quantities. 
However, this is probably not strictly true as very 
few households were able to harvest sufficient 
quantities to store for several months and stocks 
were generally depleted two months before the 
next summer rains, indicating that they were 
consumed for approximately four months after 
the summer rainfall season. Follow up interviews 
confirmed that this was the most common pat-
tern. It was also noted that some households 
would combine the dried leaves of amaranthus, 
spiderflower and black jack (only freshly availa-
ble during October to December) with the fresh 
leaves of other plants to diversify the flavour of 
the dish and that this would last as long as the 
supply of these dried leaves was available during 
the summer period. As the stored supply of dried 
African vegetables decreases during winter, so 
the households consume them at fewer meals, 
typically replacing them with the less nutritious 
and locally purchased cabbages. Given this de-
cline in stocks, it is unlikely that households 
would consume African vegetables in any form 
twice a day although twice-daily consumption is 
likely in the summer months when incomes are 
lower and the availability of a wide range of 
fresh African vegetables is greater.
A seasonal calendar was compiled with local 
residents to determine when the fresh and dried 
leaves were consumed. These are summarised in 
Table 12.3 and indicates that some leaves could 
be consumed fresh for up to seven or eight 
months, such as Guxe (Corchorus). In other in-
stances the time period was generally shorter 
(approx. five to six months) as in the case of 
Nkaka (Momordica sp.), Tinwhembe (Curcubits 
sp.) and Mandhanda (Abelmoschus esculentus). 
It should also be noted that the preference was 
for young and tender leaves and the leaves of 
Crop Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
Guxe F F F F F D D D D F F F
Tinhwembe F F F F D D D D D D D F
Tinyawa F F F D D D D D
Tshimbu F F
Nkaka F F F F D D D D F F
Mandhanda F F F F D D D D F
Rirudzu D F F
Thyeke D F F
Muxiji D F F
Table 12.3: Seasonal consumption patterns of African 
vegetable fresh and dried leaves
D=Dried, F=Fresh, Blank Space=Not consumed in any form
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older plants would generally not be harvested 
for fresh consumption.
The percentages of the households that dried 
and stored leaves are provided in Table 12.4. An-
other two naturally occurring plants were men-
tioned but because they were not easily found 
and the research team was unable to identify 
them they are not indicated in the table. Drying 
and storing is an important part of the produc-
tion system. Most leaves of the plants are har-
vested when young and dried on a corrugated 
zinc sheet. Some leaves are blanched before be-
ing dried as this makes them tender and speeds 
up the drying process. After a few days the dried 
leaves are placed in old maize meal sacks and are 
stored for latter consumption.
The significance of African vegetables 
in household food security
The survey indicated that 80% of households 
felt that African vegetables were important in 
ensuring food security. At the same time, 51% 
said that exotic vegetables were not important 
to the household for food security because they 
were expensive, could not be grown locally and 
could not be dried. While 18% felt that exotic 
vegetables were important, only 2% said that 
both were important. During discussions on the 
importance of these crops for food security, the 
general impression was that attributed impor-
tance differed vastly from household to house-
hold. Households without a constant income 
tended to be more reliant on African vegeta-
bles, both in summer and winter. This was espe-
cially true where unemployment was high and 
in households where children no longer quali-
fied for child support grants and adults were not 
yet eligible for state old age pensions. In South 
Africa, food is generally more expensive in the 
rural areas and in winter certain crops are more 
expensive. Therefore dried African vegetables 
formed the basis of nutrition in most rural house-
holds and especially the poorer households, 
contributing up to 80% of their total vegetable 
consumption in winter. In summer this figure 
was closer to 95% due to the greater availability 
of these foodstuffs. Given the manner in which 
African vegetables are prioritised, it is clear that 
most rural households attached importance to 
these plants for their food security. However, 
their label as a ‘poverty or backward food’ nega-
tively affected the youth’s perception of these 
foodstuffs. The youth (generally adults under 
35 years) strongly preferred exotic vegetables, 
such as cabbage and spinach, to African vegeta-
bles. Taste seemed to be a big issue regarding 
preference for the youth. Elderly residents, on 
the other hand, preferred African vegetables as 
they said they could produce these locally with 
their limited resources and also because they 
grew up with these plants and foodstuffs, while 
exotic vegetables were a relatively recent addi-
tion to the food basket. Only 3% of households 
reported growing any exotic vegetables in the 
previous twelve months. This was attributed to 
the lack of irrigation and other required produc-
tion inputs. Despite their preference for exotic 
Tsonga name Common name % dried and stored
Predominantly naturally occurring
Guxe Jutes mallow 88%
Muxiji Black jack 47%
Thyeke Amaranthus 43%
Rirhudzu Cleome / spiderflower 43%
Nkaka Balsam apple 42%
Xiyakayana Wild gherkin 34%
Predominantly cultivated
Tinwhembe Pumpkins/squash 95%
Tinyawa Cowpeas 74%
Makalavatla Melon 21%
Mandhanda Okra 19%
Marhanga Bottle gourd 9%
Tshimbu Sweet potato < 1%
Table 12.4: African vegetable leaf drying and storing practices
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vegetables, the youth acknowledged having to 
consume African vegetables as their socioeco-
nomic and local agroecological circumstances 
prevented them from purchasing or producing 
the preferred exotic vegetables most of the time. 
Affirming the benefits of African vegetables 
(much of which has already been done by recent 
research on nutrition) and addressing the status 
issue would help to promote the consumption of 
African vegetables amongst the youth. 
Economic aspects
Economic significance of maize and 
African vegetables in the village
In August 2008 approximate figures were ob-
tained with regard to costs and yields for maize 
and African vegetables for the 2007/2008 sum-
mer rainfall season. While some attempt is made 
to understand the direct (sales) and indirect (sav-
ings by not having to buy) financial implications 
of own production and consumption of maize 
and African vegetables, the usefulness of this 
data to determine any real value to the house-
hold is limited. This is because of factors such as 
the size of the land under cultivation, the size 
of the household and the amounts harvested. 
Also, a comprehensive economic analysis would 
have to accurately determine the costs of all the 
inputs required and other costs involved. The in-
formation provided indicates a general pattern 
and does not distinguish poorer from wealthier 
households and larger from smaller plots. House-
holds used in this study ranged from three to 
seven members in size and access to land ranged 
from one to two plots of varying sizes. 
The amount of maize harvested for own con-
sumption ranged from 50 kilograms to 350 kil-
ograms of grain. Generally it was felt that the 
production of their own maize could feed a 
household for between three and five months. 
If this amount of maize was purchased from the 
local shops it would cost the household between 
R160 for 50 kilograms of maize meal and R1120 
for 350 kilograms, and thus implies a similar sav-
ing for the year.
When discussing the consumption of African 
vegetables, respondents reported that the con-
sumption of fresh leaves was difficult to deter-
mine as these were picked from the plants as 
required. This ensured that the leaves consumed 
during the season were always fresh. They esti-
mated the volume of fresh leaves to be between 
25 kilograms and 50 kilograms and that these 
plants would be consumed by the households for 
between four and six months. This consumption 
would contribute to a saving for the household 
of between R1000 and R2000 during the season. 
Similar figures were given for dried leaves with 
the exception that they were consumed for only 
three months after the season. This paints a dif-
ferent picture to the survey which suggested a 
longer period of consumption for dried leaves. 
African vegetables generally cost nothing to 
produce as the people involved in this exercise 
all attempted to save seeds of the most popu-
lar African vegetables. Maize and African veg-
etables were planted and cultivated (or encour-
aged) at the same time. Most of the expenses 
involved are considered to be a result of grow-
ing maize rather than growing African vegeta-
bles. The cost of ploughing using donkeys was 
R100 at the beginning of the season. Between 
two and five bags of maize seed were purchased 
and the cost was between R10 and R20 per bag 
depending on the supplier. The largest amount 
sown was five bags at R20 per bag resulting in 
a cost of R100. Only one household bought fer-
tiliser (LAN) and this cost about R50, while the 
others used differing amounts of kraal manure, 
which had no cost implications. No pesticides, 
herbicides or fungicides were used during the 
planting and growing season. The maximum 
input costs are therefore R250. Based on these 
figures own production, harvesting and storage 
of maize and African vegetables could provide a 
household with a saving of up to R4870 (R5120 
– R250) during the year. While on the face of it 
this might not appear significant, it is neverthe-
less substantial if the household income is less 
than R12000 per annum, for example a pension-
er headed household with between two and five 
unemployed dependents.
The villagers regard dried African leafy vegeta-
bles as a very important part of their diet in the 
six (6) months of May to October – depending on 
rainfall patterns – when fresh vegetables are not 
available. They have to buy exotic vegetables if 
they do not have enough Miroho (dried leaves), 
and they usually buy cabbage. If they do not 
have to buy cabbage because they have enough 
Miroho, they then use the money to buy other 
food such as chicken, bread, etc. or they save the 
money for other expenses such as clothing and 
schooling requirements. They say they eat bet-
ter if they have dried Miroho during the winter 
months. During discussions many households re-
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ported giving Miroho to neighbours and family 
that did not have their own supply.
Sales of African leafy vegetables in 
the study area
Some African vegetables are sold in the nearby 
towns of Letsitele and Nkowankowa. Sales are 
conducted in informal markets at the taxi ranks 
or other well-visited public places. Guxe (Corcho-
rus) and Thyeke (Amaranth) were the main Af-
rican vegetables sold in these towns. However, 
pumpkin leaves (Tinhwembe) and okra pods 
(Mandhanda) were sold on a few occasions. 
While these vegetables are generally sold fresh 
in bags, some informants reported that out of 
season one might occasionally come across dried 
African vegetables, but that this was rare. Re-
searchers did not observe this at any time dur-
ing the past three years. Like the fresh produce, 
dried leaves are apparently sold to urban resi-
dents who do not have access to them in their 
home gardens.
The Letsitele informal market area has a few 
vendors that sell African vegetables. In 2006 one 
woman was regularly selling pumpkin leaves 
(R3 a bunch) and pumpkin flowers (R1 a hand-
ful), Muxiji leaves (R3 a bag), and ground pea-
nuts at R2 for a small sandwich-bag-sized bag. 
Sometimes green okra pods were sold at R3 for a 
one-kilogram bag. Another woman sold a large 
bunch of pumpkin leaves and flowers for R5. 
She also sold pumpkins and cowpeas. In winter 
the vendors sold exotic vegetables such as cab-
bage, spinach and kale. They refused to disclose 
their suppliers to the researchers and gener-
ally seemed concerned about competition. The 
pumpkins seemed to originate from a farmer 
with good access to water.
Two customers at the Letsitele market indicated 
that they come to Letsitele from Nkowankowa 
as the vegetables are much cheaper at Letsitele, 
and that although they are happy with the qual-
ity they would like to have more variety than is 
locally available.
One woman was selling African vegetables next 
to the Nkowankowa police station in October 
2005. She was the only African vegetable vendor 
in the area. She sold pumpkin leaves and flow-
ers together (R3/bundle), Guxe (Corchorus) for 
R3 per 1 litre container, spinach (R3/bundle), kale 
(R3/bundle) and peeled groundnuts. In January 
and February 2006 she sold kale and spinach. 
She was also vague about her suppliers. She kept 
most of her stock in huge blue plastic bags that 
she kept closed to ensure it remained fresh. Her 
displayed produce looked very attractive. 
In January 2006 there were eighteen stalls at the 
Nkowankowa taxi rank. Five out of the eight-
een stalls sold African vegetables. The prices 
throughout the market were the same for the 
produce. The sizes were smaller, but not enough 
to warrant the cost of driving to Letsitele to pur-
chase them. Prices do not fluctuate over the sea-
son. One woman had a tub of water in which the 
produce was kept and she was almost sold out 
because her produce still looked fresh. Only one 
person had produce that looked poor, and she 
was not selling anything. There is evidence that 
buyers are critical of the produce, and the fresh-
est looking produce is sold first. Pumpkin leaves 
and flowers are sold for R3/bundle. All stalls sold 
this and it was the most popular product. Most 
of the stalls sold Guxe at R3 per double hand-
ful. One stall sold red amaranth at R3 per 2 litre 
container of compressed leaves. Tinyawa (cow-
peas) are sold when available. Some stallholders 
cannot find Cleome but would sell it if available. 
One stallholder said she sold pumpkin, cleome, 
Muxiji (Bidens pilosa) and amaranth in the sum-
mertime. She sold spinach and Mukwariba (not 
identified during the study) in winter. Powdered 
peanuts cost R4 for one and a half cups. Only 
one stallholder sold pumpkin flowers separately, 
at R2/handful. Only one woman indicated that 
she sells Nkaka when available. If the plants do 
not sell they perish very quickly due to the sun 
and the heat. Keeping the plants in water helps 
to improve their shelf life, but this technique 
was the exception rather than the rule.
Trade on pension day in the village is very active. 
However, local people only sold pumpkin leaves 
and groundnuts. The pumpkin leaves went for 
R5 per 2 litre container of compressed leaves. 
The other traders are usually from outside the 
village and tend to sell crops and products that 
are not available in the village such as broiler 
chickens, tomatoes, cabbage, etc. They also 
sold maize seed, both traditional and pesticide-
treated seed.  
All three areas of sale suggest that the selling 
of African vegetables could be profitable, but 
in most cases transport is required. Shelf life of 
fresh produce is a problem and wastage can be 
high if there is a lot of competition. The market 
for African vegetables needs to be studied to 
identify the best vegetables, prices, location and 
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presentation thereof. When compared to other 
crops, the profit margin on African vegetables is 
low. When compared to cabbage that sold at R5 
per head in 2006 and R7 per head in 2008, the 
pumpkin leaves were inexpensive. 
Any attempts at increasing commercialisation 
will need to be approached with caution. There 
are some concerns about the possible effects of 
changing African vegetables from a predomi-
nantly women-produced household food secu-
rity crop to a cash crop. Several cases (personal 
communication during several conferences and 
experience in East Africa) have shown that men 
take over cash crops, thus leaving women with 
fewer crops available for their home gardens. 
Women might stand to lose the small amount of 
money they do make from sales of these crops 
if they attained commercial significance. High-
er prices and the development of less tolerant 
and adaptable varieties could remove them as 
a ready source of food from rural households. 
Research on Amaranthus as a commercial crop 
was recently undertaken by the ARC-Roodeplaat 
with funding from the Department of Agricul-
ture. It focused predominantly on large scale 
production.
Income sources and 
livelihoods
The total monthly household incomes for June 
2006 are indicated in Table 12.5 and suggest that 
most households do not have a very high income 
and that almost half the households are poor by 
South African standards20. At the extremes, one 
household reported having no monthly income 
and another reported having a total income 
of more than R5000 per month. Some of these 
figures may be higher than usual because the 
survey was carried out at a time of year when 
households were more likely to benefit from 
seasonal employment. 
To get a deeper understanding of the contribu-
tion of household income to food security, re-
spondents were asked about constraints relating 
to household income. Most significant was the 
fact that 48% of the households experienced 
problems relating to food security and reported 
not having enough food or income to purchase 
food for the household at various times during 
the preceding twelve months. This is a concern 
according to Stats SA’s national General House-
hold Survey of 2004; slightly less than 20% of 
rural households in Limpopo Province reported 
experiencing food insecurity at some stage dur-
ing the twelve months preceding that survey. 
Food insecurity seems to be a problem for just 
under half the households in this village. Only 
five percent of the surveyed households had at 
least one member who was involved in the two 
vegetable garden projects run by the Limpopo 
Provincial Department of Agriculture and En-
vironment (LPDAE) or other agricultural asso-
ciations (not necessarily in this village). Through 
interaction with project members, the research-
ers determined that probably no more than 32 
people were active in the two garden projects 
during the study period. This indicates that there 
is very little opportunity for the majority of the 
residents, who are not members of a project or 
association, to get agricultural information as all 
engagement in this area is done at the vegeta-
ble garden projects. It is questionable whether 
these services are contributing to the food se-
curity of the majority of the villagers, especially 
as almost half of the households reported being 
food insecure at some stage.
Table 12.6 indicates that employment outside 
of the village and state grants are the widest 
contributors to household income. Seasonal em-
ployment is highest during the late autumn and 
winter months, from mid-May until mid-Septem-
ber. At this time of the year some men and wom-
Household total monthly income Percent
R2000+ 14%
R1000 – R1999 34%
R750 – R999 22%
R500 – R749 10%
R1 – R499 19%
No monthly income 1%
Total 100%
Table 12.5: Household incomes
20  With an average household 
size of 4.77 members, 83% of 
the residents would be living 
on less than US$2 per day and 
49% would be living on less 
than US$1 per day.
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en are employed on the citrus farms and packing 
sheds in the area, providing 20% of households 
with a necessary income during the dry winter 
months. Few people are employed in seasonal 
work outside of this period. Consequently, only 
about 46% of households have members who 
are employed regularly for the remaining eight 
months of the year.
State grants are an important source of house-
hold income in the two villages and are the most 
common source of income, although amounts 
are relatively small, especially given the mean 
household size of almost five members. Old age 
pensions and disability grants in 2005 were R810 
per person per month (females 60 years and 
over and males 65 years and over). Child support 
grants were for children up to the age of 14 years 
and were R180 per child per month. While these 
amounts can be considered low, most people 
reported that they were vital for the household 
and contributed to the survival of all household 
members and not just the grantees.
Remittances from household members living 
temporarily or permanently away from the vil-
lage also make a contribution to household 
income, but most people reported that these 
contributions were irregular and often only re-
ceived when the person visited or returned to 
the village. Often remittances would be in the 
form of food or clothing and not in cash. 
Very small numbers of the households indicated 
that they harvested the natural resource base 
surrounding the villages for food and other 
livelihoods, such as selling firewood. However, 
observations clearly indicated that most house-
holds harvested fuel-wood in the areas sur-
rounding the village. A visit during winter 2008 
indicated that barren areas had increased and 
that trees on the surrounding hills were now be-
ing harvested for firewood.
Residents indicated that they relied on a number 
of other lesser and infrequently used income-
generating strategies for their survival and gen-
eral well-being. These included the making of 
traditional beer and clay bricks which are sold 
locally. 
While Table 12.6 illustrates that households have 
a number of diverse sources of livelihoods, it is 
Household livelihood sources Percent
At least one member with some form of employment 66%
A member with full-time employment 22%
A member with regular part-time employment 24%
A member with seasonal employment (predominantly in winter months) 20%
State grant recipient households 83%
State old-age pension 24%
State child grant or disability grant 59%
Remittances from temporary migrants 22%
Remittances from family member permanently living away from village 7%
Collecting wild edible plants 7%
Hunting, trapping or collecting wild animals and insects 3%
Collecting and selling firewood 2%
Agricultural activities 90%
Production of crops 90%
Extra source of household food 83%
Primary source of household food 5%
Extra source of income 2%
Production of livestock 59%
Extra source of household food 29%
Primary source of household food 26%
Extra source of income generating purposes 4%
Other – including reselling of crops/groceries and making traditional beer 5%
Table 12.6: Household livelihood sources
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evident that social grants and off-farm work are 
the most common sources of income for house-
holds. Agricultural activities are the most wide-
spread means of livelihood and involve livestock 
and crop husbandry. About 59% of households 
acknowledged producing various livestock at 
intervals during the previous twelve months. 
While 29% did so for extra food, 26% did so as a 
main source of food and only 4% produced live-
stock primarily for income generating purposes. 
Although livestock husbandry was common, the 
figures in Table 12.6 indicate that the percent-
age of households owning livestock other than 
poultry was low. Wealthier households tended 
to own more livestock, particularly cattle and 
goats. Slightly more than half of the households 
owned chickens during the preceding twelve 
months. Households owning donkeys used these 
animals to generate an income through their 
use in ploughing household gardens and trans-
porting firewood and water. All livestock, with 
the exception of poultry and pigs, grazed on 
communal land in and around the village. Most 
livestock were unattended while they grazed 
although some cattle owners with large herds 
would employ a local herdsman to look after 
the cattle during the day. Goats roamed the area 
freely with only a handful being tethered while 
they grazed.
Crop production is the most widespread live-
lihood activity and is primarily practised for 
household food security purposes. This seems 
to be done more as a food safety-net, rather 
than for income, and is heavily reliant on sum-
mer seasonal rainfall. Of the 90% of households 
that produced agricultural crops as a livelihood 
source 83% noted that this was to ensure an ex-
tra source of food for the household and 5% re-
ported that it was the main source of household 
food. Cropping is practiced at the two vegetable 
garden projects in the village and at most home-
steads. However, the practices at the vegetable 
garden projects and the home gardens differ at 
times and this needs to be examined in order to 
determine the relative contribution of agricul-
ture to food security at these different sites. 
Policy issues
The Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture 
– which represents the founding document of 
the Presidential Working Committee on Agri-
culture and is effectively government’s primary 
statement regarding agrarian reform – says vir-
tually nothing about specific measures to sup-
port smallholders. Rather the document speaks 
broadly of allowing/promoting “the entire spec-
trum of enterprises and farm sizes” (DoA, 2001: 
8). It also does not directly address the question 
of agricultural production for household food 
security. Despite the vegetable garden projects 
and their exotic crops appearing to be failures, 
the extension services and the government do 
not seem to be able to develop a better and 
more focused food security strategy for rural 
households facing similar conditions as those 
found in this village. The dogged commitment 
to introducing high-input technologies and 
crops seems to prevent government agricultural 
services from addressing the problems at hand. 
If nothing else, the predilection for community 
projects that involve readily stolen borehole 
pumps must be recognised for the stalemate 
that it is. Rainwater harvesting and water man-
agement strategies may well be more appropri-
ate help in the long-term than merely replacing 
the pumps or purchasing the missing parts. 
The extension officers involved are currently not 
making any comments in this regard except to 
say that the people cannot afford to maintain 
or replace the pumps as they are too poor. It is 
possible that support might be obtained under 
Livestock resources Percent of households owning 
livestock
Mean number owned 
among owning 
households 
Dairy cattle 6% 7.6
Beef cattle 13% 6.6
Goats 15% 8.2
Pigs 4% 11.2   
Poultry – chickens and pigeons 53% 14.2
Donkeys 6% 7.0
Table 12.7: Livestock ownership
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the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Pro-
gramme (CASP) but similar questions about ap-
propriateness would arise given the content of 
the existing support programme.
Social and institutional issues
One consistent benefit of the vegetable garden 
projects is that they provide the thirty or so af-
filiated households with access to an extra piece 
of land on which to grow food crops. So despite 
their problems they have some benefit. Especial-
ly for the women who started the care group, 
this has provided them with a social environment 
to produce what they want and discuss relevant 
matters away from male influences. The projects 
also enable the women and few men involved to 
interact with outside agricultural service provid-
ers, which does increase their knowledge of ag-
riculture, and this has resulted in a few women 
experimenting on their own in their home gar-
dens, and is a reason for some households us-
ing fertiliser at their home gardens (although 
discussions with project members highlighted 
that very little technology that was practiced at 
the projects could be used in the household gar-
dens). They also remain expectant of receiving 
more resources and inputs from the extension 
services. 
Women are also engaged in their own seed stor-
age and exchange network with other women in 
the village. While some women were willing to 
share information freely with one another, oth-
ers tended to keep information to themselves.
Human dimensions
Most people reported that they learned their ag-
ricultural skills from their parents and grandpar-
ents, and developed them further by exchanging 
information with one another. They noted great 
differences between practices at home and on 
the projects; at home they practised agriculture 
the ‘traditional’ way and did not want to lose 
this part of their culture as it enabled them to 
secure food, even in times of poor rainfall. 
One or two of the wealthier men who were 
not part of these projects were affiliated to ag-
ricultural associations outside the village and 
reported that they obtained information from 
these sources. Some people had also developed 
knowledge about conventional farming from 
exposure to commercial farms at some stage 
in their employment histories. Others had ob-
tained this from interacting with the extension-
supported projects. However, it was clear that ir-
respective of whether or not these technologies 
are agro-ecologically appropriate, most people 
did not practise them because of the associated 
costs.
Local people argued that despite the presence 
of the vegetable projects with their convention-
al approaches to agricultural production, their 
own local and traditional practices were equally 
important to agriculture and food security. How-
ever, despite the problems experienced with the 
water and borehole pumps over the years, they 
did not frown upon technologies, as they had 
seen the benefit of these under certain condi-
tions, i.e. when everything worked well. They 
reasoned that perhaps they could blend certain 
aspects of the two approaches. At the end of the 
2005/2006 study they had compiled a list of po-
tential areas of cooperation between their prac-
tices and what they considered to be ‘conven-
tional’ (technologically-based) or external prac-
tices. This was due to the fact that many people 
could see the strengths of both types of farming 
as well as the constraints evident in both. 
The discussions and observations indicated that 
most of the more active farmers, who were ac-
knowledged as such by their peers, tended to be 
those who were either very poor or by contrast 
those with enough money to be able to afford 
external inputs. Interestingly, both of these 
groups seemed to be more open to experimen-
tation than those in the middle. Wealthier farm-
ers tended to adopt more conventional practices 
more readily than the poorer ones; however, 
many of the poorer farmers were engaged in 
their own experimentation. 
Environmental issues
Despite African vegetables being significant for 
household food security, various agro-ecological 
conditions, combined with social circumstances, 
are contributing to a decline in their availabil-
ity as a foodstuff. The preferences and attitude 
of the local youth mentioned above is only one 
of these factors. Others are soil erosion due to 
overgrazing and poor land and water manage-
ment.
During the dry winter season the vegetation on 
the communal lands and home gardens is re-
duced and the ground is left bare after harvest-
ing and grazing. A significant amount of erosion 
can be attributed to the mismanagement of the 
commons. This is a result of the extensive and 
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unmanaged harvesting of wood for fuel and 
the overgrazing of livestock, especially unat-
tended goats, donkeys and cattle. There were 
some plans to reduce overgrazing, but in winter 
it was said that this was hard to enforce because 
forage in any form is scarce. Measures included 
tethering livestock and rotating them on a daily 
basis so that they are not able to overgraze any 
particular area. However, not everybody com-
plied with this practice and during the study very 
few tethered livestock were actually seen on the 
commons.  
The village experiences most of the summer 
precipitation in the form of thunderstorms. The 
rainfall is hard but generally short in duration. 
The water rushes down the hills, through the 
village, and removes the topsoil from fields and 
homestead gardens. This has a significant nega-
tive impact on soil availability, suitability and 
the presence of seeds of self-seeding plants in 
the area. A few women residents have tried to 
control water flow and run-off by erecting stone 
bunds and digging furrows. However, rather 
than collecting the water or controlling the 
flow, these measures tended mainly to divert 
the water away from these homesteads towards 
others and the gravel roads, thus exacerbating 
downstream problems. In some areas patches 
bare of topsoil had developed, and even during 
the rainy season these patches were not covered 
with any vegetation due to the loss of nutrients, 
seeds and the bare soil being too hard for root 
penetration. These areas were especially prone 
to water and wind erosion.
In the smaller home gardens it was observed 
that people did not plough across the slope in 
order to restrict the water flow. Inadvertently, 
much of the rain ran down the slope without 
penetrating the soil sufficiently. While inter-
cropping may contribute to erosion control it is 
not as efficient as it could be under current prac-
tices. It was also observed that people in the vil-
lage had no knowledge of simple and effective 
water management technologies such as grass 
strips, planting pits, semi-circular pits, earth ba-
sins and raised beds. Similarly, there was no use 
of household grey water for crop production. 
Management of this water could allow for the 
production of certain crops during winter. It was 
previously mentioned that the majority of dwell-
ings have zinc roofs and therefore the potential 
for rainwater harvesting. However, the lack of 
guttering prevented this from being used with 
any effectiveness.
The future
Official agricultural activities generally and also 
in the study area tend to overlook the benefit 
(and constraints) of local agricultural knowledge 
and practices while exclusively focusing on the 
transfer of conventional technology.21 By and 
large this is inappropriate, as virtually none of 
the households have the resources to use this 
technology. Also, those who are involved in 
the projects ironically practise one type of ag-
riculture at the project site and another in their 
home gardens and fields. by focusing more on 
local practices and knowledge and supporting 
and enhancing the principles inherent in this 
knowledge, more households could receive the 
benefits of conventional agricultural technol-
ogy. An effective mixture of the principles inher-
ent in the two systems would go a long way to 
achieving this.
During the discussions at focus group workshops 
and also during informal interviews with resi-
dents, a number of areas were identified where 
they requested support and information. These 
are described below:
• Seed systems – Many women stored seeds 
and some requested further information 
on this practice, especially with some of 
the exotic vegetables that were becoming 
indigenised. There would be value in shar-
ing information on all aspects of exotic and 
traditional vegetable seed systems, such as 
how and when they can be harvested and 
cleaned, how long they can be stored, etc. 
Emphasis should be placed on promoting 
seed systems for African vegetables and 
re-introducing the selection of fruits and 
plants for seed harvesting to ensure that 
adequate and good quality seeds are har-
vested. Effective nursery establishment on 
a small-scale within home gardens would 
help many households to increase their ac-
cess to healthy and nutritional plants. ‘Seed 
fairs’ could be one way in which awareness 
of the importance of seed systems in rural 
villages might be improved. 
• Appropriate training – There is a need for 
more appropriate training that is relevant 
to specific local circumstances. This often 
requires follow-up visits by specialists to 
help with adaptation of technologies to 
local conditions. In some cases technology 
is not being used optimally, and might in 
fact be causing a loss of total yield per area. 
21 The reader should bear in 
mind that the intention was 
never to assess the current 
Provincial Department of Ag-
riculture projects. In fact when 
the field site was selected we 
were unaware of their purpose 
and only knew that two proj-
ects were located in the area. 
This case is not an assessment 
of the two projects but rather 
suggests that they are inappro-
priate in their current form due 
to various technological and lo-
cal social constraints. Given this 
they could be altered in various 
ways so that available technol-
ogy could serve the majority of 
the residents as opposed to the 
few people who are involved in 
the two projects.
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Researchers, extension officers and farmers 
need to work together to determine the ef-
fectiveness of practices, and to promote ad-
aptations that are locally appropriate and 
where needed. The appropriateness and 
timing of training in communities should 
be decided together with the community 
members for whom it is intended. 
• Livestock care – During the study and the 
survey a number of male residents indicated 
a concern about their livestock, especially 
cattle. In winter forage is scarce and a few 
men mentioned cattle dying from disease 
at this time. Livestock information seems to 
have been lost at several levels and to vary-
ing degrees. The following are possible ar-
eas for training: breeding and selection of 
all livestock, dipping practices (found to be 
ineffective in many communities, probably 
also here), livestock management, stock-
ing rates, feeding alternatives in winter. 
Farmers should know when to decide to 
sell, rather than let their livestock die dur-
ing winter. The services of donkey experts 
should be made more widely available to 
provide advice and support to local donkey 
owners and users. This would be especially 
useful with regard to nutrition and the re-
pairing and fitting of harnesses, carts and 
ploughs to ensure comfort and efficiency.
There were some other areas in which local 
residents require information so that they could 
include this in their practices. These include the 
following:
• Utilisation of African vegetables – African 
vegetables make a significant contribution 
to food security and household nutrition. 
However, there are some possibilities of 
this being undermined if the crops are not 
protected – e.g. being kept free of aflotox-
in and mycotoxin contamination – during 
cropping, harvesting, processing (drying) 
and storage. Improved hygiene and food 
safety during drying and storage would re-
duce contamination and losses. This could 
be done by introducing a number of health 
safety principles to the residents. At the 
same time, awareness should be created of 
the different methods of food preparation 
that will help to increase the nutritional 
content of the food (e.g. the addition of a 
little fat, chopping, optimal boiling times, 
etc.). There is an argument for specifically 
promoting the production of yellow fleshed 
sweet potatoes as these are high in beta-
carotene from which vitamin A is derived. 
• Cultivation – Local residents are very aware 
of the principles of their soil preparation 
and cropping activities. However, collabo-
rative research might improve this within 
the constraints of the resources which are 
available to them. Pension and other social 
grants are often used to purchase inputs 
such as seed and fertiliser. Research could 
optimise production and possibly reduce 
the expenditure on these items. There is a 
need to evaluate the possible use of liquid 
manure in the communities and also the use 
of grey water. Trench/door gardens, raised 
beds and micro-gardens might prove viable 
alternatives and enable basic food produc-
tion with minimal effort, even in winter. This 
will enable households with sick members 
and working women to produce some crops 
if they so desire. It is possible that planting 
patterns can be optimised, even with some 
form of rotation, and here farmers and re-
searchers can combine their knowledge. 
• Soil and water management – The study 
indicates that there are two primary areas 
that need to be addressed in order for any 
previously mentioned requests and sugges-
tions to achieve optimal benefit. Without 
addressing soil and water management, it 
is possible that agricultural production will 
decline and people will move towards other 
sources of livelihood. Some villagers men-
tioned that already they are unable to pro-
duce some crops. The youth are averse to 
a number of traditional crops and very few 
seem to be involved in any sort of agricul-
tural production. If water and soil manage-
ment are optimised in the local situation, 
then residents will not only be able to opti-
mise their cropping of traditional foods and 
African vegetables, but will most probably 
be able to introduce some exotic vegeta-
bles into their home gardens. This will en-
able them to diversify their diets. Such crops 
might even be sold for income generation 
purposes, thereby taking food security be-
yond mere household consumption. How-
ever, the production of these crops is clearly 
not going to come about if people have to 
rely on communal boreholes and projects. 
The handful of farmers who have access to 
water in winter along with other resources 
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is already involved in production for selling, 
but there is scope for more people to be-
come involved. The information and training 
transferred by the Department of Agricul-
ture would then benefit more households. 
This information could be shared by means 
of farmer-to-farmer extension throughout 
the villages and surrounding areas. 
Data collected during the course of the study in-
dicate that water is a problem for two reasons: it 
is scarce, and when it does rain it often promotes 
erosion. Existing water management practices 
are inadequate. This means that the water needs 
to be controlled and the soil managed so that it 
can maximise the use of the limited water sup-
ply. The water needs to be controlled so that it is 
absorbed by the soil. Also, alternative sources of 
water need to be investigated. In addition, the 
soil structure and nutrient quality need to be im-
proved. These two practises go hand in hand and 
need to be done together. It is clear that farmers 
already have certain local knowledge and agri-
cultural research could assist in enhancing this 
knowledge and improving farmers’ manage-
ment practices. Collaborative or participatory 
research could help find solutions for problems 
relating to these two primary constraints. 
With regard to water and soil management, the 
following is suggested as initial practices to be 
shared with and discussed in collaboration by 
farmers and researchers: 
• Water harvesting strategies and people 
should be encouraged to test the methods 
for themselves, thus ensuring that they use 
the most appropriate techniques for their 
resources and conditions. A number of op-
tions are available and include terracing, 
stone bunds, trench or raised beds, semicir-
cular bunds, furrows, and even small dams 
or catchments for those living adjacent to 
the hillside. 
• Water retention methods for decreasing 
water loss during thunderstorms would in-
crease yield potential by decreasing the loss 
of topsoil. These methods would also reduce 
the loss of seeds in the seedbed. 
• Water recycling methods could be investi-
gated for non-root and tuber vegetables.
The soil’s fertility along with its ability to absorb 
and retain sufficient water for production pur-
poses needs to be improved. Practices such as 
mulching, composting, and the use of liquid and 
green manure need to be investigated. Working 
sufficient organic matter into the soil will im-
prove its nutrient content by encouraging ani-
mal and micro-organism life in the soil and the 
subsequent conversion of organic matter into 
humus. This will also ensure that the soil is of the 
right texture so that it retains sufficient moisture 
for crop production and simultaneously reduces 
water and top soil run-off.
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Introduction
The Madiba Trust Farm is located in the Maruleng 
District Municipality in a village called Lafdal, 30 
kilometres south of Tzaneen. The farm is a regis-
tered legal entity under the Trust Property Con-
trol Act of 1988. The Madiba Trust Farm is a 165 
hectares farm involved in the production and 
marketing of mangoes and horticultural crops. 
The farm has been under the ownership of 187 
beneficiary households from Sekororo and Bal-
lon since 2000. The beneficiaries acquired the 
land through the land redistribution programme 
using the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant. 
The governance and leadership of the farm is 
handled by a board of trustees while daily op-
erations of the farm fall under the responsibility 
of a farm manager. Currently, only two benefici-
aries reside at the Madiba Trust Farm, including 
the farm manager.
The farm has a significant amount of necessary 
infrastructure in place, including two functional 
boreholes (with another two boreholes to be 
equipped in the future), 10 hectares of land with 
main line pipes for irrigation, two reservoirs with 
20 000 litre capacity each, a workshop and a 
farm house. Other valuable assets include a 5-ton 
truck, a tractor, a bakkie and a disc plough. 
Historical evolution
The Madiba Trust Farm was bought in 1998 from 
John Green on behalf of the beneficiary group 
at the market value of R2.1 million. The farm was 
officially handed over to the beneficiaries in the 
year 2000. The farm had been in operation for 
more than 15 years before it was handed over to 
the group. At its peak, the farm employed about 
50 permanent workers in addition to many cas-
ual labourers.
According to the business plan that was formu-
lated during the planning stages of the project: 
“The vision of the project is an agro-based 
firm engaged in the primary production 
of high value horticultural crops and sub-
tropical fruits driven by the need to build 
a first-class sustainable and profitable rural 
agricultural hub.
“The mission of the farm is to expand its 
operations to its full production capacity 
and to produce high value crops satisfying 
customer needs and creating a sustainable 
and profitable farming venture for its 
beneficiaries.” 
However, while the project never collapsed as 
many other land reform projects have, it cer-
tainly never came close to satisfying its lofty 
ambitions. The problem had many of the charac-
teristic features of ‘rent-a-crowd’ redistribution 
projects in particular, whereby the reality of the 
participation of many of the official beneficiar-
ies was questionable from the beginning, while 
the functioning of the project faltered early 
on. This is despite significant spending early on 
to improve the irrigation infrastructure (to an 
amount of about R800 000, which came out of 
the ‘balance of grant’), and efforts to provide 
training and management support. For example, 
in the first two or three years, a non-governmen-
tal body, Technoserve, was brought on board to 
assist with management and securing of loans. 
Through Technoserve, a local commercial farmer 
was engaged to advise the farm management 
13 Madiba Trust Farm, Limpopo: a 
redistribution project exhibiting 
‘classic’ group problems and elite 
capture
Abenet Belete and Irvine Mariga, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, University of Limpopo
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on production and marketing aspects. However, 
for reasons that are unclear, this relationship 
ended. 
The project has effectively been taken over by 
the Board of Trustees and the farm manager 
(who is himself a beneficiary). Divisions within 
the Board, which appears to pit most of the 
Board members against the chair on questions 
of control over and allocation of revenues, con-
tribute to a sense of paralysis and paranoia. Pres-
ently, production carries on under the day-to-day 
guidance of the manager and assistant manag-
er, who are the only two permanent members of 
staff on the project. The manager reiterates the 
growth objectives of the project (in terms that 
echo the language in the business plan regard-
ing the project’s ‘vision’ and ‘mission’), but it is 
clear that the necessary capital to realise these 
goals will not be forthcoming any time soon. 
Natural and physical 
resources
Madiba Trust Farm has a total area of 165 hec-
tares, of which 105 are arable land. The whole 
farm has flat fields of mostly fertile red soils. The 
farm is partially fenced and has several build-
ings, including the main farm house and another 
house that is being leased to an Eskom worker. 
The main house currently serves as the farm of-
fice and is mostly bare, reflecting the current 
production and possibly financial situation of 
the farm. There are workers’ quarters for about 
four workers on the farm. The farm has two 30 
m2 pack houses and an old pack house that was 
formerly equipped with a cold room and pack-
ing equipment. Moreover, there are two sheds 
for equipment and a workshop. There are two 
or three concrete water tanks and a total of 8 
boreholes. Most of the infrastructure on the 
farm has been neglected for a long time and all 
the physical structures on the farm need some 
form of refurbishment. 
Production systems
Mango trees cover 33 hectares of the total area 
of the land, while another six hectares are car-
ries various vegetable crops, including green 
pepper, green beans, baby marrow, butternut 
and tomatoes. Butternut and tomatoes are cur-
rently produced on relatively small plots. There 
is potential to increase the production of veg-
etables to about 30 hectares, provided all the 
boreholes are brought into service. 
Observations showed good management of the 
vegetable crops but rather poor management of 
the mango orchards. Some of the mango trees 
need to be rejuvenated through pruning, there 
is tall grass in some of the mango orchards, and 
there are no basins at the bases of the trees to 
enhance moisture conservation given that the 
orchard is not irrigated. It seems there is no 
management related to fertilisation or pesticide 
spraying effected on the mango trees.
Economic aspects: gross 
margin analysis of fruit and 
vegetable crops
Madiba’s primarily mango customers are neigh-
bouring atchar processing factories around Tza-
neen and the Johannesburg Fresh Produce Mar-
ket, the latter also being the market for about 
60% of the farm’s vegetable produce since 2003. 
The balance of the produce is sold to bakkie 
traders and local customers at farm gate.
Figure 13.1: Photos of Madiba Trust Farm
Baby marrow showing powdery mildew Poorly tended mango trees 
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Item Rand/ha Details
A. Gross income 26 250
875 boxes/ha @ R30/box (box 
= 4 kg)
B. Total variable costs 9 600
      Land preparation (tractor) 950
      Seeds 200
      Planting materials (staking supports) 1 200
      Irrigation 1 000
      Fertiliser 900
      Pesticides 1 000
      Labour (weeding, harvesting, etc.) 1 850
      Packing, marketing, transport 2 500
C. Gross margin (A-B) 16 650
Item Rand/ha Details
A. Gross income 25 000 1000 boxes/ha @ R25/box
B. Total variable costs 12 123
      Land preparation (tractor) 1 000
      Transplants (labour) 1 200
      Fertiliser 800
      Herbicides 350
      Irrigation (electricity) 2 500
      Harvesting (labour) 1 500
      Packing and grading (labour) 2 000
      Marketing, transport 2 773
C. Gross margin (A-B) 12 877
Table 13.1: Gross margin for mangos (2008)
Table 13.2: Gross margin for green beans (2008)
The vegetables produced are presented and 
packed in various bags per size and weight rang-
ing from 1, 4, 10 and 25 kilograms, as well as 1000 
kilograms for mangoes. The farm plans to secure 
off-take contractual agreements for 80% of the 
vegetable produce and to supply mangoes to 
atchar processing factories, juicing companies 
and local customers. Other envisaged crops to 
be incorporated in the marketing plan include 
baby marrows and patty pans.
According to the information obtained from 
the farm manager and assistant farm manger, 
the selection of vegetable crops included in the 
current production system is informed by a num-
ber of general factors such as suitable climatic 
conditions and soils, availability of water for ir-
rigation, and availability of market. Currently, 
the three main vegetable crops that are grown 
on the farm are baby marrows, green beans and 
green peppers, while smaller amounts of land 
are devoted to butternut and tomatoes. Ac-
cording to the information obtained from the 
farm manager, these latter two crops may not 
be grown in the future. Thus, the gross margin 
analysis was done on the three main vegetable 
crops only and for the mangos. It should be not-
ed that the farm does not keep proper farm re-
cords, making quantitative estimation of inputs 
and outputs difficult. Analysis of gross margins 
is based on recall and assisted estimation of in-
put costs and revenue from the sale of crops. The 
gross margins for all crops were worked out on a 
Note: The farm manger and extension agent of the area have indicated that the yield of green beans on a hectare 
of land is 3.5 tons on average.
Note: there are about 200 mango trees per hectare of land.
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hectare basis. It should also be noted that gross 
margins are taken as relative indicators, rather 
than absolute enterprise profitability as they ex-
clude farm overheads.
The three vegetable crops show varied profit 
margins ranging from R12 877/ha for green 
peppers to about R14 670/ha for baby marrow, 
while the margin for mango was R11 457. 
The gross margins for green beans and baby 
marrows are relatively high and thus make these 
vegetable crops very attractive. However, the 
rosy picture painted by the figures is probably 
not accurate. In particular, there is a concern 
that the figures – which were provided by the 
farm manager and who, as mentioned above, 
could not produce anything like detailed and 
comprehensive records22 – over-state income, 
seemingly by using the best price achieved for 
the whole harvest when in fact different prices 
were paid according to different markets, 
product quality, etc. Another important 
consideration is that, although the land planted 
to vegetables is irrigated, it does not appear that 
the project regularly gets more than one harvest 
per year, suggesting that it is operating at below 
potential in more ways than one.
The area where the farm is situated is known for 
good mango production, however due to the 
poor agronomic practice (e.g. no timely prun-
ing) on the farm, the yield of mangos per tree 
and hence per hectare is quite low. Land alloca-
tion for each vegetable crop does not seem to be 
done proportionately based on profit margins as 
the current land allocation for baby marrows is 
one hectare and that of green beans four hec-
tares. 
Notwithstanding concerns about the accuracy 
of the enterprise-level figures, we estimated 
that the total turnover for the farm was about 
R950 000 per annnum in 2008, total operational 
costs were R480 000, and net farm income was 
R470 000. The total wage bill was a conspicuous-
ly low R81 000, which excluded payments made 
to the manager and assistant manager, about 
which we were unable to obtain any informa-
tion. 
An essential component of successful vegetable 
production is the ability to access markets. Mar-
ket channels for these crops are the Johannes-
burg Fresh Produce Market and large supermar-
kets such as Pick ’n Pay and Woolworths. Also, 
bakkie traders are very visible in the area where 
the farm is located.
It should be noted that the farm has a total area 
of 165 hectares and yet only about 39 hectares 
of land are under production. Of the remain-
ing land, most appears to be unutilised, though 
some is rented out to a nearby commercial cattle 
farmer for grazing. 
Livelihoods significance
While this net farm income seems quite ample, 
it works out to only about R2500 per beneficiary 
Item Rand/ha
A. Gross income 30 000 *
B. Total variable costs 15 300
      Land preparation (tractor) 975
      Irrigation (electricity) 2 979
      Fertiliser 2 678
      Pest control 568
      Weed control 1 144
      Transplanting (labour) 1 421
      Harvesting (labour) 1 350
      Packing and grading (labour) 1 900
      Marketing, transport 2 315
C. Gross margin (A-B) 14 670
Table 13.4: Gross margins for 
baby marrow (2008)
Item Rand/ha
A. Gross income 24 000 *
B. Total variable costs 12 543
      Land preparation (tractor) 1 500
      Fertilisers 850
      Irrigation (electricity) 1 200
      Crop protection 500
       Labour 1 993
       Materials (crates, cartons) 3 000
      Packing and marketing 3 000
      Other sundry expenses 500
      C. Gross margin (A-B) 11 457
Table 13.3: Gross margins for 
green pepper (2008)
22  This is despite the fact that 
having an accountant attached 
to the farm is a requirement 
for registration as a trust. The 
farm’s financial records are 
therefore evidently kept by 
an accountant based in Polok-
wane. We did not have access 
to these records and thus can-
not comment on how accurate 
or up-to-date they are; as for 
why the farm manager did not 
have copies, or why he was 
not willing to share them, is 
another question.
* 4 crates/tree, 800 crates/ha, @ R30/crate
* 1200 boxes/ha @ R25/box
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household for the year. Even adding the wage 
bill as a form of benefit to project members, if 
one takes (estimated) overhead into account, 
the potential income per beneficiary still prob-
ably works out to about R2500. However, we 
know little about how the income from the 
farming operations is shared out, and still less 
about what happens with the lease income 
theoretically accruing to the project. In effect, 
the benefits accruing to beneficiaries are some-
where between very modest to non-existent. 
To what extent this is because the farm is op-
erating below potential, and to what extent 
this is intrinsic to the nature/design of the pro-
ject, is uncertain. If the farm were operated at 
its commercial potential, the scale of benefits 
would be decidedly more significant. Assuming 
the project were able to boost the area under 
vegetable production to 30 hectares and plant 
multiple crops per year, then the profits could be 
three or more times what they presently are. But 
this begs the question how any such additional 
profits would actually be used. In short, the ac-
quisition of Madiba Trust farm 10 years ago has 
had little impact on the livelihoods of the ben-
eficiaries and surrounding communities, unless 
that impact is negative as a result of the loss of 
regular employment. 
Social and institutional 
dimensions
The project is supposed to promote people’s in-
comes and improve their social status in terms of 
food security, improved health, ability to cater 
for their families and a secured future. However, 
the current state of organisation and member-
ship at Madiba makes these goals appear far-
fetched. The salient aspect of the project is the 
extent to which it has effectively been captured 
by a small number of individuals, meaning the 
manager, assistant manager, and half a dozen 
members of the Board of Trustees. 
Of course, this ‘institutional’ dysfunctionality has 
implications for the operational performance of 
the farm, but not to the extent that production 
has collapsed entirely. Indeed, this is perhaps 
the single most significant insight from the case 
study: in contrast to the many land reform pro-
jects that collapse entirely because of a lack of 
leadership or severe in-fighting, Madiba Trust 
is an example of a situation where, through 
undemocratic and unsavoury means, enough 
leadership is maintained to keep commercial 
production going, albeit at a reduced level. This 
reinforces the importance of looking beyond the 
strict economic performance of projects, which 
in this instance reflects what has gone wrong as 
much as what has gone right.
Possibly the most astonishing and offensive 
aspect of the project is the fact that it offers 
only casual employment, except of course to 
the manager and assistant manager. If the en-
terprise margins are even remotely correct, this 
cannot be for lack of project income. Whether it 
is ever advisable or desirable for project benefi-
ciaries to assume the role of ‘wage earners’ (as 
opposed to co-owners and/or farmers) is its own 
debate; what seems less ambiguous is the fact 
that regular employment is preferable to casual 
employment, particularly on a farm that used to 
maintain such a large regular workforce.
What are the responsibilities of government in a 
context like this? Certainly it is understandable 
that Land Affairs officials do not perceive it to 
be their role to provide indefinite mediation in 
projects whose land was transferred some years 
ago (particularly given the urgency of progress-
ing towards the ‘30% target’), and similarly 
one can understand why extension agents feel 
ill-equipped to resolve what are complex social 
problems. However, across Limpopo, the pro-
vincial department of agriculture did embark 
on something like an attempt to re-engineer 
redistribution projects such as Madiba Trust. 
The process of “de-registration” began two or 
three years ago and involved a systematic sweep 
through all of the older redistribution projects 
to encourage inactive project beneficiaries to 
agree to have their names removed as official 
beneficiaries. The thinking seemingly was that 
much of the problem with these first-genera-
tion redistribution projects was the large num-
ber of inactive members lingering on the farm 
boundaries and interfering with the efforts of 
the committed few to get operations onto a 
more solid footing. By de-registering, non-active 
beneficiaries would acknowledge that they had 
no right to expect anything from their (former) 
projects, and simultaneously would be eligible 
to apply for assistance all over again.
While there are instances where this type of 
interference of non-active beneficiaries is very 
real, it does not appear to be the norm, and 
moreover non-participation is not necessarily a 
choice. While the sequence of events around the 
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dramatic downsizing of Madiba Trust is murky, 
it seems clear that it was those who seized con-
trol of the project who left no space for the par-
ticipation of the majority. Meanwhile, extension 
officers and land reform officials are waiting 
on the sidelines at Madiba to be provided with 
a revised list of official beneficiaries, i.e. now 
that the de-registration process being handled 
from Polokwane has run its course. On the other 
hand, it would appear that in reality the de-reg-
istration process has been quietly dropped, hav-
ing failed to convince more than a fraction of 
non-active project members to sign away their 
membership.
Gender, class and human 
dimensions
Little was learned through our research about 
the composition of the beneficiary group, but in 
a sense this is immaterial because most of these 
beneficiaries are such only in an official sense, 
while probably not deriving any actual benefits 
from the project at all. It was observed however 
during one of the fieldwork visits that most of 
the casual workers who happened to be there 
on that particular day were women; however is 
not possible to make assumptions about wheth-
er beneficiaries are exclusively or even mainly 
female.
Similarly, little was learned about the composi-
tion of the Board of Trustees, and whether the 
Board members belong to a different class stra-
tum from the ordinary beneficiaries. 
Perceptions of performance
The Land Affairs official and the agricultural 
extension staff perceive production levels at 
Madiba as very low. The farm has high poten-
tial and a lot of money has been spent, including 
the R800 000 to enhance irrigation capacity. The 
management of the mango orchards is very poor 
and only a very small area is under horticultural 
crops. Even the managers acknowledge that the 
current levels of production are rather low. Some 
of the unused fields are currently rented out to 
a neighbour for cattle grazing. It is thought that 
production at the farm could be increased by di-
versifying the enterprises, for example by keep-
ing cattle and adding avocado and macadamia 
to the fruit grown on the farm. 
Environmental aspects
There are no obvious threats to the environment 
from current farming activities at Madiba Trust 
Farm, or at least, those that exist are typical of 
commercial farming of orchard and horticultural 
crops in South Africa. The farm is generally flat, 
thus the risk of water erosion is low. One aspect 
that needs to be effected however is the neglect 
of making fireguards to protect the farm from 
external veld fires, as they are rampant in the 
area. 
Conclusion
Madiba Trust Farm is in some sense a product 
of its time, that is, one of the first-generation 
redistribution projects characterised by too large 
a group and too naïve a business plan. The par-
ticular grant mechanism that was used to create 
it has largely been superseded by other grant 
mechanisms, and generally there is awareness 
and wariness nowadays of group projects that 
was absent (or muted) in the period from 1994 
to 2000. Perhaps we are not certain what to do 
about the projects like Madiba Trust that are al-
ready out there, but at least we are not creating 
new ones along the same lines. If the farm that 
was acquired on behalf of Madiba Trust in 2000 
were instead to have been acquired today for 
redistribution, the project would look quite dif-
ferent, especially in light of the further increases 
in the redistribution grant that were introduced 
last year.
That might be consoling on the one hand, but 
also a cause of concern. With today’s redistribu-
tion grant structure, it is perfectly conceivable 
that the farm which became Madiba Trust could 
have been acquired by three families. To put this 
in broader perspective, as a consequence of al-
locating more funding per beneficiary for land 
acquisition and other capital needs, in 2007/08 
the Department of Land Affairs spent R1.3 bil-
lion on redistribution, of which the vast majority 
went to support a mere 2100 emerging farmer 
beneficiary households. 
This type of assistance might have its role, 
but it clarifies that much of what falls under 
redistribution cannot be described as broad-
based poverty reduction. Thus there remains 
a need to use agriculture somehow to benefit 
larger numbers of people, and almost inevitably 
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this returns us to the question of groups. Indeed, 
the impetus of government agencies to work 
with groups rather than individuals is still very 
much in evidence, even though it may take 
different forms. The compelling logic to working 
with groups is that it allows limited government 
resources to touch larger numbers of people. 
In agriculture, there is an added incentive in 
that many of the technologies are lumpy (e.g. 
tractors and irrigation systems), and it is difficult 
to justify giving them away to single individuals 
(though this is happening more frequently in 
light of the). Thus we might be clear that we 
will not create new projects like Madiba Trust, 
but to the extent we are committed to the use 
of agriculture to pursue large-scale poverty 
reduction, it is not altogether clear we have 
identified robust alternatives.
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Introduction
This small vegetable project is located in Ga-
Sebati village about 30 kilometres south-west of 
Mankweng (60 kilometres from Polokwane). The 
area is accessed through an all-weather gravel 
road. The project is located on the eastern edge 
of the village. The 3.2 hectare plot on which the 
project is located was given to the group by the 
chief according to an indefinite ‘permission to 
operate’’ arrangement. It is a typical communi-
ty project whose main objectives were to fight 
hunger and poverty. The project was initiated by 
local villagers and continues to be run by them. 
All the members belong to the same chiefdom. 
Project membership is restricted to residents of 
the Ga-Sebati area only. Currently, there are 
twelve members, of whom ten are women and 
two are men. 
Historical evolution
The project was formed in 1992 by villagers from 
Ga-Sebati as a tool to fight poverty and hunger 
by providing vegetables for consumption by 
members and sale of excess produce. The project 
was conceptualised as a self-help project hence 
the name “Hold my hand I can stand,” and its 
formation was the idea of the current ‘manager’ 
of the group. The project started with 72 farmers 
but over time this figure dwindled to 12. Some 
of the reasons advanced for that are: i) some 
members found better opportunities elsewhere 
for making money, ii) some stopped as soon as 
they qualified for social grants, iii) some had no 
time because they had to look after children or 
grandchildren in the village, and iv) others did 
not like periodic contributions to maintain the 
facilities and pay for electricity. 
At the start of the project each farmer had only 
one bed, but now each has access to six beds 
because of the drop in active members. The re-
maining farmers now have much better poten-
tial to produce excess produce for sale. The re-
maining farmers feel they have invested much in 
the project and this coupled with better incomes 
from the sale of the vegetable crops perhaps 
made the 12 beneficiaries stay on the project. 
Initially, the farmers had dug an open well out-
side the scheme and were pumping water into 
buckets and carrying them to the vegetable 
plots by hand or in wheelbarrows. This entailed 
lots of hard work and indicates the level of com-
mitment of the farmers. Also, during these first 
four years the garden area was fenced off using 
Acacia brush and project ran without any exter-
nal assistance, including extension advice.
In about the fifth year of the project’s existence 
– by which time the group had already dwindled 
to its current size – the then Department of Ag-
riculture of the Northern Province assisted the 
group with fencing, a borehole and an irrigation 
system. This group was very pleased with these 
developments, even though the Department 
provided little if any assistance subsequently by 
way of planning or technical advice. 
The group is frequently approached by commu-
nity members who wish to join it. However, the 
group refuses, saying that there is only enough 
land for their present number.
14 Nkuke Ketla Ema vegetable 
project, Limpopo: individual market-
oriented vegetable production in 
the context of group-managed 
infrastructure
Irvine Mariga and Abenet Belete, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, University of Limpopo
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Natural and physical 
resources
The project is located on well drained sandy 
loam soil. The area is fairly flat, with a depres-
sion in the South eastern corner. The Ga-Sebati 
area has scrub vegetation dominated by Acacia 
species, and is typical of Limpopo bushveld. The 
area is characterised by low and erratic rainfall 
estimated at about 400 mm per annum. The rain 
season extends from November to April. The 
rainfall is not adequate and hence all the crops 
require total or supplemental irrigation. The Ga-
Sebati area is prone to frost from mid-June to 
early August. 
The scheme plot is 210 metres long and 150 me-
tres wide, giving an area of 3.2 hectares. The 
project has a brick under asbestos storeroom 
near the entrance. This is used to store tools, 
hose pipes and produce. It also serves as a rain 
shelter during the rainy season. There is a pit la-
trine in one corner of the scheme. There are only 
3 small trees that can provide shade within the 
scheme. The scheme is fenced with barbed wire 
(8 strands and reaching about 2 metres high) but 
only half of the perimeter is reinforced with 2 
metre high diamond mesh fencing. It is because 
of this that small animals such as rabbits and im-
pala sometimes feed on the vegetables at night.
Adjacent to the eastern edge of the project area 
is a borehole. The capacity and depth specifica-
tions of the borehole are not known but it pro-
vides irrigation water throughout the year. The 
borehole is fitted with a submersible electric 
pump and an irrigation network of pipes and 
water outlets runs in the scheme. Irrigation is 
done using hose pipes (see Figure 14.1).
Production systems
The scheme’s 3.2 hectare garden is subdivided 
into small plots of 22 metres by 15 metres in ex-
tent. These are arranged in six rows each with 
12 plots, making a total of 72 plots. Each farmer 
has two plots in each row. There are 18 irrigation 
points at which 30 metre long hose pipes are fit-
ted to irrigate the individual plots.
The vegetable crops grown in the project are 
beetroot, spinach, onion, tomato, cabbage, 
sweet potato, butternut, groundnut, bambara 
groundnut, carrot, pea, sugar bean, chillies and 
green pepper. From the interaction with farm-
ers, the main crops are sweet potato, butternut, 
spinach, beetroot, carrot, tomatoes, onion, and 
cabbage. The choice of crop is left to the individ-
ual farmers as well as when they want to grow 
it. Crops are grown throughout the year but 
Figure 14.1: Farmer irrigating spinach crop (see uneven stand)
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there is little activity during the period of high 
frost probability, i.e. June to August.
Land preparation is mostly done by hired trac-
tor, with the final seedbed prepared manually. 
Farmers use individually owned hand hoes and 
rakes, but these are mostly in poor condition. 
There are some project tools that are stored in 
the storeroom at the production site. These in-
clude seven hose pipes, a knapsack sprayer, a 
hand sprayer and 5 wheelbarrows. 
At Nkuke Ketla Ema project, there is very limited 
use of agrochemicals. A few farmers occasionally 
apply LAN (limestone ammonium nitrate) (28% 
nitrogen) and pesticides, mostly insecticides. 
These are procured from the local shops. It ap-
pears there is no use of fungicides at the project 
despite growing fungal disease prone crops such 
as tomatoes and green pepper. Soil fertility is to 
a limited extent managed by applying decom-
posed leaf litter collected from nearby bushes or 
compost manure made from a mixture of grass 
and weeds from the scheme. A few farmers ap-
ply small amounts of chicken and goat manure.
Most of the farmers depend on family labour, 
which occasionally involves their children and 
grandchildren. The farmers stated that in Ga-
Sebati very few youths willingly work on their 
parents’ plots. The labour is mostly required to 
make irrigation furrows in the beds and to ir-
rigate the vegetables.
The project has a borehole just outside the 
scheme. The borehole and the irrigation piping 
were installed with the assistance of the Pro-
vincial Department of Agriculture in the then 
Northern Province. The borehole is fitted with 
a submersible pump. The transformer was once 
stolen but of late theft is not a major concern for 
the project. The capacity of the borehole is not 
known but the project members indicated that 
water was not a limiting factor. The electricity 
used for pumping was the problem due to an 
escalating electricity bill. The crops are surface 
irrigated using hose pipes to put water into the 
shallow furrows or into basins. This form of ir-
rigation demands formation of appropriate 
structures prior to planting the crop. The farm-
ers indicated that this is challenging in terms 
of labour requirements. The crops are irrigated 
twice a week despite stage of growth. This sug-
gests possibilities of inefficiency of either over 
or under-irrigation during some part of the 
crop’s growth. Each member contributes R50 per 
month towards irrigation electricity costs.
As far as the project members are concerned, 
they do not have any marketing problems. They 
successfully sell all their produce at the farm-
gate or in the village. The crops mostly sold 
include sweet potato, beetroot, spinach, but-
ternut, carrots, onion, tomatoes, and cabbage. 
The farmers estimated that they consume about 
a quarter of their production with the rest sold. 
Figure 14.2: A good stand of beetroot
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Farmers stated that they fetch prices similar to 
those at the markets in Mankweng.
Production constraints
The farmers indicated a number of production 
constraints and the following are the most im-
portant ones:
a) The farmers stressed their limited ability to 
procure inputs as the key limiting factor, 
particularly as it relates to fertilisers, pesti-
cides and electricity for irrigation. In effect, 
low production levels mean that the money 
realised from vegetable sales is too little to 
be used for both household cash needs and 
purchase of inputs, thus they cannot afford 
inputs and the monthly electricity bill of R50 
per farmer is on the high side. Some farmers 
indicated that sometimes they do use social 
grant money towards project obligations.
b) The project farmers lack technical advice. 
They stated that the government exten-
sion officer responsible for their area does 
not visit the scheme despite the assistance 
they rendered the group earlier by way of 
infrastructure. Another aspect that clearly 
underscored this problem was the poor crop 
stands in some plots. There were many gaps 
in some spinach and beetroot plantings, as 
well as too densely populated carrots.
c) Another production constraint was animal 
damage at night. The farmers indicated that 
rabbits, rodents and birds damaged their 
crops as half of the scheme is not fenced 
with diamond mesh fencing. There were no 
measures in place to control these pests. 
d) The farmers stated that in Ga-Sebati very 
few youths willingly work on their parents’ 
plots.
e)  Sub-optimal pesticide and fertiliser use (both 
inorganic and organic) also adversely affects 
their vegetable crops. The farmers indicated 
heavy insect pressure among the production 
constraints.
f)  The farmers also do not have any organised 
rotational system.
g)  The Ga-Sebati area is prone to frost. This re-
stricts plantings in the May to August period 
and farmers indicated that crops that toler-
ate frost also do grow slowly during that pe-
riod. At the time of visits to the area in early 
August 2008, all the sweet potato vines had 
dried up to ground level from frost damage 
and very few beds had any plantings.
Economic aspects: gross 
margin analysis 
Gross margin analysis is undertaken of the veg-
etable crops in order to better understand the 
economic viability of the project. Fixed costs for 
some of the basic tools for the vegetable pro-
duction as well as the enterprise budget for the 
different vegetable crops are presented below. 
It should be noted that numeracy among benefi-
ciaries is low such that quantitative estimation 
of inputs and output was very difficult. There-
fore, analysis of gross margins for the various 
vegetable crops is based on recall and assisted 
estimation of input costs and revenue from the 
sale of crops. Initially, the gross margin analysis 
was done on the basis of actual plots that the 
beneficiaries own and then the gross margins 
for all crops were converted to a ‘per hectare’ 
basis.
Most of the labour for harvesting and other ac-
tivities is provided by the plot holders, however 
some additional labour is hired by some of those 
who grow sweet potatoes and beetroot.
Hand tools mainly include hand hoes (with a 
typical purchase cost of R30), garden forks (R85), 
spades (R60), and rakes (R40).
The vegetable enterprises show varied profit 
margins ranging from about R4000 to about 
R17 000 per hectare across the different vegeta-
bles. These margins are relatively high and thus 
make the vegetable enterprise very attractive, 
although of course the actual amounts of land 
in production are relatively small. Production 
of butternut, sweet potato and spinach are fa-
voured by the project beneficiaries as these veg-
etable crops are easier to produce compared to 
a crop such as tomato. 
An essential component of successful vegetable 
production is the availability of and easy access 
to market. Market channels for these crops are 
mostly the local community. 
Livelihoods significance
The project contributes to household nutrition 
and income. The precise extent of these ben-
efits is difficult to establish, as the farmers do 
not keep production or sales records. However, 
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if we assume that the average number of plots 
farmed in a typical year is 9 (each farmer has six 
plots, roughly half of which they plant twice in 
a year), and from each planted plot one earns 
an average amount of R430 (this is averaging 
across the different enterprises captured in the 
previous tables), then the cash income per group 
member per year would be in the order of R3500 
to R4000. In addition, since sales represent only 
about 75% of members’ production, one would 
have to take into account the value of what is 
kept back for home consumption, a rough im-
puted value for which we would put at another 
R1000 to R1500. 
These figures are not large, on the other hand 
this is not a full-time activity, and may also ex-
plain why some of the 12 group members regard 
the amount of land as too small. Some members 
indicated that there are times they use social 
grant money or other cash for project contribu-
tions for electricity or ploughing, implying that 
the cash earnings are generally not sufficient to 
allow accumulation of savings that can be drawn 
down to keep participation in the project going. 
In fact, the researchers observed an interesting 
relationship whereby better-off group members 
– generally meaning those with wage income 
from teaching or some other activity – tend to 
use less of their land than worse-off members, 
suggesting the ‘compensatory’ nature of the ag-
ricultural activities at the project.  
Social and institutional 
dimensions
The ages of the project farmers range from 44 to 
75 years. One member is below 50 years of age, 
two are in the 50-59 age brackets, four between 
60 and 69 years, and four are above 70 years. 
Table 14.1a: Gross margin analysis for selected vegetables, 
2008
Tomato Cabbage Spinach Butternut
Revenue (R/ha) 7 576 16 674 21 212 18 182
Variable inputs (R/ha)
    Tractor operations (R/ha) 1 212 1 000 1 051 910
    Seedlings (R/ha) 910 910 1 516 859
    Irrigation (R/ha) 1 300 1 500 1 334 1 364
    Hired labour (R/ha) 0 0 0 0
    Total input costs (R/ha) 3 422 3 410 3 901 3 133
Net profit (R/ha) 4 154 13 264 17 311 15 049
Plot size (ha) 0.033 0.0165 0.033 0.033
Actual net profit (Rand) 137 219 571 497
Sweet potato Onion Carrots Beetroot
Revenue (R/ha) 24 242 21 212 15 152 16 667
Variable inputs (R/ha)
    Tractor operations (R/ha) 1 455 2 121 910 910
    Seedlings (R/ha) 2 424 1 516 1 212 1 136
    Irrigation (R/ha) 3 030 3 030 1 516 1 515
    Hired labour (R/ha) 1 000 0 0 500
    Total input costs (R/ha) 7 909 6 667 3 638 4 061
Net profit (R/ha) 16 333 14 545 11 514 12 606
Plot size (ha) 0.0165 0.0165 0.033 0.033
Actual net profit (Rand) 269 240 380 416
Table 14.1b: Gross margin analysis for selected vegetables, 
2008
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Most of these farmers receive social grants. Pro-
ject membership is restricted to residents of the 
Ga-Sebati area. This aspect may help to create 
cohesion in the group. 
The small group of farmers is led by a commit-
tee comprising a manager, assistant manager, 
secretary, treasurer and assistant treasurer. The 
committee is selected every three years, mostly 
on the basis of interest and potential to lead. 
The project members meet every Monday morn-
ing. The secretary keeps records of meetings but 
there are no production-related records. The 
current manager is male while the secretary is 
female. The group is religious, all members are 
teetotallers, and meetings begin and end with 
prayers. All money contributed for project activi-
ties, such as payment for electricity and pump 
maintenance, is kept by the treasurer as the 
group has no bank account. The group does not 
have any security measurements for the project 
other than locking up the storeroom and the 
main gate. No deliberate effort is made to guard 
the project site. 
Gender, class and human 
dimensions
The group at Nkuke Ketla Ema vegetable pro-
ject appears to operate in harmony. There ap-
pear to be no gender problems, and there is 
a dominance of women both in the project at 
large and on the current committee. Indeed, the 
manager is a man while all of the other commit-
tee members are women, a pattern that is sur-
prisingly common among community projects 
of this sort. During discussions all farmers pre-
sent were participating freely. In other African 
communities the tendency is for women to only 
endorse what their male leaders have stated. Al-
though it became clear that there is some class 
differentiation among the group members – by 
which we mean that some are more educated 
and have secure employment – this does not ap-
pear to influence interpersonal interactions at 
the project. There are some farmers who own 
cattle and goats and can therefore access ma-
nure to fertilise their vegetable crops. Another 
factor which may contribute to the harmony in 
the group is that all members come from the 
same village under the same chief. The orderly 
nature of interactions and operations could also 
be due to the maturity of the farmers.
Perceptions of performance
The project members are aware that their pro-
duction levels are low, primarily because of poor 
agronomic practices such as little or no use of 
organic and chemical fertilisers and pesticides, 
poor spacing and other practices. They cited 
poor plant growth and insect damage as some 
of the reasons for their poor yields. They howev-
er emphasised their limited capacity to purchase 
the required fertilisers and insecticides.23 
Policy environment
Observations of the cropped plots and discus-
sions with the farmers at Nkuke Ketla Ema pro-
ject clearly suggest that small farmer-initiated 
projects cannot be sustainable without exten-
sion backup by local extension services or non-
governmental organisations. The local tradi-
tional authority supported the farmer initiative 
by granting them the land to use but has no 
capacity for anything else. It seems the respon-
sibility for support of such projects should pri-
marily lie with the Department of Agriculture 
through their municipal managers. According 
to the farmers, the nearest extension office 
from Ga-Sebati is located 30 kilometres away at 
Mankweng. However, the extension supervisor 
for the area indicated that the extension officer 
who serves Ga-Sebati area is located at Makate 
village, 12 kilometres from the project. The same 
supervisor strongly indicated that it is the policy 
of the Department to provide technical advice to 
projects such as the Nkuke Ketla Ema vegetable 
project and was surprised at the claim that this 
was not the case. He indicated that only recently 
they held a road show at Ga-Sebati focusing on 
control of fruit fly in mangoes. The Department 
has planned several activities to revive agricul-
ture in Capricorn District. The supervisor also in-
dicated that the Department encourages small 
projects to link up with relevant NGOs for ad-
ditional support. If the project was big, it could 
also attract agro-chemical salespeople who also 
provide technical back-up.
Environmental aspects
The vegetable garden for the Nkuke Ketla Ema 
project is well planned in that soil erosion is 
unlikely to be a major problem. There were no 
visible signs of soil loss at the time of the vis-
its to the project. The only activity that farmers 
23  This accords well with the 
argument in Tim Hart’s chapter 
on “African vegetables and 
food security for poor agrar-
ian households in Limpopo 
Province” in this volume, which 
contrasts community gardens 
along the lines of Nkuke Ketla 
Ema with household’s use of 
traditional African vegetables 
in their home plots.
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embark on which can impact the environment 
negatively is the use of Acacia brush to reinforce 
the two sides of the perimeter fence which do 
not have diamond mesh fencing. The farmers 
seemed to be aware of the need to conserve the 
soil for the long-term sustainability of their pro-
ject.
The future
There are positive and negative prospects for 
this project, briefly summarised below.
On the positive side:
• The spirit of self-reliance is very strong in 
the group as seen by their ability to pay for 
electricity, pump maintenance and the trac-
tor.
• The project has a reliable water source.
• The tenure for the plot seems almost guar-
anteed.
• There is land for possible expansion of the 
project.
• The large population in Ga-Sebati and oth-
er neighbouring villages almost guarantees 
them a market.
• The current garden contributes to meeting 
the households’ food and income needs 
of participants, albeit in a supplementary 
manner. Indeed the extent of their success 
in this regard has led to other community 
members expressing an interest in joining 
the project.
 On the negative side are the following points:
• Most of the farmers are elderly and hence 
the future continuity of the project is in 
doubt, not least since the farmers indicated 
that only very few young people are inter-
ested in assisting them.
• The farmers’ lack technical ability to farm 
efficiently.
• The farmers’ lack adequate inputs, includ-
ing those that can be sourced locally such as 
forest tree leaf litter, compost manure and 
animal manure.
• The project is not being supported with ex-
tension advice. 
Conclusion
There are a number of interesting lessons from 
this project:
• Self-reliance is possible even among fairly 
poor communities.
• There is need to involve the local youths 
in agriculture. This is a big challenge but it 
needs to be addressed urgently if agricul-
ture is to contribute to rural livelihoods in 
future.
• Smallholder farming projects require tech-
nical support, otherwise performance levels 
will remain at unsustainably low levels.
• There may be need for more stringent su-
pervision of agricultural extension officers. 
• Erection of a shed by the roadside next to 
the vegetable garden will assist in market-
ing the fresh produce on a regular basis.
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Introduction
There is general agreement that small-scale poul-
try production can stimulate local economic de-
velopment and improve human nutrition in rural 
areas (Wynne and Lyne, 2004). In South African 
rural settlements, poultry, primarily chickens, are 
raised by means of different production systems 
of which the scavenging system is the most the 
common. In this system, a small number of birds, 
typically about six in total, roam freely around 
the homestead during the day, scavenging for 
food. At night they are usually locked up for se-
curity reasons (Smith, 1990). Also common is the 
improved scavenging system in which poultry 
keepers supplement the food intake of the birds 
from scavenging with leftovers from homestead 
meals and stored grain that is no longer fit for 
human consumption. The general objective of 
these two systems is to obtain a modest supply 
of eggs and meat whilst maintaining the bird 
population through natural processes of repro-
duction.
There are also rural households that operate 
small- or medium-scale broiler or egg produc-
tion units (Sonandi, 1996; Lent and Van Aver-
beke, 1998; Wynne and Lyne, 2004). The objec-
tive of the poultry unit system is to generate 
income from sales. Producers operating the unit 
system have to invest in production inputs. Typi-
cally these inputs consist of high-performance 
chicks, energy for heating during the brooding 
period (which lasts for the first three weeks), 
vaccines and medicines to prevent or control dis-
eases, and high-protein feeds, vitamins and min-
erals to ensure the birds’ optimum growth and/
or laying (Sonandi, 1996). The birds are reared 
in dedicated structures to protect them against 
the elements. 
Small- and medium-scale poultry units tend to 
specialise in either broilers or eggs, and broiler 
units are especially common. Broilers grow very 
rapidly and typically reach a live weight of about 
two kilograms in just under 40 days. The mar-
ket for small poultry units consists mainly of the 
neighbourhood. Medium-scale units have to ac-
cess additional markets to ensure that the birds 
are sold as soon as possible after reaching their 
target weight. Delay in the sale of market-ready 
birds reduces gross margins. Access to markets, 
both input and output, tends to be the most im-
portant constraint to the financial sustainability 
of poultry unit enterprises.
In 2004, a survey of household consumption 
of poultry products was conducted in the area 
around Thohoyandou (Ralivhesa and Van Aver-
beke, 2005). Broadly speaking, the boundary of 
the study area was located at a distance of 10 
kilometres from the centre of Thohoyandou, 
but minor adjustments were made to take into 
account spatial features of the physical land-
scape that were thought to limit (e.g. mountain 
range) or facilitate (presence of a tarred road) 
access to Thohoyandou. The instrument used 
in the household consumption survey took into 
account household income and sampling was 
stratified into urban and rural. 
15 Small-scale broiler production 
in the Thohoyandou area: an 
enterprise that can be conducted 
successfully at different scales but 
with contrasts between individual-
based and group-based enterprises
Wim van Averbeke and Eric Ralivhesa, Department of Crop 
Sciences, Tshwane University of Technology
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The results of the 2004 household consumption 
survey showed that on average, rural house-
holds consumed five dozen eggs per month and 
11.6 kilograms of chicken, of which 5.6 kilograms 
was purchased in the form of live birds. Urban 
households also consumed five dozen eggs on 
average and 14.2 kilograms of chicken, of which 
6.0 kilograms was purchased as live birds. It was 
estimated that the 67 231 households residing in 
the study area annually consumed 4.6 million 
chickens, of which 2.1 million were purchased as 
live birds. Annually, they also consumed about 
48.4 million eggs. 
In 2005, an audit was done of small-scale poultry 
enterprises that used the unit system in the area 
around Thohoyandou. The results of the audit 
are presented in Table 15.1. 
Following the audit, a survey of a sample of poul-
try production enterprises was done (Ralivhesa 
et al., 2006). The survey showed that broiler 
enterprises more or less used the same produc-
tion system across the different size categories. 
In terms of production costs, there was no real 
evidence of economies of scale except for heat-
ing, where costs were proportionately lower for 
larger units. The mortality rate was also inversely 
related to scale. On average, the mortality rate 
was 17% in small enterprises, 10% in medium en-
terprises and 1% in large enterprises. Marketing 
practices and prices differed among the size cat-
egories. Small enterprises marketed directly to 
consumers at an average price of R29 per bird. 
Medium enterprises marketed to both consum-
ers (R25 per bird) and to traders who purchased 
in bulk at R23 per bird. Sales directly to consum-
ers at R25 per bird represented a minor propor-
tion of the sales of large enterprises. The bulk of 
their sales were to fairly large traders at R20 per 
bird. As a result, enterprise size did not really af-
fect financial sustainability of broiler enterpris-
es, because while larger units enjoyed modestly 
lower unit costs, they were also compelled to sell 
on average at modestly lower prices.
As with broiler units, layer units also more or 
less practised the same production system across 
the different size categories. There was evidence 
of economies of scale because production costs 
increased as scale was reduced. An inverse rela-
tionship with scale also applied to mortality rates 
and productivity. The average mortality rate was 
5% in micro enterprises, 2% in small enterprises 
and less than 1% in medium enterprises, and on 
average hens produced 25 dozen eggs per year 
in micro enterprises and 29 dozen in small and 
medium enterprises. Micro enterprises charged 
slightly less for a dozen of eggs (R7.80) than 
small and medium enterprises (R8.40) but slight-
ly more for a cull (R27.50 per cull in micro enter-
prises versus R25 per cull in small and medium 
enterprises). Micro and small enterprises also 
derived income from the sale of manure (about 
R8.50 for a 50 kilogram grain bag filled with ma-
nure), whilst owners of the medium enterprises 
that were sampled all used the layer manure 
in their own cropping enterprises. In terms of 
financial sustainability, micro layer enterprises 
were by far the most vulnerable of the three size 
categories of layer enterprises.
Using the information in Table 15.1 and the re-
sults of the household consumption survey, it 
was estimated that smallholder poultry units 
within the study area annually produced 300 000 
birds (6.5% of total household consumption) 
and 112 120 dozen eggs (2.7% of total household 
consumption). 
Number of birds per production 
cycle
Broiler production enterprises 
(number)
Layer production enterprises 
(number)
Micro (< 50) * 11
Small (50-199) 10 5
Medium (200-1 999) 42 2
Large (>2 000) 1 0
Total 53 18
Source: Ralivhesa et al., 2006.
Table 15.1: Number of poultry enterprises in the various size 
categories in the Thohoyandou area (n=71; 2005)
*Information on micro broiler enterprises was not available. Consequently, even though this category of broiler 
units may have been present in the study area, they were not included in the audit.
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On the whole, the results of the 2005 survey sug-
gested that these poultry unit enterprises were 
financially viable, successful ventures, but before 
such a conclusion could be reached there was 
need for a longitudinal study. This warranted 
the conduct of a case study in the same study 
area. The sharp increases in the cost of feed, 
energy and chicks during 2008 presented an in-
teresting change in the circumstances of produc-
tion, which offered an ideal opportunity to as-
sess the sustainability of these enterprises and to 
identify the strategies they had adopted to cope 
with the changes.
Methods
The common methodology developed for the 
case studies was such as to preclude the conduct 
of a simple follow-up visit to the enterprises that 
were surveyed in 2005, i.e. using the same survey 
instrument to collect data. To some extent, this 
was fortunate, because one of the methodologi-
cal weaknesses of the 2005 poultry unit survey 
was that enterprise budgets were compiled by 
means of interviews with owners or managers. 
When analysing the data, anomalies were iden-
tified for some of the enterprises and these cast 
doubt on the trustworthiness of the entire body 
of data. Consequently, the decision was made to 
limit the study to broiler enterprises only and to 
survey a smaller number of elements.
For the purposes of the current case study, 16 
broiler enterprises were selected purposively so 
as to represent the full spectrum of enterprises 
in the same study area as for the 2005 enterprise 
survey. Enterprise budget information was ob-
tained by combining interviews with owners, 
managers or representatives of the enterprises 
with the inspection of enterprise records. In ad-
dition, data were not collected for a single (aver-
age, normal, typical) production cycle as was the 
case in 2005, but for an entire production year 
(1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008). Several enterprises 
kept full records for each cycle (batch), which 
assisted application of the new method of data 
collection greatly. In other cases, the enterprise 
budgets were constructed painstakingly in col-
laboration with producers, primarily by sorting 
through boxes of receipts. 
Historical perspective
Smallholder broiler enterprises in Vhembe are 
mostly new-millennium developments. Only 
three of the 16 enterprises included in the sam-
ple were established before 2000 (Fig. 1). 
The broiler projects consisted of both individu-
ally-owned and group projects. Table 15.2 sum-
marises the ownership and origin information of 
the 16 enterprises that were sampled.
The origin of nearly all 16 enterprises was un-
employment and the need to generate income. 
Figure 15.1: Year of establishment of smallholder broiler 
enterprises (n=16; 2008) 
0
1994 or earlier 1995–1999 2000–2004
Year of enterprise establishment
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8
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Case Type of 
project
Gender 
and 
class of 
owner(s)*
Name and origin of the enterprises
1 Individual Female, 
single 
mother, 2 
children, 
very poor
The Nephulu Broiler Farm started as a micro-layer project that was established with public 
funds (Limpopo Department of Agriculture). Proceeds from asset disposal (culls) were invested 
in a broiler unit.
2 Individual Male, 
married 
policeman, 
not poor
The Tshitimbi Broiler Farm was started in 1993 by the father of the owner. After returning 
from Gauteng, the owner first worked in his father’s broiler enterprise, was then handed 
the business and developed it. Has since joined the police. His spouse now runs the broiler 
enterprise.
3 Individual Female, 
married 
mother, 4 
children, 
poor
The Netshikulwe Broiler Farm was started by the female spouse to add to husband’s wage 
income.
6 Individual Male, 
single who 
lives with 
parents, 
not poor
The Dzivhani Poultry Farm was started by a university graduate who after failing to find work 
started to sell live cull hens and produced eggs on a small scale to generate income. Later on 
he switched to broiler production.
9 Individual Male, 
married, 3 
children, 
poor
The Nyadenga Broiler Farm was started by a migrant worker who returned home and 
ultimately found work in a broiler project. He subsequently started his own business by 
renting the facility of another individual who discontinued production following a disastrous 
batch.
11 Individual Male, not 
poor
The Tamisani Poultry Farm is run by a man who rents the facility from a collapsed group 
project. Nothing is known about the man’s status.
12 Individual Female, 
not poor
The Mulondi Poultry Farm was started by a young educated female who, after failing to find 
work, started her own broiler enterprise using a Land Bank loan.
13 Individual Male, poor The Mamilasigidi Poultry Farm was started by an uneducated female migrant worker who 
following her return home engaged in various small-scale rural business ventures, including 
broiler production.
15 Individual Female, 
widow, 6 
children, 
poor
The Netshiongolwe Poultry Farm was started by a widow who combined motherhood with 
small income generation projects and ventured into broiler production. Her brother, a medical 
doctor in Gauteng, financed the infrastructure on her new farm.
4 Group 9 females, 
poor
The Iyaphanda Co-operative started as a self-help initiative by 27 participants that obtained 
funding from Department of Health and Welfare to establish a broiler enterprise.
5 Group 1 male, 1 
female, 
poor
The Mega Poultry Project was to be the show-case of the Department of Health and Welfare. It 
started with 14 members, collapsed and was then revived by two members of the group. 
7 Group 7 females, 
very poor
The Tshamutilikwa Poultry Project was a poverty alleviation project initiated by 15 women. 
It remained very small until it obtained modest funding from the Department of Health and 
Welfare.
8 Group 12 females, 
very poor
The Kondelela Poultry Project was started by 33 women to alleviate poverty. It obtained 
funding from the Department of Health and Welfare.
10 Group 9 females, 
poor
Vhuawelo started as a home-care initiative that added broiler production to its activities to 
raise the income of members. 
14 Group 4 males, 6 
females, 
very poor 
and poor
The Lwamondo Farmer and Service Project was started by 10 people to create employment. It 
rents its poultry house. It has not been funded.
16 Group 6 females, 
poor
The Thusashulaka Poultry Farm was started by 13 people to alleviate poverty. It received 
modest funding from the National Development Agency and the Department of Agriculture. 
Table 15.2: Origin of smallholder broiler enterprises in Vhembe (n=16; 2008)
* Categorisation of class in “very poor”, “poor” and “not poor” refers – somewhat impressionistically – to the time when the broiler enterprise 
was started and may not reflect the current status.
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Generally, people who started broiler projects 
were poor or very poor, but several of the own-
ers of individual projects have since improved 
their financial status and are no longer poor. 
Four of the nine individually-owned projects 
were started by migrant workers who returned 
from Gauteng, following retrenchment or dis-
satisfaction with the kind of work they were 
able to find. Six of the nine individually-owned 
projects started as small enterprises that were 
expanded over time. Gender appeared not to be 
a factor in starting individually-owned broiler 
enterprises as both men and women had start-
ed such projects. Two of the nine individually-
owned projects were started by obtaining access 
to disused facilities through renting. 
Five of the seven group projects were started as 
community-based poverty alleviation and em-
ployment creation initiatives that succeeded in 
obtaining funds, mostly from public agencies, 
to acquire infrastructure and in some instances 
even the necessary working capital for the first 
production cycle. Group projects were dominat-
ed by women.
Natural and physical 
resources
Central to broiler production is the broiler house, 
which needs to provide the desired environment 
for the growth of the broiler chicks. During the 
first three weeks of growth, called the brood-
ing period, conditions need to be warm, which 
means that heating is necessary, especially dur-
ing the winter period. Thereafter ventilation 
becomes very important to maintain fresh air 
and avoid excessively high temperatures, which 
cause heat stress. The provision of water and 
feed are also critical for optimum growth. The 
provision of sufficient drinkers and feeders en-
sures that these are available to all the birds all 
of the time. Lastly, there is a need to provide 
artificial light, because darkness slows growth. 
Usually this is achieved by means of electric light 
bulbs. Table 15.3 provides a summary of the main 
attributes of the broiler houses that were found 
in the 16 projects. 
The terminology used to categorise the broiler 
houses in Table 15.3 was as follows:
• “Rudimentary” refers to a house that was 
constructed using home-made, waste or 
second-hand materials (Figure 15.2, upper 
left). Functionally rudimentary houses tend 
to be sub-standard because of poor ventila-
tion or insulation.
• “Elementary” refers to a house that is func-
tionally more or less adequate but the ma-
terials used tend to be of fairly low quality 
(Figure 15.2, upper right).
• “Comprehensive” refers to a house that is 
functionally adequate but it differs from 
the sophisticated house in terms of durabil-
ity and cost of the materials used (Figure 
15.2, lower left).
• “Sophisticated” refers to a house that is 
built using durable and expensive materials 
and that enables high levels of environmen-
tal control (Figure 15.2, lower right).
Broilers are space-efficient and can be housed 
at densities of up to 15 birds/m2. Practically, this 
means that a 3 metre by 3 metre room can ac-
commodate 100 chickens from day-old to market 
readiness. The space efficiency of the production 
system enables rural people to site small-scale 
production units on their residential plots, but 
typically as they grow their enterprises the use 
of residential land becomes problematic, not 
only from the perspective of available space but 
also from an environmental perspective. Broiler 
units are smelly, especially during summer, and 
this upsets neighbours (see Case 2).
There were important differences between in-
dividually-owned and group-owned projects in 
terms of average capacity and average cost of 
the broiler infrastructure. Individually-owned 
projects tended to have a greater capacity (2561 
birds on average) than group-owned projects 
(1586 birds on average), but the average cost of 
the infrastructure in group projects (R187 783) 
was 5.6 times higher than that in individually-
owned projects (R33 393). Expressed as a cost to 
capacity ratio (cost of infrastructure per bird), 
the contrast between the two types of projects 
was even greater. In the case of individually-
owned projects, the average cost of infrastruc-
ture was R13.04 per bird, whilst in group projects 
it was R118.40. The difference can be largely at-
tributed to the fact that a number of the group-
owned projects had received relatively copious 
material support from public agencies.
Production system
Across the 16 enterprises the production system 
being used was highly standardised. Day-old 
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Case Number of 
houses
Total capacity 
(batch size)
Estimated total 
cost (Rand)
Categorisation
Individually-owned enterprises
1 1 200 3 000 Rudimentary 
2 3 3 000 72 000 Elementary 
3 2 1 600 30 000 Elementary 
6 1 400 2 250 Rudimentary 
9 1 1 500 Rented Elementary 
11 4 10 000 Rented Sophisticated 
12 2 900 22 000 Elementary 
13 1 450 4 500 Rudimentary 
15 3 5 000 100 000 1 elementary and 2 comprehensive 
Mean 2 2 561 33 393
Group-owned enterprises
4 2 2 700 160 000 Comprehensive 
5 2 5 000 880 000 Sophisticated
7 1 700 27 500 Elementary
8 3 1 800 127 000 1 rudimentary and 2 elementary 
10 1 500 75 000 Sophisticated 
14 1 100 1 200 Rudimentary 
16 1 300 43 780 Comprehensive with three partitions
Mean 1.5 1 586 187 783
Figure 15.2: Categories of smallholder broiler houses found in 
Vhembe 
Table 15.3: Summary attributes of the broiler houses used in 
smallholder broiler production in Vhembe (n=16; 2008)
Rudimentary broiler house Elementary broiler house
Comprehensive broiler house Sophisticated broiler house
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broiler chicks, usually of the Ross breed, are pur-
chased from commercial hatcheries and are sup-
plied to the units in boxes of 100 chicks, either 
directly or through intermediation by the Vhem-
be District office of the Limpopo Department of 
Agriculture in Thohoyandou. 
The Ross breed was developed to grow very 
rapidly. When conditions are optimal, day-
old Ross broilers can attain a live weight of 2 
kilograms after 38 to 40 days. They have been 
bred to eat much more than other chickens and 
this trait has certain negative side effects, such 
as susceptibility to leg problems and the sudden 
death syndrome. Leg problems are expressed 
as struggling to get up and move around. The 
sudden death syndrome, also called ‘flip over’, is 
essentially the result of birds eating themselves 
to death. 
To achieve optimum growth rates the birds are 
subjected to ad libitum, phased feeding. This 
means that the birds are allowed to eat as much 
as they want and that the composition of the 
feed is modified as the birds grow. Normally, 
the birds are fed a high (22%) protein diet called 
the ‘starter’ diet, which may be offered in mash 
or pellet form, during the initial three weeks 
of growth. During the fourth and fifth weeks, 
the birds are then put on a medium (20%) 
protein diet called ‘grower’ diet and during 
the last week they are fed a low (19%) protein 
diet called ‘finisher’ diet. All producers applied 
phased feeding but they all tended to have their 
own schedule, with some only using two phases, 
namely starter and finisher. Without exception 
the 16 enterprises sourced their feeds from com-
mercial suppliers. 
To minimise the effects of stress, the birds are 
sometimes provided with extra vitamins after 
arrival in the units. Health management is es-
sential because the birds are very susceptible to 
diseases. Day-old chicks arrive inoculated against 
important poultry diseases, such as the infamous 
Newcastle disease, and during production in the 
units their immunity is boosted by providing 
vaccines through the drinking water. The provi-
sion of medicines becomes necessary when the 
birds get ill. Health management also involves 
the prevention of infections by means of disin-
fecting shoe-baths at the entrance to the units 
and the cleaning, disinfection and resting of the 
facility between batches.
Economic aspects
Average budgets for the two types of broiler 
projects are presented in Table 15.4. Budgets for 
the individual enterprises appear in Table 15.5. 
Production costs
Total production cost per chicken ranged be-
tween R19.28 and R31.22 in individually-owned 
projects and between R19.62 and R30.71 in 
group-owned projects (Table 15.5). The average 
total production cost was R23.49 per broiler in 
individually-owned projects and R23.10 in group-
owned projects. Table 15.4 shows the purchase 
of day-old chicks (about 21% of the total cost of 
production) and feed (about 69% of the total 
cost of production) to be the two major produc-
tion costs. The interviews revealed that owners 
made limited use of the discount opportunities 
that arise from bulk purchases. Some of the en-
terprises that had a capacity that exceeded 1000 
chickens operated contracts with a Gauteng-
based hatchery. This contract stipulated that 
chicks had to be purchased in quantities of 1000 
or more and in return the client received a dis-
count of R10 per box of 100 chicks purchased. 
Collaboration among small enterprises to make 
up the numbers to take advantage of this dis-
count appeared rare and inconsistent, possibly 
because of difficulty in synchronising timing of 
re-stocking. There were also opportunities to ne-
gotiate discounts on bulk feed purchases (5 tons 
or more), but only one instance was identified 
in which this opportunity was exploited, even 
though the discount was substantial (R30 per 50 
kilograms of feed). 
During the interviews, two factors that affected 
variability in production costs were identified, 
namely mortality rate and the period the chick-
ens remained in the house after reaching market 
readiness. Both factors deserve attention as they 
appear to affect the economic sustainability of 
smallholder broiler enterprises in the study area.
Mortality rate 
A chicken that dies before it is sold represents 
a financial loss because the costs of the inputs 
the chicken had consumed until the time of its 
death, as well as of the chick itself, cannot be 
recovered. In commercial broiler production the 
mortality rate is considered too high when it 
exceeds 10%. Table 15.5 shows that during the 
July 07 to June 08 production year, the average 
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Input per chicken Individual (n = 9) Group (n = 7)
Rand % Rand %
Day-old chick 5.09 21.67 4.74 20.52
Feed 16.04 68.28 15.86 68.66
Transport 0.53 2.26 0.69 2.99
Sawdust 0.45 1.92 0.61 2.64
Energy 0.41 1.75 0.38 1.65
Medicines and disinfectants 0.34 1.45 0.67 2.90
Labour 0.60 2.55 0.00 0.00
Rent 0.22 0.94 0.00 0.00
Maintenance 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.65
Total production cost 23.49 100.00 23.10 20.52
Gross income 29.20 27.35
Gross margin 5.71 3.76
Total number of birds produced 9 533 4 114
Mortalities (%) 6.8 14.5
Net income (July 07-June 08) (Rand) 43 484 13 528
Table 15.4: Average farm budget for individually-owned and 
group-owned broiler enterprises (July 07-June 08)
mortality rate in individually-owned broiler en-
terprises ranged between 2.7% and 9.5%, with 
an overall average of 6.8%. In group-owned 
projects the average mortality rate ranged be-
tween 4.2% and 38.0%. Three of the seven 
group-owned projects recorded average mortal-
ity rates in excess of 10% and the overall aver-
age of 14.5% was also well above the industrial 
tolerance limit. Scrutiny of the full enterprise 
budgets of the individual projects shows that 
high mortality rates were characteristic of some 
of these projects, such as the Khondelela Project 
(Case 8), but not of all. Take for example, the 
group-owned enterprise called the Lyapandha 
Co-operative (Case 4). It produced 11 batches of 
chickens during the July 07 to June 08 produc-
tion year. In 10 of these 11 batches the mortality 
rate varied between 1.75% and 6.25% and the 
average was 3.6%, which was excellent. Howev-
er, the November 2007 batch was a disaster with 
a mortality rate of 41.7%. Some of the individu-
ally-owned projects experienced similar events. 
For example, the Tshitimbi Broiler Farm (Case 2), 
the oldest of all 16 enterprises with an average 
mortality rate of 7.2%, experienced a mortality 
rate of 30% in its November 2007 batch of 3000 
chickens. By comparison, the average mortality 
rate in the other 11 batches was only 2.4%, indi-
cating the excellent performance of this farm. In-
dications were that group projects found it more 
difficult to recover from setbacks than individual 
projects. High mortality rates are expected to 
reduce the average cost of feed per chicken as 
fewer chickens have to be raised to market readi-
ness. This could possibly explain why the average 
feed cost of group-projects was 18c lower than 
that of individually-owned projects (Table 15.5). 
The higher overall average mortality rate experi-
enced by group projects was mostly reflected in 
the lower gross income per chicken because this 
parameter was calculated using the batch sizes 
as reference. Overall average gross income per 
chicken in individually-owned projects was R1.85 
more than in group projects.
Duration of stock clearance
Once chickens have reached market readiness 
they need to be sold as soon as possible. Af-
ter six weeks the growth rate of the birds de-
clines but the birds’ feed intake remains high as 
their maintenance requirement increases with 
growth. Keeping the birds longer than necessary 
erodes the gross margin even though the cost 
of their extended stay is partially recovered by 
charging higher prices. There was no evidence 
that individually-owned projects cleared their 
stock faster than group projects as both identi-
fied this to be a major challenge.
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Marketing and sales
Smallholder broiler enterprises sell their birds in 
two ways, namely to individual customers and to 
hawkers. Selling to individual customers has the 
advantage of being able to charge high prices, 
but sales tend to move slowly. Selling to hawk-
ers has the advantage of being able to sell large 
numbers of birds at once, but hawkers demand 
substantial discounts. Typically hawkers operate 
bakkies that are equipped with cages for the 
transportation of chickens. They move around 
daily and target places of likely sales, such as 
pension pay-out points. 
Marketing of the birds is done by word of 
mouth, by advertising availability of chickens us-
ing posters at the entrance of the enterprise, by 
informing hawkers and by phoning to a weekly 
radio programme on a local radio station that 
allows smallholders to advertise their produce 
free of charge.
The prices enterprises charged for their chick-
ens varied from R21 to R45 per bird. Price was 
affected by the type of customer (individual con-
sumers or hawkers), the size of the bird and the 
presence of competition (remoteness tended to 
increase the price).
Broiler litter was another source of income for 
some of the enterprises. Empty feed bags were 
filled with litter and sold to gardeners and crop 
farmers. For example, during the July 07 to June 
08 production year, the Tshamutilikwa Poultry 
Project (Case 7) produced 1400 chickens and 
generated R294 from the sale of broiler litter at 
R7.00 per bag. Income from the sale of litter con-
tributed 0.8% of the total gross income of this 
enterprise. 
Overall economic performance
The information that was collected on the eco-
nomic performance of the 16 enterprises indicat-
ed that smallholder broiler projects in Vhembe 
are economically viable enterprises. Those cases 
that were not performing particularly well had 
experienced one or more batches in which the 
mortality rate was exceptionally high. There 
were reasons to believe that the quality of the 
day-old chicks delivered to projects during Oc-
tober and November 2007 was suspect. Individu-
ally-owned enterprises appeared to be more re-
silient to setbacks caused by exceptionally high 
mortality rates than group projects.
Livelihood significance
From a livelihood outcome perspective, the dif-
ference between individually-owned and group-
owned broiler enterprises was striking. Without 
exception individual owners obtained consid-
erable financial benefit from their enterprises, 
with several relying entirely on their enterprises 
for their livelihood (Cases 1, 6, 9 and 12). In four 
of the nine cases, the enterprises even provided 
livelihoods for others through employment (Cas-
es 9, 11, 12 and 15). Group projects, on the other 
hand, stood out for the absence of livelihood 
benefits to participants. With the exception of 
the Tshamutilikwa Poultry Project, where mem-
bers received a single payment of R400 each dur-
ing the production year under consideration and 
also received up to five birds each for both East-
er and Christmas, responding members of the 
other group projects were adamant that so far 
they had not received any material benefit from 
participating in their broiler projects. The total 
gross margin data for the production year un-
der consideration (Table 15.5) show that in three 
enterprises (Cases 4, 14 and 16) there was noth-
ing or very little to distribute among members. 
Another three enterprises (Cases 7, 8 and 10) 
recorded gross margins ranging between R7280 
and R11 730 for the year, which would have al-
lowed for the payment of at least one modest 
dividend, but this did not occur. One group 
enterprise (Case 5), achieved a gross margin of 
R62 245, but this was a project that had been re-
vived recently and the two members running it 
were probably building up a financial reserve. 
The exact reasons for the sharp contrast between 
individually-owned and group-owned enter-
prises in terms of livelihood impact can only par-
tially explained by differences in the economic 
performance, including differences in capacity 
and productivity. Further research is needed to 
pinpoint the constraints that limit the livelihood 
benefits participants in group projects obtain. 
In some cases participants claimed to have been 
engaged in broiler production for seven years 
without obtaining any material reward for their 
labour and this begs for an explanation. 
Social and institutional 
dimensions
Socially, smallholder broiler projects appeared 
to be well embedded in their local settings even 
though residents complained about the smell 
of enterprises that were located on residential 
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sites in their midst. Important to group-owned 
projects were internal social relationships, but 
only limited attention was awarded to the inves-
tigation of the social arrangements that guided 
collaboration and management of the enter-
prise. Considering the public and private invest-
ments that have been made in these projects 
and the lack of material benefits accruing to 
members of these projects from participation in 
the enterprise (in one case no benefits after sev-
en years of production), this aspect begs for ad-
ditional research. Only in one group enterprise 
(Case 5) was corruption mentioned as a factor 
that had affected performance.
The support system being provided by the De-
partment of Agriculture and other public and 
private institutions in Vhembe was considerable 
and seemingly quite effective. The Department 
facilitates the purchase of quality day-old chicks 
using a system of bank deposits and bulk order-
ing. People interested in purchasing chicks de-
posit the purchase price in the bank account of 
the hatchery and present the deposit slips to a 
dedicated staff member of the Department of 
Agriculture in Thohoyandou. Here orders are 
communicated to the hatchery and within one 
week the order is delivered to the Departmen-
tal Officer, who informs clients of the date and 
time of arrival of their orders. Clients collect the 
chicks from the Office in Thohoyandou. The De-
partment claims to ensure quality of the chicks 
being delivered. The dedicated staff member is 
also the District expert in poultry production, 
whose sole responsibility is to provide producers 
with technical advice and to organise training 
and special occasions (farmers’ days) at which 
national experts present lectures on poultry 
production. Training, which is offered free of 
charge, is done through the Madzivahdila Col-
lege of Agriculture, which is located about 10 
kilometres from Thohoyandou. The six-week 
training programmes combine theory and prac-
tice, with trainees being guided through a com-
plete broiler production cycle. At the local level, 
producers can also obtain information from the 
village extension officer. As indicated, a local 
radio station, Phalaphala FM, has a weekly pro-
gramme at 5:30 am on which smallholders can 
advertise their produce.
Several donors, both public and private, have 
funded smallholder broiler development in the 
District, but donations are limited to group 
projects. The interviews indicated that individu-
als who have sought financial assistance to es-
tablish or expand their broiler infrastructure de-
pended on the Land Bank or family members. 
Groups on the other hand have been supported 
by a wide range of donors. The interviews indi-
cated that the Department of Health and Wel-
fare was the main public agency that rendered 
financial support for the objective of poverty 
alleviation. Other public funding agencies in-
cluded the Department of Economic Develop-
ment and the Department of Agriculture. The 
Department of Agriculture was claimed to fund 
about three applications per year. Selection of 
the projects was said to be primarily based on 
evidence of commitment to succeed among the 
applicants. Private and parastatal donors includ-
ed Eskom, the National Development Agency 
and Old Mutual.
Tenure arrangements that applied to the land 
on which broiler enterprises were established 
were entirely traditional. Tribal leadership in the 
form of the village headman were responsible 
for the allocation of residential sites on which 
most of the individually-owned projects were 
located. Group projects were mostly located on 
tribal farmland with the headman responsible 
for initial allocation and in some cases the chief 
and the municipality endorsing the allocation.
Gender, class and human 
dimensions
There was no evidence of gender bias in broiler 
production because both men and women were 
found to have started such enterprises. However, 
it needs pointing out that group-owned projects 
had a membership that was dominated by wom-
en, not only from the start, but increasingly so 
over time. Men who joined group projects at the 
start tended to withdraw more readily from the 
projects when material benefits were not forth-
coming.
The evidence that was collected suggested that 
individually-owned broiler enterprises were 
started by people from different walks of life, 
including very poor, poor and not so poor, edu-
cated and uneducated, young and old. Group-
owned project, on the other hand, were domi-
nated by poor and very poor women of variable 
age, usually married, who had not received much 
education. The reason for the dominance of this 
particular class in group-owned enterprises was 
that nearly all of these projects arose as poverty 
alleviation interventions. It needs pointing out 
that broiler production is a rather ‘simple’ activ-
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ity because the system is applied following well-
developed guidelines. Even without education 
it is still quite easy to learn the recipe of good 
practices that need to be applied to be success-
ful.
Perceptions of performance
Perceptions of performance reflected the eco-
nomic performance of the different enterprises, 
and therefore also the contrast between indi-
vidually-owned and group projects. Whereas 
not all owners considered themselves as entirely 
successful, most were conscious of the positive 
contribution their enterprises had made to their 
livelihood outcomes. Group projects mostly pro-
ceeded in the hope that circumstances and per-
formance would improve in future. 
Policy environment
The current policy environment is particularly 
supportive of group projects, especially finan-
cially, but individuals do benefit from access to 
training, information and inputs in the form of 
day-old chicks. To what extent growth in small-
holder broiler production can be sustained in 
Vhembe is not certain, but the Department of 
Agriculture believes that there is still consider-
able potential. Spatial analysis of the distribu-
tion of small-scale broiler enterprises with a view 
of avoiding high levels of competition could be 
added to the institutional support services on 
offer. One reason for believing potential still 
exists overall is the evidence provided above to 
the effect that smallholder broiler units within 
in the Thohoyandou area account for less than 
7% of the area’s total household consumption 
of birds.
Environmental aspects
Air pollution was identified as a problem for 
enterprises that were located within residential 
environments. Facilitating the translocation of 
growing enterprises onto farmland was identi-
fied as a possible way to alleviate this problem. 
The future
The study of 16 smallholder broiler enterprises 
indicated that this type of enterprise has the 
potential of being economically viable. The 
developmental approach that is being used in 
Vhembe, particularly in terms of training and 
technical support, has a lot of merit and could be 
considered as a model for other Districts where 
human population densities are high. The prob-
lems identified with group-enterprises need ad-
ditional research to identify why such projects 
fail to provide sustainable benefit streams to 
participants.
Individually-owned enterprises held realistic 
views of the future, seeking to improve the effi-
ciency of their enterprises and associated activi-
ties. Group projects, on the other hand, had less 
realistic visions, with many identifying further 
expansion in capacity combined with the estab-
lishment of an abattoir as the way forward to 
sustainability and improved returns.
Conclusions
The case study of a selection of 16 smallholder 
broiler enterprises in Vhembe served the objec-
tives of the overall study into ‘strategies to sup-
port South African smallholders as a contribution 
to government’s second economy strategy’ be-
cause it provided several examples of enterprises 
that had been established successfully in rural 
areas by people who had experienced difficul-
ties becoming usefully integrated into the first 
economy. Broiler production, as it is applied by 
the enterprises that were included in the study, 
follows a well established production system 
that can easily be learnt, even by people with 
little or no education. It is the opinion of the 
authors that modification of the system to re-
duce economic leakages could further enhance 
the impact of these enterprises on village econ-
omies. At this stage, all the inputs are sourced 
externally. System modification could internal-
ise most inputs, but this would require major 
change in terms of breed selection and also the 
adoption of crop production and processing sys-
tems that would enable local manufacturing of 
poultry feed.
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Introduction
Munzhedzi is a land restitution project located 
in Limpopo about 30 minutes east of Makhado 
town. Munzhedzi is one of the few land reform 
projects encountered in which the absence of 
deliberate planning or attempts to devise and 
adhere to a business plan are so extreme, that 
in a sense it is a model of land reform that is ob-
vious but also uncommon. Because of its ‘open 
access’ aspect, Munzhedzi therefore reveals 
something about the strong demand for land 
for homestead purposes, whereas official policy 
tends to recognise housing on the one hand, and 
land for agricultural purposes on the other. How 
precisely to characterise this land demand is not 
altogether clear; it would appear that a large 
share of the residents are younger households 
whose heads saw the relatively cheap, well-lo-
cated land as a good opportunity to move out 
of their parents’ households. However, other 
people clearly seized the opportunity to move 
away from land that is inferior in terms of soil 
quality and rainfall predictability, e.g. the area 
south of the Soutpansberg ridge and west of the 
N1 (Kutama, Sentamule, etc.). 
Historical evolution
In July 1998, a chief by the name of T. J. Rambau 
lodged a claim with the Restitution Commission 
on behalf of the Munzhedzi community. The 
land had been dispossessed from the Munzhedzi 
people through various mechanisms between 
the mid-1930s and the mid-1960s. In 2000, while 
waiting for word on the fate of the community’s 
claim, Chief Rambau learned that the local mu-
nicipality intended to use some of the claimed 
land to enable the extension of Vleifontein 
Township. He then organised an ‘occupation’ 
by claimant and other households so as to pre-
vent this. The occupiers immediately set about 
demarcating residential plots and constructing 
shacks. 
In 2002, the Commission formalised the return 
of the land to the Munzhedzi claimants, who 
numbered 486 beneficiary households. The land 
is situated on the west of Vleifontein Township, 
about 5-10 minutes southeast of Elim along the 
Elim-Bandelierkop (R578) road. Prior to its set-
tlement by the Munzhedzi claimants, it was va-
cant state land, though some of the Vleifontein 
residents grew crops there and residents of vari-
ous neighbouring communities grazed their live-
stock there.
Although a communal property association (CPA) 
was formed in order to accept the property title 
and to manage the land, the CPA committee has 
never had any effectively meaningful function. 
When Chief Rambau died shortly after the res-
toration of the land, one of his sons took over as 
chief, and quickly set about demarcating plots to 
anyone who wanted one and could pay a mod-
est fee (about R220 for claimant households and 
R320 for non-claimants). As of early 2008, there 
were 1160 demarcated residential plots. Of these, 
a total of 931 were occupied, of which 178 were 
occupied by claimant households and the others 
by non-claimant households. The vast majority 
(88%) of claimant households who settled at 
Munzhedzi relocated from Nthabalala, which is 
about 10 minutes’ drive away over a hilly  gravel 
road. While about a third of the non-claimant 
households also came from Nthabalala, another 
third came from other adjacent communities, 
and another third came from elsewhere, includ-
ing some from other provinces and indeed other 
countries. 
16 Munzhedzi restitution project, 
Limpopo: a restitution project that 
went wrong in a good way?
Michael Aliber, Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian 
Studies, University of the Western Cape
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Why did people re-settle at Munzhedzi in such 
numbers? The fact that the chief allowed people 
to acquire plots at Munzhedzi merely explains 
what made it possible, but why did so many peo-
ple choose to, despite the absence of services or 
any credible development plan? In answer to this 
question, people’s responses fall into two catego-
ries, namely those who praise the fact that agri-
cultural conditions are better at Munzhedzi than 
where they came from (in terms of being flatter 
and having better soil and rains), but roughly as 
many cite the fact that they are now closer to 
transport routes through which they have better 
access to piece jobs in Makhado. In essence, in 
terms of its settlement pattern and style of land 
use, Munzhedzi is a recreation of a communal 
area, but more favourably located and with bet-
ter agricultural conditions than many. Commu-
nal water taps were only installed in 2007 (but 
frequently do not work), and neither electricity 
nor schools have been forthcoming.
Natural and physical 
resources
The extent of the land is 1204 hectares. For 
roughly two decades prior to the settlement of 
the claim, the land had been unoccupied and 
largely unused. Rainfall averages 660 mm per 
year (versus e.g. 440 mm for Mara Research Sta-
tion, located 56 kilometres to the west). Com-
mercial farms in the immediate area are either 
cattle farms or irrigated orchards; grain farming 
has not taken place on a commercial scale in the 
area for several decades (South African Weather 
Service, 2009). 
Figure 16.1: Satellite image showing location of Munzhedzi 
relative to other settlements
215
Research
Report
Within Munzhedzi, plots average 30x50 me-
tres. In general, 60% of stands have homestead 
gardens, however about 15% of non-inhabited 
stands also have gardens. (The percentage of 
stands with gardens is highest for those parts of 
Munzhedzi which were settled earliest, possibly 
indicating that there tends to be a lag between 
settlement and using land for gardening; this in 
turn would imply that the overall percentage is 
likely to have risen and continue rising from the 
60% figure estimate from earlier 2008.) Only a 
fraction of the land has been demarcated for 
residential use (see figure below), while an ad-
ditional modest amount is being used by about 
20 households on smallholdings outside/beyond 
their homesteads (mostly in the order of 0.5 to 
1 hectare in size). The rest of the land is not be-
ing used for farming, though it is extensively 
used for the collection of firewood, thatch, wild 
foods, etc. The extent to which the ‘excess’ land 
at Munzhedzi is used for grazing livestock is not 
entirely clear, however the grazing is classified 
as sourveld and thus is not ideal for large stock 
husbandry. 
The allocation of residential plots appears to 
have slowed, owing to the perception that the 
land is now full. In a recent interview with the 
chief, he indicated that he is no longer allocat-
ing plots, though other key informants imply 
that in fact the chief has been reallocating plots 
that had been allocated earlier but never set-
tled, but not actually demarcating and allocat-
ing new plots.
The contradiction between the obvious fact that 
the land remains largely unoccupied, with the 
perception of community members that it is full, 
can be resolved by understanding that people 
have fairly strict ideas as to what parts of the 
land are desirable for settlement, and the key 
issue is proximity to a good road. The primary 
road is the Elim-Bandelierkop road (which is the 
more or less straight road that runs diagonally 
across the top of Figures 16.1 and 16.2), and sec-
ondly the road that passes Vleifontein township 
towards Nthabalala to the south. In other words, 
the road is the most significant physical resource 
next to the land itself, or perhaps one could say 
Figure 16.2: Satellite image showing pattern of settlement at 
Munzhedzi
216
Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.
that a plot is of value to the extent it is close 
to the road. Indeed, it is worth pointing out 
that there is no electricity, and communal wa-
ter taps were installed a few years ago but func-
tion poorly. In choosing to move to Munzhedzi, 
many people effectively decided to sacrifice ac-
cess to some of these services, in favour of being 
closer to a good road, but also to have a plot on 
relatively good land, however small. 
Production systems
Virtually all of the households who engage in 
gardening or farming at Munzhedzi grow maize 
on a rain-fed basis. Just under half of these 
households also grow other crops and vegeta-
bles, including sweet potatoes, tomatoes, beans, 
groundnuts, sugar cane; and some also maintain 
fruit trees such as mango and pawpaw. 
Of 135 ‘agriculturally active’ households inter-
viewed in mid-2008, just over half hired tractor 
services for soil preparation (mainly from an ad-
jacent land redistribution project), while the oth-
ers relied exclusively on hand hoes. Of the latter, 
about a sixth hired labour to undertake (or assist 
with) land preparation. Most households who 
hire tractor services spend about R140 for this, 
however those with larger or multiple plots, or 
those with extra land outside the demarcated 
area, spend more. One individual hired don-
key services, on which he spent R300. In terms 
of other inputs, 44% of households use at least 
some hired labour, virtually all purchase at least 
some of their seeds, 11% use chemical fertilisers, 
and only 2% use pesticides. It is worth noting 
that only five of these 135 households also prac-
tised agriculture on land outside of Munzhedzi.
A smaller number of households keep livestock 
at Munzhedzi, and these primarily within their 
homesteads. Altogether about one sixth keep 
chickens (overwhelmingly for home consump-
tion), and a handful keep goats, pigs and cat-
tle. Among the few households who keep cattle, 
the main reason however is for income-earning 
purposes, but the largest ‘herd’ observed is 20 
(with the second largest being 5). There is a 
relationship between arable production and 
keeping of livestock, for example while 41% of 
those with gardens or fields keep livestock, only 
14% of those without gardens do so. Only eight 
households incurred cash costs associated with 
livestock, generally for parasite control among 
those few with cattle. Only two households, be-
ing cattle owners, spent money on hired labour 
for livestock.
Economic aspects
While all of the 135 ‘agriculturally active house-
holds’ interviewed in mid-2008 incur some cash 
costs for inputs related to garden or crop pro-
duction, only 6 (about 4%) had any cash in-
come. This was by design rather than, say, be-
cause 2007/08 was a poor growing season (three 
quarters of respondents reported that it was a 
relatively good season). As mentioned above, by 
contrast only 8 households incurred cash costs 
associated with keeping livestock, versus the 5 
who had cash income from livestock sales.
One way in which the economic significance 
of own production can be appreciated – espe-
cially in light of the emphasis placed on grow-
ing mealies – is by considering the extent to 
which households satisfy their own mealie meal 
needs. The figure below summarises, by look-
ing at the percentage of households from the 
sample of 135 ‘agriculturally active’ households. 
The figure shows that for 60% of households, 
own-produced maize in the 2007/08 season was 
sufficient to satisfy only 1 to 2 months’ worth of 
mealie meal needs, while only about 5% actually 
produced a surplus. However, given that mealie 
meal accounts for about 9% of total household 
expenditure (i.e. despite some own production), 
it can be argued that own production of maize 
is potentially meaningful for marginal house-
holds.    
As a more comprehensive measure of the eco-
nomic significance of agricultural production at 
Munzhedzi (including garden/crop production 
as well as livestock production), we have esti-
mated net farm income for the 2007/08 season. 
The calculation is incomplete in the sense that it 
does not seek to place a value on own (i.e. non-
hired) labour, whereas it does seek to impute a 
value for production for own consumption, us-
ing market prices as proxies for ‘value’. The fig-
ure below summarises the findings, distinguish-
ing between those who hired tractor services for 
land preparation versus those who did not.  
What the figure shows is that almost 15% of ‘ag-
riculturally active’ households derived a nega-
tive net farm income in the 2007/08 season. No-
tably, however, almost all of these were those 
who hired tractor services, reflecting the fact 
that these services constitute one of the main 
cash costs among those who employ them. For 
another 20% of households, net farm income 
was less than R250, and again, these were domi-
nated by those who hired tractor services. At the 
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same time, however, those who hired tractor 
services predominate among the relatively few 
whose net farm income exceeded R1500.
Livelihoods significance
Agriculture is clearly not the most important 
component of people’s livelihood strategies at 
Munzhedzi. In fact, according to the census of 
all households conducted in early 2008, only 
one household (representing 0.1% of all settled 
households), identified agriculture as its main 
source of (cash) income. 
However, as noted above, generating cash in-
come is not most residents’ purpose in ‘farming’, 
particularly those who are gardening within 
their homestead stands. Thus ‘imputed income’ 
Figure 16.3: Distribution of estimated own-produced mealie 
meal expressed in terms of months of need 
Figure 16.4: Distribution of estimated net farm income, 
2007/08
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
<1 1–2 3–4
Months
Sh
ar
e 
o
f 
sa
m
p
le
5–6 7–11 12+
By tractor
By hand
0%
<-2
49
-25
0 t
o -
1
0 t
o 2
49
250
 to
 49
9
500
 to
 74
9
750
 to
 99
9
100
0 t
o 1
499
150
0 t
o 1
999
200
0 t
o 2
999 399
9+
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Net farm income
Sh
ar
e 
o
f 
sa
m
p
le
218
Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.
is of more interest. The figure below seeks to 
give an idea of the relationship between net 
farm income and average annual household 
expenditure, where the latter is a proxy for to-
tal household income. While the pattern is not 
very well defined, there appears to be a general 
negative relationship, i.e. higher economic ben-
efits from agriculture are associated with lower 
total household expenditure/income. This runs 
counter to the often-told story that households 
derive more benefit from agriculture the bet-
ter off they are in the first place, simply because 
it is easier for them to invest in inputs. Rather, 
with the exception of an outlier point for those 
households with net farm income in the R2000 
to R2999 range, it seems that poorer households 
get more out of agriculture, presumably because 
they need to. It is not that the other logic does 
not also play a role, however it may be the case 
that Munzhedzi simply does not offer much op-
portunity for investing in agriculture, so agricul-
tural participation is driven more by need than 
by opportunity.
An obvious reason for the fairly modest pay-off 
from gardening is the limited size of most of the 
gardens. Indeed, 60% of the 135 ‘agriculturally 
active’ survey respondents indicated a need or 
desire for more land. The explanations captured 
in the survey for this desire to have more land 
tend to be opaque (“Because I am not satisfied 
by what I harvest”), however some give a clearer 
indication that the purpose of having more land 
would be to be able to pursue subsistence pro-
duction on a (somewhat?) larger scale: “If I get 
more land I can farm and harvest better and stop 
buying food for a long time as it is expensive”; 
“Because what we harvest cannot support us 
for long time”; “Because if I have a big field, I 
can farm and get good harvest and stop buying 
Figure 16.4: Relationship between net farm income and 
average annual household expenditure
Grants 30%
Wages 51%
Business/enterprise 2%
Agriculture 0.1%
Other 9%
Combination 8%
Total 100%
Table 16.1: Main source of household ‘cash’ income (2008)
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maize meal;” etc. What are absent are unambig-
uous declarations to the effect that the respond-
ent wants more land to enable production on a 
commercial basis.
However, there is seemingly a contradiction be-
tween this predilection for having more land, 
and maintaining the sort of convenient ‘peri-ur-
ban’ lifestyle people have opted for. Many peo-
ple at Munzhedzi would appear to be interested 
in accessing more land there so as to garden on 
a larger scale, which would imply larger home-
steads, i.e. so that the land would be close. (The 
chair of the CPA Committee indicated that, had 
the chief not usurped the Committee’s function 
of land allocation, then larger plots might have 
been created.) But this would imply either that 
many of the homesteads would end up further 
away from the main roads, or that there would 
be fewer homesteads, i.e. fewer households and 
people.
One other livelihood issue bears mentioning, 
namely that gardeners/farmers at Munzhedzi 
hire casual workers to undertake tasks related to 
crop or garden production. Our rough estimate 
is that the total amount spent on labour in the 
2007/08 season was around R57 000; while this 
is not much in the greater scheme of things (it 
represents less than 1% of aggregate household 
expenditure/income among Munzhedzi’s resi-
dents), it does equate to about 1600 person-days 
of work (at R35/day), which is not trivial.
Social and institutional 
dimensions
Residents of Munzhedzi who garden or farm, do 
so on an individual household basis. The excep-
tions are two projects which were initiated by 
a local NGO (which also organised donor fund-
ing to cover start-up costs, e.g. for structures), of 
which one is a piggery and the other a broiler 
project. The piggery closed down within the first 
two years, while the broiler project is still car-
rying on, albeit with only a handful of house-
holds remaining active. While neither project 
was closely examined for the purposes of de-
veloping this case study, the impression gener-
ated is that they are typical of group agricultural 
projects, in which quality of management and 
ability to operate ‘entrepreneurially’ are weak. 
There is no sign of support from the provincial 
department of agriculture at Munzhedzi. Thus 
the vast majority of those involved in agriculture 
at Munzhedzi do so independently, and with-
out outside support apart from informal sup-
port from neighbours, which is fairly common 
and mainly involves borrowing of hand tools. 
Neither is there evidence of residents cooperat-
ing in order to purchase inputs in bulk. As for 
milling services to turn maize grains into meal, 
virtually all maize growers at Munzhedzi rely on 
Hluvukani Mills, a business north of Elim which 
has an elaborate and efficient system of collect-
ing maize from many of the villages in the area 
at specified points on pre-arranged days, after 
which it mills the grain (according to individu-
als’ preferences) and returns the meal for a fee. 
Larger maize producers may however make 
other arrangements, for example with mills in 
Makhado town. 
Arguably the biggest institutional issue at Mun-
zhedzi is the discord between the current chief 
and the CPA committee. There are two conse-
quences of the discord; first, as mentioned, the 
chief24 feels free to allocate plots regardless of 
the CPA’s (legally-based) objectives; and second, 
it is unclear who represents the community, for 
example to coordinate appeals to the munici-
pality for improved services. Beyond this, there 
is another problem at Munzhedzi, in the form 
of a power struggle between the ‘chief’ and a 
headman who claims that part of Munzhedzi 
falls under his governance. This confuses the 
inhabitants of Munzhedzi, since some of them 
don’t know if they fall under Nthabalala or un-
der Munzhedzi. 
Notwithstanding the fact that these are real is-
sues, the discord does not flare up into nasty 
conflict, and most importantly there are no 
discernible simmering tensions between claim-
ant and non-claimant households. Indeed, the 
degree to which people resettled at Munzhedzi 
from different places and for different reasons, 
and over such a brief period of time, and yet 
seemed to create a harmonious community, is 
almost uncanny. Neither focus group discussions 
with Munzhedzi claimants and non-claimants 
(which were conducted separated), nor the fo-
cus group discussion with claimants who had not 
re-located to Munzhedzi, nor discussions with 
the police stationed across the road in Vleifon-
tein, turned up deep divisions or pervasive social 
problems within the community. However, there 
are indications that the one or two Zimbabwean 
households residing at Munzhedzi are victim-
ised, though they refused to be interviewed so 
that we could hear their first-person accounts.
24 Another dimension of this 
story is that the chief’s legitima-
cy is regarded by many as ques-
tionable. It is not doubted that 
he is the son of the late Chief 
Rambau, but he did not grow 
up in the chief’s household and 
appeared to show up mainly in 
order to reap the benefits of al-
locating/selling plots. However, 
his legitimacy is not openly 
challenged by anyone.
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Gender, class and human 
dimensions
Thirty-eight percent of ‘agriculturally active’ 
households are women-headed. The average 
age of women household heads is 59 versus 46 
for male household heads, a discrepancy which 
is usual given that a high proportion of women 
household heads tend to be widows. It is further 
interesting to note however that 61% of wom-
en-headed households hired tractor service ver-
sus 51% of male-headed households.
Respondents were asked to describe who were 
the ‘rich’ and who were the ‘poor’ at Munzhed-
zi. The most common answers referred to hous-
ing quality or employment or both. 
The ‘rich’ are:
• “Those with big houses”
• “Those who are working so they can build 
big houses” 
• “Those who have better houses and eat 
well”.
And the ‘poor’ are:
• “Those who live in small houses”
• “Those who are not working”
• “Those who stay in shacks and sometimes 
go to bed with empty stomachs”.
To the extent quality of housing is a good indi-
cator, the wealth-differentiation at Munzhedzi 
is quite visible, with scatterings of shacks inter-
spersed with three-bedroom brick houses sport-
ing tile roofs. As implied by some of the quotes 
above, there is seemingly a close correspond-
ence between employment status (and taking 
into account the nature of the employment), 
and household wealth. Moreover, using our 
own crude classification of housing quality (‘be-
low-average’, ‘average’, and ‘above-average’), 
we observe that the ‘rich’ are well-represented 
by women headed households: of the 13% of ag-
riculturally active households residing in ‘above-
average’ dwellings, almost two-thirds belong to 
women-headed households, even though wom-
en-headed households represent the minority of 
all households. 
One other implication of the fact that some 
households build very nice homes at Munzhedzi, 
is that they must therefore perceive there to 
be little tenure insecurity, despite the fact that 
their actual tenure status (especially among non-
claimants) is highly ambiguous. The most salient 
aspect of land tenure in Munzhedzi is the lack 
of clarity regarding land tenure, which is closely 
related to the general crisis in respect of govern-
ance mentioned above. Since Munzhedzi is part 
of a restitution project, in principle Munzhedzi’s 
main authority in respect of land matters is the 
CPA, which in fact is the ‘legal person’ in whose 
name the land is titled, i.e. in the form of free-
hold tenure. However, whereas in principle a 
CPA holds land on behalf of the CPA’s members, 
at Munzhedzi the CPA has become eclipsed by 
the chief, not least by allocating plots to house-
holds, including to households who are not tech-
nically members of the CPA or even notionally 
part of the claimant community. The CPA com-
mittee has decided to be cooperative rather than 
combative, but in effect the result is that there 
is no authority at Munzhedzi that is widely re-
garded as legitimate, which also calls into ques-
tion the security of tenure of the plots allocated 
by the ‘chief’. One particular problem is that the 
‘chief’ appears to have sold some stands more 
than once, i.e. to different people. In the words 
of one respondent, “It can happen that one 
stand is sold to 5 different people at the same 
time, without them knowing it; the problem is 
that people don’t always receive receipt, so they 
often cannot prove they paid the money for the 
stand.” This may be true, but it does not appear 
to happen with developed plots, and perhaps it 
is the case that tenure security is established by 
building structures, rather than the building of 
structures having to wait for some kind of for-
mal indication of tenure security.
As for who are the biggest producers at 
Munzhedzi, it appears to be neither the poorest 
nor the wealthiest households, but rather from 
among those who are intermediate in wealth 
and income. Our inference is that the poor do 
not have the means to produce much (e.g. to 
pay for the tractor services), while the well-off 
lack either the interest or the time to farm on a 
larger scale. 
Perceptions of performance
When agricultural extension officers and local 
councillors see Munzhedzi, they see two things: 
a land reform project that went wrong, and a 
style of settlement that has precluded meaning-
ful agricultural development. As an opportunity 
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for agricultural land reform, Munzhedzi has 
now been ruined by the fact that probably the 
best part of the property has been taken over by 
residential plots. 
The level of satisfaction among Munzhedzi’s 
residents, however, is very high. Of the 135 ag-
riculturally active households interviewed, only 
three regretted having moved there, identifying 
the lack of service delivery as their reason. The 
vast majority, by contrast, are happy that they 
have moved, indicating a mix of reasons as indi-
cated earlier:25
•  “We are glad because we farm and harvest 
better than before.”
• “I am able to farm, the soil is more fertile 
here than where I was staying.”
• “I’m feeling much better when I am here 
and I can do my business of selling sorghum 
beer.”
• “Beautiful land, we can have maize and 
vegetables and we harvest better.”
• “We are free now without relatives.”
• “We are next to town and there is lots of 
transport.”
• “I am next to the bus stop.”
• “I was [previously] far away from town and 
there were no jobs.”
• “We are happy in our forefathers’ land.”
It is no coincidence that similar tensions are play-
ing themselves out in the adjacent land reform 
projects of Mavungeni and Shimange, where 
the desire of many to establish homesteads and 
farm on a small scale, is pitted against visions of 
establishing modern, large-scale commercial ag-
ricultural enterprises.
Policy environment
Munzhedzi points to an abandonment of the 
‘official’ line of thinking about agricultural land 
reform projects, which is rather focused on com-
mercial farming and land use plans that priori-
tise land for farming purposes rather than set-
tlement. On the other hand, even if Munzhedzi 
has not been embraced, it has been tolerated. 
There are no efforts to remove people from the 
land, for instance. The real question is whether 
any government officials might begin to regard 
Munzhedzi as a model, not necessarily to be rep-
licated, but at least to be borrowed from. There 
is no indication at present that this is happening. 
And yet, in other respects, settlements like Mun-
zhedzi are congruent with government’s think-
ing about socio-economic development of the 
broader Elim area, whose population has grown 
dramatically over the past 30 years. This thinking 
is that the growing population density of Elim 
presents opportunities to make Elim a more self-
sufficient shopping and services centre, i.e. rath-
er than being a mere satellite of Makhado town 
or Thohoyandou. To that end, Trade and Invest-
ment Limpopo, which is a parastatal subordinate 
to Limpopo’s Department of Economic Develop-
ment, Environment and Tourism, commissioned 
a series of “nodal scoping reports”, in essence 
market studies meant to inform investors of the 
potential for building malls in rural towns. One 
such study was commissioned for Elim, and in 
2006 Hubyeni Mall was built at Elim’s main in-
tersection. 
Anomalous as it may seem, Munzhedzi is part of 
the ‘peri-urban’ development of which Hubyeni 
Mall forms part of the overall logic. The beauty 
of Munzhedzi – as with many peri-urban settle-
ment options – is that it combines the advantag-
es of residing close to a town with being able to 
pursue agriculture on a small scale while main-
taining a more or less typical rural lifestyle. How-
ever, while this might implicitly be the thinking 
behind the spatial development initiatives being 
pushed by Trade and Investment Limpopo, it has 
not until very recently been part of the thinking 
within the agriculture and land portfolios.26
The future
Munzhedzi is here to stay. What remains uncer-
tain is whether the large portion of land that 
is presently unoccupied will eventually be set-
tled or used more extensively for agriculture. 
Another question is whether the good soil that 
many recent arrivals cite as one of the main 
advantages of living Munzhedzi, will remain 
good. In terms of interventions to improve the 
quality of life of those already residing at Mun-
zhedzi, is eagerly awaited electricity, improved 
water access, and other services. And yet, there 
is much that in principle could be done to sup-
port agriculture, however modest it may be. This 
could include for example technical support to 
gardeners, promotion of household water har-
vesting techniques, etc. It could also involve im-
26 The recent development of 
note is the passing mention by 
the newly established Depart-
ment for Rural Development 
and Land Reform (which sub-
sumes the former Department 
of Land Affairs) that it see the 
development of malls as one 
aspect of rural development. 
The pronouncement has been 
met with a stunned silence 
from most academics working 
on rural development.
25 Presumably if we had posed 
the same question to those 
households who are not ag-
riculturally active, we would 
have heard more unhappy 
voices. 
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proving investment in fencing so that the unoc-
cupied and unfarmed parts of Munzhedzi could 
be used as a controlled commonage.  
Conclusion
Munzhedzi represents a kind of land demand 
that is presently not catered for through land re-
form, and a style of small-scale agriculture that is 
not sufficiently valued by agricultural extension 
officers and agricultural policy. In fact, Munz-
hedzi represents a peri-urban livelihood strategy 
that is widely recognised in policy circles as an 
‘opportunity’, but which is not clearly accom-
modated in the policies of some of the relevant 
departments, e.g. Land Affairs. 
One reason for believing that Munzhedzi rep-
resents something of wider significance is the 
findings from other research that demonstrates 
that the type of land demand manifested at 
Munzhedzi is in fact common. A survey con-
ducted in Limpopo, Free State and Eastern Cape 
in 2004-05 (HSRC, 2005), which among other 
things sought to understand the nature of land 
demand among rural blacks, revealed that the 
majority of those who want land, want rela-
tively small plots (i.e. 5 hectares or less). Further 
inspection revealed that those who want small 
pieces of land are primarily interested in subsist-
ence production and tenure security, as opposed 
to farming for income-generating purposes.
However, this is not to suggest that Munzhedzi 
serves as a model in terms of process. The uncon-
trolled, even chaotic manner in which Munzhed-
zi came about is not to be romanticised, and 
there is reason to suppose that better outcomes 
could have been achieved had it evolved as a de-
liberate and properly planned project.
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